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« [....]l’érection d’un mur coupant l’île en deux dans sa partie la plus étroite servit à protéger les
régions fertiles et policées du sud contre les attaques des tribus du nord. […] Mais déjà cet ouvrage 
purement militaire favorisait la paix, développait la prospérité de cette partie de la Bretagne; des 
villages se créaient; un mouvement d’afflux se produisait vers nos frontières» 
 
Marguerite Yourcenar, Mémoires d’Hadrien (1951), 202 
 
 
While Member States remain responsible for controlling their own border, the Union’s common policy 
in support of Member States’ efforts should be continuously developed and strengthened in response 
to new threats, shifts in migratory pressure and any shortcomings identified, […] People-to-people 
contacts in border regions and between family members should be facilitated. Border management 
should support, not stifle, economic growth in border regions of neighbouring countries.  
 
European Commission, Preparing the next steps in border management in the European 
Union (2008), 2-3  
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Abstract 
 
This thesis, starting from the premise that territorial borders retain their importance in public 
international law, examines in detail the EU’s regulatory framework for the management of 
its external borders. It will argue that there are in fact two sets of external borders: those of 
the area in which the rules on the free movement of persons apply, and those of the Schengen 
area. The border crossing rights under the two corresponding sets of rules will be examined in 
detail.   
            The focus will then shift to the broader Schengen rules for the management of the 
external borders. The thesis will discuss the ration le of the EU’s interest in borders, the 
legislative acquis adopted, and the relation between legislation and executive action. An 
elaborate discussion on the organisation and functio ing of the “European Border Agency” 
(Frontex) serves to illustrate the importance of operational cooperation in this area. A final 
chapter will look at the external dimension of this policy field. A distinction is made between 
the relations with third countries for the purpose of managing the external borders and the 
exportation of Community standards. Also in the external sphere, the objective of controlling 
irregular migration and the operational nature of EU action are prominent.   
            It is concluded that the management of he external borders takes place in a much 
more complex and uncertain legal framework than is often assumed. Whilst border 
management should be a part of or rather complement a Common European Asylum and 
Migration policy, it now risks becoming a substitute for it. Even where legislation is adopted, 
it has a strong operational character, which carries sks in terms of accountability and 
legitimacy. The legislation in this area is both far-reaching and ill-thought through at the same 
time.  
 
 
 1 
I. Introduction 
 
Since the Laeken European Council Conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2001 called upon the 
Council and the Commission to start work on arrangements for the cooperation between Member 
State border guard authorities, developments in this policy area have been fast and far-reaching.1 
The present thesis examines the regulatory framework for the management of the external 
borders of the European Union that is progressively b ing put in place. This apparently simple 
statement raises a number of questions.  
 First of all it is necessary to establish what is meant by “regulatory framework.” Borders 
are at the crossroads of national and international law. With the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, granting the European Union important competences for the regulation of the 
external borders, a third set of rules needs to be tak n into account, namely Community law. 
However, the notion of regulatory framework embodies more than just the legal regime that 
applies at the external borders. It also refers to the implementation thereof, both in law and 
practice, that is to say the way in which the powers of management of the external borders are 
being exercised and by whom. 
 Second, the notion of border management requires definition. It shall be understood as the 
processes and procedures associated with border checks which take place at authorized crossing 
points, including airports, and border surveillance, which is carried out on the so-called green 
(land) borders between authorized crossing points as well as along the blue (sea) borders.2 While 
this definition closely resembles the definition ofborder management given in the 2002 
Commission Communication on the integrated management of the external borders, the concept 
of integrated boarder management, as recently defined by the Council, is much broader, including 
a four-tier system of access control of which border control (checks and surveillance) are but an 
element.3 
 Finally, it should be questioned what is to be understood precisely by the notion of the 
“external borders of the European Union.” It has been argued that Europe is increasingly difficult 
                                                
1 European Council Conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, point 42. 
2 This definition is largely the same as given by Hills, though she does not include sea borders: Hills, A., ‘The 
rationalities of European Border Security’, 15 European Border Security 1 (1996), 69.   
3 COM(2002) 233 final, Commission Communication ‘Towards Integrated Management of the External Borders of 
the Member States of the European Union’, 26; Council Conclusions on Integrated Border Management, Brussels, 4-
5 December 2006 (Council Document 15801/06). 
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to define, even in strict legal terms.4 The variable geometry of European integration as well as the 
absence of a finalité geographique of the European project seem to support this argument. The 
reference in plural first of all gives expression t the fact that the European Union consists of 
sovereign states to whom the power to regulate entry i o their respective territories remains a 
core principle of their sovereignty. Yet it also indicates that the there may be different sets of 
“external borders” to be found in different places.  
 
A broad consensus can be found amongst social scienti ts that borders are “not simple lines on a 
map deciding where one jurisdiction or political authority begins and the other ends”.5 Much 
attention has been paid to the metaphorical or symbolic meaning of the border.6 Lapid has 
proposed an entire research agenda labelled “border, identities and orders”, arguing that the three 
are connected in a triangle in which each element has a determining value for the others.7 
 Numerous academics have emphasised the diminishing value, both relative and real, of 
borders as a regulatory tool in a globalising world. Border functions have increasingly become 
disconnected from the territorial frontiers, shifting to sites within as well as beyond the territory 
of the Member States.8 This thesis nevertheless focuses on the management of territorial borders. 
This approach risks criticism for being too positivistic or too narrow. However, this thesis does 
not argue that the more metaphysical dimensions of borders should be ignored. Nor should the 
importance of border controls away from the geographical border be left unnoticed. What it does 
argue is that territorial borders and their regulation remain important subjects of study, especially 
in the context of the European Union. This is not merely because the international state system 
remains the foundation upon which modern public inter ational law is constructed, but also 
because the borders that delimit those states continue o form physical obstacles between those 
“in” and “out” a given territorial jurisdiction. A classic discourse on sovereignty and territoriality 
                                                
4 Cowley, J., ‘Locating Europe’, in: Groenendijk, K.. et al. (Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003), 36. 
5 Anderson, M., Frontiers:  Territory and State formation in the Modern World (Cambridge, Polity Press, 1996), 1. 
6 Cassarino, J.-P., Approaching Borders and Frontiers: Notions and Implications (Florence, EUI RSCAS Research 
Report 3, 2006), 5. 
7 Lapid, Y., ‘Identities, Borders, Orders: Nudging International Relations Theory in a New Direction’, i : Albert, M., 
Jacobsen, D. and Lapid, Y. (Eds), Identities, borders, orders: rethinking international relations theory (Minneapolis, 
University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 1-20. 
8 Zureik, E. and Salter, M., ‘Introduction’, in: Zureik, E. and Salter, M. (Eds), Global Surveillance and Policing - 
Borders, security, identity (Portland, Willan Publishing 2005), 4. 
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continues to inform the thinking on borders and by consequence the way in which access control 
is regulated.     
 Border institutions have always had the dual objectiv  of defence and discipline.9 While 
the defence function of borders has lost much of its relevance after the Cold War, borders still 
serve as sites of law enforcement, in particular of migration rules. This holds true today, even if 
other sites and forms of monitoring the movement of people complement controls at the 
territorial borders. With the lifting of checks at the internal borders of the EU Member States that 
form part of the borderless Schengen area, the logic f controls at the internal borders has been 
largely transposed to the external borders.  
 The reality at the EU’s external borders shows that although visa requirements and 
carriers sanctions may have closed off official air routes and ferry connections, this has not 
stopped people from attempting to reach Europe irregularly. A 2007 Report on illegal migration 
in Central and Eastern Europe found that since 2004 there had been an increase in the use of 
official road border posts for illegal crossings, although in many countries the most common way 
of crossing the border irregularly remained on feet, outside designated crossing points.10 
According to a 2004 report of the ICMPD an estimated 100,000 to 120,000 undocumented 
migrants try to cross the Mediterranean each year.11 Not only can official numbers provide a 
mere estimate of the actual size of these flows, they also fail to express the cost of human life and 
suffering of such journeys.  
 
This thesis looks at the regulation of the EU’s external borders from two angles. The first is that 
of EU substantive law: the legal regime that governs the crossing of the EU’s external borders by 
individuals. What are the rights and obligations of dif erent categories of people who wish to 
enter or exit the European Union’s territory? The second looks at the external borders from an 
institutional point of view. It seeks to establish the relation between the Union and its Member 
States in this policy area and the role of the different EU Institutions. Phrased in legal terms, the 
question is one of competences and the division thereof between the various actors within the 
                                                
9 Geouffre de Lapradelle, P., La Frontière (Paris, Les Editions Internationales, 1928), 14. 
10 Futo, P. and Jandl, M. (Eds), 2006 Year Book on Illegal Migration, Human Smuggling and Trafficking in Central 
and Eastern Europe - A Survey and Analysis of Border Management and Border Apprehension Data from 20 States 
(ICMPD, Vienna, 2007), 20-21. 
11 ICMPD, ‘Irregular transit migration in the Mediterranean: some facts, futures and insights’ (Vienna, 2004), 8. 
 4 
European constitutional order, not merely in relation to each other, but also in relation to 
neighbouring third countries. 
 The power over borders is, like most policy fields in the area of Justice and Home Affairs 
(JHA), intimately linked to a core understanding of s vereignty. Not only do Member States wish 
to retain the power to decide who enters their territory, the guarding of the EU’s external borders 
may also involve the use of force. The study of the “objective component” of borders is therefore 
likely to provide an insight into the broader development of the European polity, not merely 
internally, but also vis-à-vis third countries.12  
 The EU’s policy for the management of the external borders may also provide an insight 
into other fields covered by the Union’s objective of creating an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ). Measures for the management of the external borders are now firmly based in 
Title IV EC of the First Pillar of the EU. Being int mately linked to the EU’s immigration and 
asylum policy the study of the external borders may be able to tell us more about the 
development of Union’s policy in this area.   
 It should furthermore be recalled that - despite being united under the common AFSJ 
objective - policies in Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) remain divided over Title IV EC and Title 
VI EU on police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters. Border management is currently the 
only police power that is communitarised, forming an example of how competences under the 
Third Pillar “branch out.”13 Since the use of force could potentially infringe fundamental rights 
and freedoms, the development of any policy in relation to the exercise of police powers needs to 
be both legitimate and accountable. The management of the external borders of the EU may serve 
as a laboratory for future cooperation in the AFSJ, especially in view of the merging of the First 
and Third Pillar foreseen by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
 
Chapter II-VI serve to give the reader the necessary b ckground against which the more in-depth 
study of the management of the external borders in the final chapters must be understood. Article 
II will discuss the relevant rules of public international law on borders, and discuss the continuing 
relevance of the concept of sovereignty and territoriality. Chapter III will discuss the extent to 
which the powers to regulate the external borders have been carried over from the Member State 
                                                
12 Cohen, A., The Symbolic Construction of Community (London, Routledge, 1989), 12. 
13 Fijnaut, C., ‘Police Co-operation and the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, in: Walker, N. (Ed.), Europe’s 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), 266. 
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to the EU level and the way in which this has been do e. Chapter IV will show that the location 
of the external borders is not only determined by the extent to which these powers have been 
transferred, but also by the non-participation of certain Member States in the rules applicable to 
the borders of the Schengen area and the association of certain third countries with these rules. 
Chapter V will discuss in detail the border crossing right that are based on the Community rules 
on free movement. Chapter VI will discuss the regime governing the crossing of the external 
borders of the Schengen area.  
Chapter VII is in a sense an introduction to the broader questions of EU border 
management through its revisiting the logic for the EU’s involvement in this policy area. Up until 
that point, the common rules for the crossing of the external borders that were discussed in 
Chapters V and VI could still find their justification by reference to the EU’s internal market 
rationale of the free movement of persons. However, the external borders have increasingly 
become the place where the EU asserts a role for itself n the provision of internal security. The 
abundant activity of the EU in this policy field, the restrictive nature of its activities and the 
amount of resources directed at the prevention of the irregular crossing of the external borders 
beg further scrutiny.  
 Chapter VIII will discuss in detail the legislative measures that have been adopted for the 
management of the external borders. This chapter will however show that much of the activity for 
the management of the external borders is actually non-legislative in nature and consists of the 
coordination of Member States’ border guard authoriies. In addition, some of the most important 
pieces of legislation that have been adopted in this area provide already existing practical 
cooperation arrangements between the Member States with a legal basis and framework. 
However, the suitability of integration through operational cooperation rather than through 
substantive legislation needs to be questioned. It seems not only to deliberately frame political 
questions as non-political, but also prevents democratic and judicial scrutiny.  
 A good example of legislation that codifies previously existing, rather informal 
cooperation arrangements, is that of the European Border Agency, Frontex. This agency will be 
the subject of Chapter IX. It will look at Frontex’s position in the EU’s institutional architecture, 
its organisational build-up, tasks and activities. Also Frontex is presented as an a-political, 
technical body. The Chapter takes issue with that. P rticular attention will be paid to the 
accountability of its activities. Chapter X will look at the external dimension of EU border 
 6 
management. It will show how the logic for the management of the external borders which was 
described in Chapter VII is  reflected in the external dimension thereof. The external dimension 
does not only consist of cooperation with third countries for the management of common borders, 
but also the promotion of the EU’s standard abroad an the shifting of the surveillance of the 
Member States’ borders outside Member States’ territories. Joint operations at sea, outside the 
Member State’s territorial waters, once more lead to important questions of accountability. It will 
confirm a more central theme in this second part of this thesis, that is the difficulty of joint law 
enforcement activities, both in practical terms andin terms of legitimacy and accountability in the 
absence of a common legal framework for such activities.  
 
 7 
II. Borders: Delimiting Sovereignty 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In order to examine the legal regime at the EU’s external borders it is necessary, as a preliminary 
step, to examine the concept of a border and its legal significance. Borders as institutions are a 
construct of international law. In contrast to a vast literature on the border as a multi-faceted 
concept in political geography, political science, anthropology and sociology,1 the concept of a 
border in international law is largely confined to i s territorial or geographical meaning as an 
imaginary line on the surface of the earth separating he territory of one state from that of 
another.2  
 The argument is frequently put forward that the border as a “unified, univocal concept” is 
a myth.3 Indeed, it is hard to sustain that a state’s border has the same function and effect for 
individuals belonging to different groups, nor that the border is experienced at the same location.4 
This does however not mean that states’ territorial borders, as understood in public international 
law, have shifted, nor that they should be considere  redundant as a site at which a state exercises 
its sovereign powers.   
The aim of this chapter is first of all to set out the most important rules of public 
international law relating to the definition of borders. This will allow us at a later stage to define 
the meaning of European external borders. Secondly, it will show that in spite of globalisation, 
borders maintain their importance in the organization of the public international legal order. The 
explanation for this is not merely to be found in the fact that the states they delimit continue to 
form the basis of public international law.5 The explanation must also be sought in the continui g 
relevance of the concept of sovereignty and in particular one of its key characteristics: 
territoriality.  
                                                
1 See for an overview: Cassarino, J.-P, ‘Approaching Borders and Frontiers (Florence, EUI RSCAS, CARIM 
Research Report, 2006/03). 
2 Jennings, R. and Watts, A. (Eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Harlow, Longman, 1992), 661. 
3 Kesby, A., ‘The multiple and shifting border and iternational law’, 27 OJLS 1 (2007), 113. 
4 Ibid. 
5 Brownlie, I., ‘Rebirth of Statehood’, in: Evans, M. (Ed.), Aspects of Statehood and Institutionalism in 
Contemporary Europe’ (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1997), 5.  
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This chapter will conclude with a discussion of therules of public international law which 
confer rights on individuals to cross a sovereign state’s border. An examination of these rules and 
the relevant case law is necessary for two reasons. First, they condition lawmaking on and the 
actual management of the EU’s external borders. Secondly, they show how territorial thinking 
continues to inform migration and refugee law. As a result, the physical border remains the first 
and only place at which border crossing rights may be asserted.  
   
2. Defining Borders in International Law 
 
Borders form the necessary delimiting element of territory, which together with people and 
authority is one the three essentials of statehood.6 Article 2 of the Draft Declaration on the Rights 
and Duties of States reads: 
 
 “Every State has the right to exercise jurisdiction over its territory and over all persons and things 
therein, subject to the immunities recognized by inter ational law.”7  
 
The territory of a state includes the airspace above the land, as well as the earth beneath it.8 It 
further includes a 12 mile territorial sea.9 As such, the territory in which a state exercises 
sovereignty is a volume rather than a surface.10 In addition to the territorial sea, countries may 
claim an additional 12 mile contiguous zone in which they may assert jurisdiction - yet in which 
they are not sovereign - to “prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary 
                                                
6 Müller-Graf, P.-C., ‘Whose Responsibility are frontiers?’, in: Anderson, M. and Bort, E. (Eds), The Frontiers of 
Europe (London, Pinter, 1998), 15. Often a fourth element, the capacity to enter into relations with other states, is 
mentioned. See e.g. Article 1 of the 1933 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States, 165 LNTS 19 
(1934).  
7 International Law Commission, Draft Declaration on the Rights and Duties of States, attached to GA Resolution 
375 (IV) of 6 December 1949. 
8 According to the Roman adage: Cuis est solum, eius est usque ad caelum ad inferos (“for whomsoever owns the 
soil, it is theirs up to the sky and down to the depths”). For the airspace this was laid down in the 1919 Paris 
Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navig tion, 11 LNTS 173 (1922). Although there is no consensus on 
a legal boundary between airspace and outer space, ther  is an implied principle that a state’s sovereignty does not 
extend indefinitely into space: Boczek, B., ‘International Law: A Dictionary (Lanham, Scarecrow Press, 2005), 239. 
9 Articles 3 and 33, UN Convention on the Law of theSea (hereinafter: UNCLOS). 
10 Caflisch, L., ‘A Typology of Borders’ (Presentation at the International Symposium on Land and River Boundary 
Demarcation and Maintenance in Support of Borderland Development, Bangkok, 7-9 November 2006), 3. 
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laws and regulations.”11 They may further assert jurisdiction over the exploitation and exploration 
of living and non-living marine resources in an area of 200 miles from the coast, the so-called 
Exclusive Economic Zone.12 Finally, states have the right to harvest mineral and non-living 
material in the sub-soil of their continental shelf to the exclusion of others.13   
A distinction is made between boundaries, which are the lines dividing land territory over 
which States exercise full jurisdiction, and limits, which are the lines dividing spaces in which 
states do not exercise full territorial jurisdiction, such as those separating maritime spaces.14 This 
different terminology does justice to the fact that maritime spaces are attributed according to 
rules different from acquisition of territory and tha  these are not subject to a state’s full 
sovereignty.15 Provisional dividing lines, such as in areas of de facto authority, are called 
demarcation lines. 
 
With regard to governmental processes, there are four main stages in the history of a boundary: 
allocation, delimitation, demarcation and administration.16 Allocation refers to the initial political 
division of territory between states.17 The delimitation of a boundary consists of its definition, 
whereas the demarcation of a boundary, which presupposes its prior delimitation, consists of 
operations marking it out on the ground.18 Public international law does not require the 
boundaries of a state to be fully delimited, nor does it require demarcation. A German-Polish 
Mixed Arbitral Tribunal stated in 1929: 
 
 “In order to say that a State exists (…) it is enough that this territory has a sufficient consistency, 
even though its boundaries have not yet been accurately delimited, and that the State actually 
exercises independent public authority over that territory.”19 
                                                
11 Articles 3 and 33, UNCLOS. 
12 Articles 55-57, UNCLOS. 
13 Article 76, UNCLOS. A state’s continental shelf may exceed 200 nautical miles until the natural prolongation 
ends, but it may never exceed 350 nautical miles, and 100 nautical miles beyond 2,500 meter isobath. 
14 Caflisch, L., supra note 10, 1-2. 
15 Ibid., 2. Caflish argues that this holds true even for the territorial sea which is subject to a right of innocent passage 
for foreign ships (Article 52, UNLCOS). 
16 Jones, S., Boundary Making: A Handbook for Statesmen, Treaty Editors and Boundary Commission (New York, 
Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1971), 5. See also: Geouffr  de Lapradelle, P., La Frontière (Paris, Les Editions 
Internationales, 1928), 15-16 and Prescott, J., Boundaries and Frontiers (London, Croom Helm, 1978), 31. 
17 Prescott, J., ibid. 
18 Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad) judgment, ICJ Reports (1994), 6, para. 56. 
19 Deutsche Continental Gas-Gesellschaft v Poland (1929), 5 AD 11 (1929-30), 15, reproduced in Crawford, J., ‘The 
Criteria for Statehood in International Law’, 48 BYIL (1976-77), 113. 
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As the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in North Sea Continental Shelf held: 
 
 “There is (…) no rule that the land frontiers of a State must be fully delimited and defined, and 
often in various places they are not.”20 
 
What matters is that a state consistently controls a sufficiently identifiable core of territory.21 
Nonetheless, considerable value is attributed to clearly defined boundaries, especially in the 
interpretation of boundary treaties. The Permanent Court of Arbitration in its Advisory Opinion 
of 21 November 1925 held that:  
 
“(…) any article designed to fix a frontier should, if possible be so interpreted that the result of the 
application of its provisions in their entirety should be the establishment of a precise, complete 
and definitive border.”22 
 
The definitive nature of borders is highly valued in international law as follows from the ICJ’s 
judgment in the Preah Vihear case:  
 
 “In general, when two countries establish a frontier b tween them, one of the primary objects is to 
achieve stability and finality. This is impossible if the line so established can, at any moment, and 
on the basis of a continuously available process, be called in question, and its rectification 
claimed, whenever any inaccuracy by reference to a clause in the parent treaty is discovered. Such 
a process could continue indefinitely, and finality would never be reached so long as possible 
errors will remain to be discovered.”23 
 
The fact that the clausula rebus sic stantibus (fundamental change of circumstances) may not be 
invoked as a ground for suspension or termination of a boundary treaty according to Article 
62(2)(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties underscores the importance of 
                                                
20 North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Netherlands), ICJ Reports (1969), 3, para. 46. 
21 Malanczuk, P., Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (London, Routledge, 1997), 76.  
22 Interpretation of Article 3, para. 2 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Advisory Opinion, 1925, PCIJ, Series B, No. 12, 20 
and recalled in: Territorial Dispute (Libya/Chad), supra note 18, para. 47. See also Lapradelle, who considered 
delimitation to be a “principe fondamental du droit international moderne”, supra note 16, 72. 
23 Temple of Preah Vihear (Cambodia/Thailand), ICJ Reports (1962), 17, para. 34. 
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stable and final borders. So does the preeminence of the principle of uti possidetis juris. This 
principle was developed in the course of the decolonization of Latin America and subsequently 
applied to the same process on the African continent. It is essentially a “retrospective principle, 
investing as international boundaries administrative limits intended originally for quite other 
purposes”.24 It is aimed at “securing respect for the territorial boundaries at the moment when 
independence is achieved”.25 The ICJ held that the principle was “not a rule pertaining to one 
specific system of international law,” but a principle of general scope.26  
Outside the context of decolonization, it was applied by the Badinter Commission in 
relation to the conflict in Yugoslavia, providing the basis for the international community’s 
recognition of the seceding republics as states with borders corresponding to the former internal 
boundaries of the Yugoslav federation.27 In this regard, it should be noted that also the Guidelines 
adopted by the EC Member States on 16 December 1991on the recognition of new states in 
Eastern Europe and in the Soviet Union required the “respect for the inviolability of all frontiers 
which could only be changed by peaceful means and by common agreement”.28  
 
Political geographers often distinguish between boundaries and frontiers.29 The term frontier has 
the connotation of borderland, of an area of transition within which the boundary lies.30 It is in 
this sense that Lapradelle uses the term voisinage when he argues that a borderland reemerges 
after delimitation in the guise of an organized regime, subject to both international and internal 
                                                
24 Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute (El Salvador/Honduras), ICJ Reports (1992), 351, para. 43 
25 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), ICJ Reports (1986), 554, para. 23. See for a critique of this pr nciple and 
the fact that is has been left unaffected by the rights of people to self-determination: Castellino, J. and Allen, S., Title 
to Territory in International Law: A Temporal Analysis (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2003). 
26 Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), ibid. 
27 Arbitration Commission, set up in September 1991 in the context of the Conference on Peace in Yugoslavia, 
composed of five judges who were president of the constitutional courts of EC Member States and presided over by 
Robert Badinter, then President of the French Conseil Constitutionnel. Adherence to the principle has been criticized 
by inter alia Castellino and Allen, supra note 25 and Radan, P., The Break-Up of Yugoslavia and International Law 
(New York, Routledge, 2002), chapter 7. 
28 These Guidelines were then referred to in the EPC Declaration on Yugoslavia of that same day. See: Rich, R., 
‘Recognition of States: The Collapse of Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union’, 4 EJIL 1 (1993). 
29 Sahlin, P., Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees (Berkeley, University of California 
Press, 1989), 4.  
30 Prescott, J., supra note 16, 31.  
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law.31 O’Dowd notes that the difference between frontier and boundary somehow coincides with 
the difference between two functions of borders, namely as gates and walls.32  
However, under public international law, a state’s sovereignty ends only at the border 
itself. A state is therefore free to extend all its activities up to the borderline, subject of course to 
international obligations which may for example prevent certain activities in border area or 
regulate the position of inhabitants on both sides of the border.33 The concept of frontier zone as 
such is however unknown to public international law.34 The arbitrary tribunal in the Lac Lanoux 
clearly rejected an argument to the contrary by Spain: 
   
 “As for recourse to the notion of the ‘boundary zone’, it cannot, by the use of a doctrinal 
vocabulary, add an obligation to those sanctioned by positive law.”35 
 
Political scientists often use the terms borders, boundaries and frontiers interchangeably, as do 
instruments of public international law. For the purpose of this thesis the use of the term border 
will be preferred, referring to the outer limit of a state’s land territory or territorial sea, as well as 
a state’s airports and sea ports serving internatiol destinations. 
 
3. Sovereignty, Territory and Borders  
 
Ruggie has observed that the “central attribute of m dernity in international politics has been a 
peculiar and historically unique configuration of territorial space, known as the Westphalian 
system of states.”36 Modern public international law has been shaped on the basis of this system 
                                                
31 Lapradelle, P., supra note 16, 234. 
32 O’Dowd, L., ‘Frontiers of Sovereignty in the New Europe’, in: O’Dowd, L. and Wilson, T. (Eds), Borders, 
Nations and States (Aldershot, Avebury, 1996), 7. 
33 Bothe, M., ‘Boundaries’, in: Bernhardt, R. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume I, No 10 
(Amsterdam, North Holland, 1992), 447. The demilitariz tion of a border area between two former warring states 
can result in a de facto frontier zone. 
34 De Visscher, C., Problèmes de Confins en Droit International Public (Paris, Pedone, 1969), 13. Cf. the decision of 
the Arbitral Tribunal in La délimitation de la frontière maritime entre la Guinée-Bissau et le Sénégal: « La frontière 
est la ligne formée par la succession des point extrêmes du domaine de validité spatiale des normes de l’ordre 
juridique d’un Etat » (31 July 1989, Revue générale des droit international publique, 253), quoted in: Verhoeven, J., 
Droit International Public (Brussels, De  Boeck & Larcier, 2000), 499.  
35 Lac Lanoux Arbitration (Spain/France), 24 ILR 101 (1957), 129. 
36 Ruggie, J., ‘Territoriality and Beyond: Problematizing Modernity in International Relations’, 47 International 
Organization 1 (1993), 144. 
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of independent, territorially defined, sovereign states. In relations between states, sovereignty 
refers to the legal personality under public international law, internally it expresses the 
supremacy of the governmental institutions.37  
 The function of borders is both inward and outward looking.38 Borders define the outer 
limit of state sovereignty beyond which a State hasno comprehensive claim of jurisdiction and 
beyond which other States infringe the principle of non-intervention.39 Sovereignty and 
jurisdiction, both fundamental concepts in public international law, can only be understood in 
relation to territory.40 It is within and in relation to a geographic territo y that states are supremely 
authoritative.41 Under the classic doctrine of state sovereignty, the state has an absolute and 
exclusive power of control over its territory and its nhabitants. In the Island of Palmas case 
Judge Huber stated: “Territorial sovereignty (…) involves the exclusive right to display the 
activities of a State.”42 
 Jurisdiction, as an expression of sovereignty, concerns “the extent of each state’s rights to 
regulate conduct or the consequences of events.”43 The term may refer to the power to legislate 
(prescriptive jurisdiction), to adjudicate (judicial jurisdiction) or to enforce. As a presumption 
jurisdiction is territorial; enforcement jurisdiction is exclusively territorial.44 The Permanent 
Court of International Justice held in the SS Lotus Case:  
 
 “[t]he first and foremost restriction imposed by international law upon a State is that - failing the 
existence of a permissive rule to the contrary - it may not exercise its power in any form in the 
territory of another State. In this sense jurisdiction is certainly territorial; it cannot be exercised by 
a State outside its territory except by virtue of a permissive rule derived from international custom 
or from a convention.”45 
 
                                                
37 Shaw, M., International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), 409. 
38 Bothe, M., supra note 33, 447. 
39 Ibid. As the ICJ held in Corfu Channel (UK/Albania): “[b]etween independent States, respect for territorial 
sovereignty is an essential foundation for international relations.”: ICJ Reports (1949), 35. The continuing relevance 
of the latter element was evidenced in May 2007 when Iran captured fifteen British marines, who allegedly found 
themselves in the country’s territorial waters: ‘Seized sailors “held in Tehran”’ (BBC News, 26 March 2007). 
40 Shaw, M., supra note 37, 409. 
41 Philpott, D., ‘Sovereignty’ (Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, 17 March 2009)  
42 Island of Palmas (USA/Netherlands), 2 RIAA 829 (1928), 29. 
43 Oppenheim, L., Oppenheim’s International Law (Harlow, Longman, 1992), 456. 
44 Brownlie, I., Principles of Public International Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1998), 301. 
45 SS Lotus (France/Turkey), PCIJ Reports, Series A (1927), No 10, 18. 
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In today’s world many processes are transnational ad many “circuits of power” exist with only 
limited links to the state.46 This has given rise to the claim that the Westphalian state system is in 
decline. Globalisation would make it increasingly difficult for states to effectively regulate 
transnational activities, whilst an increasing web of legal obligations under public international 
law would curtail states’ room for maneuver. An emerging global human rights regime, but also 
the far-reaching integration in the framework of the European Union, are often mentioned as 
prime examples of those. Because of the intimate link between sovereignty, territory and borders, 
this alleged demise of the state deserves more critical attention, not in the least because this study 
examines the management of the borders of a non-state entity.   
 
4. Decline of the State? 
 
The classic economic definition of globalisation is synonymous with international economic 
integration.47 In this sense, neither globalisation, nor the proclamation of the end of the state’s 
authority is new. Already the first era of globalist on, roughly from 1850-1914, was 
characterized by rapid growth in international trade and investments, the removal of barriers to 
trade, better means of transportation and mass migration. Also then it was claimed that it would 
“only be a matter of time until the state would just be one among many human associations, at 
best quantitatively, but by no means qualitatively, distinct from them.”48 Although contemporary 
globalisation has been found to be deeper and broade , the medium to long term effects of the 
international financial crisis remain to be seen.49  
 The globalisation of law, either through the convergence of legal systems, private 
regulation or treaty regimes, remains a very limited phenomenon.50 Moreover, the quantity of 
obligations by which a state binds itself under public international law does not as such affect its 
                                                
46 Walker, N., ‘Late Sovereignty in the European Union’, in: Walker, N. (Ed.), Sovereignty in Transition (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing, 2003), 6. 
47 Gavin, B., The European Union and Globalisation: Towards Global Democratic Governance (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 2001), 3. 
48 Morgenthau, H., ‘The Problem of Sovereignty Reconsidered’, 48 Colum L Rev 3 (1945), 342, referring to the work 
of Barker, E., Church, State and Study (London, Methuen, 1930), 151. 
49 Bordo, M. et al., ‘Is Globalization Today Really Different than Globalization a Hundred Years Ago?’ (Cambridge, 
NBER Working Paper No 7195, June 1999), 4. The OECD has already warned against protectionism: OECD, 
‘Globalisation and Emerging Economies’ (Policy Brief, March 2009), 5. 
50 Shapiro, M., ‘The Globalization of the Law,’ 1 Ind J of Global Legal Stud 1 (1993-1994), 37.  
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sovereignty. The question of how far the government of a state through treaties under 
international law may restrict that state’s freedom f action is a question of politics.51 Such 
constraints are first and foremost a self-limitation, resulting from the exercise of the sovereign 
power to conclude international agreements.52 The characterization of the WTO Agreement by 
the Appellate Body is telling in this respect:  
 
 “The WTO Agreement is a treaty - the international equivalent of a contract. It is self-evident that 
in an exercise of their sovereignty, and in pursuit of heir own respective national interests, the 
Members of the WTO have made a bargain. In exchange for the benefits they expect to derive as 
members of the WTO they have agreed to exercise their sovereignty according to commitments 
they have made in the WTO Agreement.”53 
 
A tension between human rights and sovereignty may be considered “constitutive of the modern 
interstate system.”54 Some authors consider that the proliferation of inter ational human rights 
instruments constrains sovereign states’ freedom of action.55 However, as argued by Joppke, 
liberal states, for which the protection of human rights is part of their legal culture, are “self-
limited rather than globally limited.”56 At various occasions the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) has held that the international jurisdiction f human rights, reinforces or complements 
domestic jurisdiction.57  
 
Territoriality, a key element of sovereignty, may be defined as spatially defined political rule, or 
alternatively as “a spatial strategy to affect, influence or control resources and people, by 
                                                
51 Kelsen, H., ‘Sovereignty and International Law,’ 48 Geo LJ 4 (1960), 637. 
52 See for the classic authority: SS Wimbledon (UK, France, Italy, Japan and Poland/Germany), PCIJ Reports, Series 
A (1927), No 1, 25. 
53 Japan - Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body (AB-1996-2) DRS 1996: I, 108. 
54 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, C., Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization and Emancipation 
(London, Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), 223.  
55 Jacobson, D., Rights across Borders: Immigration and the Decline of Citizenship (London, John Hopkins 
University Press, 1996); Sassen, S., Losing Control - Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1996); Soysal, Y., Limits of Citizenship (Chicago, Chicago University Press, 1994).  
56 Joppke, C., Immigration and the Nation-state: The United States, Germany and Great Britain (Oxford, OUP, 
1999), 264. 
57 See e.g. Ankerl v Switzerland (Appl. No. 17748/91), ECtHR, 23 October 1996, para. 34 and Selmouni v France 
(Appl. No. 25803/94), ECtHR, 28 July 1999, para. 74. 
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controlling an area.”58 The decline of the sovereign state has often been d scribed as a decline in 
the importance of territoriality. In Beck’s words: “the association of place with community or 
society is breaking down.”59 It has been argued that power need not necessarily be organized 
territorially by the use of linear, exclusive boundaries, nor does power require to be organized 
territorially at all.60  
 However, as long as nations will continue to exist and identify themselves as such, there 
will be a strong link between people and land, forming a crucial part of that national identity.61 A 
normative argument in defence of territoriality is that the territorial state constitutes “the only 
entity successful in providing an arena in which all in the defined territory have access to 
common institutions and the equal protection of law.”62 Others have pointed out the equalitarian 
character of territoriality in more general.63 Modern constitutions have conceived civil and social 
rights as rights of the person residing in the territory of the state irrespective of their citizenship 
status.64 In the words of Arendt:  
 
 “Freedom, where it existed as a tangible reality, has always been spatially limited. This is 
especially clear for the greatest and most elementary of all negative liberties, the freedom of 
movement; the borders of national territory or the walls of the city state comprehended and 
protected a space in which men could move freely…”65  
 
More factually, Clark has argued that “[a]part from a few isolated and oft-repeated examples - 
such as the internet and financial networks - most other human activities and relations appear to 
                                                
58 Kahler, M., ‘Territoriality and conflict in an era of globalization’, in: Kahler, M. and Walter, B., Territoriality and 
conflict in an era of globalization (Cambridge, CUP, 2006), 3; Sack, R., Human Territoriality: Its Theory and 
History (Cambridge, CUP, 1986), 19. 
59 Beck, U., What is Globalisation? (Cambridge, Polity Press, 2000), 74. 
60 Ruggie, J., supra note 36, 149 and Forsberg, T., ‘Beyond Sovereignty, Within Territoriality: Mapping the Space of 
Late-Modern (Geo) Politics’, 31 Cooperation and Conflict 4 (1998), 363-364.  
61 Walzer, M., Spheres of Justice (New York, Basic Books, 1983), 44. 
62 Schachter, O., ‘The Decline of the Nation-State and its Implications for International Law’, 36 Colum J Transnat’l 
L 7 (1998), 22. 
63 Forsberg, T., supra note 60, 376. 
64 Joppke, C., supra note 56, 271. 
65 Arendt, H., On Revolution (London, Penguin Books, 1990), 275. See also Arendt, H., The Promise of Politics 
(New York, Schocken, 2005), 119. However, Arendt does not necessarily define political space only territorially, nor 
does she define territory as merely geographical: Lindhal, H., ‘Finding a place for freedom, security and justice: the 
European Union’s claim to territorial unity’, 28 ELRev 4 (2004), 468. 
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be steadfastly grounded, even if not wholly territoially enclosed.”66 As Sassen has noted: “Much 
that we describe as global, including some of the most strategic functions necessary for 
globalisation, is grounded in national territories.”67 Solutions to the question of jurisdiction in 
cyberspace are often cast in territorial terms68 and even non-state terrorism, has been brought 
back into a territorial frame with the identification of so called rogue states.69  
Also the territorial scope of international treaties remain most commonly determined by 
the sum of Contracting Parties’ territories. For instance, in Soering the ECtHR held that “Article 
1 [ECHR] (…) which provides that ‘the High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within 
their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I’ sets a limit, notably territorial, on 
the reach of the Convention.”70 The Court in Banković, confirmed that the Convention operates 
“in an essentially regional context and notably in the legal space (espace juridique) of the 
Contracting States.”71 In Ilaşcu the same Court established jurisdiction of Moldova, holding de 
jure sovereignty over an area under effective control by the Russian Federation.72  
 
Sovereign statehood is only one form of territorial organization, and irrespective of the fate of the 
territorial state, the “imagination of territorial spaces” remain forceful.73 Processes of de-
territorialization and re-territorialisation go hand in hand as one can observe units other than 
nation-states increase their territorial identity.74 These entities can seldom be depicted as non-
territorial, yet at the same time do not (openly) caim sovereignty.75  
 The most important example of a clearly territorial, non-state entity is the European 
Union. Although it carefully avoids the association with the idea of European statehood and its 
institutions are extremely conscious of Member States’ sensitivities in this respect, there is a 
                                                
66 Clark, I. ‘A “Borderless World”?’, in: Fry, G. and O’Hagan, J. (Eds), Contending Images of World Politics 
(Houndmills, MacMillan, 2000), 81. 
67 Sassen, S., supra note 55, 14. 
68 See for instance: Spataro, J., ‘Personal jurisdiction over the Internet: How international is today’s shoe?’, III JTLP 
1, 2002. 
69 The use of the term rogue state emerged during the Clinton administration; George W. Bush used the expr ssion 
“Axis of Evil” in his State of the Union Address on 29 January 2002. 
70 Soering v United Kingdom (Appl. No. 14038/88), ECtHR, 7 July 1989, para. 86. 
71 Banković and Others v Belgium and Others (Appl. No. 52207/99; adm. dec.), ECtHR 12 December 2001,  para. 
80.   
72 The ECtHR in fact established a joint responsibility of Russia and Moldova, limiting that of Moldova to positive 
obligations towards persons within its territory: Ilaşcu and others v Moldova and Russia (Appl. No. 48787/99), 
ECtHR, 8 July 2004, para. 331. 
73 Forsberg, T., supra note 60, 357.  
74 Ibid. 
75 Ibid., 367. 
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“deep presumption of sovereignty implicit in the constitutional discourse of supremacy and direct 
effect.”76 In the famous words of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) the EC formed “a new 
legal order of international law for the benefit of which the states have limited their sovereign 
rights”.77  
 Sassen has argued that sovereignty and territory remain key features of the international 
system.78 They have however been “reconstituted and partly displaced onto other institutional 
arenas outside the state and outside the framework of nationalised territory.”79 Rather than 
sovereignty having come to an end, the scope and exclusivity of States’ sovereignty has been 
limited.80  
This interpretation carries much resemblance with the theory of legal or constitutional 
pluralism, in that it argues that states have been joined by other loci of constitutional authority. 
Also Held’s concept of cosmopolitan sovereignty decouples sovereignty from the idea of fixed 
borders and territories governed by states alone.81 In this view states do not become redundant, 
but they are no longer to be regarded as the sole centers of legitimate power within their borders; 
rather they are shaped and formed by an overarching cosmopolitan legal framework.82 Although 
one can discern a resemblance with constitutional pluralism, the difference lies in the hierarchical 
character of an overarching framework of cosmopolitan sovereignty.     
 The difficulty with approaches that regard sovereignty as being vested in more than one 
entity, is that this is difficult to reconcile with the inner logic of sovereignty as indivisible. A 
possible solution is presented by Walker’s concept of “late sovereignty.”83 
 Walker begins by replying to the claim that states are less and less capable of exercising 
factual control through the use of their sovereign powers, by arguing that “the framing and 
ordering claim and capacity of the core or axiomatic idea [does not] depend upon the 
environment or behavioral field contemplated by the axiomatic idea being directly or 
                                                
76 Walker, N., supra note 46, 12. See for a more discussion of these princi les: De Witte, B., ‘Direct Effect, 
Supremacy, and the Nature of the Legal Order’, in: De Búrca, G. and Craig, P. (Eds), The Evolution of EU Law 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999), 177-213. 
77 In Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 the ECJ still added “albeit within limited fields”, which was 
subsequently omitted in Opinion 1/91 on the Draft EEA Agreement[1992] ECR I-2821. 
78 Sassen, S., supra note 55, 28. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Sassen, S., ‘Beyond Sovereignty: De-facto Transnatio lism in Immigration Policy, 1 EJML (1999), 194. 
81 Held, D., ‘Law of States, Law of Peoples: Three Models of Sovereignty,’ 8 Legal Theory 1 (2002), 33. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Walker, N., supra note 76. 
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exhaustively controlled or determined by that idea.” It is therefore mistaken to equate sovereignty 
with a factual situation of de facto internal control or external independence.84  
 The core idea of sovereignty must instead be defined as a speech act, “[a] discursive form 
in which a claim concerning the existence and characte  of a supreme ordering power for a 
particular polity is expressed (…).”85 In doing so, the “emergence of functionally limited polities 
which do not claim comprehensive jurisdiction over a particular territory” allows for a conception 
of “autonomy without territorial exclusivity”, i.e. to consider sovereignty in non-exclusive 
terms.86 This does not however mean that these functionally limited polities can be imagined 
without territory. Rather, in order to be able to examine the way in which the EU manages its 
borders, one must identify both its powers in this field, the nature of these powers in relation to 
the Member States, as well as the territorial scope of their application.87 
  
5. Immigration: Last Bastion of Sovereignty? 
 
Migration laws and border controls are considered part of the core of states’ sovereignty.88 It is a 
maxim of public international law, that a state’s territorial sovereignty encompasses a general 
power to regulate the entry and exit of persons, to the point of completely closing its borders.89 
Torpey has shown how the development of the modern nation state was not only characterised by 
the effective monopolisation by the state of the usof force, but also of the control over the 
legitimate means of movement of people, even if these controls only became widespread with the 
development of bureaucracies and technologies.90  
 Cowley rightly points out that to migrate in legal terms means to attain a certain kind of 
status with regard to both a society and a jurisdiction, which although related to a territory is not 
                                                
84 This constitutes a “descriptive or constative fallacy”: Werner, W. and De Wilde, J., ‘The Endurance of 
Sovereignty’, 7 EJIR 3 (2001), 285. 
85 Walker, N., supra note 76, 6. 
86 Ibid., 23. 
87 This will be done in Chapters III and IV respectively. 
88 Tilly, C., Coercion, Capital and European States (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1990), 96-97. 
89 See for a critique: Nafizger, J., ‘The General Admission of Aliens under International Law’, 77 AJIL 4 (1983), 
804-847. For a defense of this point of view from the perspective of political theory, see: Walzer, M.supra note 61 
and a challenge thereof: Carens, J., ‘Aliens and Citizens, The Case for Open Borders’, 2 Rev of Pol 49 (1987), 251-
273. 
90 Torpey, J., The invention of the Passport: surveillance, citizenship, and the state (Cambridge, CUP, 2000), 7. 
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exhaustively defined by it.91 He does however concede that migration inevitably involves the 
physical crossing of borders. Here we shall focus on this particular instance, namely the rules of 
public international law that govern an individual’s physical access to a state’s territory. 
 
Increasing global interconnectedness and rising differences in wealth distribution fuel migration 
movements.92 While countries increasingly open their borders to the flow of goods, services and 
capital, they are keen to invoke their sovereign rihts to restrict the entry of people. This may be 
regarded as the major paradox of present day globalisation. Although legal writing tends to 
confirm the principle of territorial sovereignty asn absolute power for the state over its borders, 
the interpretation thereof often approaches the more liberal position adopted by Nafziger that 
states are under “a qualitative duty to admit aliens when they pose no threat to the public safety, 
security, general welfare, or essential institutions f a recipient state.”93 In practice however even 
the potentially most important limitation on a state’s power over the entry of aliens, international 
asylum law, leaves state sovereignty largely in tact.94 The exclusion of non-nationals with a 
reference to the territorial sovereignty of the states, serves as evidence that a classical legal 
discourse continues to shape migration law.95 As Dauvergne has noted, the emerging global 
human rights regime has not “markedly increased rights entitlements at the moment of border 
crossing, nor has it significantly increased access to human rights for those with no legal 
status.”96 Salter has rightly pointed out the paradoxical situat on at states’ borders where “one 
may claim no rights but is still subject to the law.’’ 97 
   
There are few comprehensive international rules on the free movement of persons. The UN 
International Convention on the rights of migrant workers and their families entered into force on 
                                                
91Cowley, J., ‘Locating Europe’, in: Groenendijk, K., et al. (Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders (The Hague, 
Kluwer Law International, 2003), 33. 
92 In 2005, some 191 million people, amounting to 3 per cent of the world’s population, lived outside thir country of 
origin: GCIM, ‘Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action’ (Report, October 2005), 1.  
93 Nafiziger, supra note 89, 804. As Hathaway points out such approach would shift the burden of proof on the state 
aiming to restrict migration: Hathaway, J., Book Review, 88 AJIL 3 (1994), 564. 
94 Joppke, C., supra note 55, 265. 
95 Cornelisse, G., ‘European Integration and Immigraton by Third-Country Nationals: The Obduracy of theNational 
Border’ (December 2007).  
96 Dauvergne, C., ‘Sovereignty, Migration and the Rule of Law in Global Times’, 67 MLR 4 (2004), 613. 
97 Salter, M., ‘The Global Visa Regime and the Political Technologies of the International Self: Borders, Bodies, 
Biopolitics’, 31 Alternatives 2 (2006), 169.   
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1 July 2003, but the most important receiving state have failed to ratify it.98 Most significantly, it 
does not contain rules on the crossing of the contracting states’ borders.   
 The General Agreement on the Trade in Services (GATS), part of the World Trade 
Organization Agreements, deals with some aspects of free movement of persons related to the 
provision of services.99 Two basic principles govern the functioning of the GATS: the most 
favoured nation (MFN) treatment and national treatment. The MFN treatment requires that the 
most favourable treatment given to a third country be extended to parties to the GATS.100 The 
national treatment requires that nationals of parties to the GATS will be accorded equal treatment 
to nationals of the receiving state.101 Members may invoke exceptions from the MFN treatment in 
the case of “economic integration agreements” or “labour market integration agreements.”102  
The GATS Annex on the movement of natural persons under the agreement stipulates that 
GATS shall not prevent governments from applying measures to regulate the entry of natural 
persons into their territory, or to regulate their t mporary stay, or protect the integrity of borders 
and the orderly movement of natural persons across them. Member States discretion is somewhat 
circumscribed by the second part of this proviso that such measures may not be applied in ways 
as to “nullify or impair the benefits accruing to any Member”.103 Nonetheless, it may be 
concluded that “the WTO supervision of national regulation of the movement of people is much 
weaker than its supervision of goods, other services, and technology, and applies to a very narrow 
segment of international migration”.104 Moreover, the GATS requires equality of treatment, 
rather than an opening of the market to foreign servic  providers, which means a protectionist 
government may still act in full compliance of its GATS obligations.105 
 
                                                
98 1990 UN International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their 
Families, 2220 UNTS I-39481. 
99 Mode 4 of the so called ‘Modes of Supply of Services’, Article I(2)(d), GATS. Note that the service con ept in the 
GATS covers both the Community freedom of services and the freedom of establishment.   
100 Article II, GATS 
101 Article XVII, GATS 
102 Articles V and Vbis, GATS 
103 Article 4, GATS Annex on Movement of Natural Person Supplying Services under the Agreement. 
104 Newland, K., ‘The Governance of International Migration: Mechanisms, Processes and Institutions’, (Migrat on 
Policy Institute, Paper prepared for the Policy Analysis and Research Programme of GCIM, September 2005), 1 . 
105 Charnovitz, S., ‘Trade Law Norms on International Migration’, in: Aleinikoff, T. and Chetail, V. (Eds), Migration 
and International Legal Norms (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser Press, 2003), 246. 
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Once more, the EU is unique in its regulation of intra-Community migration of nationals of EU 
Member States.106 The free movement of persons is one of the four fundamental Treaty freedoms. 
Even if the right of free movement was initially limited to the economically active, the 
Community legislator has been progressively expanding this right through secondary legislation, 
which has moreover been interpreted broadly by the ECJ. From an early stage most EU nationals 
could invoke a right to cross an intra-Community border merely upon producing a passport or 
other identity document proving nationality of one of the Member States.107 Intra-community 
border controls have now been fully abolished betwen the majority of Member States that form 
part of the Schengen area. However, the lifting of b rder checks has been accompanied by a 
reinforcement of controls at the common external borders. The transfer of the logic of national 
border control to the external borders forms a clear ex mple of re-territorialisation rather than de-
territorialisation.108 Therefore commentaries on the changing nature of borders in Europe refer 
mostly to the borders between Member States.  
 It has been submitted that in the field of migration control supranational cooperation, 
instead of limiting Member States’ sovereignty, is actually enhancing it.109 Although there may 
be a valid point in the argument that by “going supra-national” Member States may evade certain 
legal constraints at the national level or simply increase their capabilities for control, this would 
mean considering sovereignty as a state of affairs, rather than as a claim to ultimate ordering 
power. One therefore would have to agree with Koslow ki that, regardless of its purpose, policy 
integration does transform sovereignty.110 
 
                                                
106 Indeed, the reference to the EU here is too broad and too narrow at the same time. One should take account of the 
variable geometry resulting from the Schengen acquis as well as the EEA Agreement. A detailed examinatio  of 
these agreements will follow in Chapters IV and VI. 
107 See in more detail Chapter V. 
108 Harvey, C., ‘The Right to Seek Asylum in the European Union’ 1 EHRLRev 17 (2004), 31. 
109 See for instance: Freeman, G., ‘The Decline of Sovereignty? Politics and Immigration Restriction in Liberal 
States’, in: Joppke, C. (Ed.), Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the United States 
(Oxford, OUP, 1998), 91. It has further been argued that sovereignty is enhanced because of the greater 
independence of the executive on the Community level, thus being less constrained by national (human rights) limits: 
Lavenex, S., ‘Shifting Up and Out, The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control’, 20 WEP 2 (2006), 331. 
Although I am hesitant to equate the executive with state sovereignty, the increasing importance of the executive 
branch of government as a result of globalisation has also been pointed out by Sassen, S., ‘Shaking up Citizenship’ 
(18th Annual Globalisation Lecture, Amsterdam, 20 April 2006). 
110 Koslowksi, R., Migrants and Citizens: Demographic Change in the European State System (Ithaca, Cornell 
University Press, 2000), 166-167. 
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The clearest compromise between “the exclusive power f the state over entry into and presence 
in its territory (…) and the competing humanitarian impulse to aid strangers in necessitous 
circumstances” can be found in asylum law.111 The 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees does not provide for a right to asylum, nor does any other international 
instruments. The 1967 Declaration on Territorial Asylum re-iterates that the granting of asylum is 
“an exercise of sovereignty”.112 The Geneva Convention does contain in Article 33(1) the 
obligation of non-refoulement, meaning that no country may deport a person to a c untry where 
that person faces persecution, or risk of serious human rights violations. The principle of non-
refoulement is now widely accepted as being customary law.113  
 The Geneva Convention cannot be invoked by a person who is still within the territorial 
jurisdiction of his/her country of habitual residenc .114 However, it has been argued that once 
outside the country of origin the principle of non-refoulement must apply.115 There is a broad 
consensus that this is indeed the case as regards rejection at a state’s border. This implies that 
there is a right to physically cross a state border when presenting oneself with an asylum claim at 
that border, although the Convention itself is not explicit on this point.116 Robinson, writing in 
1953, still argued that Article 33(1) of the 1951 Convention does not apply to refugees who seek 
entry into the territory of a contracting state.117 In his words “if a refugee has succeeded in 
eluding the frontier guards, he is safe; if he has not, it is his hard luck.”118 However, Article 3(1), 
of the UN Declaration on Territorial Asylum makes clear that a person seeking asylum shall not 
be rejected at the border.119 According to the interpretation of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNCHR), non-rejection at the border within the interpretation of 
                                                
111 Fitzpatrick, J., ‘Flight From Asylum: Trends Towards Temporary “Refuge” and Local Responses to Forced 
Migrations’, 35 Virginia J Int’l L 1 (1994), 34-35. 
112 Article 1(1), UNGA Resolution 2312 (XXIX), Declaration on Territorial Asylum, 14 December 1967. 
113 Edwards, A., ‘Human Rights, Refugees, and The Right “To Enjoy” Asylum’, 2 IJRL 17 (2005), 301.  
114 Definition of “refugee”, Article 1A(2), 1951 Geneva Convention. 
115 Fischer-Lescano, A. et al., ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements under International Human Rights and Refugee 
Law,’ 21 IJRL 2 (2009), 267.  
116 Noll, G., ‘Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International Law?’, 17 IJRL 3, 548. 
117 Robinson, N., Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (New York, Institute of Jewish Affairs 1953), 163; 
See also Grahl-Madsen, A., The Status of Refugees in International Law - Volume II. Asylum, Entry and Sojourn 
(Leiden, Sijthoff, 1972), 94 and Maasssen, H.-G., Die Rechtsstellung des Asylbewerbers im Völkerrecht (Frankfurt 
am Main, P. Lang, 1997), 97. 
118 Robinson, ibid. 
119 Declaration on Territorial Asylum, supra note 112. As Weis notes this is a wider interpretation of the principle 
than can be found in the travaux préparatoires of the 1951 Convention: Weis, P., ‘The United Nations Declaration 
on Territorial Asylum’, 7 Can YB Int’l L (1969), 142. 
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the principle.120 Within the EU, Article 3(1) of the Dublin II Regulation on determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application stipulates that a Member States 
shall examine the application for asylum made t the border or in their territory.121  
 
It is important to note that the ECtHR has ruled that for the purpose of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR), international transit zones, e.g. at airports, do not have extraterritorial 
status despite their name.122 Therefore, Contracting Parties cannot withhold the rights arising 
under the ECHR to someone who is physically present in the territory by denying him/her legal 
presence through the fiction of extra-territoriality. Under Article 3(1) of the Dublin II Regulation, 
Member States would therefore have to consider persons in transit as being “within their 
territory.” Australia has under its “Pacific Solution” exempted parts of its territory from the 
application of its asylum rules.123 In the United States, the “white foot, wet foot” policy exempted 
in a similar way territorial waters from its asylum and immigration laws in respect of Cuban 
nationals.124  
While states have attempted to shift the legal - as opposed to the territorial  - border  
inwards, they have likewise sought to shift it outwards, by erecting pre-border legal obstacles 
preventing asylum seekers and irregular migrants from actually reaching a state’s territory. In this 
respect the term “remote policing” has been applied to refer either to specific procedures and 
technologies, such as pre-boarding procedures or visa-requirements, as well as the deployment of 
police officers or private actors outside national territory.125 The result is that the individual 
                                                
120 UNHCR Executive Committee, Conclusion No 6 (XXVIII) “Non-Refoulement”: Report of the 28th Session: UN 
doc A/AC.96/549, para 53.4 (1977) and Conclusion No 22 (XXXII) “Protection of Asylum- Seekers in Situations of 
Large-Scale Influx”: Report of the 32nd Session: UN doc A/AC.96/601, para. 57.2 (1981). 
121 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (Dublin II) establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the 
Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-
country national, OJ 2003, L50/1 (hereinafter: Dublin II Regulation).  
122 Amuur v France (Appl. No. 19776/92), ECtHR, 25 June 1996, para. 52. 
123 Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001. See: Morris, J., ‘The Spaces in Between: 
American and Australian Interdiction Policies and Their Implications for the Refugee Protection Regime, 21 Refuge 
4 (2003), 58. A change of government in 2007, brought the Pacific Solution to an end: ‘Australia ends “Pacific 
Solution”’ (BBC News, 8 February 2008). A ‘Migration Legislation Amendment (Migration Zone Excision Repeal) 
Bill 2006,’ is pending.  
124 The policy results from a 1995 agreement with Cuba nder which Cuban nationals which make it to US soil (“dry 
foot”) are admitted, whereas those that are intercepted (“wet foot”) are returned to Cuba, or in case of fear of 
persecution resettled in other countries. The policy is formally know as the 1994 US-Cuba Immigration Accord and 
has been written in to law as an amendment to the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act, Public Law 89-732, 2 Novemb r 
1966. 
125 Bigo, D. and Guild, E., ‘Policing at Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in: Bigo, D. and Guild, E., Controlling 
Frontiers:  Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), 234.  
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him/herself has become an additional “site of regulatory enforcement control” and that borders 
have multiplied.126  
A number of national cases serve to illustrate the importance of territory in the way in 
which states assert their presumed “sovereign right to exclude.”127 In the Sale Case128, the US 
Supreme Court ruled on the conformity of an executive order directing the US Coast Guard to 
intercept vessels on the High Seas carrying Haitians who had fled their home country and turning 
them back to Haitian territorial waters, before determining whether they qualified as refugees. 
The majority of the Supreme Court, Blackmun J dissenting, did not consider the order to 
be in breach of the principle of non-refoulement. Even though the type of interdictions at issue:  
 
“may (…) violate the spirit of Article 33 (…) a treaty cannot impose uncontemplated 
extraterritorial obligations on those who ratify it through no more than its general humanitarian 
intent. Because the text of Article 33 cannot reason bly be read to say anything at all about a 
nation’s actions toward aliens outside its own territory, it does not prohibit such actions.”129 
 
The Australian High Court ruled in a similar vein in the Ibrahim case:  
 
“The provisions of the Convention “assume a situation in which refugees, possibly by irregular 
means, have somehow managed to arrive at or in the territory of the contracting State” 130 
 
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights however found the US to have violated 
Article 33(1) of the Geneva Convention, sharing the view of the UNHCR in its Amicus Curiae 
brief before the US Supreme Court, in which it concluded Article 33 knows no geographical 
limitations.131 It also considered the US to have acted in violatin of Article XXVII of the 
American Convention on Human Rights which provides for a right to seek and receive asylum in 
                                                
126 Sassen, S., supra note 67, 69.  
127 This chapter will not engage in a broader examinatio  of the possible extra-territorial application of the principle 
of non-refoulement. Where relevant, we will return to this point in Chapter X in relation to the extra-territorial borde 
controls at sea by the EU Member States. For an extensive discussion see inter alia: Noll, G., supra note 116 and 
Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Offshoring and Outsourcing of 
Migration Control (PhD thesis, Aarhus University, 2009), 116 ff. 
128 Sale Acting Comr, Immigration and Naturalization Service v Haitian Centres Council Inc [1993] 509 US 155. 
129 Ibid., 183. 
130 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Ibrahim [2000] 174 ALR 585, para. 136. See also: Minister 
for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar and others [2002] 187 ALR 574, para. 42. 
131 Case 10.675, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v United States, Report No 51/96, Inter-AmCHR, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. (1997), para. 157. 
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a foreign territory. The interdiction and return operations effectively prevented Haitians from 
seeking asylum in other countries in the region.132  
In R. v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport the House of Lords was asked to rule on 
the legitimacy of the posting of British immigration fficials at Prague Airport whose task was to 
prevent asylum seekers, predominantly of Roma ethnici y, from boarding planes bound for the 
UK.133 As Lord Bingham of Cornhill, who presented the majority opinion, argued, the principle 
of non-refoulement was to no avail to the applicants, who: 
 
“have not left the Czech Republic nor presented themselves, save in a highly metaphorical sense, 
at the frontier of the United Kingdom.”134 
 
Nevertheless, three of the five concurring opinions paid attention to the Sale case in an obiter 
dictum. Lord Bingham of Cornhill considered that the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights had “understandably” found a breach of the Geneva Convention.135 He distinguished the 
situation of the applicants from those of the Haitians, who, although not in the United States, 
were outside Haiti, the country of their nationality, and thus the implication seems to be that they 
were entitled to protection under the principle of n n-refoulement. 
Lord Hope of Craighead also distinguished the Sale Case in that the refugees in that case 
had already reached the High Seas. Nonetheless he considered the decision in Sale to be correct: 
 
“The issue in that case was not as to what was or was not fair. The majority recognised the moral 
weight of the argument that a nation should be prevented from repatriating refugees to their 
potential oppressors whether or not the refugees were ithin that nation’s borders (…) But in their 
opinion both the text and the negotiating history of article 33 affirmatively indicated that it was 
not intended to have extraterritorial effect.”136 
 
Although the Decision of the Inter-American Commission seems to support the argument that 
international bodies and human rights norms constitute an effective check on government action 
                                                
132 Ibid., para. 162. 
133 R. v Immigration Officer at Prague Airport et al., ex parte European Roma Rights Centre et al. [2004] UKHL 55, 
9 December 2004. 
134 Ibid., para. 26. 
135 Ibid., para. 21. 
136 Ibid., para. 68. 
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in the field of migration, it should be recalled tha  the United States has not accepted jurisdiction 
of the Inter-American Court.137  
 The House of Lords did eventually condemn the operation as, in the words of Baroness 
Hale of Richmond, “inherently and systematically discr minatory” against Roma passengers and 
therefore unlawful under both domestic and internatio l customary and treaty law.138 In that 
respect the case supports the argument that constraint  on national migration control policy have 
to a large degree been derived from national law and enforced by national courts.139  
  
6.  Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to give an overview of the most important rules of public international 
law covering both the definition of territorial borders under public international law and the right 
to cross a state’s territorial border. It has showed notwithstanding assertions to the contrary, 
territorial borders retain their importance in the public international legal order.  
 The explanation must first of all be found in the continuing relevance of states within the 
public international legal order. Moreover, sovereignty and in particular its key element 
territoriality continue to inform modern day thinkig on legal and political organisation even if 
these concepts are no longer necessarily confined to the straightjacket of the Westphalian state.  
The distinction between sovereignty as a state of affairs and as a speech act, is well 
reflected in the discussion on migration. Illegal migration is an affront to sovereignty because it is
evidence that a nation is not in control of its borders.140 Although from a legal point of view 
states indeed remain the most important actors in deciding on the entry and exit of aliens, in 
practice states generally have “no choice but to assert the prerogative of sovereignty against the 
recognition of their failure to effectively control migration flows.”141  
                                                
137 Unlike under the ECHR, under the American Convention on Human Rights, cases can be referred to the Court 
only by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights or a state party. In case the Commission finds a viol tion 
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33 Comp Pol Stud 2 (2000), 189. 
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The example of shifting borders may be invoked to support the argument that one should 
move attention away from the territorial border.142 At the same time however, they underline the 
continuing importance of a territory and its borders, which remain firmly in place. It is one’s 
presence within these borders that brings one within the territorial jurisdiction and the protection 
of the state in question. As the reward of having evad d pre-border controls and presenting 
oneself at the actual border becomes higher, the number of people likely to try to do so will 
increase. One must therefore agree with Sassen’s observation that “state-centered border regimes 
- whether open or closed - remain foundational elemnts in our geopolity”, even though indeed 
these “coexist with a variety of other bordering dynamics and capabilities”.143  
                                                
142 Cowley, J., supra note 91, 34. 
143 Sassen, S., ‘When National Territory is Home to the Global: Old Borders to Novel Borderings’, 10 New Pol Econ 
4 (2005), 535.  
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III.  EU Powers in Border Management 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The European Union is not a state. Bearing in mind Walker’s concept of late sovereignty, this 
does not however exclude the possibility for it to dispose of competences in an area generally 
considered as being one of the state’s core prerogatives, the control over borders. In the 
famous words of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) on the nature of the European 
Community, it constitutes “a new legal order of inter ational law for the benefit of which the 
states have limited their sovereign rights.”1 A fundamental difference between the European 
legal order and that of its Member States is that te Union legal order is a system of attributed 
powers. This means that the EU does not possess a general legislative competence, a 
Kompetenz-Kompetenz, but that it must be possible to trace back the EU’s actions to a 
particular legal basis laid down in the founding treaties. The question of whether the EU has a 
power to act is of fundamental constitutional importance. The system of attributed powers is 
one of the “defining features of the relationship between the Community and its Member 
States.”2  
Anderson and Bigo state that the European Union does have one of the characteristics 
of a state, namely “clearly defined borders, with control and surveillance procedures in 
place.”3 However, the question of how far these borders are ind ed well defined is closely 
connected to the question of which powers relating o the entry and exit of persons into the 
Member States’ territory have been carried over from the national to the EU level and the 
territorial scope of these rules. This chapter willstudy the process through which the EU has 
acquired competences for the management of the external borders and how these competences 
define the nature of these borders.4  
While in the previous chapter emphasis was laid on the territorial element of 
sovereignty, for the purposes of this chapter it is worth recalling two further definitions of 
                                                
1 In Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos [1963] ECR 1 the ECJ still added “albeit within limited fields”, which was 
subsequently omitted in Opinion 1/91 on the Draft EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-2821. 
2 Dashwood, A., ‘The Attribution of External Relations Competence’, in: Dashwood, A. and Hillion, C. (Eds), 
The General Law of EC External Relations (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), 116. 
3 Anderson, M. and Bigo, D., ‘What are EU Frontiers for and what do they mean?’, in: Groenendijk, K., et al. 
(Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), 13. 7-26 
4 Later chapters will examine the use that has been made of these competences: Chapters VIII, IX, X. 
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sovereignty and the state. In the words of Weber th state is “a human community that 
(successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given 
territory.”5 According to Schmitt, “[s]overeign is he who decides on the exception,” that is he 
who has the power to step outside the rule of law and call for the state of emergency.6 The 
first definition is of importance because border management potentially includes the use of 
force, the second, because borders are still considered to have an important role in protecting 
a state’s internal and external security.7 This policy area may therefore be able to inform our 
understanding of the EU and the way in which the European polity evolves.  
 
2.    External Borders and the Single Market Objectiv   
 
From the outset, the establishment of a common market formed one of the main objectives of 
the EC. In accordance with the functional principles of an economic integration process this 
objective pursued not only the free circulation of capital, goods and services, but also of the 
factors of production themselves, “the capital of men”.8 As early as 1974 the conclusions of 
the Heads of State and of Government meeting in Paris on 9 and 10 December 1974 called for 
an examination of the possibility of establishing a P ssport Union and in particular of 
abolishing passport control within the Community. In the course of 1984 and 1985 various 
European Council Conclusions called upon the Commission to take action in order to 
complete the common market as a means of relaunching t e European project. In particular it 
asked the Commission to draw up a detailed programme with a specific timetable for the 
completion of a single market.9 This became the Commission’s White Paper on the 
completion on the internal market, which provided the foundations for the adoption of the 
Single European Act (SEA).10  
                                                
5 Weber, M., The Vocation Lectures (Indianapolis, Hackett Publishing Company, 2004), 33. 
6 Schmitt, C., Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty (Chicago, The University of 
Chicago Press, 1985, 5.  
7 See also Chapter V. One may add that borders themselves can be viewed as sites of exceptional measures 
(identity and security checks, closure): Vaughan-Williams, N, ‘Borders Territory, Law’, 2 IPS 4 (2008), 329. 
8 Farkas, O., ‘Free movement and European Citizenship: leaving behind the labour supply approach’ (Paper 
presented at the EUI Alumni Association Interdisciplinary Conference, Florence, 5-6 October 2006), 3. 
9 See e.g. the Resolution of the Council and the representatives of the governments of the member states of the 
European communities, meeting within the Council, on free passage across the Community's internal frontiers 
for Member State nationals, 19 June 1984 and the Brussels European Council Conclusions, 29-30 March 1985. 
10 COM(85) 310 final, Commission White Paper, ‘Completing the Internal Market’. See for a concise overviw 
of the political dynamics that allowed for the adopti n of the SEA: Craig, P. and De Búrca, G., EU Law: Text, 
Cases and Materials (Oxford, OUP, 2003), 1170-1179. 
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 The SEA inserted the current Article 14 EC which provides for the establishment of 
the internal market, defined as “an area without internal frontiers in which the free movement 
of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured.” The following quotations from the 
Commission’s White Paper show that the removal of internal borders was not merely for the 
sake of reaping the economic benefits, but also in order to contribute to a “peoples’ Europe”: 
 
 “The formalities affecting individual travellers area are a constant and concrete reminder to 
the ordinary citizen that the construction of a real European Community is far from complete. 
 
Even though these controls are often no more than spot checks, they are seen as the outward 
sign of an arbitrary administrative power over indivi uals and as an affront to the principle of 
freedom movement within a single Community.”11 
 
However, the free movement of persons proved to be the most contentious of the four 
freedoms and completing the internal market in thisarea the most difficult. While the SEA 
introduced qualified majority voting for internal market legislation in Article 100a EC (the 
current Article 95 EC), the free movement of persons was explicitly excluded from the scope 
of this article. This exclusion of the free movement of persons only lost its relevance with the 
introduction of the co-decision procedure in this area by the Maastricht Treaty. 
 As Cornelisse notes, the limitation of the scope of free movement rights to nationals of 
the EU Member States is not apparent from the way in which these rights are formulated in 
the EC Treaty.12 The distinction between nationals of the Member States and Third Country 
Nationals (TCN) has however been applied from the outset and endorsed by the ECJ. Since 
the free movement of persons excludes TCNs, it was not at all evident that the area without 
internal frontiers was to be interpreted so as to mean an area without border checks.13 In fact 
the UK, a Member State in which immigration control has always relied much more on entry 
and exit control rather than on controls within the territory, has been opposing an 
interpretation that would abolish checks at the intr al borders.14 
 The White Paper noted that the abolition of internal frontiers would make it much 
easier for nationals of non-Community countries to m ve from one Member State to 
                                                
11 COM(85) 310 final, ibid., 14. 
12 Cornelisse, G., ‘European Integration and Immigraton by Third-Country Nationals: The Obduracy of the 
National Border’ (December 2007).  
13 See Case 238/83, Caisse d’Allocations v Meade [1984] ECR 2631, para. 7. 
14 In fact until the adoption of the Identity Cards Act 2006 (c. 15), the UK did not know a duty of identification. 
See also Layton-Henry, Z., ‘Britain: From Immigration Control to Migration Management’, in: Cornelius, W., et 
al., (Eds), Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2004), 315 
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another.15 The Commission’s Communication of 1988 on the abolition of controls of persons 
at Intra-Community borders however pointed out that it would be difficult to envisage a 
selective abolishing of identity controls at internal frontiers depending on whether the 
traveller was a Community citizen or a citizen of a third country, since nationality can only be 
established by applying some form of control.16  
 The Commission thus advocated an interpretation that would lead to the lifting of all 
checks on individuals at the internal borders of the Member States. In a Communication of 
May 1992, it expressed its concern on the slow progress made towards the completion of the 
internal market in relation to the free movement of persons, and reaffirmed that: 
 
 “[t]he phrase “free movement of … persons” in Article 8a refers to all persons, whether or not 
they are economically active and irrespective of their nationality. The internal market could 
not operate under conditions equivalent to those in a ational market if the movement of 
individuals within this market were hindered by contr ls at internal frontiers.  
 
 (…) 
 
 Any other interpretation of the objective of abolishing physical frontiers would render 
 Article 8a ineffective.”17 
 
The point that Article 14 EC covers both the economically active and non-economically 
active was supported by the argument that this article was found in Part One of the EEC 
Treaty, entitled “Principles,” thus applying to all nationals of Member States. To a large 
extent the Court’s broad interpretation of the right to free movement of persons had already 
made this distinction of limited practical relevance.18 One should however realise that the 
Commission observations are limited to the right to cr ss a Member States’ border, not to 
more extensive rights of residence, which would still be dependent on the economic 
independence of the Member State’s national.  
 
The Commission White Paper argued that internal borders could not be abolished altogether 
until adequate safeguards against terrorism and the illicit trade in drugs were introduced. The 
                                                
15 COM(85) 310 final, supra note 11, 16. 
16 COM(88) 640 final, Commission Communication on theabolition of controls of persons at Intra-Community 
borders, 5. 
17 SEC(92) 877, final, Commission Communication on the Abolition of Border Controls, 10 and 12. 
18 See Chapter V.  
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Commission however recognised that these were subject ar as that did not in all their aspects 
fall within the scope of the Treaty.19 The White Paper further emphasised the need to find 
alternative means of protection for controls at the int rnal borders and to strengthen those 
already existing.20 Increased controls at the external borders formed th  obvious example.  
 The link between the removal of the internal border and the need for compensatory 
measures, in particular reinforced controls at the ext rnal borders early on became the central 
theme of the debate on removing checks at the internal borders.21 Already before the 
publication of the White Paper, the adoption of a proposal on the basis of Article 100 EEC for 
a Directive on the easing - not the abolishing - of controls applicable only to EU nationals was 
made dependent upon the adoption of a resolution on c operation between control 
authorities.22 Two declarations made at the time of adoption of the SEA further underline the 
connection between the lifting of internal border che ks and compensatory measures:   
 Political Declaration by the Governments of the Memb r States on the free movement of 
 persons: 
In order to promote the free movement of persons, the Member States shall cooperate, without 
prejudice to the powers of the Community, in particular as regards the entry, movement and 
residence of nationals of third countries. They shall also cooperate in the combating of 
terrorism, crime, the traffic in drugs and illicit trading in works of art and antiques. 
 General Declaration on Articles 13 to 19 of the Single European Act: 
Nothing in these provisions (Articles 13-19 SEA) shall affect the right of Member States to 
take such measures as they consider necessary for the purpose of controlling immigration from 
third countries, and to combat terrorism, crime, th traffic in drugs and illicit trading in works 
of art and antiques. 
 
In its 1988 Communication the Commission considered that as far as it concerned the 
tightening of the external borders, there was no need to propose a directive dealing 
                                                
19 COM(85) 310 final, supra note 11, 10.  
20 COM(85) 310 final, supra note 11, 10. 
21 Nanz, K.-P., ‘Free Movement of Persons According to the Schengen Convention and in the Framework of the 
European Union’, in: Pauly, A. (Ed.), De Schengen à Maastricht: voie royale et course d’obstacles (Maastricht, 
EIPA, 1996), 61-79. 
22 COM(84) 749 final, Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the easing of controls and formalities 
applicable to nationals of the Member States when crossing intra-Community borders, as amended by COM(85) 
224 final. See COM(88) 640 final, supra note 16, 17. The directive was never adopted and eventually withdrawn 
by the Commission. 
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specifically with the matter, although it added that it might want to reconsider this position in 
the light of progress made at the intergovernmental level.23  
 In December 1988 the Rhodes European Council set up a Group of Coordinators to 
oversee the plethora of intergovernmental working groups on the free movement of persons 
that had emerged.24 The following year, the Madrid European Council approved a work 
programme for the establishment of an area without internal frontiers prepared by the Group 
of Coordinators. This so-called Palma document called for the approximation of national 
laws, collaboration between national administrations a d a prior strengthening of controls at 
the external frontiers. It noted however the political divergences “(…) on the interpretation 
and scope of the relevant Treaty provisions i ter alia 8A EC [14 EC] and the obligation 
flowing therefrom (…) and where the competence for taking decisions and action lay.” 25 
It may come as little surprise that the way forward was an intergovernmental one. 
Under the responsibility of the immigration minister  work started on a “Convention on 
crossings at the external frontiers of the Member States.” This resulted in the Member States 
reaching agreement in June 1991, but disagreement between the UK and Spain as regards the 
territorial scope of application of the Convention in relation to Gibraltar prevented the 
signature.  
 
3.  Bringing the External Borders within the EU Legal Framework 
 
In the run-up to the 1991 intergovernmental conference Germany advocated the integration of 
the intergovernmental cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) that had taken shape so 
                                                
23 COM(88) 640 final, ibid.,  34. 
24 In the mid-1970s a judicial cooperation group was established which discussed judicial cooperation in criminal 
and civil matters within the framework of the European Political Cooperation (EPC). The Rome European 
Council of 1975 created the TREVI group, which was a network of national officials from Ministries of Justice 
and the Interior. It developed a range of working groups, that reported to occasional ministerial meetings. One of 
these working groups, Trevi 92, dealt with the security issues of the free movement of people, including 
compensatory measures needed for the relaxation of intra-EC border controls. In addition, a number of ad hoc 
groups were created: the most important being the Ad hoc Working Group on Immigration (1986), the Comité 
Européen de la Lutte Anti-Drogue (1989, CELAD) and the Groupe d’Assistance Mutelle (1992, GAM, custom 
authorities): Lavenex, S. and Wallace, W., ‘Justice and Home Affairs: Towards a “European Public Order”?’, in: 
Wallace, H. et al. (Eds), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2005), 459. 
25 ‘Free Movement of Persons: a Report to the European Council by the Co-ordinators Group’ (Palma 
Document). The document was initially intended to remain confidential, but was reproduced in a Report of the 
House of Lords Select Committee on the EC, ‘1992: Border Controls of People’ (HL Paper 90, Session 1988-89, 
22nd Report, 1989), 55. One may consider this document an early forerunner of the 1999 Tampere Agenda and 
the 2005 Hague Programme, both setting the EU’s agenda in JHA. Although its focus is on the free movement of 
persons, the measures it envisaged as necessary for the abolishment of checks at the internal borders covered 
illegal immigration, drug trafficking, terrorism, information exchange, co-operation between law enforcement 
agencies, etc.).  
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far outside the Community legal order, with the British government firmly opposing such a 
move. A Dutch draft, bringing both a common foreign security policy and cooperation on 
JHA under a single treaty structure, was quickly cast aside.26 Instead the Treaty of Maastricht 
created the European Union with an intergovernmental Third Pillar on JHA. Only limited 
aspects of visa policy were brought under the “supranational” EC Treaty in Article 100c.27  
Article K.1 of the Treaty of Maastricht defined the “rules governing the crossing by 
persons of the external borders of the Member States and the exercise of controls thereon” as 
one of the “areas of common interest.” Article K.3 introduced three types of acts that could be 
taken in relation to these areas of common interest: joint positions and the promotion of joint 
cooperation, joint actions and conventions. All these instruments were subject to unanimity in 
the Council, and in addition, conventions needed to be ratified in accordance with Member 
States’ constitutional requirements. Some areas of common interest, including the rules 
governing the external borders, seem to have been lss sensitive to Member States’ 
sovereignty concerns. They were made subject to a passarelle clause and the Commission 
was given a right of initiative shared with the Member States. 28  
Article K.4 provided for a Coordinating Committee, which came to be known as the 
K.4 Committee, assisting the Council in JHA, without prejudice to the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives (Coreper).29 Under Article 100d EC, the K.4 Committee also 
contributed to the preparation of the Council’s proceedings in the fields referred to in Article 
100c EC. The raison d’être of this Committee was to limit the role of ambassadors in Coreper 
(with a background in foreign ministries) in the affairs of interior ministers.30 In essence, the 
                                                
26 Within the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the day of the Council meeting at which the disproval of the 
other Member States of the Dutch draft became clear, Monday 30 September 1991, is still referred to as Lundi  
Noir.  
27 These included the determination of a common list of countries whose nationals required a visa and a uniform 
visa format. It should however be noted that the Commission was required to examine any request for measur s 
by the Member States and that an effective implementatio  of an EC visa policy could be easily hampered by 
Member States blocking related measures under the Third Pillar: Cullen, D. et al., Cooperation in Justice and 
Home Affairs: An Evaluation of the Third Pillar in Practice (Brussels, European Interuniversity Press, 1996), 
32-33. 
28 The passarelle clause (Article K.9 TEU) allowed for the possibility of applying the co-decision procedure to 
the first three areas of common interest, which included the rules on external borders. Such transfer was subject 
to a “double lock” procedure (unanimity in the Council and approval of all Member States according to their 
national constitutional requirements) and has never been put into effect. In the other three areas the Member 
States’ right of initiative was exclusive (Article K.3(2) TEU). See: O’Keeffe, D, ‘Recasting the Third Pillar’, 32 
CMLRev 4 (1995), 900. 
29 Article K.4(1) TEU read in conjunction with Article 155 TEC. 
30 Peers, S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Harlow, Longman, 2000), 18 and Monar, J, ‘Justice and Home 
Affairs’, in: Edwards, G. and Wiessala, G. (Eds), The European Union 1999/2000: Annual Review of Activities 
(JCMS, Oxford, Blackwell, 2000), 137 
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K.4 Committee replaced the Rhodes Group of Coordinators and the pre-existing structure of 
committees and working parties that was now brought nder its umbrella. 
 
As far as the free movement of persons was concerned, th  deadline for the establishment of 
the internal market, 31 December 1992, was not met.Guild points out that the interest of the 
Commission to seek abolition of the internal borders fo  persons may have been limited, since 
even after the Maastricht Treaty, powers to regulate the external borders remained 
intergovernmental.31 As we saw earlier, the Commission did speak out strongly in favour of 
the abolition of all controls in its Communication f May 1992, also expressing its concern 
about the slow process of ratification of the Dublin Convention on rules determining Member 
States’ responsibility for asylum claims and the failure to adopt the External Frontiers 
Convention.32 
 In 1993, at the instigation of the Copenhagen European Council, the Commission used 
its shared right of initiative and proposed a Council Decision adopting the External Frontiers 
Convention as a Third Pillar Convention.33 Amendments to the Draft Convention were made 
to bring the proposal in line with the EU treaty provisions on “Third Pillar Conventions” and 
the post-Maastricht reality. New decision procedures for the implementation of the 
Convention were foreseen by Article K.3(2)(c) EU.34 The conclusion of the EEA Agreement 
which extended the four freedoms of the internal market to the three EEA countries, 
necessitated changing the reference to nationals of the EU member states to persons having 
free movement rights under Community law. Articles on the crossing of goods were deleted 
from the draft since in the run-up to the 31 Decembr 1992 deadline the Community 
legislation necessary to remove the control on goods at the external borders had been 
adopted.35  
                                                
31 Guild, E., ‘Moving the Borders of Europe’ (Inaugural Lecture, University of Nijmegen, 30 May 2001), 10. 
This is also the view taken by Advocate General Cosmas in his opinion in Case C-378/97, Wijsenbeek [1999] 
ECR I-6207, para. 71. It may be argued that, had there been the political will to do so, it would have b en 
possible to regulate aspects of the external borders under the Treaty provisions on the free movement of persons. 
Support for this argument may be found in: De Witte, B., ‘Non-market values in internal market legislation’, in: 
Nic Schuibne (Ed.), Regulating the Internal Market (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), 69-70. This seems also 
to have been the Commission’s point of view, when it stated that it would consider proposing a directive 
depending on progress made at the intergovernmental l vel: COM(88) 640 final, supra note 22, 34.  
32 Dublin Convention, OJ 1997, C254/1. 
33 COM(93) 684 final, Commission Proposal for  (I) a decision, based on Article K3 of the TEU establishing the 
Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States, (II) a Regulation, based on Article 
100C of the TEC determining the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing 
the external borders of the Member States.  
34 Qualified majority, unless otherwise provided. 
35 Most importantly the adoption of Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Custom  
Code, OJ 1992, L302/1. See also the list of measures at the end of SEC(92) 877 final, supra note 17, 14-15. 
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It is important to note three things in relation to the amended draft. First of all, the 
draft Convention still contained a direct link betwen the territorial scope of application of the 
right of free movement for persons and territorial external borders of the EC Member States. 
The definition of external borders in the Draft Conve tion refers only to the EU Member 
States, not the EEA members. Second, with the deletion of articles on the crossing of goods, 
the exclusive focus on the free movement of persons was born. Third, the Draft Convention 
did not itself require the abolition of internal border controls. Rather it was a preliminary step 
towards such abolition.36 
The Council did not reach agreement on the Decision on the External Frontiers 
Convention. This was partly due to the continuing disagreement over the status of Gibraltar, 
but also on the role of the European Court of Justice,37 the connected decision of a common 
visa policy under Article 100c EC and related conventions: “[e]nhanced legal competence has 
proved to be similarly ineffective in the face of political opposition in related areas.”38   
In 1993 the Parliament brought an action against the Commission for failing to make 
the required proposals for the implementation of the free movement of persons across internal 
borders.39 To avoid condemnation the Commission came forward with three proposals which 
were however never adopted.40  
Meanwhile, the question as regards the scope and effect of Article 14 EC continued to 
stir up debate. The British Government renewed its claim that the declaration attached to the 
SEA was sufficient to justify the retention of internal border controls, which triggered the 
response by the Commission that it would use its legal powers to achieve a border free 
Europe.41 Martin Bangemann, Internal Market Commissioner at the time, suggested the 
“waving” of a closed passport at internal border contr ls. The “Bangemann wave” represented 
a compromise aimed to facilitate as much as possible the exercise of the right of free 
movement of EU citizens in the face of continuing border controls.42  
 In 1997, a Dutch Euro-parliamentarian refused to sh w his passport upon arrival at 
Rotterdam airport - at the time serving exclusively destinations within the EU - arguing that 
with the expiry of the 31 December 1992 deadline, Article 7a TEC (now Article 14 EC) and 
8a TEC (now Article 18 EC) had direct effect. Through the preliminary ruling procedure, the 
                                                
36 Guild, E., Immigration Law in the European Community (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001), 226. 
37 Article K. 3 TEU provided for the possibility of jurisdiction of the ECJ over Third Pillar Conventions. 
38 Anderson, M. et al., Policing the European Union (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), 143. 
39 Case C-445/93, Parliament v Commission, OJ 1994, C1/12. 
40 COM(95) 346-348 final, COM(95)347 amended by COM(97) 106 final. 
41 Ibid, 122. 
42 Spencer, M., States of Injustice: A Guide to Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the European Union 
(London, Pluto Press, 1995), 52. 
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case arrived before the ECJ.43 The intervening Member States all concurred with the
Commission that specific Community measures at the ext rnal borders would be necessary 
before internal border checks could be lifted in order to avoid the possibility of a Member 
State being faced with an unwanted TCN entering via another Member State.44 In addition, 
the UK reiterated that in its view, even if the Court were to accept the direct effect of Article 
8a, border checks would continue to be permitted since only persons having the nationality of 
a Member State have a right of entry into a Member State.45  
The Court did not reply directly to the UK’s argument. Instead, it held that the Treaty 
provisions in question could not be accorded direct ffect, since they presupposed the 
adoption of implementing legislation.46 The ECJ endorsed the view that -  in the absence of 
rules on control at the external borders, including conditions of access, visas and asylum - the 
exercise of the right of free movement presupposes that the person concerned can proof that 
s/he has the nationality of a Member State.47 In this judgment we therefore see the judicial 
endorsement of the view that controls at the external borders of the Community formed the 
necessary prerequisite for the establishment of the internal market.   
It is important to realise that this case was decided in the autumn of 1999, that is after 
the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which had brought about a political 
compromise over the lifting of internal border contr ls and had expanded the jurisdiction of 
the Court over migration, borders and visas.48 As Guild remarks the judgment is therefore 
perfectly understandable from a political point of view, although it should be regretted that it 
denied the right to move freely throughout the entir  EU territory which the SEA had 
arguably conferred upon those present within EU territory.49  
  
4. The Schengen Agreements 
 
In parallel with the preparations for the completion of the single market, economic pressures, 
not least from the transport industry, pushed a limited number of Member States to enter into 
                                                
43 Case C-378/97, Wijsenbeek [1999] ECR I-6207. 
44 Ibid., para. 28. 
45 Ibid., para. 37. 
46Ibid., para. 40. Interestingly the Court did not refer to another declaration on Article 8a, stating that te date of 
31 December 1992 did not create an automatic legal effect. 
47 Ibid., para. 42. 
48 See infra section 5. 
49 Guild, E., supra  note 36, 233. 
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negotiations to remove obstacles to cross-border trade.50 On 13 July 1984 France and 
Germany signed the Saarbrucken Convention, an initiative of former German chancellor Kohl 
aimed at making border controls more flexible. The Benelux countries, which had already 
eliminated checks at their internal borders51 entered into negotiations with the French and 
German Governments, resulting in the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985.52 The Schengen 
Agreement formed the legal framework - under public international law - for the abolition of 
border controls between these Member States. The abolition of border checks was to be 
achieved by 1 January 1990.53   
This 1990 deadline was not met, partly because imple enting measures were not in 
place on time and partly because of the uncertainties surrounding German reunification at that 
time. On 19 June 1990 the Schengen Contracting Parties complemented the Schengen 
Agreement with the Schengen Implementation Convention (CISA). The CISA set out detailed 
rules on the controls at the common external borders of the participating states, police co-
operation. Importantly it introduced a common visa regime for periods not exceeding three 
months and provisions on responsibility in matters of asylum.54 Moreover, it provided for the 
establishment of the Schengen Information System (SIS), a data system shared by the 
Schengen signatories, providing data on persons or objects, such as people against whom an 
arrest warrant had been issued or stolen vehicles as recorded by the participant countries.55 
The CISA clearly stated that controls at the external borders were to be carried out 
within the scope of national powers and national law, yet in accordance with uniform 
principles and taking into account the interest of all Contracting Parties.56 Each Contracting 
Party remained responsible for the control and surveillance of its respective part of the 
                                                
50 Bigo, D., Police en Reseaux : l'expérience européenne (Paris, Presses de Sciences-Po, 1996), 114. 
51 On the basis of the 1960 Convention Concerning the Transfer of Entry and Exit Controls to the External 
Frontiers of the Benelux Territory. 
52 Note that this is the very same day the European Commission published its White Paper on Completing the 
Internal Market, supra note 10. 
53 Article 17 read in conjunction with Article 30 of the Schengen Agreement. 
54 The provisions on asylum have been superseded by the 1990 Dublin Convention, supra note 32, which has 
been incorporated in EU law as Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms 
for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member 
States by a third-country national, OJ 2003, L50/1 (hereinafter: Dublin II Regulation). 
55 Title IV, CISA. A forerunner of this system was foreseen by the - never adopted - Convention on a European 
Information System, which is referred to in Article 13(2) of the Draft External Frontier Convention, supra note 
33. 
56 Article 6, CISA, currently Article 15(1), Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the 
rules governing the movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ 2006, L105/1 
(hereinafter: SBC). 
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external borders.57 The CISA entered into force between the five original signatories on 1 
September 1993, but was not applied until 26 March 1995.  
The CISA provided in Article 134 that it would apply only in so far as it is compatible 
with Community law. As both Bigo and Guild point out, the primacy accorded to Community 
law, in particular Article 14 EC, was never used to impede the Schengen system.58 Rather it 
was given legitimacy as an enhanced cooperation va t la lettre and described as a laboratory 
for future European integration.59 The Commission in its 1988 Communication stated that it 
in no way wished to slow down progress where progress could be made.60 The Commission 
was from an early stage involved in the negotiations in order to ensure conformity with 
Community law. 
 Title V of the CISA dealt with the checks at the internal borders on goods. Unlike 
cooperation on the entry of TCNs, the Schengen Contracting Parties could not establish a 
single customs regime amongst themselves without encroaching upon the Communities 
exclusive competences in this field. Rather the provisi ns of Title V reduce checks on good 
carried by travellers to the lowest level possible, urge the Contracting Parties to have 
formalities such as customs clearance take place within the country and to facilitate and 
harmonise formalities governing the movement of goods across external borders within the 
framework of the Executive Committee, the EC and other international forums. Since the 
establishment of the internal market these provisions have become largely redundant in 
relation to the Member States, but they remain a part of the Schengen acquis and their 
application is specifically excluded in the Schengen Association Agreements with third 
countries.61  
                                                
57 This remains the case also after the integration of the Schengen acquis into the EU legal order, discussed 
below. See for instance recital 4, Regulation Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ 2004, L349/1. 
58 Guild. E., supra note 31, 13 and Bigo, D., ‘Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?’, in: 
Bigo, D. and Guild, E. (Eds), Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2005), 66. Many scholars are however of the opinion that partial agreements, i.e. agreements concluded 
outside the EU’s institutional framework between less than all of its Member States, remain possible. Se  e.g. De 
Witte, B., ‘Chameleonic Member States: Differentiation by Means of Partial and Parallel International 
Agreements’, in: De Witte, B. et al. (Eds.),  The Many Faces of Differentiation in EU Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2001). In my opinion Article 43 EU, stating that Member States may have recourse to enhanced cooperation, 
does not exclude partial agreements. One could argue that the principle of loyal cooperation requires Member 
States to make a genuine attempt to explore the options of enhanced cooperation first before leaving the EU 
framework. The logic of Article 43a EU inserted by the Treaty of Nice seems to support this argument. If 
enhanced cooperation is only to be undertaken as a last resort, this a fortiori applies to intergovernmental 
cooperation. 
59 Monar, J., ‘‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Institutional and Substantial Dynamics in the  
perspective of the European Union’, Collegium 22 (December 2001), 13.  
60 COM(88) 640, supra note 16, 4. 
61 See Chapter IV. 
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5.  Careful Communitarisation 
 
The Third Pillar as instituted by the Maastricht Treaty had considerable institutional and legal 
weaknesses, which manifested themselves in the slowpr gress made since its entry into 
force. The failure to adopt the External Frontiers Convention forms a case in point. Rather 
than adopting binding instruments, the failure within the Council to reach consensus led to the 
adoption of soft law measures such as resolutions and recommendations.62 The serious 
limitations on the powers of the European Parliament and the ECJ tainted the Third Pillar 
with a lack of transparency and democratic and judicial accountability. From the same 
perspective, the Schengen Agreements, were even more questionable. These agreements were 
implemented through decisions by the Executive Committee, consisting of Member States’ 
Representatives, which were not published and not subject to judicial review.    
Consensus amongst Member States and EU institutions about the failure of the Third 
Pillar did not however mean there was a consensus on the solution.63 The Amsterdam Treaty 
not only included important changes to the structure of cooperation in JHA, but also 
contained a substantial opt-in for the UK and Ireland nd confirmed the Danish opt-out.64 The 
Amsterdam Treaty transferred asylum, immigration and other policies related to the free 
movement of persons to the EC Treaty, to be dealt with under a new Title IV and reformed 
the Third Pillar covering the remaining police and ju icial cooperation. JHA policies were 
united in Article 2 EU under a single objective, that of creating an Area of Freedom, Security 
and Justice “in which the free movement of persons is assured in conjunction with appropriate 
measures with respect to external border controls, asylum, immigration and the prevention 
and combating of crime,” linking once more, but now explicitly in the EC Treaty, free 
movement with compensatory measures including controls at the external borders.65  
The same link is found in Article 61(a) EC, obligin the Council to adopt within a five 
year period, measures to ensure the free movement of persons in accordance with Article 14 
EC, in conjunction with directly related flanking measures with respect to external border 
controls. Article 62(2)(a) gave the Council the power to adopt measures on the crossing of the 
                                                
62 O’Keeffe, supra note 28, 894.  
63 Stetter, S., ‘Regulating migration: authority delegation in justice and home affairs’, 7 JEPP 1 (2000), 93. 
64 These will be discussed in the next chapter. 
65 Is has however been noted that, unlike the Single Market Objective or the EMU, the AFSJ lacks clear 
definition: Walker, N., ‘In search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A constitutional Odysse ’, in: 
Walker, N. (Ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), 5.   
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external borders of the Member States, establishing standards and procedures to be followed 
by Member States in carrying out checks on persons at such borders. Article 63(3)(b) formed 
the legal basis for measures on illegal immigration a d illegal residence, including 
repatriation of illegal residents. Article 64(2) EC allowed the Council, acting by qualified 
majority on a proposal from the Commission, to take emergency measures in the event of a 
sudden inflow of nationals of third countries in one of the Member States. Article 66 
conferred upon the Council the power to take measures to ensure cooperation between the 
relevant departments of the administrations of the Member States in the areas covered by Title 
IV, as well as between those departments and the Commission. 
 Although the Treaty of Amsterdam conferred important powers for the management of 
the external borders on the EU, this transfer of powers has not been exclusive, in the sense of 
representing a complete transfer of competences from the Member States to the Community; 
these powers are held concurrently with the Member States. Shared competence may become 
exclusive where the EC has enacted legislation and thereby preempted the powers of the 
Member States.66 
 The extension of the EU’s powers in the areas covered by the Schengen Agreements, 
in combination with the opt-outs granted to a number of Member States, enabled the adoption 
of a protocol to the Amsterdam Treaty bringing the cooperation under the Schengen 
Conventions within the institutional and legal framework of the European Union.67 In two 
decisions based on Article 2 of the Schengen Protocol, the Council identified the Schengen 
acquis and assigned a legal basis to the various parts of that very acquis.68 Rules relating to 
visas, migration and asylum, including those on the crossing of external borders, were brought 
under the new Title IV EC, whilst the provisions for mutual legal assistance in criminal 
matters were moved to the Third Pillar.69 The larger part of the Schengen provisions on 
external borders were assigned to either Article 62 or 66 EC as regards legal basis.70  
                                                
66 In how far this has been the case will be discussed in Chapter VII. 
67 Article 5(1) of the Schengen Protocol states that proposals and initiatives that build upon the Schengen acquis 
shall be subject to the relevant provisions of the Tr aty.  
68 Council Decision 1999/435/EC concerning the definitio  of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/1 and 
Council Decision 1999/436/EC determining the legal b sis for each of the provisions or decisions which 
constitute the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/17. 
69 Den Boer, M., ‘Justice and Home Affairs Cooperation  in the Treaty on European Union: More Complexity 
Despite Communautarization’, 3 MJ  4 (1997), 313. 
70 No agreement was reached on the legal basis for the SIS and consequently it was brought under the Third 
Pillar, on the basis of Article 2, fourth paragraph, of the Schengen Protocol.  
 43 
 The incorporation of the Schengen provisions introduced into EC law the distinction 
between internal and external borders taken from the Schengen Convention and the CISA.71 
Article 1 CISA defined internal borders as: 
 
the common land borders of the Contracting Parties, their airports for internal 
flights and their sea ports for regular ferry connections exclusively from or to other 
ports within the territories of the Contracting Parties and not calling at any ports 
outside those territories 
 
External borders were defined as:  
 
the Contracting Parties’ land and sea borders and their airports and sea ports, 
provided that they are not internal borders.72 
 
As can be seen from the above definition, the Schengen external border is not just a line, but 
comprises a whole “network of ports of entry.”73 It is interesting to note the negative 
definition of external borders as not being internal, emphasising that the external borders are 
not a closed list.74  
It is imperative to realise that due to the opt-out and opt-ins of several Member States, 
the external borders of the Schengen area, that is the area without border controls in which 
there is free movement for all, do not coincide with the “external borders” of the area in 
which there is the free movement for persons having this right under Community law. The 
notion of external borders of the Member States in the Maastricht Treaty, is thus a different 
and broader one from that of the Treaty of Amsterdam.   
                                                
71 Crowley rightly points out the contradiction between Article 14 EC abolishing internal borders and Article 
62(1) EC which states that the Council shall take measures to ensure the absence of any control of persons when 
crossing internal borders: Crowley, J., ‘Locating Europe’, in: Groenendijk, K., et al. (Eds.), In Search of 
Europe’s Borders (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), 38.   
72 This definition is taken over in Article 2(1) and (2), SBC. 
73 Salter, M., ‘Passports, Mobility and Security: How smart can the border be?’, 5 ISP 1 (2004), 80. 
74 Note the similar negative definition in the Draft External Frontiers Convention, supra note 33:  
 
 External Frontiers mean: 
(i) a Member State' s land frontier which is not contiguous with a frontier of another Member State, 
and maritime frontier; 
(ii)  airport and seaport, except where they are considere  to be internal frontiers for purposes of 
instruments enacted under the Treaty establishing the European Community. 
 
The 1988 Commission Communication, still referred to the question of the extent to which ports and airports 
were to be considered internal borders as contentious, this was probably resolved in the absence of the UK 
participation in the Schengen acquis. 
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 The importance of the definition of the Schengen external border was shown in Case 
C-170/96.75 Here, the Commission brought an action against the Council in which it argued 
that Joint Action 96/197/JHA on Air Transit Visas (ATV) should have been adopted under the 
First Pillar on the basis of the former Article 100c TEC.76 The ECJ however ruled that the 
ATV did not involve the crossing of the EU’s legal external border since it required the 
holders to stay in the transit area of the airport.77 
 
Article 67 of Title IV provided for a transitional period of five years in which the Commission 
shared its right of initiative with the Member States. This period ended on 1 May 2004, 
although the Commission is required to take into account requests of the Member States to 
submit proposals to the Council. During the transitional period decision making in the 
Council was unanimous, with a right of consultation f r Parliament. On the basis of the 
second indent of Article 68(2) EC, the Council extend d, as of 1 January 2005, the co-
decision procedure to Article 62(2)(a) EC.78  
 With the Treaty of Amsterdam, the K.4 Committee was renamed Article 36 
Committee and its competences were limited to the areas remaining under the Third Pillar.79 
Instead of applying the usual working structure in Community areas of competence (working 
groups - Coreper - Council), the Member States set up a Strategic Committee on Immigration, 
Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA), essentially for the same reason the K.4 Committee had been 
instituted, namely limiting the influence of the ambassadors in Coreper.80 As a result, the 
areas of the First Pillar continued to be subject to a four level working structure.81 
 Article 68 EC restricts the role of the Court under Title IV EC. Only national courts 
from which no further judicial remedy is possible have a duty to refer preliminary questions 
                                                
75 Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council (“Air Transit Visas”) [1998] ECR I-3655. 
76 Joint Action 96/197/JHA on airport transit arrangements, OJ 1996, L63/8. 
77 Case C-170/96, supra note 75, paras 23-24. Note that this is a legal fiction which would not be accepted for 
the purpose of protection under the ECHR: Amuur v France (Appl. No. 19776/92), ECtHR, 25 June 1996, para. 
52.  
78 Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain reas covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, 
OJ 2004, L396/45. In accordance with Protocol (No 35)on Article 67, the Council acted since 1 May 2004 by 
qualified majority, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, in order to 
adopt the measures referred to in Article 66. 
79 Monar, J., supra note 30, 135. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Under the Third Pillar there is a Treaty legal basis for the Article 36 Committee, the SCIFA however was set 
up under the Council’s powers of internal organisation. 
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to the ECJ.82 Article 68(2) EC further excludes the Court’s jurisdiction from measures taken 
under Article 62(1) EC - the legal basis for measure  related to the abolition of internal border 
controls - in as far as they relate to the maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of 
internal security.83  
The most likely interpretation of Article 68(2) EC is that it forms the Community equivalent 
of Article 35(5) EU, aimed to prevent the ECJ from pronouncing itself on the legality and 
proportionality of Member States law enforcement authorities or the exercise of the 
responsibilities incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and 
order and the safeguarding of internal security.  
 Peers argues that Article 68(2) does not prevent the Court from ruling on the 
interpretation or validity of EU acts in a preliminary ruling procedure.84 If for instance such a 
ruling led to the conclusion that a certain police a tion was not in conformity with an EU act, 
it would depend on the power of the national judiciary under domestic law to sanction the law 
enforcement agencies. 
Interestingly, this article also does not seem to prevent the ECJ from pronouncing 
itself on the correct interpretation of measures baed upon Article 62(2)(a) EC relating to the 
external borders. Therefore, in principle the Court would not be barred from ruling whether or 
not a border guard’s action was in conformity with the SBC. This would however seem to run 
against the logic of Article 64(1) EC which emphasise  that the Member States are ultimately 
responsible for the safeguarding of their internal security. It seems to have been the Member 
State’s intention, expressed in Articles 68(2) EC and 35(5) EU, to exclude the judicial review 
of Member States action also in this policy field. Powers of physical coercion remain tightly 
in the hands of the Member States. Controls at the Schengen external borders are carried out 
in accordance with the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and national legislation. For instance, 
Article 4 SBC states that border guards shall ensure that a TCN who has been refused entry 
does not enter the territory of the Member State concerned. One can imagine that this may on 
occasion require a degree of coercion. The conditions f r the use of this force are however 
prescribed in national law and the authorities permitted to use force are designated 
exclusively by national law.85   
                                                
82 Article 68(1) EC. In cases in which a Member State has made a declaration according to Article 35(3)(b) EU, 
this means that in practice jurisdiction of the ECJ may be more restricted under Title IV EC than under th  Third 
Pillar of the EU. 
83 A similar exception is contained in Article 2(1) of the Schengen Protocol. 
84 Peers, S., supra note 30, 47. This seems to be confirmed in Case C-150/05, Van Straaten [2006] ECR I-9327, 
para. 37 regarding an entry made in the SIS. 
85 Recital 12 and Article 15(1), SBC. 
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 The second indent of Article 67(2) EC required the Council to take a decision at the 
end of a five year transitional period following the entry into force of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam with a view to adapting Article 68 EC. Notwithstanding that this period ended on 
1 May 2004, the Council has not yet taken such a decision. The Commission did come 
forward with a Communication to “contribute to the adaptation” of Article 68 EC, annexing a 
draft Council Decision which would cease to apply the Article in its entirety.86 
 
The limited rights of the European Parliament under th  consultation procedure, although not 
alien to other parts of the EC Treaty, combined with the shared right of initiative during the 
transitional period, the restricted jurisdiction of the Court and the four-level working structure 
in the Council all show that the process of communitarisation or more generally that of supra-
nationalisation has been gradual.  
  
6. The Reform Treaty: Final Step in the Communitarisation of JHA  
 
In what respect will the Lisbon Treaty change the lega  framework outlined above? Most 
importantly it will merge the First and Third Pillar, making co-decision the standard 
legislative procedure for the whole AFSJ and as such completing the process of 
communitarisation of competences in JHA. Article 71 TFEU provides for the setting up of a 
Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), replacing the CATS, which should “ensure 
that operational cooperation on internal security is promoted and strengthened.”87 
 In Article 3(2) TEU, we find the overall AFSJ objective in its original formulation. 
The first chapter of Title V TFEU, lays down the general provisions applicable to the AFSJ. 
In Article 67(2) TFEU, the link between the absence of internal border controls and the policy 
on the external borders is much less prominent thanunder Article 61(a) EC, rather attributing 
importance to both independently. Article 67(3) TFEU states that the Union shall strive for a 
                                                
86 COM(2006) 346 final. The Commission argues here that e principle of effective judicial protection is “one 
of the fundamental rights that help to define the very concept of the rule of law.” In view of this sweeping 
statement, one may wonder why the Commission did not call upon the Council to act earlier, a first step in a 
possible procedure against the Council before the ECJ for failure to act on the basis of Article 232 EC. Also the 
ECJ has defined the principle of effective judicial protection as general principle of Community law stemming 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, see Case 222/84, Johnston [1986] ECR 1651, 
paras 18 and 19 and recently Case C-432/05, Unibet [2007] ECR I-2271, para. 37. 
87 In the European Convention it was proposed to merge the various Council working groups dealing with 
internal security and remove the CATS from the legislat ve process: Final Report of Working Group X on 
Freedom, Security and Justice, European Convention, CONV 426/02, 16. Therefore the COSI will be discussed 
in Chapter VIII. 
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“a high level of security” amongst others through the “coordination and cooperation between 
police and judicial authorities and other competent authorities”.  
 The current Title IV EC is only amended to a very limited extent and is clearly 
recognisable as such in Chapter 2 of Title V TFEU. Article 74 TFEU almost literally retakes 
Article 66 EC on administrative cooperation. The legal basis for measures on the external 
borders is however refined. Article 77(2)(b) refers to measures “concerning the checks to 
which persons crossing external borders are subject”, while Article 77(2)(d) provides that the 
Union has competence to “any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an 
integrated management system for external borders.”  
 It is interesting that the Treaty introduces the concept of integrated management 
system for external borders. This notion has so far been defined only in the Council 
Conclusions on Integrated Border Management of December 2006, which suggested it was a 
very broad concept, including not only border contrl, but also the fight against crime and 
inter-agency cooperation.88 It is yet to be seen to what extent Article 77(2)(d) TFEU will 
allow the Community legislator to include under this legal basis aspect on criminal law and 
police cooperation relating to the external borders.89 However, it could be argued that this 
would still have to be done under the chapter on police cooperation. Another question is 
whether this article would in the long run allow for the conferral of executive powers on EU 
officials.90 Recalling Weber’s definition of the state, the use of force by EU officials would 
considerably change the nature of the European Union and the way in which it relates to its 
Member States.91 
 Under the Constitutional Treaty the ECJ would have immediately been given full 
jurisdiction over this entire policy area. The Lisbon Treaty delays this for a maximum of five 
years for those policy areas that currently fall under the Third Pillar. In addition the special 
protocols on the position of the UK, Ireland and Denmark are now extended to cover the 
whole of the AFSJ.92 The possibility for the Court to review the legality and proportionality of 
                                                
88 Results of the JHA Council, Brussels, 4-5 December 2006 (Council Document 15801/06), 26. 
89 EU Counter-Terrorism Coordinator De Kerchove has called it “absurd” that under the current legal framework 
Frontex cannot deal with security related threats other than irregular migration: ‘Europe is kwetsbaar voor 
Terrorisme’ (De Standaard, 11 September 2008).  
90 In Chapter IX we will discuss how EC legislation has regulated the exercise of executive powers by national 
border guards from one Member State when deployed in the framework of joint operational activity in another 
Member State. 
91 Weber, M., supra note 5. 
92 Under the transitional arrangements the UK may, at the latest six months before the expiry of the transitional 
period, notify the Council that it will not accept the powers of the institutions for measures falling u der the old 
Third Pillar, which will then cease to apply to the UK, after which the UK may however decide to opt-in again to 
these measures under the Protocols applicable to the UK on the Schengen acquis and Title IV TFEU. 
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operations carried out by a Member State’s police or other law enforcement agencies or of the 
exercise of a Member State’s duty to maintain law and order and safeguard internal security 
remains excluded in Article 276 FEU. However, this article applies only to the chapters on 
judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation. 
 Monar has argued that the restriction of the Court’s jurisdiction regarding the legality 
and proportionality of the actions of nation law enforcement agencies is in line with the 
principle of respect for the essential state functions in maintaining law and order and 
safeguarding internal security. This principle was l id down in Article I-5(1) CT and will, 
after the Lisbon Treaty, be found in Article 4(2) EU and Article 72 TFEU.93 Others have 
argued in the same vein that this clause reflects the position of the Member State governments 
as ultimate providers of security for citizens.94  
 However, national competences may have been extended on the basis of European 
legislation.95 The House of Lords in its report on the future role f the ECJ rightly considered 
this restriction on the Court’s jurisdiction as unjstified. The Lords argued that the ECJ 
should be entitled to assess the validity of Member States’ enforcement authorities when 
implementing Union legislation against the norms contained in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights.96  
 
7. Re-instating the Internal Borders  
 
Although Article 2(1) of the CISA provided that all internal borders could be crossed at any 
point without any checks being carried out, the second paragraph of the same Article 
stipulated that national border checks could be re-instated where public policy or national 
security so required. When immediate action would be required this could be done without 
prior consultation of the other Contracting Parties. In December 1995 the Schengen Executive 
Committee took a Decision on the procedure for applying Article 2(2),97 necessitated by the 
                                                
93 Monar, J., ‘A new “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” for the Enlarged EU? The results of the European 
Convention’, in: Henderson, K., The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Enlarged Europe (Hampshire, 
Palgrave MacMillan, 2005),  129. 
94 Elise Consortium, ‘Security Issues and critical institutional balances in the on-going IGC’: 
http://www.eliseconsortium.org/article.php3?id_article=146. 
95 See for instance Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
procedures between Member States, OJ 2002, L190/1.  
96 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘The Future Role of the European Court of Justice’ (HL Paper 
47, Session 2003-04, 6th Report, 15 March 2004), 37. 
97 Decision of the Executive Committee on the Procedur  for applying Article 2(2) of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen Agreement, SCH/Com-ex (95) 20, rev. 2. 
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invocation of the article by France in order to justify its refusal to lift controls at its borders in 
July 1995.98 It emphasized that “the reinstatement of border controls must remain a matter of 
exception.”  
With the implementation of the Schengen acquis in the EU legal order, Article 2(2) 
CISA was assigned Article 62(1) EC as legal basis. It was thus communitarised. Yet, Article 
2(1) of the Protocol on the incorporation of Schengen in the EU states that “in any event, the 
Court of Justice shall have no jurisdiction on measure  or decisions relating to the 
maintenance of law and order and the safeguarding of internal security”, which seems to refer 
to Article 68(2) EC. In addition the Decision determining the legal basis for each of the 
provisions of the Schengen acquis explicitly mentions Article 64(1) EC, which stipulates that 
Title IV EC shall not affect the exercise of the Member States’ responsibilities in matters of 
law and order and internal security.  
 Chapter II of the SBC has replaced Article 2(2) CISA as well as the Decision on the 
procedure for application thereof, taking over most f its substantive content. A significant 
improvement made is the duty to inform the European P rliament and the public on a re-
instatement of border controls.99 The EP rapporteur had requested the Council to adjust the 
power of the Court as provided for in Art. 67(2) 2nd i dent EC in order to give the ECJ the 
competence to rule on the legality of a Member State’s decision to re-instate controls at its 
internal border, but no amendments to this effect were included.100  
In practice the reinstatement of internal border controls means that to all means and 
effects the internal border of the Member State in question becomes an external border. 
Article 28 of the SBC stipulates that where border controls at internal borders are 
reintroduced, the relevant provisions of the Title II of the SBC apply mutatis mutandis. 
 Borders have been mainly been re-instated around major (political) events, rather than 
for the fight against criminal activities.101 The re-instatement of borders has also been used to 
create a sense of security and protection.102 The French decision to re-install border checks 
                                                
98 This refusal was initially motivated by discontent over the Netherlands policy on soft drugs.  
99 Article 27 and 30 respectively, SBC. This duty is however limited by overriding security concerns (article 29) 
and Member States are, when requested, to respect the onfidentiality of information provided in relation to the 
reintroduction of checks at the internal border. 
100 EP Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (A6-0188/2005), 64. 
101 Groenendijk, K., ‘Reinstatement of Controls at the Int rnal Borders of Europe: Why and Against Whom?’, 10 
ELJ  2 (2004), 168. 
102 Ibid., 170.  
 50 
after the London bombings in July 2005 is a clear example of this.103 If the reinstatement of 
controls at the internal borders is to remain the exception, for the time being, it is the Member 
States that decide on this exception. Although one cannot fully draw the comparison with 
Schmitt’s state of exception, in that the Member States do not step outside the rule of law, but 
rather substitute their own rules for those of the EU, it is nevertheless useful to point out that 
in this respect Member States have retained sovereignty over their borders.104 The Lisbon 
Treaty seems to change this, in that it would extend the jurisdiction of the ECJ to cover all of 
the current Title IV EC. Nevertheless, one may expect the Court to take a “hands-off” 
approach if a case were to be brought before it.  
 Article 64(2) which allows the Council to take emerg ncy measures in a situation 
characterised by the “sudden inflow of nationals of third countries” is significant in that it 
allows the Council to establish that there is an emergency situation. It is however important to 
realise that such measures are to be decided upon by unanimity, which makes it not only 
politically, but also legally impossible for such measures not to be agreed upon without the 
consent of the Member State in question. The Lisbon Treaty maintains this unanimity.  
 More generally, EU Member States remain competent to declare a state of emergency. 
This is also evidenced by Article 297 EC which refes to measures a Member State may be 
required to take in the event of serious internal disturbances affecting the maintenance of law 
and order, war or similar circumstances. Although the ECJ has jurisdiction to rule on such 
measures under Article 298 EC, AG Jacobs noted in his opinion in Case C-120/94 that if a 
Member State considers that the attitude of a third state threatens its vital interests, its 
territorial integrity, or its very existence, it is for the Member State and not for the Court to 
determine a response to that perceived threat, and there are no judicial criteria by which the 
appropriateness of such a response can be measured.105 One could envisage that such a 
situation would also include the suspension of the Community rules relating to the 
management of the external borders.  
  
 
                                                
103 Council Document 6055/06. The Schengen Border Code does not however contain the possibility for 
Member States to simultaneously re-install border controls in the event of a major terrorist threat, as did the 
Commission proposal, Article 24, COM(2004) 391 final. 
104 Schmitt, C., supra note 6. See on Carl Schmitt’s theory on emergency: Gross, O, ‘The normless and 
exceptionless exception: Carl Schmitt’s theory of emergency powers and the “norm exception” dichotomoy’, 21 
Cardozo L Rev (2000), 1825-1868. 
105 Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs in Case C-120/94, delivered 6 April 1995, Commission v. Greece [1996] 
ECR I-1513, para. 65. The ECJ never ruled on the cas as it was withdrawn from the register on request of the 
Commission. 
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8. Conclusion 
 
It was not until the Treaty of Amsterdam that the Community acquired powers for the 
regulation of the external borders through the transfer of policies from the Third Pillar to the 
First Pillar and the transformation of the Schengen acquis into European law. This 
communitarisation of competences has however been a gradual process, which for the broader 
cooperation in JHA will find its conclusion with the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, 
albeit again subject to a transitional period, as well as old and new opt-outs for a small 
number of Member States.  
The transfer of competences in the area of the management of the external borders 
from the national to the supranational level, first within the framework of Schengen and later 
within the EU, appears to have been less contentious han other areas of JHA. Already under 
the Maastricht Treaty it was one of the areas subject to a so-called passarelle clause and 
unlike the closely related task of police cooperation it was communitarised by the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. One explanation for this is the link that w s created from the end of the 1980s 
onwards between the reinforcement of the external borders and the establishment of the 
internal market project. Diverging opinions as to the nature and scope of Article 14 EC and in 
particular the meaning of “an area without internal frontiers” only found their solution in the 
Amsterdam Treaty. The ECJ then endorsed this modus vivendi by denying Article 14 EC 
direct effect. 
The Schengen Agreements brought about an effective disjunction between the external 
borders and the territorial scope of free movement rights. This could have been, but was not, 
remedied by the External Frontiers Convention. As a result, the major distinction in external 
borders is that between the EU external borders which are coincident with the Schengen 
external border, e.g. the Polish-Ukrainian border, and the EU external borders which are not, 
e.g. the British or Irish borders. Whilst at the Schengen external borders, border procedures 
are regulated by the SBC, at the non Schengen EU external borders it is the national law of 
the Member State in question that determines the procedures to be followed, albeit within the 
limits imposed by EU law.106 
                                                
106 These limits are set by the EU rules on the right of free movement of persons, see Chapter VI. 
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 Groenendijk and Guild state that with the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
the definition of EU borders has become a matter of competence of the Community.107 This 
statement is true if one reads borders here in its broader, functional definition, being the place 
at which persons may face controls which may prevent them from continuing their journey 
towards a Member State of destination. The actual territorial border, which retains its 
importance in both international and Community law, is still defined by reference to the 
Member States’ territory. The new Article 69(4) TFEU underlines once more that the powers 
currently contained in Article 62 EC leave the competence of Member States as regards the 
geographical demarcation of their borders, in accordance with international law, unaffected.108 
Even Schengen Member States retain an important competence over the management 
of their borders, internal and external, in that they remain the ultimate providers of national 
internal security. They remain competent to reinstate border checks where they consider this 
to be necessary for reasons of public policy or natio l security. Moreover, one could argue 
with Carl Schmidt that while EU Member States retain the power to declare “a state of 
emergency”, which could include the re-instatement of border checks and a suspension of the 
Schengen rules, they remain sovereign. In addition, although the Community has acquired 
important powers for the regulation of the management of the external borders, coercive 
powers remain firmly in the hands of national authorities, who act upon the basis of powers 
conferred upon them by national law.  
 
                                                
107 Groenendijk, K. and Guild, E., ‘In search of Europe’s borders: Article 62 EC, Visas and European 
Community Law’, in: Groenendijk, K., et al. (Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders (The Hague, Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 1.  
108 This was also stipulated in the 9th recital to Decision 2004/927/EC, supra note 78. Of course, Member States 
will always be under the obligation to comply with EU law in exercising this competence. See in this respect 
Case C-146/89, Commission v. UK  [1991] ECR I-3533 on the extension by the UK of its territorial sea and the 
effects thereof on the activities of fishermen from ther Member States. 
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IV.  Locating Europe’s External Borders 
 
1. Introduction  
 
The incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the EU’s legal order introduced the definition 
of external borders in Community law. However, this definition only defines the external 
borders of the Schengen area, in which not all Member States participate. In the previous 
chapter it was therefore concluded that rather thanspeaking of one set of borders one should 
speak of two: the external borders of the Schengen ar a and the external borders of the area in 
which the Community rules on the free movement of persons apply. This chapter will 
examine the geographical location of these two sets of borders, which coincide only where the 
external borders of the area of free movement of persons coincide with the external borders of 
the Schengen area.1   
 Considering that since the Treaty of Amsterdam the Schengen acquis has formed an 
integral part of the Community acquis, our point of departure will be Article 229 EC, whic  
determines the territorial scope of the EC Treaty. Determining the territorial scope of the 
Community rules of free movement and the Schengen acquis is necessary not because an 
interest is taken in the internal application of these legal regimes, but because they determine 
the geographical location of the borders thereof.  
 It will however soon become clear that Article 229 EC can only function as a prima 
facie definition of these borders. Not only does a number of Member States not participate in 
the Schengen acquis, various third countries have associated themselve with the Community 
rules on the free movement of persons and the rulesof the Schengen acquis. This chapter will 
therefore examine the various ways in which the territorial scope of these specific parts of the 
Treaty - the Community right of free movement of persons and the Schengen acquis - has 
been either limited or extended. It will examine in detail the modalities of these countries’  
(non) participation.  
 Finally, the situation at the borders of a number of Member States requires specific 
attention. Although the Member States are ultimately responsible for the geographical 
                                                
1 In accordance with Article 49 EU the Union is open to accession by any European state respecting its 
principles. This chapter will not engage in the broader discussion on a finalité politique, nor try to define the 
notion of “European state.” It is therefore a sketch in time, subject to future enlargements.  
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demarcation of their borders, outstanding conflicts may have implications for the management 
of the external borders and beyond.     
 
2. The Territorial Scope of the Community Right of Free Movement 
 
2.1 Article 229 EC: The Territorial Scope of the ECTreaty 
 
Article 229(1) EC enumerates the 27 Member States to which the Treaty applies. In principle, 
the treaty applies to the whole territory of each Member State as “primarily defined by 
reference to [their] constitution.”2 The free movement of persons is one of the four 
fundamental freedoms and there are no territorial derogations other than the limitations in 
territorial scope contained in Article 299 EC. Article 299 EC itself does not refer to the 
territory of the Member States, nor can a similar article be found in the EU Treaty. The 
successor of Article 355 TFEU, in combination with Article 52 TEU, leaves no doubt that the 
article defines the territorial scope of what currently are the EC and EU Treaty.  
The Member States’ territory includes the French Overseas Departments,3 the Azores, 
Madeira and the Canary Islands. The territories have been given the status of “outermost 
region” in Article 299(2) EC, meaning that in the application of the Treaty special account 
shall be taken of their structural social and economic situation.  
Under Article 299(3) EC, the Treaty does not apply - with the exception of Part Four 
on association - to the non-European countries and territories which are listed in Annex II of 
the Treaty and have special relations with Denmark (Greenland), France (French Overseas 
Territories), the Netherlands (the Dutch Antilles) and the United Kingdom. It does not apply 
at all to those countries and territories with special relations to the UK that are not listed in 
Annex II. Greenland joined the EC as an integral part of Denmark in 1973. However, after the 
establishment of home rule in 1979, the population v ted against continued EC membership 
in a referendum. The EC Treaty was amended in 1984 and Greenland received the status of 
overseas territory.4 
                                                
2 Case 148/77, Hansen v Hauptzollamt Flensburg [1978] ECR 1787, para. 10. 
3 The French Overseas Departments are: Guadeloupe, Reunion, Guyana, Martinique.  
4 Treaty amending, with regard to Greenland, the Treaties establishing the European Communities, OJ 1985, 
L29/1. 
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 The Lisbon Treaty adds in Article 355(6) TFEU, stating that the European Council 
may, on the initiative of the Member State concerned, adopt a decision amending the status, 
with regard to the Union, of a Danish, French or Netherlands country or territory referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2. The European Council shall act unanimously after consulting the 
Commission.5 
Article 299(4) EC stipulates that the Treaty shall apply to the European territories for 
whose external relations a Member State is responsible. This means that the EC Treaty 
applies to Gibraltar, which is a British Overseas Territory, falling under UK sovereignty, 
without being part of the UK.6  
Under Article 299(5) EC, the Treaty applies to the Ǻland Islands (Finland) in 
accordance with the provisions set out in Protocol N  2 to the Act of Accession of Finland. 
The protocol recognizes the special status of Ǻland under international law and allows for 
restrictions on the freedom of services and establishment for natural persons.7  
Under Article 299(6) EC, the Treaty does not apply to the Danish Faeroe Islands. It 
does apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man, but only to the extent necessary to 
ensure implementation of the arrangements for these Islands set out in the Act of Accession of 
the UK.8 Originally the Treaty did not apply to the UK sovereign bases on Cyprus.9 This has 
changed with the accession of Cyprus to the EU. Protocol No 3 to the Act of Accession of 
2003 amended Article 299(6)(b) EC so as to make parts of EC law applicable, notably the 
customs and common commercial policy.10 The Community acquis on the right of free 
movement was not extended to the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). However, there has been a 
right of entry from and into the SBAs, without borde  controls, under a 1960 Agreement in 
                                                
5 A declaration adopted at the time of the signature of the Constitutional Treaty, which first introduced this 
clause, made it clear that it was to allow for the ransformation of Mayotte into an Outermost region, a d 
possibly of the islands of Saint Martin and Saint Barthélémy, belonging to the Region of Guadeloupe, into
OCTs. See also: French Senate, Rapport d’Information N  329, Session Ordinaire 2004-2005 (Annex to the 
Minutes of the Session of 10 May 2005). In Réunion, t was however wrongly interpreted to mean that the island 
could be made an OCT against its will, resulting in a egative vote on the Constitutional Treaty: Ziller, J., ‘The 
European Union and the Territorial Scope of European Territories’, 38 VUWLR 1 (2007), 62. 
6 In Article 28 of the Act of Accession of the UK (OJ 1972, L73/14) Gibraltar was excluded from the Customs 
Area, the Common Agricultural Policy and the VAT regime.  
7The islands are an autonomous, neutral part of Finland, see the Act on the Autonomy of Åland, 16 August 
1991/1144). Protocol No 2 to the Act of Accession of Finland, OJ 1994, C241/9. 
8 Most importantly the rules on customs matters and quantitative restrictions apply to both the Channel Islands 
and the Island of Man, Article 1, Protocol No 3 on the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man to the Act of 
Accession of  the UK, OJ 1972, L73/164. 
9 When Cyprus gained independence in 1960, the UK retained full sovereignty over these bases as “Sovereign 
Base Areas”, which totals 3 per cent of the island. See: Ahnish, F., The international law of maritime boundaries 
and the practice of states in the Mediterranean Sea (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993), 256 ff. 
10 Articles 1 and 2, Protocol No 3 to the Act of Accession of Cyprus on the Sovereign Base Areas of the UK in 
Cyprus, OJ 2003, L236/940. 
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which the UK unilaterally declared not to create customs ports or other frontier barriers 
between the SBA and Cyprus.11 The Protocol provides in Article 5 that Cyprus is not required 
to carry out checks on persons crossing their land and sea boundaries with the SBA and any 
Community restrictions on the crossing of external borders shall not apply in relation to such 
persons. Under Article 5(2) of the Protocol, the UKis responsible for controlling the external 
borders of the SBA, the definition of which however excludes the land and sea borders with 
Cyprus.12  
 An interesting observation is made by Ziller who argues that there could be a 
“contradiction between the geographical scope of application and the personal scope of 
application of EC law in the case of Danish, French and Dutch OCTs.”13 He argues that the 
limitation of the territorial scope of EC law involes limitations for the free movement of 
persons, while the territorial origin of citizens of a Member State on the territory of the state 
should be of no consequence according to the constitutional principles of non-discrimination 
common to the Members States. The right of free move ent is however linked to EU 
citizenship, which is determined on the basis of Article 17 EU by Member State nationality. 
Where the free movement of persons is territorially pplicable, it can therefore be exercised 
by an EU citizen independent of his/her territorial origin. A good example here is the island of 
Saint Martin. The French part of the island forms part of the EU, the Dutch part does not. The 
Dutch (and consequently EU) citizens of the island can nevertheless use their free movement 
rights in order to cross the border to the French part of the island.     
  
2.2 Temporary Derogations from the Community Right of Free Movement  
 
Treaties of Accession may contain temporary exceptions on the provisions on the free 
movement of workers. Greece was given full free movement of workers only six years after 
joining the EC in 1981, while Portugal and Spain obtained the full freedom of movement of 
its workers seven years after their accession in 1986.14 On the basis of the Acts of Accession 
of 2003 and 2005, temporary derogations apply to the “new” Member States, with the 
                                                
11 Appendix O to the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus: Declaration of Her 
Majesty’s Government Regarding the Administration of the Sovereign Base Areas. See in more detail: Skoutaris, 
N., The Cyprus issue: The four freedoms in a (Member) State of siege. The application of the acquis 
communautaire in the areas not under the effective ontrol of the Republic of Cyprus (PhD thesis, EUI, 2009). 
12 Part Four, Article 1(a), Protocol No 3, supra note 10. 
13 Ziller, J., supra note 5, 56. 
14 Articles 44-48, Act of Accession of Greece, OJ 1979, L291/17 and Articles 55-60, Act of Accession of Spain 
and Portugal, OJ 1985, L302/23. 
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exception of Malta and Cyprus (EU-8).15 Article 24 of the Act of Accession of 2003 stipulates 
the temporary provisions in connection with the individual country annexes V to XIV. These 
provisions allowed the “old” Member States (EU-15) to apply their national immigration laws 
or previously concluded bilateral agreements regulating access to the labour market for a two 
year period, thus derogating from the free movement of workers. After this period they would 
have to notify the Commission if they intended to extend application of national rules for 
three more years.16 A further application of national rules for another two more years would 
be possible in case of serious disturbances of the labour market or the threat thereof.17 This 
so-called “2+3+2 formula” is applied to Romania and Bulgaria.18 
A standstill clause in paragraph 2(14) of the CEEC country annexes and paragraph 
1(14) of the annexes for Bulgaria and Romania, guarantees that national measures shall not be 
more restrictive than those prevailing on the date of signature of the Treaty of Accession. 
Moreover, in the application of the principle of Community preference for access to the 
labour market, an “old” Member State must give precedence to nationals from the new 
Member States over third country nationals. Ott has argued that it is unclear which 
consequences the standstill clause has on the rights of family members, who under the Europe 
Agreements had a right of entry and residence once the worker had established himself legally 
in one of the Member States.19 The EU-8 country annexes merely mention in paragraph 2(9) 
that the EU-15 may derogate, to the extent necessary, from the provisions of Directive 
68/360/EEC20 insofar as it may not be dissociated from Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on the 
free movement of workers.21 However, since the rights of family members are dependent on 
                                                
15 Act of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia 
and the Slovak Republic, OJ 2003, L236/33 and the Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ 2005, 
L157/203. 
16 The Commission in COM(2006) 48 final argued that te 2004 enlargement had been an economic success and 
had not upset the labour market balance in any of the member states, nevertheless a number of Member States 
maintained its restrictions. 
17 Only two Member States, Germany and Austria, have in oked this provision.  
18 Article 23 read in conjunction with Annex VI and VI of the Act of Accession of Bulgaria and Romania, OJ 
2005, L157/203. See for an overview of the restrictions still in place: 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=466&langId=en. 
19 Ott, A., ‘The “Principle” of Differentiation in an Enlarged European Union – Unity in Diversity?’, in: I glis, 
K., and Ott, A. (Eds), The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity? (Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 120. 
20 Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the 
Community for workers of Member States and their families, OJ Sp. Ed. 1968, L257/13, 485, repealed by 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside fre ly 
within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004, L158/77. 
21 Council Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 on freedom of m vement for workers within the Community, OJ Spec. 
Ed. 1968, L257/2, 475. 
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those of the worker, the same logic should apply to family members, namely that their 
situation after enlargement should not be allowed to be more restrictive than before.22  
The transitional arrangements do not apply to the fre dom to provide services or the 
freedom of establishment, with its corollary rights of free movement. The Posted Workers 
Directive, which deals with the freedom to provide services, is not subject to the transitional 
arrangements.23 Moreover, as will be discussed in detail in the following chapter, the right to 
enter another Member State can be invoked on the basis of a valid passport or identity card 
alone. Therefore the limitations on the free movement of workers impact on the right to work 
and the right of residence of EU-8 citizens, rather t an on the actual possibility for a citizen 
from the EU-8 to enter or exit a Member State. 
Although it is not the first time an enlargement has been accompanied by a transitional 
regime for the acceding Member States, earlier derogati ns were put in place before the 
concept of European citizen was inserted in the Treaties. In view of the ECJ’s characterization 
of European citizenship as the “fundamental status of nationals of the Member States,” it 
comes as little surprise that no transitional arrangements apply to Articles 12 and 18 EC.24 
Since, the nationals of the EU-8 are European citizens from the moment of accession, they 
have not merely the possibility, but also the right of entry, exit and residence for up to three 
months under Directive 2004/38/EC.25 Moreover, Article 40 of both the Act of Accession f 
2003 and the Act of Accession of 2005 explicitly state that national rules imposed by the 
acceding Member States during the transitional period shall not lead to border controls 
between Member States and therefore hamper the proper functioning of the internal market. 
The conclusion must be that the borders of a Member State cannot function as a site of control 
for the national provisions that remain in force during the transitional period.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
22 See also Case 77/82, Peskeloglou [1983] ECR-1085, para.12 in which the Court held that the transitional 
provision in the Greek Act of Accession constituted a erogation of the free movement of workers and therefore 
had to be interpreted restrictively.  
23 Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of services, OJ 1997, 
L18/1. Note that Germany and Austria are allowed to apply restrictions on the cross-border provision of services 
in certain sensitive sectors as provided by para. 2(13) of the EU-8 annexes to the Accession Treaty 2003, as well 
para. 1(13) of the Country Annexes to the Accession Treaty 2005. 
24 See for instance Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I-6193, para. 31 and Case C-138/02, Collins [2004] 
ECR I-2703, para. 61. 
25 Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 20. 
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2.3 Extension of the Free Movement of Persons to the EFTA countries 
 
In the previous chapter it was briefly noted that the freedom of movement of persons has been 
extended to the EEA countries, necessitating amendmts to the draft External Frontiers 
Convention. These countries all belong to the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). The 
EFTA was founded in 1960 by the Stockholm Convention by a number of non EC members 
as an economic counterbalance to the more politicaly driven EEC.26 Many of the EFTA 
Members, such as Austria, Finland and Sweden, have join d the EU over time. The EFTA 
currently comprises Liechtenstein, Norway, Iceland Switzerland.  
Between the individual EFTA countries and the EC a system of free trade agreements 
was put into place. In April 1984, at a ministerial meeting between the EFTA countries and 
the EC on the occasion of the final implementation of these free trade agreements, the 
ministers issued the Luxembourg Declaration, which stressed the importance of further 
cooperation and called for the creation of a “dynamic and homogeneous European Economic 
Space”.27 It was a good five years later that, on the initiative of Commission President 
Jacques Delors, the idea was relaunched and formal negotiations were opened.28 The 
Community, the Member States and the EFTA countries, concluded the European Economic 
Area (EEA) Agreement in May 1992.29 It allowed the EFTA countries to participate in the 
single market, including the free movement of persons, without joining the EU.30 The 
Annexes to the EEA agreement list the provisions of C mmunity legislation that apply to the 
EEA countries.  
 
After a negative vote in a referendum on the EEA agreement in Switzerland, the remaining 
EFTA countries joined the EEA Agreement.31 It entered into force on 1 January 1994. 
Switzerland however pursued its aim of obtaining access to the internal market through the 
negotiation of bilateral sector agreements. An agreement on the free movement of persons 
                                                
26 See: http://secretariat.efta.int/Web/Info_Kit/History. The founding members were: Austria, Denmark, Norway, 
Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the UK. Finland joined in 1961, Iceland in 1970, and Liechtenstein in 1991. 
27 Ministerial Meeting Between EFTA Countries and the EC and its Member States', EFTA Bull. 2/84, 6 (1984). 
28 Brandtner, B., ‘The ‘Drama’ of the EEA: Comments on Opinions 1/91 and 1/92, 2 EJIL 3 (1992), 302. 
29 Commission and Council Decision 94/1/EC, ECSC on the conclusion of the Agreement on the EEA between 
the European Communities, their Member States and Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden 
and Switzerland, OJ 1994, L1/1. 
30 See Part III of the EEA Agreement on the free movement of persons, services and establishment, in particular 
on the free movement of workers Article 28(5) read in conjunction with Annex V.  
31 Commission and Council Decision 94/2/EC, ECSC on the conclusion of the Protocol adjusting the Agreement 
on the EEA between the European Communities, their Member States and Austria, Finland, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein, Norway and Sweden, OJ 1994, L1/571. 
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was signed in 1999 and entered into force 1 June 2002.32  Its initial duration was seven years, 
after a positive referendum on 8 February 2009 the agr ement was renewed indefinitely.33  
 The Agreement does not simply copy the Community provisions on free movement as 
does the EEA Agreement.34 It does not make explicit reference to the EC legislation on the 
free movement of persons, but rephrases and restructures the rights contained therein in 
Annex I. The right of entry is laid down in Article 3 of the Agreement, to be read together 
with Article 1 of Annex I. The Agreement also lacks an institutional framework, such as the 
EEA agreement, with a Court and Surveillance Authori y. 
 It is important to note that the EEA Agreement explicitly provides that a country 
becoming a member of the EU shall also apply to become party to the EEA Agreement.35 
Article 6(5) of the 2003 Act of Accession, and Article 6(6) of the 2005 Act of Accession 
reiterate this for the accession countries. The Swiss agreement, following standard treaty 
practice, is silent on enlargement.  
 
Although the EEA and the EC-Switzerland agreement are mixed agreements, i.e. covering 
Community and Member State competences and therefor signed by both, the Acts of 
Accession stipulate that accession of the new Member States to such agreements is to be 
agreed by the conclusion of a protocol between the Council, acting unanimously on behalf of 
the Member States, and the third country or countries concerned. A 2004 EEA Enlargement 
Agreement was signed by the EC, the Member States and the EEA countries, on 3 July 2003 
and entered into force provisionally as of 1 May 2004, the date of enlargement.36 The 2007 
EEA Enlargement Agreement was signed on 25 July 2007 and is currently in the process of 
ratification. Pending its ratification it is applied provisionally as of 1 August 2007.37  
 Two protocols to the Agreement on the free movement of persons with Switzerland 
have extended the rights contained in the Agreement to the Member States that acceded in 
2004 and 2007 respectively.38 In a referendum on 25 September 2005, the Swiss voters, 
                                                
32 Agreement between the EC and its Member States, of the one part, and Switzerland, of the other, on the free 
movement of persons, OJ 2002, L114/6. 
33 Article 25(2), ibid. 
34 Peers, S., ‘The EC-Switzerland Agreement on Free Movement of Persons: Overview and Analysis’, 2 EJML 
(2000), 128. 
35 Article 128, EEA Agreement. 
36 2004 EEA Enlargement Agreement, OJ 2004, L130/3.   
37 2007 EEA Enlargement Agreement, OJ 2007, L221/1.  
38 Protocol to the Agreement between the Community and its Member States, of the one part, and Switzerland, of 
the other, on the free movement of persons regarding the participation, as contracting parties, of [EU-10] 
pursuant to their Accession to the EU, OJ 2006 L89/30 and the Protocol to the Agreement betwe n the 
Community and its Member States, of the one part, and Switzerland, of the other, on the free movement of 
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approved of the extension of the agreements to the EU-10. On 8 February 2009, they 
approved the extension to Romania and Bulgaria, in the same referendum that ended the 
sunset clause of Article 25(2) of the Agreement. Both in the case of the agreements on the 
EEA enlargement and the extension of the scope of the Agreement on the free movement of 
persons with Switzerland, transitional arrangements similar to or the same as those found in 
the Acts of Accession have been put in place.  
 The relations amongst the EFTA countries are governed by the revised EFTA 
Convention , which was signed in Vaduz on 21 June 2001 and mirrors the sectoral agreements 
between Switzerland and the EU. It entered into force on 1 June 2002, the same day as the 
Switzerland-EU agreements.  
 
The EEA agreement and the EC-Switzerland Agreement have enlarged the area of free 
movement of persons with the territory of the third countries parties to these agreements, 
placing some of the borders of the area of free move ent beyond actual EC territory. The 
Community legislator may however adopt new EC legisation or amend existing rules, and the 
ECJ may give an interpretation, all of which raise th questions as to how to ensure the 
uniform application of the acquis also in this wider area of free movement of persons.    
 The EEA Agreement establishes an EEA Joint Committee, consisting of the 
Contracting Parties’ representatives, which in order to “guarantee legal security and 
homogeneity of the EEA”, must reach agreement on amend ents to the EEA Annexes 
necessitated by new Community legislation. In case of disagreement, the Agreement 
ultimately provides for a suspension of the affected part, however maintaining all rights that 
may have already arisen under the Agreement for individuals.39 
The Joint Committee further keeps under constant review the development of the case 
law of the ECJ and the EFTA Court.40 If the Joint Committee does not succeed in preserving 
the homogeneous interpretation of the Agreement within two months after a difference in the 
case law of the two Courts has been brought before it, it may agree to bring the case before 
the ECJ.41 If disagreement persists for six months and the parties have not agreed to bring the 
                                                                                                                                              
persons, regarding the participation of the Bulgaria nd Romania pursuant to their accession to the EU, OJ 2009, 
L124/53. 
39 Article 102, EEA Agreement. 
40 Article 105(2), EEA Agreement. The draft EEA agreement envisaged a single EEA court, but in Opinion 1/91, 
the ECJ ruled that such judicial mechanism would infringe Article 164 EEC of the Treaty: Opinion 1/91 on the 
draft EEA Agreement [1991] ECR I-6079, para. 3. 
41 Article 111(3), EEA Agreement. 
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case before the ECJ, they may either resort to safegu rd measures42 or apply the procedure 
that may eventually lead to a suspension of the relevant part of the Agreement.43 
The EC-Switzerland Agreement provides for a Joint Committee consisting of 
Contracting Parties’ representatives, but otherwise lacks an institutional structure like that of 
the EEA. It contains much less elaborate provisions t  ensure the homogenous application of 
the Agreement. Article 16(1) provides that parties must “take all measures necessary to ensure 
that rights and obligations equivalent to those contained in the legal acts of the European 
Community to which reference is made are applied in relations between them.” Article 16(2) 
states that in relation to “concepts of Community law, account shall be taken of the relevant 
case law of the Court of Justice prior to the date of signature.” Article 17 states that 
Contracting Parties shall inform each other through the Joint Committee, when initiating 
legislation in a field covered by the Agreement and in case of a change in the case law. The 
Joint Committee is limited to an “exchange of views” in such cases. Presumably in case of 
serious disagreement jeopardizing the homogenous implementation of the Agreement, a 
revision under Article 18 would be required.  
 
3. Schengenland: The Territorial Scope of the Schengen Acquis 
 
3.1. The Territorial Scope of the Schengen Agreements 
 
Let us now turn to the second set of borders that we identified in the previous chapter, the 
Schengen borders. Prior to the Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force 1 May 1999, 
all Member States had acceded to the Schengen Conventions, with the exception of the UK 
and Ireland.44 Neither of the Schengen Agreements contains an explicit clause determining 
the territorial scope of the Agreements. Instead, reference is made throughout the text to the 
territories of the Contracting states. Article 138 of the Schengen Implementation Convention 
did state that it applied only to the European territory of France and the Netherlands. A 
French Declaration to the Treaty of Amsterdam repeated once more the exclusion of the non-
                                                
42 Article 111(3) read in conjunction with Article 113, EEA Agreement. 
43 Article 111(3) read in conjunction with Article 102, EEA Agreement. 
44 Italy (signed 27 November 1990), Spain and Portugal (signed 25 June 1991), Greece (signed 6 November 
1992) and Denmark, Finland and Sweden (signed 19 December 1996), all are included in the Schengen acquis as 
published in the OJ 2000, L 239/1. 
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European territory of the French state. In practice here are no border checks with Monaco, 
San Marino and Vatican City, whose borders can therefore be considered e facto external 
borders. Border checks do however exist in the caseof Andorra.   
  A number of the association agreements through which t e Member States joined the 
Schengen cooperation contain special arrangements for specific parts of their territory. Article 
1(e) of the “Declaration on the towns of Ceuta and Melilla” to the 1991 Accession Agreement 
of Spain states that border checks on persons departing from these Spanish enclaves situated 
in North-Africa, would remain in force, independent of whether their destination lies in 
mainland Spain or any of the other Contracting Parties. The enclaves nevertheless have to be 
considered Schengen territory. The Schengen acquis fully applies in Ceuta and Melilla and 
both towns are mentioned as authorised border crossing points in the forerunner to the 
Schengen Borders Code (SBC).45 
 A Joint Declaration to the 1992 Accession Agreement of Greece states that the 
contracting parties shall take into account the special religious and constitutional status of 
Mount Athos, a semi-autonomous monastic republic from which women are banned. 
 Article 5(1) of the 1996 Accession Agreement of Denmark states that the agreement 
shall not apply to the Faeroe Islands and Greenland. Article 5(2) however states that because 
of the cooperation within the Nordic Passport Union between Iceland, Norway, Sweden, 
Finland and Denmark, persons travelling between these parts of Denmark and any of the other 
Schengen countries shall not be subject to border ch cks. In practice therefore the borders of 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands constitute Schengen ext rnal borders.46 A joint statement in 
the Final Act to the Accession Agreement provides that he agreement would only enter into 
force once it was established that rules necessary for the implementation of effective control 
and surveillance measures at the external borders of the Faeroe Islands and Greenland had 
been put into place.47  
 
 
 
                                                
45 Common Manual, OJ 2002, C313/133. Thanks to Paula García Andrade for pointing this out. The Schengen 
Borders Code in Article 36, specifically mentions that it shall not affect the special arrangements for Ceuta and 
Melilla, which would have been superfluous had they not been Schengen territory. 
46 Kjaer, K., ‘How Many  Borders in the EU’, in: Groen ndijk, K.., et al. (Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders 
(The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), 180. 
47 See on the practical difficulties at national level: Kjaer, K., ibid., 184. 
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3.2 United Kingdom and Ireland 
 
The Protocol to the Treaty of Amsterdam on the application of certain aspects of Article 7a of 
EC Treaty to the UK and Ireland brought a political so ution to the disagreement over the 
interpretation of an “area without frontiers” in Article 14 EC. The protocol seems to imply 
that this must be understood as an area without internal border controls, stating that Article 14 
notwithstanding, the UK and Ireland will be allowed to exercise such controls at its internal 
borders as it may consider it necessary to verify the right to enter under Community law and 
to determine whether or not to grant other persons permission to enter. References to the UK 
include those European territories for whose external relations the United Kingdom is 
responsible.  
 The protocol also endorses the Common Travel Area between Ireland and the UK. The 
Common Travel Area finds its legal basis in unpublished administrative agreements from 
1922 and 1952.48 As Ryan notes it formed a pragmatic response to the practical and political 
difficulties linked to the management of the UK-Ireland land border.49 Maintaining this 
passport free travel area with the UK, formed the main reason for Ireland not to join the 
Schengen cooperation. However, this reason may now lose force as the Common Travel Area 
seems to be coming to an end.50 The UK Government has proposed to introduce checks on 
passengers and their documents on sea and air routes t  and from Ireland. It did not however 
intend to introduce fixed immigration controls at the land border.  
 
The position of the UK and Ireland in relation to the Schengen acquis has been regulated in 
the Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union 
(Schengen Protocol). A separate “Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland” regulates 
the position of these Member States as regards the broader cooperation in justice and home 
affairs under Title IV EC (Title IV Protocol).  
 The Schengen Protocol provides in Article 4 that te UK and Ireland can “at any time 
request to take part in some or all of the provision  f the Schengen acquis,” depending on a 
unanimous vote in the Council. On the basis of thisarticle, the Council has adopted two 
decisions, one for the UK and one for Ireland respectiv ly, outlining the specific parts of the 
                                                
48 See Ryan, B., ‘The Common Travel Area between Britain and Ireland’, 64 MLR 6 (2001), 855-874. 
49 Ibid., 870. 
50 ‘New border control will abolish free movement betw en UK and Ireland’ (The Times, 25 October 2007) and 
‘Britain and Ireland agree to tighten border check’ (The Times, 25 July 2008). The UK Border Agency’s 
Consultation Paper, ‘Strengthening the Common Travel Ar a’, was published on 24 July 2008. The  UK 
Government’s response on 15 January 2009. 
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Schengen acquis in which these countries had requested to participate and in which they were 
allowed to do so by the Council.51 
 Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol states that for “proposals and initiatives to build 
upon the Schengen acquis” the relevant provisions of the Treaties apply. This means that for 
the adoption of measures that develop parts of the Schengen acquis, the decision-making 
procedure is determined by the legal basis assigned to the part of the Schengen acquis in 
question.52 Moreover, since the UK and Ireland are in principle non-participants in the 
Schengen acquis, the provisions on enhanced (or closer) cooperation apply.53 For this reason, 
the second subparagraph continues that in the context of measures developing the Schengen 
acquis, “where either Ireland or the United Kingdom or both have not notified the President 
of the Council in writing within a reasonable period that they wish to take part,” the 
authorization for enhanced cooperation is deemed to be granted to the Member States that 
fully apply the Schengen acquis and “to Ireland or the United Kingdom where either of them 
wishes to take part in the areas of cooperation in question.” 
The Title IV Protocol establishes in Article 1 that the UK and Ireland are not bound by 
measures adopted under Title IV EC. Article 3 of the same protocol makes it possible for 
either the UK or Ireland to notify the President of the Council within three months after a 
proposal has been presented to the Council on the basis of Title IV that it wishes to participate 
in the adoption thereof, “whereupon it shall be entitled to do so.” Under this protocol the UK 
and Ireland seem to have a generous opt-in to measures that have a legal basis in Title IV EC. 
However, Article 7 of the same Title IV Protocol makes it clear that this provision is without 
prejudice to the Schengen Protocol. Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol must therefore be 
considered a the lex specialis to Article 3 of the Title IV Protocol. The latter applies only to 
legislation with a legal basis in Title IV which does not fall within the notion of “proposals 
and initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis” in the meaning of the Schengen Protocol.    
 
In Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05, the UK contested its exclusion by the Council from two 
regulations which where wholly or in part based on Article 62(2)(a) EC, the legal basis in 
                                                
51 See Council Decision 2000/365/EC concerning the request of the UK to take part in some of the provisin  of 
the Schengen acquis, OJ 2000, L 131/43 and Council Decision 2002/192/EC concerning Ireland’s request to take 
part in some of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2002, L 64/20. 
52 See Council Decision 1999/436/EC determining the legal basis for each of the provisions or decisions which 
constitute the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/17. 
53 Article 43 EU. 
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Title IV for measures on the crossing of the external borders of the Member States.54 The 
Council argued that they formed a development of that part of the Schengen acquis for which 
the Council had not granted the UK previous permission to participate. Decision 
2000/365/EC, the decision taken on the basis of Article 4 of the Schengen Protocol which 
determines the areas of the Schengen acquis in which the UK participates, does not include 
the rules relating to the crossing of the external borders of the Schengen area.55 The UK had 
however argued that application of Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol, allowing them to 
participate in the development of Schengen developing measures, was independent of prior 
application of Article 4 (“independence thesis”). It based its argument in part on Declaration 
No 46 on Article 5 attached to the Schengen Protocol. This declaration states that Member 
States shall make every effort to facilitate action amongst all Member States in the domains of 
the Schengen acquis, in particular (though not exclusively) where Ireland and the UK have 
opted-in to parts of that acquis. 
 
The Court held that the classification of a measure as developing the Schengen acquis must, 
like the choice of legal basis, be based on objectiv  factors which are amenable to judicial 
review in particular the aim and content of the act, s both the choice of legal basis and the 
classification of an act as developing the Schengen acquis determine the procedure for its 
adoption. 56 It further ruled that the reference to “proposals nd initiatives to build upon the 
Schengen acquis” refers to measures building upon the Schengen acquis within the meaning 
of Article 4. Since these measures must be consistet with the provisions they implement, 
they presuppose the acceptance of both those provisions and the principles on which those 
provisions are based.57 The purpose of Article 5 is to allow the UK and Ireland to refrain from 
participating in the development of the parts of the Schengen acquis to which they had opted-
in under Article 4. According to the Court this interpretation of Articles 4 and 5 ensures the 
effet utile of these provisions, by allowing on the one hand the UK and Ireland to opt-in to 
                                                
54 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004, L 349/1 and Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel 
documents issued by Member States, OJ 2004, L 385/375. For the more specific content of these regulations and 
particulars of these cases see Chapter VIII. 
55 Council Decision 2000/365/EC, supra note 51. 
56 Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-1145, para. 75-77 and Case C-137/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR 
I-11593, para. 54-56. See the ECJ’s established case law in Case C-300/89, Commission v Council (“Titanium 
dioxide”) [1991] ECR I-2867. See for further discussion: Rijpma, J., ‘Annotation to Cases C-77/05 and C-
137/05’, 45 CMLRev 3 (2008). See for a very critical note: Chalmers, D., ‘Cut off from Europe: the Fog 
surrounding Luxembourg’, 33 ELRev 2 (2008), 135-136. 
57 Case C-77/05, ibid., para. 68 and Case C-137/05, ibid, para. 50. 
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parts of the Schengen acquis, whilst on the other hand overcoming any possible re uctance 
these countries may have to do so for fear of being bound by a further development of the 
acquis.58  
 
The UK had submitted in the alternative that Article 5 would apply only to “Schengen-
integral measures.” Schengen integral measures would then be those measures that by their 
nature would require prior acceptance of the underlying acquis, such as amendments to the 
acquis itself. The article would however not apply to Schengen-related measures which, 
although linked to the development of the acquis, were capable of autonomous application 
and as such did not pose a threat to the integrity of that very acquis. This argument was 
accepted by the Advocate General in her opinions.59 The Court however ruled that this 
distinction, even if the UK had argued that it was merely an interpretative tool, lacked a basis 
in the Treaties or secondary Community law.60  
The Court instead gave a very broad interpretation of the phrase “proposals and 
initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis,” to the effect that it covers any measure that 
may, judged by its content and purpose, render more effective parts of the Schengen acquis.61 
Under this construction very few measures that have their legal basis in Title IV EC will fail 
to qualify as a Schengen developing measure and consequently the scope of the Title IV 
protocol has been drastically reduced.  
Arguably, the Court should have paid more attention o the question of whether the 
UK’s participation in the contested regulations would have impeded the “practical 
operability” of the Schengen acquis.62 Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol, as amended by the 
Lisbon Treaty, introduces this criterion in relation to the UK and Ireland’s participation in the 
Schengen acquis. The Court could have taken the fact that a measur is capable of 
autonomous application into account as an element in determining whether a measure 
constitutes a proposal or initiative to build upon the Schengen acquis.  
Despite the fact that the Court interpreted the purpose of Article 4 as to ensure the 
maximum participation of Member States in the Schengen acquis, its actual purpose seems to 
be to provide the Schengen Member States with a veto power as regards the participation of 
                                                
58 Case C-77/05, ibid., para. 66. 
59 Opinions of AG Trstenjak, delivered on 10 July 2007. The AG here followed the view expressed by Thym, D.,  
Ungleichzeitigkeit und europäisches Verfassungsrecht (Baden-Baden, Nomos Verlag, 2004), 98. 
60 Case C-77/05, supra note 56, para. 73 and Case C-137/05, supra note 56, para. 52.  
61 Case C-77/05, ibid, para. 85 and Case C-137/05, ibid, para. 65. 
62 See the new Article 5(3) of the Schengen Protocol. 
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the UK and Ireland in parts of the Schengen acquis.63 Here one could argue that the 
intergovernmental origins of the Schengen cooperation shine through. One could imagine a 
Member State like Spain to be highly unwilling to give up such power, bearing in mind the 
continuing disagreement with the UK over the sovereignty of Gibraltar.64 
Considering that it is unlikely in the foreseeable future that the UK will subscribe to 
the abolition of controls at its border as a means of facilitating the free movement of persons, 
the Court may well have blocked the UK’s participaton in parts of the Schengen acquis 
indefinitely.65 However, the Court’s judgments may in the long run co tribute to the UK and 
Ireland’s integration in the Schengen acquis by confronting these Member States with 
undesirable consequences of their non-participation in parts thereof. In view of the extensive 
opt-outs negotiated in the Lisbon Treaty this should be assessed positively.  
 
3.3  Denmark 
 
Denmark’s reservation on participation in the field of asylum and migration dates back to the 
Edinburgh Decision attached to the Maastricht Treaty which was the result of a negative 
referendum on the Maastricht Treaty earlier that year. A “Protocol on the position of 
Denmark” to the Treaty of Amsterdam regulates the position of this Member State as regards 
Title IV EC. It clearly states in Article 1 that Denmark does not take part in the adoption of 
measures under this title.  
 Article 3 of the Schengen Protocol makes it clear that Denmark’s rights and 
obligations under the Schengen acquis remain unchanged, i.e. on the basis of obligations 
under international law. Hence, the Danish territory, with the exceptions as laid down in the 
CISA, continued to form part of the borderless Schengen Area. The legal basis for this then 
seems to be Article 3(1) of the Schengen Protocol, rather than the original Schengen 
Agreements, which would explain why the enlargement of the EU did not necessitate 
additional agreements under public international law with the acceding Member States. 
Where the Schengen area is however expanded through the association of third countries with 
the Schengen cooperation such additional agreements would be necessary.66  
                                                
63 Case C-77/05, supra note 56, para. 67.  
64 See section 4.3 below. 
65 Notice also that the Protocol on the application of certain aspects of Art. 14 of the Treaty establishing the 
European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland has been maintained by the Treaty of Lisbon.  
66 Presumably however only in respect of those parts of he Schengen acquis that find their legal basis in Title IV 
EC. On a different interpretation of Article 3, second paragraph of the Schengen Protocol: Hanf, D., ‘Flexibility 
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 Regarding proposals building upon the Schengen acquis under the First Pillar, 
Denmark has the possibility to opt-in to these measures within six months.67 Measures under 
Title IV EC which are not considered a development of the Schengen acquis are outside the 
scope of the possibility to opt-in.68 Denmark could, of course, become affiliated to such 
measures on the basis of agreements under pubic international law.  
 Under the Lisbon Treaty the Protocol on Denmark would cover the whole area of 
freedom, security and justice (AFSJ), so including also the former Title VI EU on police and 
judicial cooperation. Article 8 of the Protocol provides however that Denmark can unilaterally 
amend the Protocol, bringing into effect Annex I tothe Protocol, which would allow Denmark 
to opt-in, in a way similar to the UK and Ireland to measures developing the Schengen acquis.   
 
3.4 Schengen Associated Countries 
 
Notwithstanding its incorporation into EU law, a number of third countries have joined the 
Schengen area. It was noted above that the borders of the area of free movement in some 
instances are to be found outside EC territory. This also holds true for the external borders of 
the Schengen area in the case of the Schengen Associated Countries (SAC). 
 
Norway and Iceland 
 
At the same time at which Denmark, Finland and Sweden joined the Schengen Agreements, 
19 December 1996, Norway and Iceland concluded a Cooperation Agreement with the 
Schengen Contracting Parties.69 This agreement was essentially aimed to retain the 
arrangements in place for the movement of persons within the Nordic Passport Union. The 
free travel area between the Scandinavian countries was established in 1952 and abolished 
border controls with the 1957 Nordic Passport Control Agreement, effective as of 1 May 
                                                                                                                                              
Clauses in the Founding Treaties from Rome to Nice’, in: De Witte, B. et al. (Eds),  The Many Faces of 
Differentiation in EU Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2001), 18. 
67 Article 5, Protocol on the Position of Denmark. 
68 This could be an additional reason for which the Court decided to interpret broadly the notion of “pro osals 
and initiatives to build upon the Schengen acquis. Denmark would have been excluded from opting intothese 
measures had they been classified as not developing the Schengen acquis, while it does participate in the 
Schengen cooperation.  
69 Cooperation Agreement between [the] Contracting Parties to the Schengen Agreement and Schengen 
Convention and Iceland and Norway as regards the abolishment of control on persons at the common borders 
(translation), Trb 1997, 133.  
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1958.70 Norway and Iceland participated in the Schengen Executive Committee, but did not 
have a vote.71  
 Article 6 of the Schengen Protocol stated that Norway and Iceland were to be 
associated with the implementation and development of the Schengen acquis. On 18 May 
1999 both countries concluded an Agreement to this effect with the EU, which entered into 
force 26 June 2000.72 Article 14 of the Agreement excludes Svalbard (Spitsbergen, 
Norway).73 On 1 December 2000 the Council decided that, as from 25 March 2001, the 
Schengen acquis arrangements would apply in full to the five countries of the Nordic Passport 
Union, meaning that all controls were lifted on that d te.74  Since the EEA is however not a 
customs union, checks on goods, for instance against co traband, may still be carried out and 
involve checks on persons.75  
 The Agreement establishes a Mixed Committee, consisti g of the representatives of 
the Contracting Parties, which discusses matters related to the Schengen acquis and the 
development thereof.76 It is informed of any legislative proposal relevant to the agreement.77 
Council Decision 1999/437/EC determines in Article 1(a) that the provisions of the Schengen 
Association Agreement shall apply to proposals developing the rules on the crossing by 
persons of the external borders, including the rules on border controls.78 
 Although the Commission is held to consult with the experts of Norway and Iceland in 
the drafting phase, it is clearly stated that the adoption of new acts or measures is reserved to 
the competent institutions of the EU.79 These acts must be implemented in the internal legl 
order of Norway and Iceland and will, unless stated otherwise, enter into force at the same 
                                                
70 1952 Protocol concerning the abolition of passports for travel between Sweden, Denmark, Finland and 
Norway, UNTS 1954, 2655 and 1957 Convention between Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden concerning 
the waiver of passport control at the intra-Nordic frontiers (translation), UNTS 1959, 4660. 
71 Article 2(2), 1996 Cooperation Agreement, supra note 69. 
72 Agreement concluded by the Council and Iceland and Norway concerning the latters’ association with the
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/36 (hereinafter:  
‘Schengen Association Agreement NO/IS’). Since thisagreement finds its legal basis directly in the Protocol 
there was no need to adopt separate Council decisions for those parts of the acquis falling under the First Pillar 
and those under the Third Pillar.  
73 See in more detail on the position of the five Nordic countries within the Schengen Framework: Kjaer, K., 
supra note 46, 169. 
74 Council Decision 2000/777/EC on the application of the Schengen acquis in Denmark, Finland and Sweden 
and in Iceland and Norway, OJ 2000, L309/24. 
75 Case E-2/97 Maglite [1997] EFTA Court Report 127, para. 25. 
76 Articles 3 and 4, Schengen Association Agreement NO/IS 
77 Article 5, ibid.  
78 Council Decision 1999/437/EC on certain arrangements for the application of the Agreement concluded by the 
Council of the EU and Iceland and Norway concerning the association of those two States with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/31. 
79 Articles 6 and 8(1), Schengen Association Agreement NO/IS.  
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time for all Contracting Parties.80 Article 8(2) foresees in the procedure to be followed in case 
Norway or Iceland need to fulfil constitutional requirements before they can become 
binding.81 
 If either Iceland or Norway notifies the Commission that it will not implement an act 
in its internal legal order, the Agreement must be considered as terminated for the respective 
state, unless the Mixed Committee determines otherwis .82 The Agreement stipulates that the 
acceptance of EU legislative measures developing the Schengen acquis creates rights and 
obligations not only between the Community and its Member States on the one hand and 
Norway and Iceland on the other, but also between Ic land and Norway themselves.83 The 
fact that the agreement creates rights between states indicates that these rights are not directly 
conferred upon the EU/SAC citizen, but require implementation in the national legal order of 
Norway and Iceland.  
 The Mixed Committee closely monitors the development of the relevant case law of 
the ECJ and the competent courts of Iceland and Norway relating to the provisions of the 
Schengen acquis.84 Iceland and Norway are entitled to submit statements and written 
observations in cases before the ECJ in prejudicial ases on questions concerning the 
Schengen acquis.85 In case of a substantial difference in the case law or the application of the 
acquis by the national authorities, the Mixed Committee has two months to seek a way to 
ensure a uniform application and interpretation.86 If is does not succeed in doing so, Article 
11 determines that the Mixed Committee shall at ministerial level seek to settle to the dispute. 
If after a maximum of 120 days it has not succeeded in oing so, the agreement is to be 
considered terminated in relation to Norway or Iceland, depending on the country concerned. 
 More than with the EEA Agreement, the continuation of the Schengen Association 
Agreement is dependent on the unconditional acceptance of the Schengen acquis. This could 
be explained by the more limited scope of the Schengen acquis, but possibly also by the 
strong interest Norway and Iceland had in continuing the Nordic Passport Union as well as in 
participating in Schengen’s flanking measures, such as access to the Schengen Information 
System (SIS).87 
 
                                                
80 Article 8(1), ibid. 
81 In that case only Norway is held to apply the act provisionally, where possible: Article 8(2)(c), ibid.  
82 Article 8(4), ibid. This would have to imply a suspension of the Nordic Passport Union.  
83 Article 8(3), ibid. 
84 Article 9(1), ibid. 
85 Article 9(2), ibid. 
86 Article 10, ibid. 
87 This security based motivation will be discussed in more detail in Chapter VII. 
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Switzerland and Liechtenstein 
 
Switzerland signed a Schengen Association Agreement with the EU on 26 October 2005, after 
the Swiss population had endorsed the Government’s intention to adhere in a referendum on 5 
June 2005.88 On the basis of Article 14(2) parts of the agreement were applied on a 
provisional basis.89 The Agreement is the first mixed pillar agreement, meaning it was 
concluded by both the EC and EU.90 The agreement entered into force on 1 March 2008, 
controls at the land borders were lifted on 12 Decemb r 2008 and at air borders on 29 March 
2009.91 Like Norway and Iceland, Switzerland is not in a Customs Union with the Schengen 
Member states which means that checks on goods at the in ernal Schengen border remain 
possible. 
 The Agreement with Switzerland mirrors the Agreement between the EU and Norway 
and Iceland. It sets up a second Mixed Committee and provides for the same procedures to 
ensure the uniform application of the Schengen acquis and the eventual suspension of the 
agreement.92 The only difference can be found in Article 7(2)(b) and flows from 
Switzerland’s constitutional tradition of direct democracy. In case a positive vote in a 
referendum is required in order for an act to become binding, Switzerland will have two years 
to inform the Council on whether it will implement the act or not. Where no referendum is 
necessary, but can nevertheless be called, Switzerland will notify the Council after the expiry 
of the referendum deadline. From the moment of entry i o force of the act until Switzerland 
makes its notification, it shall, where possible, implement the act provisionally. If this is not 
possible, causing a disruption to the Schengen cooperation, the EU and EC may take 
proportionate and appropriate measures against Switzerland ensuring the smooth operation of 
Agreements. Council Decision 1999/437/EC applies by analogy to Switzerland on the basis of 
the Council’s Decision on the signature of the Schengen Association Agreement.93 
                                                
88 Agreement between the EU, the EC and Switzerland o the association of Switzerland with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2008, L53/52 (hereinafter: ‘Schengen 
Association Agreement CH/LI’) 
89 Articles 1, 3, 4, 5 and 6 and the first sentence of Article 7(2)(a); these articles however mainly con ern the 
setting up and functioning of the Mixed Committee.  
90 Council Decisions 2004/849/EC (sic) (OJ 2004, L368/26) and 2004/861/EC (OJ 2004, L370/78) on the 
signing, on behalf of the EU and the EC respectively, of the agreement with Switzerland concerning the 
association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis. 
91 Article 15, Schengen Association Agreement CH/LI read in conjunction with Council Decision 2008/903/EC 
on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis in Switzerland, OJ L327/15. 
92 In practice these two Mixed Committees meet as one, se  the Joint Declaration on Joint Meetings of Mixed 
Committees attached to the  Schengen Association Agreement CH/LI. 
93 Article 4(1), Council Decision 2004/860/EC on the signing, on behalf of the Community, and on the 
provisional application of certain provisions of the Agreement between the EU, the EC and Switzerland, 
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After the Swiss “yes” to Schengen, Liechtenstein also started negotiations on 
accession. Article 16 of the Agreement with Switzerland allowed Liechtenstein to join the 
agreement by means of a protocol, preventing the need to conclude a separate Agreement. On 
28 February 2008 the Council adopted the decision on the signature of such protocol.94  The 
protocol takes over mutatis mutandis the provisions of the Swiss Schengen Association 
Agreement.  
  
Relations between the Schengen Associated Countries, with Denmark and with non-Schengen 
Member States 
 
The Association Agreement with Norway and Iceland states that it replaces the previously 
existing Cooperation Agreement of 1996.95 While the Protocol on the Position of Denmark in 
Article 2 provides that no provision of any international agreement concluded by the 
Community pursuant to Title IV EC can bind Denmark, this Member State does seem bound 
by the Association Agreement between the EC and Norway and Iceland, which confirms our 
interpretation that the Schengen Protocol forms the legal basis under public international law 
for Denmark’s association to the Schengen acquis.96  
The Association Agreement with Switzerland explicitly mentions that Switzerland 
should conclude separate international agreements with Denmark, as well as with Norway and 
Iceland in order to create rights and obligations between all associated partners applying the 
Schengen acquis.97 Article 15(3) makes application of the Association Agreement, depending 
on the implementation of those agreements. Since the Schengen Association Agreements are 
                                                                                                                                              
concerning the Swiss association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, 
OJ 2004, L370/78. 
94 Council Decision 2008/261/EC on the signature, on behalf of the EC, and on the provisional application of 
certain provisions of the Protocol between the EU, C, Switzerland and Liechtenstein on the accession of 
Liechtenstein to the Agreement between the EU, EC and Switzerland on Switzerland’s association with the
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2008, L83/3. See for the text of the 
Protocol: Council Document 16462/06. 
95 Article 18, Schengen Association Agreement NO/IS. 
96 Council Decision 1999/439/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement with Iceland and Norway concerning the 
latters’ association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, 
L176/35 does not refer to any special position of Denmark. Article 6 of the Schengen Protocol, legal basis for the 
Agreement, refers back to the Member States mentioned in Article 1 of the Protocol which include Denmark. 
97 Article 13(1) and 13(2) respectively, Schengen Association Agreement CH/LI. See for the text of the 
Agreement between Switzerland, Iceland and Norway of 17 December 2004: 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/as/2008/529.pdf and for the text of the Agreement between Switzerland and Denmark 
of 28 April 2005, relating to that part of the Scheng n acquis with a legal basis in Title IV EC: 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/sr/i3/0.360.314.1.de.pdf   
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signed by the EC/EU only, successive enlargements of the EU have not necessitated 
agreements between the new Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries.98  
 In the case of Switzerland, which is not under an obligation in the agreement on free 
movement with the Community to enlarge the area of free movement in case of accession, 
this could lead to the awkward situation of a borderless area, without free movement rights.99 
Even if neither of the two Association Agreements explicitly links the lifting of the internal 
borders to the internal market, the official logic is still that a borderless area is to foster the 
free movement of persons.100   
 From a formalistic legal point of view the Schenge Agreement could remain in force. 
Switzerland would then have to interpret the reference to “persons enjoying the Community 
right of free movement” as including nationals of those new Member States.101 Nevertheless, 
before the Swiss referendum on the extension of the free movement right to Bulgarian and 
Romanian citizens, JLS Commissioner Barrot was already quoted saying that a negative 
outcome would probably have to result in the interruption of Switzerland’s presence in the 
Schengen area.102 
 On the basis of Article 6, second paragraph of the Schengen Protocol, the Council has 
concluded an agreement with Norway and Iceland, in order to establish the rights and 
obligations between the UK and Ireland on the one hand, and Iceland and Norway on the 
other, in domains of the Schengen acquis which apply to these States.103 Although one would 
expect the necessity of a similar agreement between th  UK/Ireland and Switzerland, this is 
not foreseen in the Association Agreement. Rather the preamble of the Association 
Agreement refers to the special position of the UK and Ireland, and it is stated in Article 15(1) 
that the UK and Ireland are involved in the Council Decision on whether Switzerland fulfils 
                                                
98 If a SAC were to disagree with an enlargement of the Schengen area, it could probably invoke the clausula 
rebus sic stantibus doctrine, which would however necessitate the termination of the Association Agreement.  
99 The reverse situation of course does exist, see the case of the UK and Ireland.   
100 Note also the link between the Schengen Agreements and Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing 
the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Memb r State responsible for examining an asylum application 
lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country ational, OJ 2003, L50/1 (“Dublin II Regulation”). All 
SAC have associated themselves with this Regulation through agreements with the Community. See Article 7, 
Schengen Association Agreement NO/IS. The Schengen Association Agreement CH/LI in Article 15(4) states 
even more clearly that it shall only be applied if the Dublin rules are implemented. See also Chapter V. 
101 However one could perhaps argue that at the external borders (airports), Switzerland could refuse entry to 
nationals of the new Member States. Here a parallel may be drawn with Schengen visas with limited territorial 
validity, which allow for entry into the issuing Member State alone, see Chapter VI.   
102 ‘Swiss-EU relations challenged by eastern workers r ferendum’ (EUObserver, 6 February 2009). 
103 Council Decision 2000/29/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement with Iceland and Norway on the 
establishment of rights and obligations between Ireland and the UK, on the one hand, and Iceland and Norway, 
on the other, in areas of the Schengen acquis which apply to these States, OJ 2000, L15/1. 
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the conditions of full implementation of the acquis to the extent that they participate in that 
acquis.  
  
3.5 Accession Member States  
 
Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol requires that the Schengen acquis be fully accepted by all 
States candidates for accession.104 This has been interpreted to mean that all new Member 
States need to fulfill the requirements of the acquis upon entry to the EU, in particular a high 
level of border control at the external border as required by Article 6 CISA.105 Unlike the UK, 
Ireland and Denmark, they do not have the opportunity to opt-out of parts of the Schengen 
acquis.  
Border controls are not lifted immediately upon accession. Their removal depends on 
a separate Council decision based upon “careful examination of the legal and practical 
readiness of the new Member States” individually.106 Consequently, the “old” Schengen 
Member States remain responsible for controls at what remain for the time being de facto 
external borders, i.e. the border between “old” and “new” Member States.107 Accession states 
have nevertheless been required to ensure a sufficiently high level of border control at the 
future external border. The SBC provides that Member States up to the date of full application 
of the Schengen acquis may jointly control their common internal borders, in which case a 
person may be stopped only once for the purpose of carrying out entry and exit checks.108 
The decision to lift border controls at the temporary external borders was considerably 
delayed since a new SIS, SIS II which was considered to be indispensible for the lifting of 
internal borders, was not operational on time.109 At the initiative of Slovenia and Portugal the 
                                                
104 The decision that accession countries would have to implement to Schengen acquis in full, has been identified 
as an important impetus for its integration by the Tr aty of Amsterdam: Lavenex, S. and Wallace, W., ‘Justice 
and Home Affairs: Towards a “European Public Order”?’, in: Wallace, H. et al., Policy Making in the European 
Union (Oxford, OUP, 2005), 465. 
105 Article 3(1), 2003 Act of Accession, OJ 2003, L236/33 and Article 4(1), 2005 Act of Accession, OJ 2005, 
L157/2003. See also: Borissova, L., ‘The Adoption of the Schengen and the Justice and Home Affairs Acquis: 
The Case of Bulgaria and Romania, 8 EFARev 1 (2003), 110-111. 
106 Chapter 24 on Justice and Home Affairs, acquis communautaire:  
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/negotiations_eu10_bg_ro/chapters/chap24/index.htm. Article 3(2) Act of 
Accession 2003 and 4(2), Act of Accession 2005, supra note 105. 
107 Also referred to as “temporary external borders”: Article 2(2), Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the 
External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as p rt of the General programme ‘Solidarity and 
Management of Migration Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/22 (hereinafter: ‘EBF’). 
108 Article 17(1), Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the 
movement of persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ 2006, L105/1. 
109 Council Document 9778/2/05, Council and Commission Action Plan implementing the Hague Programme.  
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EU10 Member States were therefore linked to SIS I, which was renamed SISI4ALL or 
SIS1+.110 Border checks have now been lifted at the internal borders of the EU10 countries, 
excluding Cyprus.111 Romania and Bulgaria are awaiting a Council Decision.  
 
4. Political or Legal Uncertainty regarding Member States’ Borders  
 
In a number of Member States there remains political and/or legal uncertainty as regards the 
demarcation of their borders, which will influence the location of both the Schengen external 
border and the external border of the area in which there is the Community free movement of 
persons. This section will discuss the situation at the borders of Cyprus, the Baltic States, 
Gibraltar and Slovenia.112 In the case of Cyprus the occupation of part of the island has 
necessitated a special regime for the application of the Schengen acquis. The unclear borders 
of Estonia and Latvia with Russia shows that this does not have to prevent the full application 
of the Schengen acquis. The Gibraltar border is of interest for it constitutes a Schengen 
external border, as well as simultaneously being a border between EU Member States at the 
same time. The disagreement between Slovenia and candidate Member State Croatia show 
that territorial disputes may have far reaching consequences in the context of enlargement.  
  
4.1 Cyprus 
 
The situation as regards Cyprus is legally complex, not merely for the presence of the UK 
sovereign bases. Since 1964 a UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has been 
present at the island to prevent clashes between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot population.113 
Since 1974, the island has been divided after a Greek-supported coup led to a Turkish 
                                                
110 As of 7 July 2007 all EU10 Member States, except Cyprus, got access to real SIS data: Council Decision 
2007/471/EC on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis relating to the SIS, OJ 2007, L179/46. 
111 Council Decision 2007/801/EC on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2007, 
L323/34.  
112 One could add to this list the conflicting claims over the waters separating Greece and Turkey and the ispute 
between Spain and Morocco on the sovereignty over the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla and four insular 
formations, including the delimitation of the waters off the coasts of these “presidios”. The reader is referred 
here to the work of Ahnish, F.A., The International Law of Maritime Boundaries and the Practice of States in 
the Mediterranean Sea (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993). A border conflict be ween Romania and Ukraine was 
recently adjudicated in Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania/Ukraine), ICJ Reports, judgment of 3 
February 2009, nyr.  
113 UNSC Resolution 186 (1964), UNSC Resolution 1642 (2005) extends the mandate of the UNFICYP to 15 
June 2006. 
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invasion and the occupation of the northern part of the island. The UN has since been 
patrolling a buffer zone, also referred to as the “green line” and ensuring that there is no 
alteration of the status quo along the two ceasefire lines drawn on 16 August 1974. In 1983 a 
Turkish Republic of North Cyprus was declared, but has been recognised only by Turkey.114  
  With the rejection by the Greek Cypriots of the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan’s 
Cyprus peace plan on 24 April 2004, hopes that a united Cyprus would join the EU vanished. 
The Helsinki European Council had nevertheless already decided that non-solution of the 
problem could not hinder the islands efforts to join the EU.115 As a result the protocol on 
Cyprus attached to the  Accession Treaty foresees in “the suspension of the application of the 
acquis in the areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the government of the Republic of 
Cyprus does not exercise effective control.”116 This situation is analogous to that of Germany 
before reunification.117  
The so-called “Green Line Regulation” provides for the terms under which the 
relevant provisions of EU law shall apply to the line between those areas in which the 
Government of the Republic of Cyprus exercises effectiv  control and those in which it does 
not.118 The Regulation states in recital 7 that the Green Line does not constitute an external 
border, but that “special rules should secure an equivalent standard of protection of the 
security of the EU with regard to illegal immigration and threats to public order.” The 
Republic of Cyprus is therefore held to carry out checks on all persons crossing the line with 
the aim of combating illegal immigration of third country nationals and to detect and prevent 
any threat to public security and public policy.119 The Regulation provides that all persons 
shall undergo at least one such check in order to es ablish their identity.120 This can be 
compared to the situation under the SBC.121 Article 2(5) of the Green Line Regulation 
provides that checks on persons at the boundary between the Eastern SBA and the areas not 
under effective control of Cyprus, are carried out by the UK in accordance with Article 5(2) 
of Protocol 3 to the Act of Accession. Part Four of the Annex states that the UK shall use 
mobile units to carry out external border surveillance between border crossing points and at 
                                                
114 UNSC Resolution 541(1983). 
115 European Council Conclusions, Helsinki, 11 December 1999, point 9(b). 
116 Article 1(1), Protocol No 10 to the Act of Accession of Cyprus, OJ 2003, L236/950. 
117 Skoutaris, N., ‘Differentiation in European Union Citizenship Law: The Cyprus Problem’, in: Inglis, K., and 
Ott, A. (Eds), The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity? (Groningen, Europa 
Law Publishing, 2005), 166. 
118 Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol No 10 of the Act of Accession 
(hereinafter: “Green Line Regulation”), OJ 2004, L161/128. 
119 Article 2(1), ibid. 
120 Article 2(2), ibid. 
121 Article 7, SBC. See in detail Chapter VI. 
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crossing points outside of normal opening hours, in a way which discourages people from 
circumventing the checks at crossing points. De facto the Green Line functions as a temporary 
external Schengen border as long as a solution to the Cyprus issue is not found.  
Meanwhile irregular migration from the northern part of the island into the part that is 
under the effective control of Cyprus has been ident fi d as a growing problem.122 The 
Cypriot authorities are reluctant to step up their su veillance of the line fearing that this may 
give it a more permanent character as an external border.123 The Commission in its Report on 
the Implementation of the Green Line Regulation called for a substantial strengthening, “also 
in view of the future participation of Cyprus in the Schengen area.”124 However, since the 
Green Line does not legally constitute an external border, important legislation for the 
management of the external borders such as financial assistance under the EBF or support 
from the European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States (Frontex) cannot be allocated for this purpose.  
  
4.2 The Baltic Countries 
 
A not fully demarcated Schengen border can be found in the Baltic. Lithuania signed a border 
treaty with Russia in 1997, which was ratified by Lithuania in 1999 and by Russia in 2003. 
However, the demarcation of the Russian-Estonian and Russian-Latvian border has been 
much more problematic. Border issues for Latvia and Estonia have involved “implicit 
assertions of their newly found independence and sovereignty,” while for Russia they have 
provided a means of expressing discontent on the enlargement of NATO and the treatment of 
the Russian minority in both countries.125  
In cases where the Latvian state border did not conform to bilateral agreements which 
were in force by 16 June 1940, the date on which Latvia was occupied by the Soviet Union, 
the Latvian government considered these borders as interim demarcation lines until new 
                                                
122 COM(2008) 529 final, Commission Communication, Annual Report on the implementation of Council 
Regulation (EC) 866/2004 of 29 April 2004 and the situation resulting from its application, 3-4. 
123 Ibid., 5. 
124 Ibid.  
125 Gromovs, J., ‘Latvia’s EU Accession and the Russian Border’, in: DeBardeleben, J. (Ed.), Soft or Hard 
Borders - Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), 184. The absence of a large 
Russian minority in Lithuania may explain why a border treaty was more readily concluded here. See in more 
detail on Estonia: Viktorova, J., ‘Transformation or Escalation? The Estonian-Russian Border Conflict and 
European Integration’ (Birmingham, EU Border Conflicts Studies WP 21, August 2006).  
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bilateral agreements would have been concluded. These interim demarcation lines ran west of 
the border established by a 1920 Peace Treaty between Russia and Latvia.  
A border treaty between Latvia and Russia was to be signed in May 2005. This Treaty 
recognised the de facto border as inviolable and contained no reference to the 1920 Peace 
Treaty. The Latvian government did attach an interpretative declaration on 29 April, in which 
it stated: “the Border Agreement in no way affects the legal rights of the Latvian state and its 
citizens under the 1920 Latvia-Russia Peace Treaty and the Latvian constitution pursuant to 
international law.”126 Russia reacted by refusing to sign the agreement, signing a border treaty 
with Estonia on 18 May 2005 instead.  
The Estonia-Russia border treaty was warmly welcomed by EU High Representative 
for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, expressing hopes for 
swift ratification and for signature of a similar agreement between Russia and Latvia.127 Like 
the Latvia-Russia Treaty, the Estonia-Russia agreement contained no reference to previous 
treaties with Russia and established the de facto border as inviolable. However, when the 
Estonian Parliament in the law on ratification included in the preamble a reference to Soviet 
occupation and the 1920 Tartu Peace Treaty, Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered 
Russia’s withdrawal from the Treaty.128  
 In November 2005, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relations and 
ENP, underlined in a reply to an inquiry by leaders of the European Parliament’s foreign 
affairs committee that the EU considered the problem of the Estonian-Russian and Latvian-
Russian border treaties as something affecting the regional integrity of the entire Union and 
that signature of the outstanding border treaties wa a priority for the EU.129 Nevertheless, the 
then JLS Commissioner Frattini had already stated in September of the same year that “[t]he 
EU would support a positive result with the border tr aty [...] but this situation [could not] 
impede the path of Latvia towards the joining the Schengen area”.130 
 On 27 March 2007, the border treaty with Russia was finally signed in Moscow, after 
the Latvian Parliament had formally withdrawn its interpretative declaration. Both countries 
                                                
126 Socor, V., ‘Baltic Border Agreements on Agenda for EU-Russia Summit, 2 Eurasia Daily Monitor 85 (2005). 
See for an unofficial translation of relevant parts of this treaty: Information note on the Border Treaty between 
the Russian Federation and the Republic of Latvia (European Parliament Document, 8 June 2006):  
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2004_2009/documents/fd/d-ru20060615_07/d-ru20060615_07en.pdf. 
127 High Representative for CFSP, ‘EU HR Javier SOLANA welcomes the signature of the Estonian-Russian 
border agreement’ (Press Release Nr S188/05, 18 May 2005). 
128‘Russia revokes Estonia border agreement’ (The Washington Times, 2 September 2005).  
129 ‘EU Commissioner has raised issue of Estonian-Russian border treaties’ (Estonian Review, 15 November 
2005) 
130 ‘Latvia could join EU Schengen area without border pact with Russia – Frattini’ (AFX News, 4 eptember 
2005). 
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exchanged ratification instruments on 18 December 2007. Relations between Russia and 
Estonia however remain tense and no steps have been tak  towards a solution.131 This has 
not however prevented the lifting of border checks between Estonia and the rest of the 
Schengen area, without specific arrangements being put in place. In reply to a question by a 
Member of European Parliament the Council stated that “[a]lthough border issues essentially 
fall within the competence of Member States, the Council attaches importance to the legal 
certainty of those borders, as well as to stable relations between EU Member States and 
Russia.”132 It therefore considered that Russia should ratify the border agreement with Estonia 
as soon as possible and that the demarcation of all EU-Russia borders should be completed 
according to international standards as set out in the Road Map on Freedom, Security and 
Justice.133  
 
4.3 Gibraltar 
 
We have already noted in the previous chapter how disagreement between the UK and Spain 
on the border of Gibraltar prevented the adoption of the External Frontiers Convention. The 
Gibraltar border not only forms a border between Memb r States, but is also a Schengen 
external border. The disagreement over the border has meant that the application of important 
legislation on the management of the external borders is suspended in relation to the Gibraltar 
borders.134 
 The disagreement on the Spanish-Gibraltar border forms part of a wider problem in 
which not only the borders of Gibraltar are disputed, but also the sovereignty per se of the UK 
over the territory.135 The question on the position of the border revolves around the 
interpretation of Article X of  the 1713 Treaty of Utrecht, by which Spain yielded to the UK: 
“The full and entire propriety of the town and castle of Gibraltar, together with the port, 
                                                
131 Relations between the two countries saw an all time low with the removal of a Soviet war time statute and 
alleged cyber attacks from Russia on  Estonian computer systems in 2007: ‘Estonia accuses Russia of  “waging 
cyber war”’ (The Times, 17 May 2007). 
132 Reply from the Council of 18 March 2008 to a question by MEP Saks (PSE) of 7 February 2008 (P-0614/08). 
133 Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (Council Document 8799/05 ADD 1), 
point 1.2. 
134 See for instance Article 12(3), Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Ext rnal Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ 2004, L 349/1. 
135 Spain’s claim of sovereignty over the rock, based on the right of territorial integrity, was renewed in the 
1960s by Spanish dictator Franco. The inhabitants of Gibraltar have at times claimed a right of self-
determination on the basis of Article 1 of the UN Charter. 
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fortifications, and forts thereunto belonging (…) without any territorial jurisdiction.”136 Spain 
has argued that this cession did not include the territory north of the Rock, nor a territorial 
sea. The UK has throughout argued to the contrary and that in any case it acquired title 
through prescription by the acquiescence of Spain as regards its continuous presence since at 
least 1838 by which British sentries were established along the line of the present frontier 
fence.137 
 Spain further contests that in Article X it ceded to the UK the waters adjacent to 
Gibraltar. Here the UK has a strong claim in that the Permanent Court in Grisbadarna held 
that it is a settled principle of maritime law that “maritime territory is an essential 
appurtenance of land territory”, implying that cession of the land territory included a 
territorial sea.138 Both countries have made reservations to the UN Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) which allows for a 12 mile territorial sea, reflecting their respective 
positions and an agreement has yet to be reached.  
 After the restoration of democracy in Spain, bilater l initiatives were taken in order to 
normalise relations. These initiatives have always included the facilitation of the movement of 
persons across the Spanish-Gibraltar border. With the accession of Spain to the EC this free 
movement of persons became a legal obligation, bearing in mind that the free movement 
rights apply to Gibraltar in full and most of its citizens have UK and consequently EU 
citizenship. Nevertheless, delays have remained notorious impeding, in the view of the 
Gibraltarians, the effective exercise of their Community right of free movement.139  
 In 2002, an agreement in principle was reached on joint sovereignty, but this was 
overwhelmingly rejected by the Gibraltar population n a referendum on 7 November 2002. 
Recent progress has been made within the framework of the Trilateral Forum of Dialogue on 
Gibraltar, which includes the ministers of both the UK and Spain, as well as Gibraltar. 
Although neither party has changed its position rega ding the sovereignty issue, on 18 
September the three Governments issued a communiqué, commonly referred to as the 
Córdoba Agreement, on the outcome of their tripartite talks.  
 In relation to the crossing of the border, the Agreement provides for an improvement 
of the facilities for border controls and the introduction of a system of red and green 
                                                
136 See for the full text of Article X: Fawcett, J., ‘Gibraltar: The Legal Issues’, 43 IA 2 (1967), 238-239. 
137 The fence was erected in 1909 in the middle of the neutral zone between the rock and the Spanish guarded 
“Linea”. Levie, H., argues that the negotiation history leaves no doubt the UK has no legal basis for its claim 
over the neutral ground: ‘Gibraltar’, in: Bernhardt, R. (Ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law, Volume 
I, No. 10 (Amsterdam, North Holland, 1992), 598. Fawcett, J., ibid., argues that the Spanish refusal in 1966 to 
have the border definitely determined is a strong indication of acquiescence, 241. 
138 Ahnish, F, supra note 9. 
139 ‘The Rocky Road to Spain’ (BBC News, 13 March 2002). 
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channels.140 It further foresees in the joint use of the Gibraltar airport, situated in the neutral 
zone south of the fence, following the model of theFr nch/Swiss Geneva airport.141 The 
airport will have an access point from the north side of the fence and from the south side. 
Passengers on flights to and from Spain entering or leaving the airport through the north side 
will be considered not to have left the Schengen ara.  
Gibraltar officials retain the right to exercise contr ls on passengers on flights to and 
from the Schengen area entering or leaving the airport through the north side on grounds of 
security or in other exceptional or unusual circumstances. Passengers on flights to and from 
Spain entering or leaving the airport through the south side are subject to Schengen exit and 
entry checks by Spanish officials, after which they will go through an entry clearance by 
Gibraltar officials. The Gibraltar government has repeatedly pointed out that Spain will not 
control entry to or exit from Gibraltar, rather Schengen entry and exit checks take place at 
Gibraltar airport instead of in Spanish airports.  
 
4.4 Slovenia and Croatia 
 
A dispute over borders that has recently been making headlines is that between Member State 
Slovenia and candidate country Croatia. Although it centres around the demarcation of the 
maritime border in the Bay of Piran, there are three other unresolved conflicts regarding the 
border on the Mura River, the Trdinov vrh or Sveta Gera Mountain and in the valley of the 
Dragonja River.142 
 Although both Slovenia and Croatia in principle accept the conclusions of the Badinter 
Commission, stating that the borders of the successor tates should follow those of the 
internal borders of the former Yugoslav Federation, n some areas there is uncertainty over 
the location of that border.143 In the Bay of Piran Croatia invokes the equidistance principle of 
Article 15 of the UN Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which defines a median line as border, 
while Slovenia refers to the same article stating that he “provision does not apply, however, 
                                                
140 2006 Córdoba Agreement: http://www.gibnet.com/texts/trip_1.htm. 
141 That is before Switzerland’s association with the Schengen acquis. See Annex II to the 2006 Agreement: 
Ministerial Statement on Gibraltar Airport (18 Septmber 2006): 
http://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/latest_news/press_releases/2006/Ministerial_Statement_On_Gibraltar_Airport.pdf. 
As part of the arrangements, the airport of Gibralta  will no longer be suspended from EC Regulations a d
Directives on aviation measures.  
142 See in more general: Klemenčíc, M., and Gosar, A, ‘The problems of the Italo-Croato-Slovene border 
delimitation in the Northern Adriatic,’ 52 GeoJournal (2000), 129–137. 
143 See Chapter II on the Badinter Commission. 
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where it is necessary by reason of historic title or other special circumstances to delimit 
territorial seas of the two States in a way which is at variance therewith.” It argues that 
Slovenia has since the entry into force of the 1975 Osimo agreement between the former 
Yugoslavia and Italy exercised jurisdiction over the Bay of Piran and that the application of 
the equidistance principle would deprive the country of access to open seas.144  
 The Drnovšek-Račan Agreement of 2001 granted Slovenia a corridor to open sea, in 
return for Croatian sovereignty over a number of villages whose status was unclear due to 
overlapping land-registry books of local municipalities. It was however rejected by the 
Croatian parliament and not ratified. On 29 August 2007, the two countries informally agreed 
in the Slovenian town of Bled to bring the border dispute before the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) and set up a mixed Slovenian-Croatioan expert commission to draft the terms of 
reference.  
 This solution would be in line with the Conclusions of the Helsinki European Council 
which urged in clear terms that “candidate States (…) make every effort to resolve any 
outstanding border disputes and other related issues. Failing this they should within a 
reasonable time bring the dispute to the Internatiol Court of Justice.”145 Also the 
Negotiating Framework for Croatia from 2005 state that border issues should be resolved 
through bilateral negotiations or at the ICJ in The Hague.146  
 In October 2008 Slovenia called upon Croatia to withdraw maps and documents it has 
submitted as part of its EU accession negotiations which would prejudge the border between 
the countries, Croatia denying the existence thereof. In December 2008, Slovenia vetoed the 
opening of new negotiations chapters and the closing of others in the accession process of 
Croatia, thereby eventually delaying the country’s entry into the EU. It no longer seemed 
willing to submit the question for adjudication by the ICJ, arguing the question is political, 
rather than legal.147 
 The Commission proposed the setting up of a mediation group chaired by Nobel Peace 
Prize winner Ahtisaari, but in March 2008 the countries failed to agree on its terms.148 A 
second, unpublished, proposal of April 2008 by Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn 
intended to set up an ad hoc arbitration panel with judges nominated by both side , as well as 
                                                
144 See for an elaborate discussion of the legal questions and arguments put forward by both countries: Avbelj, 
M. and Letnar Cernic, J., ‘The Conundrum of the Piran Bay: Slovenia v. Croatia - The Case of Maritime 
Delimitation,’ 5 J Int’l L & Pol’y  (2007), 1-19. 
145 European Council Conclusions, Helsinki, 10-11 Decemb r 1999, point I.4. 
146 Commission, ‘Principles governing the negotiations’, Luxembourg, 3 October 2005, point 13. 
147 ‘Ljubljana “ready” to accept mediation in Croatia dispute’ (Europolitics, 17 February 2009). 
148 ‘Croatia accepts EU help to solve dispute with Slovenia’ (EurActiv, 10 March 2009).  
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by the Commission was rejected.149 The Commission now seems to have given up on its 
efforts, calling for bilateral talks and cancelling an EU-Croatia intergovernmental conference 
planned for 26 June 2009.150  
 The border dispute between Slovenia and Croatia casts dark clouds over future 
enlargements on the Western Balkan. Although legally, a border which is not fully 
demarcated does not have to stand in the way of a cuntry’s entry into the EU, nor the full 
application of the Schengen acquis, as shown by the case of Estonia, Slovenia continues to 
have a veto over unfreezing negotiations. Very few (potential) candidate countries do not 
have outstanding border issues and nothing would seem to prevent Croatia, once a Member 
State, from adopting a similar strategy.151 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
In view of the communitarisation of the powers for the management of the external borders, 
including the incorporation of the part of the Scheng n acquis relating to the external borders, 
this chapter took as its point of departure Article 299 EC defining the territorial scope of the 
EC Treaty. It will be clear that Article 299 EC must be seen as a prima facie definition of the 
geographical scope of EC law, specific parts of which are however either limited or expanded 
by other primary EU law (Schengen Protocol), as well as international treaties (agreements 
with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland).152  
 There can be an increasing congruence observed between the area of free movement 
of persons and the Schengen area. This is first of all the case within the EU, notwithstanding 
of course the non-applicability of the Schengen acquis in non-European parts of the EU 
territory. First of all, Article 8 of the Schengen Protocol obliges all acceding Member States 
to accept the Schengen acquis in full. The lifting of checks at the internal borders with the 
EU10 Member States, as well as the expiring of the transitional measures for the free 
movement of persons, is leading to a more homogenous legal space, with consequently more 
homogenous external borders. Also in the case of the Schengen Associated countries of 
                                                
149 ‘EU proposes panel to resolve Slovenia-Croatia row’ (EUbusiness, 15 April 2009). 
150 ‘EU officials tire of Croatia-Slovenia dispute’ (EUobserver, 24 June 2009). 
151 See the progress reports for the (potential) candidate countries: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008_en.htm 
152 It should be noted that in the case of the Customs Union, this limitation is made by secondary law: Article 3, 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing a Community Customs Code, OJ 1992, L302/1. 
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Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, the extension of the EC’s acquis on the free movement of 
persons has now been “matched” with the lifting of internal border controls.    
 Notwithstanding the extension of parts of EC law to third countries, the ECJ has 
clearly underlined in its EEA opinions, the supremacy nd independence of the EU legal 
order. Consequently, the associated countries’ participa ion in the freedom of movement of 
persons and even more so in the Schengen acquis is very much on a “take it or leave it” basis. 
Arguably this drive towards homogeneity can also be discerned in the provisions of the 
Schengen Protocol allowing the UK and Ireland to participate in parts or all of the Schengen 
acquis. The Court has however given a clear message to the UK and Ireland that they cannot 
have their cake and eat it at the same time. As was suggested, this may eventually encourage 
rather than discourage further integration of these countries in the Schengen acquis, by 
pointing out some of the disadvantages of their non-participation. 
Both the limitations to and the extensions of the geographical scope of EC law have 
lead to a patchwork if not as much of the obligations themselves, then of the institutional 
framework upon which they are built. This is evidenc d by the protocols attached to the 
EC/EU Treaties, as well as the number of bilateral treaties necessitated by each enlargement 
of the EU.  
In spite of a number of unresolved issues at the borders of a number of Member States, 
to say that Europe’s legal borders are not well defined seems too strong a conclusion to draw. 
Rather one should argue that other than in the narrow sense of the Schengen external border, 
there does not exist a Community law concept of an external border. The Schengen external 
border then is clearly defined, albeit that the definition thereof in Article 2(2) of the Schengen 
Borders Code is deceivingly transparent.  
It is the external borders of the Schengen area that form the object of the Community’s 
legislative competences in the area of border management, not the borders of the area of free 
movement of persons. However, because of the increasing overlap between these two, the 
Schengen borders gain importance as a point at which authority and control is exercised not 
merely in the name of sovereign States, but also in that of the greater Union they represent in 
doing so.    
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V. Crossing Borders: Community Rights of Free Movement  
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the preceding chapters it was established that “the” EU external border does not exist. One 
may argue that for EU citizens and third country nationals (TCN) alike, there is one functional 
border (based on the existence of border crossing rights on the basis of the Community rights of 
free movement), and two geographical borders (the Schengen border and the EU, non-Schengen, 
external border). From a substantive point of view the most important distinction is then the 
difference in treatment afforded to EU citizens andTCNs at either of these geographical borders.  
This chapter will examine the Community rights of free movement in so far as these are 
relevant to the existence of border crossing rights. In doing so, it will refine the distinction 
between EU citizens and TCNs. Advocate General (AG) Geelhoed in his opinion to the Jia case 
distinguished between the internal aspect and external aspect of migration, the latter being, at the 
current state of Community law, for most aspects firmly in the hands of the Member States.1 A 
discussion of the European Court of Justice’s (ECJ) case law on the position of a TCN who joins 
his/her EU family member in another EU Member State, coming directly from outside the EU, 
will serve to underline the continuing importance Mmber States attach to their competences as 
regards that external aspect. This also shows in the way in which (limited) the free movement 
rights have been conferred on TCNs on the basis of secondary legislation under Title IV EC.     
 
2. Border Crossing Rights based on EU Citizenship 
 
The free of movement of persons is one of the four fundamental Treaty freedoms. It applies to the 
nationals of the Member States, to the exclusion of TCNs.2 The right has developed from being 
linked exclusively to the economic activity under Articles 39, 43 and 49 EC, through persons of 
independent means3 and students4 to a more general right of free movement of European citizens 
                                                
1 Opinion AG Geelhoed to Case C-1/05, Jia [2007] ECR I-1, delivered 27 April 2006, paras 31-32.  
2 Case 238/83, Caisse d’Allocations v Meade [1984] ECR 2631, para. 7. 
3 Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residence, OJ 1990, L180/26 (“Playboy Directive”). 
4 Council Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residenc  for students OJ 1993, L317/59. 
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up to three months under Article 18(1) EC.5 Article 18(1) EC states that the right to free 
movement is “subject to the limitations and conditions laid down in this Treaty and by the 
measures adopted to give it effect.” Indeed, more ext nsive rights of residence are still dependent 
on a degree of self-sufficiency of the EU citizen.6  
 The Court has from the beginning given a broad interpretation to the right of free 
movement of Community nationals - including the right of entry and exit - whilst interpreting 
exceptions narrowly.7 In Cowan it interpreted Article 49 EC on the free movement of services, so 
as to include the recipient of services.8 In Antonissen, it made clear that Article 39 EC, on the free 
movement of workers, also applies to those Member State nationals in search of employment.9 
Under Directive 2004/38/EC, all EU citizens now have an uncontested right of entry, exit and 
residence in another Member State than their own, for a period of up to three months without any 
conditions or any formalities other than the requirement to hold a valid identity card or 
passport.10  
The right of entry must be considered to exist independent from the question whether the 
EU citizen enters a Member State other than that of his/her nationality by crossing an intra-
Community border or directly from a third country.11 Although the title of Directive 2004/38/EC 
clearly refers to free movement within the territory of the Member States this is only logical as no 
individual EU Member State would be able to refuse entry to one of its own nationals. Indeed 
Article 5(1) does not make any distinction in this regard.12 The rights of the EU citizen to cross 
                                                
5 Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely 
within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004, L158/77. See Farkas, O., ‘Free movement and European 
citizenship: leaving behind the labour supply approach’ (Paper presented at the EUI Alumni Association 
Interdisciplinary Conference: The Maastricht Treaty in Historical Perspective: A Watershed in European 
Integration?, EUI, Florence,5-6 October 2006). 
6 Carrera, S., ‘What Does Free Movement Mean in Theory and Practice in an Enlarged EU?’, 11 ELJ 6 (2005), 701. 
7 Case 139/85, Kempf [1986] ECR 1741, para. 13. 
8 Case 186/87, Cowan [1989] ECR 195, para. 15, Joined Cases 286/82 and 26/83, Luisi and Carbone [1984] ECR 
377, para. 16, Case C-348/96, Calfa [1999] ECR I-11, para. 16. In Case C-274/96, Bickel and Franz [1998] ECR I-
7637, para. 15, the Court referred in even broader terms to the intention or likelihood to receive services. 
9 Case C-292/89, Antonissen [1991] ECR I-745, para. 13. Note that later Directives - Council Directive 90/364/EEC 
(“Playboy Directive”), supra note 3 and Council Directive 93/96/EEC (students), supra note 4 - only deal with 
residence, presupposing a right of entry and exit. 
10 Article 6, Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5. 
11 Only recently the European Court of Justice has confirmed this position also in relation to TCNs with derived 
rights under Community law: Case C-127/08, Metock [2008] ECR I-0000, nyr, see in detail below. 
12 The fact that this right is to be considered the same at both the internal and external Community borders does not 
necessarily mean that the conditions under which it is exercised are the same: see the next chapter on the rules 
applicable at the Schengen external borders.  
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an intra-Community border are the same as those relating to the crossing of the Community’s 
external borders, be these Schengen borders or not.   
 
2.1 EU Citizenship 
 
At the outset, a few words need to be said about the concept of European citizenship, in view of 
the important legal consequences of this status. Article 17(1) EC states that every person holding 
the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union.  The European Council of 11 
and 12 December 1992 attached a declaration on nationali y to the Treaty of Maastricht stating 
that: “The question whether an individual possesses th  nationality of a Member State will be 
settled solely by reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.”  
The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has confirmed th  Member State’s autonomy in 
nationality matters in the Micheletti case in which it held that the conditions of acquisition and 
loss of nationality are, in conformity with international law, within the competence of each 
Member State.13 It added however, that this competence must be exercised with due regard to 
Community law. Considering the fact that the conferral of nationality by one Member State may 
have far reaching consequences for other Member States, one could envisage a situation in which 
the conferral of nationality amounts to a breach of the principle of sincere cooperation under 
Article 10 EC.14  
Despite the wording of Article 17(1), not all nationals of Member States are EU citizens.15 
Both the UK and Germany have made unilateral declarations, adopting a definition of nationality 
for the purposes of Community law differing from domestic law.16 Danish nationals residing in 
the Faeroe Islands are not to be considered as Danish nationals within the meaning of the 
                                                
13 Case C-369/90, Micheletti [1992] ECR I-4258, para. 10. The ECJ in this case granted Member States a greater 
autonomy then the International Court of Justice did in its Nottebohm judgment, in which it held that the grant of 
nationality needs only be recognised by other States if it represents the individual’s “genuine connection with the 
State”: ICJ Reports (1955), 4, para. 24.  
14 De Groot argues this could for instance be the casif a Member State were to grant its nationality to an important 
part of the population of a non-EU Member State, without prior consultation of the other Member States: De Groot, 
G.-R., ‘Towards a European Nationality Law’, 8 EJCL 1 (2004), 12. 
15 See for more detail: Hall, S., Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of the Union (Dordrecht, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1995). 
16 The Declaration that currently applies dates back to 1983 (OJ 1983, C23/1). The German declaration, which was 
first made at the signature of the EEC and Euratom Treaty, has lost its practical relevance through an amendment of 
the German nationality law in 2000 granting nationality automatically to anyone recognised as German within the 
meaning of Article 116 of the German Basic Law.    
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Treaties.17 Further questions of citizenship arise in the case of so-called kin-minorities in Central 
and South-Eastern Europe, in particular where the kin minority is located outside the EU. On 5 
December 2004, a referendum on the question whether to grant Hungarian citizenship to ethnic 
Hungarians living outside their homeland was rejectd. In late 2006 however the Greek 
government opened up Greek nationality to members of the Greek minority in Albania.18 In the 
months before their entry into the EU, applications for the nationality of Romania and Bulgaria 
by Moldavians of Romanian ethnicity and Macedonians of Bulgarian ethnicity respectively saw a 
considerable increase.19 
Another complicating factor is the fact that large parts of the Latvian and Estonian 
population of Russian origin are not EU citizens, either having Russian nationality or falling 
within the category of “non-citizens.”20 Similar complications could arise as regards the Turkish 
settlers in the northern part of the Cyprus upon reu ification of the island.21  
 
2.2 Right of Exit and Entry of EU Citizens 
 
On 30 April 2006, the deadline for implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to mve and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States has passed.22 This Directive abolishes the sectoral approach to free movement 
                                                
17 Article 4 of Protocol No 2 to the Treaty of Accession of Denmark. 
18 ‘New citizenship drive: Gov’t to naturalize some 200,000 ethnic Greeks from Albania’ (Kathimerini, 6 November 
2008). 
19 ‘Romania tackles Moldova visa rush’ (BBC News, 16 January 2007) and ‘Cashing in on EU citizenship’ (Spero 
News, 22 January 2007). 
20 A 2000 ‘Population and Housing Census’ in Estonia showed that the Russian population amounted to 6.3 percent 
and the number of non-citizens to 12.4: http://www.stat.ee/censuses. The numbers of non-citizens has been steadily 
decreasing through naturalisation to 7.5 % on 2 June 2009: Estonian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, 
‘Citizenship’, 8 June 2009: http://www.vm.ee/estonia/kat_399/pea_172/4518.html. Also in Latvia, the number of 
‘non-citizens’ has been steadily decreasing. On 1 January 2009 it however still constituted 15,8 % of the Latvian 
population, with a Russian population amounting to 1,3 percent: http://data.csb.gov.lv. 
21 See for more detail: Skoutaris, N., ‘Differentiation in European Union Citizenship Law: The Cyprus Problem’, in: 
Inglis, K., and Ott, A. (Eds), The Constitution for Europe and an Enlarging Union: Unity in Diversity? (Groningen, 
Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 169 ff. 
22 Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5. In December 2008, the Commission published t  report on the  application 
of the Directive under Article 39, in which it was highly critical: “not one Member State has transposed the Directive 
effectively and correctly in its entirety.”: COM(2008) 840 final, 3. See in more detail: Carrera, S. and Faure Atger, 
A., ‘Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the context of EU Enlargement: A proliferation of different forms of 
citizenship?’ (Brussels, CEPS Special Report, April 2009). 
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with an approach based on EU citizenship. Most importantly it repeals Directive 68/360/EEC23 
which contained the rules on free movement of EU citizens who are workers and their family 
members, as well as Directive 73/148/EEC24 which contained the rules of free movement of EU 
citizens and their family members with regards to establishment and the provision of services.  
 
Article 4 gives EU citizens and their EU citizen family members a right of exit upon production 
of a valid identity card or passport. Family members are defined in Article 2 of the Directive and 
include the spouse, registered partner where the host Member State recognizes such a relationship 
as equivalent to marriage, the dependant family members of the EU citizen and/or 
spouse/registered partner in the ascending line and in the descending line up to the age of twenty-
one.  
 It is unclear whether the term spouse is to be constructed as including a same-sex spouse. 
Considerations of non-discrimination, the full effectiveness of the free movement provisions and 
the respect for the competence of the Member States in matters of family law are strong 
arguments in favour of recognition of marriage between partners of the same sex.25 
The term dependent must be interpreted to the effect that they need the material support of 
the Community national or his or her spouse in order to meet their essential needs in the State of 
origin of those family members or the State from which they have come at the time when they 
apply to join the Community national.26  
The right of family members is highly derivative ofthe right of the worker they 
accompany. This is shown for instance by the Lebon case, in which the ECJ held that once the 
child of a worker reaches the age of 21, and is no lo ger dependent on the worker, benefits to the 
child cannot be construed as an advantage to the worker.27 The importance of the family link is 
also shown in the case of Diatta, in which the Court stated that neither living apart nor imminent 
                                                
23 Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community 
for workers of Member States and their families, OJ Sp. Ed. 1968, L257/13, 485. 
24 Council Directive 73/148/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence within the Community 
for nationals of Member States with regard to establishment and the provision of services, OJ 1973, L172/14. 
25 Bell, M., ‘EU Directive on Free Movement and Same-Sex Families: Guidelines on the Implementation Process 
(Brussels, ILGA Europe, October 2005), . 
26 Case C-1/05, Jia [2007] ECR I-1, para. 43. 
27 Case 316/85, Lebon [1987] ECR 2811, para. 14. 
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divorce affect the right of the worker’s family.28 However, implied in the judgment is that these 
rights dissolve upon divorce.  
 
Article 5(1) gives EU citizens and their EU family members a right of entry on production of a 
valid identity card or passport.29 Member States may not demand an entry or exit visa or similar 
documents. Article 5(4) codifies the case law of the Court stipulating that if an EU citizen is able 
to provide unequivocal proof of his nationality by means other than a valid identity card or 
passport, the host Member State may not refuse him entry into the territory or deny his right of 
residence merely for not presenting these documents.30 A valid identity card issued by a third 
Member State, which states that the holder has the nationality of one of the Member States, 
should be allowed to qualify as “valid identity card” under Article 5(1), or else as proof of EU 
citizenship under Article 5(4).31  
 
On various occasions the ECJ has had the opportunity to interpret the rules of Directives 
68/360/EEC and 73/148/EEC. In Pieck it ruled that an endorsement stamped on a passport at the 
time of arrival giving leave to enter the territory of the UK amounted to a “visa or any equivalent 
document” as prohibited by Article 3(2) of Directive 68/360/EEC. The phrase “entry visa or 
equivalent requirement” covers any formality for the purpose of granting leave to enter the 
territory of a Member State which is coupled with a passport or identity check at the border, at 
whatever place or time and in whatever form.32  
 Border guards may not inquire about thepurpose and duration of stay and the financial 
means at the individual’s disposal before permitting admission to the Member State’s territory.33 
Community law does not prevent a Member State from checking, within its territory, compliance 
with the obligation imposed on persons enjoying a right of residence under Community law to 
                                                
28 Case 267/83, Diatta [1985] ECR 567, para. 20. 
29 Note that since Directive 2004/38/EC grants EU citizens a general right of entry and stay for periods not exceeding 
three months, the derived free movement rights for family members of the EU citizen is mainly of importance in 
relation to their stay for periods longer than three months, or where the family member is not an EU citizen, see 
below.   
30 See Case C-215/03, Oulane [2005] ECR I-1215, para. 25 and, in the context of TCNs, Case C-459/99, MRAX 
[2002] ECR I-6591, para. 62. 
31 It appears that in practice only a few Member States consider this possible: Carrera, S. and Faure Atg r, A., supra 
note 22, 6-7. 
32 Case 157/79, Pieck [1980] ECR 2171, para 10. Article 5(1), Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5, states that: 
speaks of “No entry visa or equivalent formality may be imposed on Union citizens.” 
33 Case C-68/89, Commission v Netherlands [1991] ECR I-2637, para. 13. 
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carry their residence or establishment permit at all times, where an identical obligation is imposed 
on its own nationals as regards their identity card.34 However, where such controls take place at 
the time of entry into the Member State’s territory, they may still constitute a barrier to free 
movement if they are carried out in a systematic, arbitr ry or unnecessarily restrictive manner.35  
 
None of the cases discussed above involved an EU citizen crossing an external Community 
border. Although, as we argued above the right of entry into another Member State must be 
considered independent from the question whether this entry takes place through an internal or 
external border, one may wonder in how far border formalities may be stricter if entry takes place 
through the external borders of the Community, especially where this border coincides with a 
Schengen external border. Considering the emphasis in both the case law and legislation on free 
movement within the territory of the Member States, the Court could find room for a narrower 
definition of “entry visa or equivalent requirement” than it did in Pieck.36 In practice, the 
“Bangeman wave” at the intra-Community borders that coincide with the Schengen external 
borders (e.g. the UK border or the temporary Schengen external borders with Romania and 
Bulgaria), especially airports, seems to have been r placed with a systematic computer check of 
passports.37 
 
Articles 39(3) and 46(1) EC allow for derogations on the free movement of persons for reasons of 
public policy, public security or public health. Directive 64/221/EEC was adopted to coordinate 
all measures relating to entry, deportation and the issuance and renewal of residence permits.38 
Also this Directive has been replaced by Directive 2004/38/EC. In Article 27(2) it takes over the 
larger part of Article 3 of Directive 64/221/EEC and codifies the existing case law on this article, 
in which the ECJ has given a narrow interpretation of the rules contained therein.39  
                                                
34 Case 321/87, Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, para. 12 and Case C-215/03, Oulane, [2005] ECR I-1215, 
para. 35.  
35 Case 321/87, ibid., para. 15. 
36 See the next chapter for a discussion of the rules applicable at the Schengen external borders.  
37 The purpose of this check seems to be to verify the authenticity of the document rather than anything else.  
38 Council Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination f special measures concerning the movement and resi ence 
of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public security or public health, OJ Spec. Ed 
1964, 850/64, 117. 
39 Craig and De Búrca note that most case law deals with the public policy exception which is the less clearly defined 
concept: EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (Oxford, OUP, 2003), 827. The public security exception was recently 
invoked by the UK government when it refused entry to Dutch MP Geert Wilders on the basis that his presence 
could “threaten community harmony and therefore public security by fostering hate which might lead to inter-
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 Measures derogating from the free movement of persons hall comply with the principle 
of proportionality and shall be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual 
concerned. Previous criminal convictions shall not i  hemselves constitute grounds for taking 
such measures.40 The personal conduct of the individual concerned must represent a genuine, 
present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society.41 
Justifications that are isolated from the particulars of the case or that rely on considerations of 
general prevention shall not be accepted.42  
 In a rare case on the right to exit a country, Jipa, the ECJ ruled that the fact that an EU 
citizen has been subject to repatriation from another Member State for illegal residence, may be 
taken into account in the assessment for the purpose of restricting his/her right of free movement 
by its home Member State. However, again only “to the extent that the personal conduct 
constitutes a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat to one of the fundamental interests of 
society.”43 This assessment must be based on the fundamental interests of the Member State 
imposing the restriction, although reasons advanced by another Member State may be taken into 
account.44 While it is certainly the case that it should not be for one Member State to decide on 
what is in the interests of another Member State, th  Court was correct in allowing arguments 
advanced by other Member State’s to be taken into acc unt, thereby serving to protect the wider 
European interest.  
Directive 2004/38/EC replaces the annex to Directiv 64/221/EEC which listed the 
diseases and disabilities threatening public health, public policy or public security with a 
reference in Article 29 to diseases of epidemic potential as defined by the World Health 
Organisation.  
The procedural safeguards from Articles 5 to 9 of Directive 64/221/EEC have been taken 
over in Article 31 of Directive 2004/38/EC. EU citizens and their family members as defined in 
Article 2 of the Directive must have access to judicial and, where appropriate, administrative 
                                                                                                                                                
community violence within the UK”: Reply by the Parli mentary Under-Secretary of State, Home Office (Lord West 
of Spithead) to a question asked by Baroness Neville-Jones, 3 June 2009, Lords Hansard, Column WA90. 
40 Case 30/77, Bouchereau [1977] ECR 1999, para. 28. 
41 Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, para. 28 and Case C-348/96, Calfa, supra note 8, para. 25. 
42 Case 67/74, Bonsignore [1975] ECR 297, para. 6. Article 33 of Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5, stipulates that 
a Member State may not make an expulsion order as a pen lty or legal consequence of a custodial penalty. 
43 Case C-33/07, Jipa [2008] ECR I-0000, nyr, para. 26. The Court held that in the case at hand, the necessary 
requirements to justify a restriction on the right of free movement did not seem fulfilled, but stated it was up to the 
national court to make that assessment: para. 27.    
44 Ibid., para. 25. 
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redress procedures in the host Member State to appeal against or seek review of decisions against 
them taken on the grounds of public policy, public security or public health. The individual 
concerned may be excluded from the host Member State’s territory pending the redress 
procedure, but may not be prevented from submitting his/her defense in person, except when 
his/her appearance may cause serious public policy r public security concerns or, and this is 
important for border procedures, when the appeal or judicial review concerns a denial of entry to 
the territory. 
 
3. Third Country Nationals 
 
Although free movement rights in general do not apply to TCNs, a number of specifications need 
to be made. Certain TCNs have a derived right of free movement through their family ties with 
an EU citizen, others have an independent right under agreements between their country of 
nationality and the Community. Here again, a discusion of the right to cross the EU’s external 
border cannot be separated from an examination of the provisions on internal free movement.   
 
3.1  Third Country National Family Members of EU Citizens   
 
Under Article 5(2) of Directive 2004/38/EC, TCNs who are family members of an EU citizen 
have - like the family members that are EU citizens - a derived right of entry and exit upon 
production of their passport or valid identity card. A valid visa is an additional requirement for 
TCNs from countries that are on the visa list of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 or require a visa 
under the national law of a Member State which is not part of the Schengen area.45 Member 
States shall grant such persons every facility to obtain the necessary visas. They shall be issued 
free of charge as soon as possible and on the basis of an accelerated procedure.46 An exemption 
of the visa requirement is granted where the TCN family member of an EU citizen holds a 
residence card issued in one of the other Member States.47  
                                                
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in possession of visas 
when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that requirement, OJ 2001, L81/1. 
46 Article 5(2), Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5. 
47 Ibid. 
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In MRAX, the Court held that Community law does not preclude the possibility for a 
Member State to turn away at the border the TCN spou e of an EU citizen who is not in 
possession of the required documents.48 However at the same time it is emphasised that the rig t 
of such a TCN spouse to enter the territory of the Member State derives from the family ties 
alone.49 In order not to deny the provisions of Directives 68/360/EEC and 73/148/EEC their full 
effect, a visa should be issued without delay and, as far as possible, at the place of entry into 
national territory.50 Article 5(4) of Directive 2004/38/EC codifies the Court’s ruling in MRAX 
that in the absence of the necessary travel documents or visa, when required, the Member States 
must give the EU citizen and his family members every r asonable opportunity to corroborate or 
prove that they are covered by the right of free movement and residence.51  
 
Community law does not apply to a wholly internal situation. This was illustrated in relation to 
TCNs in a number of cases in which nationals of a Member State who had not used their rights of 
free movement were barred by national law from bringing their TCN relatives into their country 
and could not rely upon EC law.52 In Singh however, the Court did find a connection factor to 
Community law, when an Indian national, married to a British national, was refused leave to 
enter and stay in the UK when he and his wife returned to the UK after a period of employment 
in Germany. The Court ruled that this constituted a violation of the right to free movement of 
persons under Article 39 EC, since it would deter a national of a Member State from using his 
rights, knowing that upon return his/her spouse would no longer be granted entry to and residence 
in the home Member State.53 
 
However, a case in which an EU citizen and TCN wanted to rely on the ECJ’s ruling in Singh, 
was to become the source of quite some legal uncertainty as to the position of the TCN who 
wishes to join his/her EU national family member directly from outside the EU. The Akrich case 
concerned a British national who, on the basis of the Singh judgment, moved to work in Ireland 
with the objective of returning to the UK, bringing her Moroccan husband, who had no right to 
                                                
48 Case C-459/99, supra note 30, para. 59 and Case 68/89, supra note 33, para. 11. 
49 Case C-459/99, ibid., para. 59. 
50 Ibid., para. 60. 
51 Ibid, para. 62. 
52 Cases 35&36/82, Morson and Jhanjan [1982] ECR 3723, para. 17, Case C-64/96, Uecker and Jacquet [1997] 
ECR I-3171, para. 22. 
53 Case C-370/90, Singh [1992] ECR I-4265, para. 20. 
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remain in the UK back with her on the basis of Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68.54 
The ECJ ruled however that this Regulation covered only the freedom of movement within the 
Community and that it was silent on the rights of a TCN spouse of an EU citizen regarding access 
to the territory of the Community.55  
Since Mr. Akrich did not have a right to remain in the Member State of origin of Mrs. 
Akrich, the fact that the EU citizen had no right under Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 to install 
herself with her TCN husband in another Member State would not constitute less favourable 
treatment than that which she enjoyed before using the right of free movement and could 
therefore not deter her from using this right.56 The same would apply on return of the EU citizen 
to her Member State of nationality. If however the TCN husband would have had a right to 
remain in another Member State, Article 10 of Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 would have 
applied.57 
Akrich seemed to overrule the part of MRAX in which the Court held that “a Member 
State is not permitted to refuse to issue a residence permit and to issue an expulsion order against 
a third country national who is able to furnish proof f his identity and of his marriage to a 
national of a Member State on the sole ground that he entered the Member State concerned 
unlawfully.”58 However, at no point in Akrich did the Court refer to its ruling in MRAX. 
The fact that Article 5 of Directive 2004/38/EC codifies the case law in MRAX and does 
not make the right of the TCN family member to enter and reside with the EU citizen conditional 
upon prior lawful presence on EU territory seems to upport the view that, notwithstanding the 
ECJ’s ruling in Akrich, the situation of a TCN spouse entering EU territory through another 
Member State than the one of which his/her spouse has t e nationality remains covered by 
Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68, currently Directive 2004/38/EC. The ECJ in Akrich specifically 
referred to “a situation such as at issue in the main proceedings” which seems to imply that the 
judgment had to be confined to the circumstances of the particular case.59 
                                                
54 Case C-109/01, Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607. 
55 Ibid, para. 49. 
56 Ibid., para. 53. 
57 Ibid., para. 54. See however AG Mengozzi’s opinion in Case C-291/05, Eind [2007] ECR I-10719, delivered 5 
July 2007, para. 142. 
58 Case C-459/99, supra note 30, para. 69. See: Spaventa, E., ‘Annotation Case C-109/01’, 42 CMLRev 1 (2005), 
231. 
59 Case C-109/01, supra note 54, para. 50. 
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In Commission v Spain, decided a year after Akrich, the ECJ reaffirmed its ruling in 
MRAX that the right of entry into the territory of TCN spouse of an EU citizen derives from the 
family relationship alone.60 In this case Spain was condemned for imposing formalities upon the 
TCN spouses of EU citizens before being able to obtain a residence permit. The ECJ followed 
AG Stix-Hackl in her opinion that the fact that Community visa rules apply only to short-term 
visas does not mean that Member States may require immigration visas for the entry of nationals 
of non-Member States who are married to Community na io als.61 
In another case of Commission v Spain the ECJ once again referred to its case law in 
MRAX.62 In this case two TCNs were refused entry into Spain, on the basis of a notification in the 
Schengen Information System (SIS). The ECJ stated that Member States may, where an EU 
national travels within the Community in order to exercise his/her right of free movement r quire 
an entry visa for his/her TCN spouse, but that they must accord every facility for obtaining the 
necessary visa.63 It then went on to state that it was clear that the TCNs derived from their status 
as spouses of an EU citizen the right to enter the territory of the Member States or to obtain a visa 
for that purpose, notwithstanding the fact that onef them had been travelling to Spain on an 
incoming flight from Algeria.64 The facts of this case do not mention whether the TCNs in 
question were legally resident in the EU.  
In the Cikotic case, the ECJ gave a very narrow interpretation of the right of free 
movement of a TCN spouse.65 Mr. Cikotic, a TCN who lived with his EU spouse of Luxemburg 
nationality in Belgium, was refused a work permit in Luxemburg. The Court held that this was 
permitted as the right to pursue employed activity could be relied upon only in the Member State 
where the Community national pursues an activity as a worker of self-employed person.66 
Although the formulation of the present Article 23 of Directive 2004/38/EEC seems to 
corroborate the ECJ’s interpretation, this case underlines once more the fundamental distinction 
                                                
60 Case C-157/03, Commission v Spain [2005] ECR I-2911, para. 28. 
61 Opinion of AG Stix-Hackl in Case C-157/03, Commission v  Spain [2005] ECR I-2911, delivered 9 November 
2004, para. 35. 
62 Case C-503/03, Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I-01097. 
63 Ibid., para. 41. 
64 Ibid., para. 42. Reference to Akrich is made in passing only, in para. 47, in relation  the right to family life. In 
MRAX, the ECJ at one occasion speaks about entering Community territory, which seems to imply entry from 
outside: Case C-459/99, supra note 30, para. 57. 
65 Case C-10/05, Cikotic [2005] ECR I-03145. 
66 Ibid., para. 24.  
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between EU citizens and TCNs.67 Considering that this case revolved around the right to work 
under the Directive, rather than the right of exit and entry, the question poses itself whether a 
similar reading of the right of entry would be justified. Although within the Schengen area such 
unlikely interpretation would be of limited practical relevance, the absurd result thereof would be 
that a TCN who is not in possession of a residence card could be barred from entering a Member 
State different from the one in which the EU spouse is exercising his/her rights of free 
movement.68  
In the Jia case, the ECJ had the opportunity to clarify the ambiguity in its case law and 
end the confusion regarding the scope of Member States’ competence in relation to admitting 
TCN who are family members of EU nationals who have exercised their right of free 
movement.69 In this case Mrs. Jia, the Chinese mother in law of a German national living in 
Sweden, requested a residence permit while visiting her relatives in Sweden on a Schengen short 
term visa, on the basis of dependence on and family ties with the EU citizen. The application was 
rejected and in appeal proceedings the question was raised whether the Akrich case law contained 
a rule of general application that the rights of a TCN family member come into being only when 
that TCN is lawfully resident in a Member State under national legislation. 
With Sweden, Slovakia and the Commission answering this question in the negative and 
the Netherlands and the United Kingdom taking the opposite view, AG Geelhoed seemed 
determined to clarify matters once and for all.70 In his opinion to the case, he first of all pointed 
out that as Community law stands, the Member States retain competence in most aspects of 
immigration legislation and in particular of first entry to the territory by TCNs according to 
criteria laid down in their national legislation.71 AG Geelhoed added that the regulation of 
immigration at the external borders, to the extent ha harmonisation has not been achieved under 
Title IV EC, remains a competence of the Member States.72 In his view, to accept that TCNs 
could join their EU citizen spouse without interventio  of the home Member State, makes it 
possible to circumvent national immigration laws and would undermine the Member States’ 
                                                
67 Article 23 of Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5, reads: [i]rrespective of nationality, the family members of a 
Union citizen who have the right of residence or the right of permanent residence in a Member State shall be entitled 
to take up employment or self-employment there. Emphasis added. 
68 Article 5(2), Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 5. 
69 Case C-1/05, Jia, supra note 26. 
70 Opinion in Case C-1/05, supra note 1, para. 52. 
71 Ibid., paras. 32-33. 
72 Ibid., para. 64. 
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powers in respect of controlling immigration at their xternal borders.73 The rules on free 
movement should not be interpreted so as to allow for “ex post facto family reunification.”74 
AG Geelhoed added that the rationale behind the right for a TCN to join his/her EU 
citizen spouse is that of not dissuading the EU citizen from using his/her free movement rights. 
However, where the TCN did not have a right of resid nce in the home Member State in the first 
place, moving to another Member State could entail the loss of that right.75 Holding that legal 
residence forms a prerequisite of the free movement righ s of TCN family members would put an 
end to a situation of reverse discrimination such as w s the case in Morson and Jhanjan76 and 
dissuade abuse of the type that was at the basis of the Akrich case.77   
In his opinion in the Akrich case, AG Geelhoed had already argued that the Court’s r ling 
in Singh did not “create a right in favour of the national of a non-Member State to enter the 
territory of the European Union.” In that opinion however he concluded that a Member State of 
which the worker is a national may only rely on an “overriding national interest” when refusing 
entry to a TCN spouse who had not been admitted to the EU in accordance with the immigration 
laws of a Member State. His opinion in Jia went further and, were the Court to have followed his 
line of reasoning, it would have certainly have brought legal certainty: lex dura sed lex. The 
result would have been that a TCN family member of an EU citizen would have only been able to 
rely upon the rights (s)he derives from the status of the EU citizen, where his/her first entry to EU 
territory had been legal. This first entry then would not have been automatic upon production of a 
valid passport or identity card and the required visa. It would have been the Member State’s 
national immigration laws that would determine whether and under what conditions the TCN 
spouse was to be admitted. 
A few remarks need to be made. First of all, the ref rence to the Member State’s powers 
over the control of the external borders is not entir ly convincing. Even if dealing with “separate 
spheres of competence,” national competences remain subject to the Community rules on free 
movement and the principle of supremacy.78 This is also evidenced by the Schengen Borders 
                                                
73 Ibid., para. 67. 
74 Ibid., para. 70. 
75 Ibid., para. 71. Cf. the Court’s reasoning in Case C-109/01, supra note 54, para. 53. 
76 Joined Cases 35/82 and 36/82, supra note 52. 
77 Opinion in Case C-1/05, supra note 1, paras. 74-75. 
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Code (SBC), which in Article 7(2) clearly states that the rules contained therein leave unaffected 
the rights of free movement on the basis of Community law.79  
One could moreover imagine a situation in which an EU citizen is indeed dissuaded from 
using its free movement rights when a legal residence is required, namely in the case where under 
the rules of the home Member State a residence permit would be granted, but the EU citizen has 
already taken up residence in another EU Member State. Would that EU citizen then have to 
move back or delay her departure for another Member State in order to establish legal residence 
for her TCN spouse first?  
Lastly, as regards the argument of preventing abuse, it has been consistently held in the 
case law that the motives of the EU citizen for relying on the free movement provisions of the 
Treaty are of no relevance as regards his/her rightto enter and reside in another Member state as 
long as the activity pursued there is effective andgenuine.80 Indeed, in his opinion in the Akrich 
case AG Geelhoed had recalled that the intentions of the EU worker and his/her spouse are 
immaterial, which was also reiterated by the Court.81 Moreover, neither the AG, nor the Court 
questioned the genuine nature of the marriage of Mr. and Mrs. Akrich.82 
In January 2007, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ deliver d its judgment. The Court 
appeared to be at pains to avoid giving any general r statement of the law. It recalled the situation 
of the Akrich case, after which it distinguished that from the facts in the case at hand.83 It ruled 
that, as Mrs. Jia was legally present in Sweden when submitting her application, the condition of 
previous legal residence as formulated in Akrich could not be made applicable to her situation.84 
Therefore, the Court continued, Community law does not require Member States to make the 
grant of a residence permit to TCN family members subject to the condition of residing lawfully 
in another Member State.85  
 This judgment left much to be desired in terms of adding clarity to the case law on the 
position of TCN family members. By distinguishing the facts from those in Akrich, the Court 
chose not to overrule the case. However, the question of to what extent Akrich had to be confined 
                                                
79 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ 2006, L105/1. 
80 Case 53/81 Levin [1982] ECR 1035, para. 23. 
81 Opinion AG Geelhoed in Case C-109/01, Akrich [2003] ECR I-9607, delivered 27 February 2003, para. 159 and 
186. Case C-109/01, supra note 54, para. 55 and the case law cited therein. 
82 Opinion in Case C-109/01, ibid., para. 163. Case C-109/01, supra note 54, para. 57. 
83 Case C-1/05, Jia, supra note 26, paras. 28-31. 
84 Ibid., para. 32 
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to its particular facts remained, in particular since the ECJ in Jia did seem to imply that there was 
a requirement of legal entry into the EU.86  
 In the absence of a straightforward clarification by the ECJ on the right of Community 
workers to be joined by their TCN family members, similar questions continued to reappear 
before the Court.87 In Case C-291/07, Eind the Court was asked whether a Dutch national, Mr. 
Eind, who had worked in the UK, was allowed to be accompanied by his Surinamese daughter, 
Ms. Eind, upon return to the Netherlands, despite the fact that his daughter did not have a 
previous right of residence in the Netherlands and that Mr. Eind himself was no longer 
economically active.88  
 In many ways Eind formed a re-enactment of Jia. The intervening Member States 
reiterated that in their view denying a right of residence to Ms. Eind would not be capable of 
discouraging Mr. Eind to use his right of free movement, since his daughter did not have right of 
residence in the Netherlands in the first place. Contrary to the facts stated by the referring Court, 
the UK government argued that Ms. Eind had been given a right of residence in the UK on the 
basis of national law, rather than Community law, which could be read as an attempt to strip the 
case of its Community law dimension.89  
 The Court held that the right of a Community worker to return to his home Member State 
could not be considered as purely internal.90 The fact that Mr. Eind was no longer economically 
active did not change anything in this regard as he was a national of the Netherlands and 
consequently had an unconditional right to return to that Member State.91 In Jia the Court had 
already ruled that once the TCN family member is lega ly present in the host Member State, 
previous legal residence could not be made a requirment.92 The Court, without referring to Jia, 
confirmed this rule in stating that the fact that Ms. Eind did not have a previous right of residence 
in the home Member State of the EU citizen did not affect its findings.93  
                                                
86 Ibid., para. 31: “it is not alleged that the family member in question was residing unlawfully in a Member State or 
that she was seeking to evade national immigration legislation illicitly.”  
87 Case C-551/07, Sahin [2008] ECR I-0000, nyr. raised similar questions. After the Court’s ruling i  Metock (Case 
127/08, supra note 11, see discussion below) the ECJ gave its deci ion by reasoned order in accordance with the first 
subparagraph of Article 104(3) of its Rules of Procedure.  
88 Case C-291/05, Eind [2007] ECR I-10719. 
89 The Court, in line with the procedure established by Article 234, decided the case upon the facts as put before it by 
the referring Court, ibid, para. 18. 
90 Ibid, para. 37. 
91 Ibid, paras 30-31, 38 and 35. 
92 Case C-1/05, Jia, supra note 26, paras. 32. 
93 Case C-291/05, Eind, supra note 88, para. 41. 
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 In Eind the Court clearly overruled its judgment in Akrich, even if it did not do so 
explicitly.94 The Court essentially argued that, since Mr. Eind’s was given the right to be joined 
by his daughter in the UK on the basis of Community law, withdrawing that right upon return 
would deter him from going back to his home Member State, as such impeding the use of his 
right of free movement of persons. Although, as argued above, a requirement of previous legal 
residence could amount to a restriction of the freedom of movement of persons, there is 
something artificial about the Court’s reasoning. One could imagine that the Court’s reasoning 
was informed by its wish to respect Mr. Eind’s right to family life, without however referring to 
this right explicitly.95  
 The ECJ’s ruling in Eind made it clear that the right of an EU citizen to be joined by 
his/her TCN family member in another Member State than his/her own cannot be made 
dependent upon legal residence in the home Member State, where the TCN family member is 
legally present in the host Member State. However, the question that remained was how Eind 
related to the ECJ’s ruling in MRAX. Could a Member State refuse entry to a TCN family 
member at the border upon arrival from outside the EU?  
 The Court gave a definitive answer in July 2008 in the Metock case.96 The Irish High 
Court had asked for a preliminary ruling in four cases in which a residence card was refused to 
the TCN spouses of EU citizens established in Ireland. In each case the TCN spouse had entered 
Ireland asking for asylum which had been refused. The High Court asked once more whether the 
right for an EU citizen to be accompanied in the host Member State by his TCN spouse was 
dependent on a requirement of prior residence. In addition it asked whether the place and time of 
the marriage and the circumstances in which the spouse had entered the host Member State were 
of influence. 
 There could have been an easy way out for the Court in arguing that since the applicants 
in the national proceedings had not entered Ireland illegally, their situation was comparable to 
that of Mrs. Jia and Ms. Eind. It rather decided to consider the underlying question of whether the 
EU citizen’s right to be accompanied by a TCN family member includes a right to enter the 
territory of the EU. In view of the sensitive nature of the question at hand, touching upon EU 
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96 Case C-127/08, supra note 11. 
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citizens’ rights, as well as the sovereign prerogative o decide to whom to allow entry to their 
territory, it is not surprising that a total of ten Member States intervened.97  
 The Court gave a broad interpretation of the right contained in Article 5(2) of Directive 
2004/38/EC and explicitly reconsidered its ruling i Akrich.98 It held that its previous case law in 
MRAX and Case C-157/03 (Commission v Spain), which had interpreted the right of TCN family 
members under Article 10 of Regulation (EC) No 1612/ 8, applied a fortiori to the new Directive 
2004/38/EC, since this Directive aimed to “strengthen the right of free movement and residence 
of all Union citizens.”99  
 That fact that Article 5(2) requires either a visa or a valid residence card for those TCNs 
from countries that are on the visa list of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, implies that the 
Directive does not require prior legal residence. Also Article 10(2) of the Directive, which gives 
an exhaustive list of documents which a TCN family member of an EU citizen may have to 
present to the host Member State in order to obtain a residence card issued, does not include 
documents demonstrating prior lawful residence in another Member State.100  
 So far, the Court gave a perfectly valid construction of secondary legislation. However, it 
did not stop there and felt it had to support its conclusion with reference to the right to family life 
and the free movement of persons. It argued that the Community legislature recognised the 
importance of the right to family in removing obstacles to the free movement of persons.101 
 The Court, following the view of AG Poiares Maduro, argued that if it were to be left to 
the national migration laws of the Member State whether or not prior legal residence constituted a 
requirement, these provisions could differ depending o  the Member States, which would be 
incompatible with the objective set out in Article 3(1)(c) EC of creating an internal market.102 
This reasoning does not however convincingly rebut the argument that where there is no right for 
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the EU citizen to be joined by his/her spouse in the first place, there can be no question of an 
obstacle to this right. The setting of more favourable standards by individual Member States does 
not of itself have to constitute an obstacle to the functioning of the internal market.  
 The ECJ reasoned that requiring previous legal residence would lead to the paradoxical 
outcome that a Member State would be obliged, under th  Council Directive on the right to 
family reunification, to authorise the entry and resid nce of a TCN spouse of a TCN lawfully 
resident in its territory where that spouse is not already lawfully resident in another Member 
State, but would be free to refuse the entry and residence of the spouse of an EU citizen in the 
same situation.103 Here the Court ignored the fact that the Directive on family reunification does 
not apply to a number of Member States, including Ireland, showing how its argument of an 
internal market without obstacles to free movement r lates exclusively to those who can claim 
the Community right of free movement.   
 Having accepted that prior legal residence cannot be required, the Court replied to the 
second question that it was irrelevant whether the marriage was concluded before or after the 
TCN entered the host Member State. Since the Directive s ates that an EU citizen can be joined 
by his/her TCN family member, the legislator implicit y accepted the possibility that a family 
would be founded only after the exercise of the right of freedom of movement.104 Moreover, the 
refusal of a right of residence could discourage the EU citizen from continuing to reside in that 
Member State.105 For the same reason it makes no difference whether the TCN has entered the 
host Member State before or after becoming a family ember of the EU citizen.106  
 Both the AG and the Court rejected in clear terms the argument that Member States retain 
exclusive competence, subject to Title IV EC, to regulate the first access to Community territory 
of TCN family members of a EU citizens. AG Maduro rightly pointed out that the Court had held 
on earlier occasions that the free movement provisins may have the effect of limiting the 
Member States’ exercise of their powers, including those in relation to immigration control.107 
The Court stated that the Community’s competence to l gislate on the basis of the free movement 
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provisions the entry and residence of TCN family memb rs of EU citizens, also includes the 
situation in which family members are not already lawfully resident in another Member State.108  
 The Court, like the AG, added that Directive 2004/38/EC does not deprive Member States 
of their power to control entry into their territory pointing at the public policy, public security or 
public health exception and noted Article 35 of theDirective which states that in the case of an 
abuse of rights or fraud, such as a marriage of convenience, the Member States may adopt 
measures to refuse, terminate or withdraw the right conferred by the Directive.109  
 Interestingly, the AG argued that Article 35 could a so cover the Akrich case of seeking to 
evade national immigration legislation illicitly.110 Indeed, the AG did not seem to have proposed 
that the Court overrule Akrich, but rather to deny it a general scope of application.111 In view of 
the Court’s judgment it would however be difficult to envisage a situation in which the illicit 
evasion of immigration laws could lead to a restriction of the right of an EU national to be joined 
by his/her TCN family member. Since the motive for which an EU national decides to use his/her 
free movement rights is of no importance as long as the activity is effective and genuine, and as 
long as the family tie is a genuine one, there willbe no room for the Member State to bar entry on 
the basis of an abuse of rights. The Member State remains however free to impose proportional 
penalties for acting in breach of the national rules on immigration.112  
 It may come as no surprise that in a number of Member States the Metock judgment was 
received with great concern. This was particularly the case in countries such as the Netherlands 
and Denmark, which as part of their integration policy have made “marriage immigration” more 
difficult by imposing language, age and income requirements where there nationals wish to bring 
over their TCN spouse. These requirements can now be avoided if the EU national decides to use 
his/her free movement rights, without that constituting an abuse of Community law.113 Other 
Member States, such as the UK and Italy feared the judgement was an invitation for “sham 
marriages” and irregular migration.  
 It is interesting that while in the normal situation of a genuine economic activity in 
combination with a genuine family link, it is hard to find any abuse of Community law, the JHA 
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Council Conclusions of 27-28 November 2008 referring to the Metock judgement were framed 
once more in terms of abuses and misuses. The Conclusions stated that every effort had to be 
made “to prevent and combat any misuses and abuses, a  well as actions of a criminal nature, 
with forceful and proportionate measures with due rega d to the applicable law (…).”114 The 
Commission was asked to publish guidelines for the int rpretation of the Directive and to 
consider all other appropriate and necessary proposals and measures.115 It did not however ask 
the Commission to come forward with specific legislative proposals reversing the Metock 
judgment.  
 One year after Metock, those Member States that did not already act in compliance with 
the judgment, seem to have changed their administrative practices accordingly.116 While some 
will laud the Court for strengthening the right of free movement, others will read in the judgment 
as undue judicial activism. Although the Court was correct in its interpretation of the Directive, it 
should be emphasised that the judgment affects only a very limited number of TCNs and that the 
Court did not depart in any way from construing their rights as derived from those of the EU 
citizen.  Therefore, although the Member States have lost part of their power to decide upon who 
to allow to enter their territory, this is only a very limited loss. 
 
3.2 Third Country Nationals from the EEA Countries and Switzerland 
 
As was discussed in Chapter IV, free movement rights have been extended to nationals from the 
EFTA countries through the EEA Agreement and the EC/Switzerland Agreement on the free 
movement of persons. A special regime for Liechtenstei  stipulates that this country, taking into 
account its seize, may limit the annual inflow of EEA citizens in terms of residence permits it 
issues.117 This does not however affect the right of entry and exit of EU/EEA citizens.    
                                                
114 Note that the draft Council Conclusions as proposed by the UK government (Council Document 15903/08) 
indicated a much stronger intention “to amend or re-int rpret EC legislation at the dictat of interior ministries, 
without applying any form of legislative process”: Peers, S., ‘The UK proposals on EU free movement law: an attack 
on the rule of law and EU fundamental freedoms’ (Statewatch Analysis, 2008). 
115 The ‘Guidelines on free movement and residence rights of EU citizens and their families’ were adopted on 2 July 
2009, not yet published.  
116 For instance, the UK “Guidance on the application of the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 
2006” has been updated in line with the judgment.  
117 See Annex V and Annex VIII to the EEA Agreement. 
 108 
 In principle, the EEA agreement and the agreement on the free movement of persons with 
Switzerland are instruments of public international law. Their effect depends on the status of 
public international law in the domestic legal order of these countries. The ECJ’s doctrines of 
direct effect and supremacy do not automatically apply, which may raise difficulties in relation to 
Iceland and Norway, which are both dualist.118   
 The EFTA court has not attributed direct effect to he EEA agreement, but it has declared 
that the state is liable to provide for compensation for loss and damage caused to individuals by 
breaches of the obligation under the EEA Agreement to provide for the supremacy of the EEA 
Agreement under national law.119 The Court of First Instance (CFI) has attributed direct effect to 
provisions of the EEA in line with the ECJ’s case law that “a provision in an agreement 
concluded by the Community with non-member countries must be regarded as being directly 
applicable when, regard being had to its wording and the purpose and nature of the agreement 
itself, the provision contains a clear and precise obligation which is not subject, in its 
implementation or effects to the adoption of any subsequent measure.”120   
 Although Article 18 EC on EU citizenship does not apply to the EEA countries or 
Switzerland, the Directive has been incorporated in the EEA Agreement.121 Pending the 
fulfilment of constitutional requirements by Norway it is not yet applicable.122  The rights and 
obligations laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC will thus apply also to EEA citizens. The directive 
does not apply to Switzerland, for which the free movement rights are laid down in Annex I to 
the EC-Switzerland agreement on the free movement of persons.123   
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122 COM(2008) 840 final, supra note 22, 3.   
123 Agreement between the EC and its Member States, of the one part, and Switzerland, of the other, on the free 
movement of persons, OJ 2002, L114/6. 
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3.3 Third Country Nationals covered by Association Agreements 
 
Article 310 EC states that the Community may conclude agreements with third countries or 
international organisations establishing an associati n involving reciprocal rights and obligations. 
The EEA Agreement and the Swiss/EC Agreement are not the only association agreements that 
include rights of free movement. The EEC/Turkey Agreement, signed in 1963, referred to the 
possibility of granting free movement to Turkish nationals, although these provisions have never 
been implemented.124 The Agreement and its implementing decisions do however confer 
important rights on migrant Turkish workers, although only those who have already been 
admitted to a Member State.125   
 It is settled case law of the ECJ under the provisi ns of the Turkey/EEC Association 
Agreement that Member States retain the power to regulate the entry of Turkish nationals to their 
territory, as well as the conditions under which they may take up first employment.126 The Court 
furthermore held that unlike nationals of Member States, Turkish workers are not entitled to 
move freely within the Community but benefit only from certain rights in the host Member State 
whose territory they have lawfully entered and where they have been in legal employment for a 
specific period. Moreover, there is no initial right of entry to family members of Turkish 
workers.127  
 The same applies to the Europe Agreements which were concluded with the Central and 
Eastern European Countries before their accession to the EU. Here again important and directly 
effective rights were conferred upon TCN workers, yet only on those that were already admitted 
to a Member State.128 The so-called Stability and Association Agreements (SAA) that are 
currently being concluded with the countries of the western Balkan are similar in content and aim 
to the Europe Agreements and the EEC/Turkey Agreement.  
                                                
124 EEC-Turkey Agreement (“Ankara Agreement”), OJ 1964, L217/3687. See: Melis, B., Negotiating Europe’s 
Immigration Frontiers (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2001), 68. 
125 See on the direct effect of the non-discrimination pri ciple contained in Article 3(1) of Decision No 3/80 of the 
Association Council on the application of the social security schemes of the Member States of the European 
Communities to Turkish workers and members of their families, OJ 1983, C110/60: Case C-262/96, Sürül [1999] 
ECR I-2685, para. 74. 
126 See i.a.: Case C-37/98, Savas [2000] ECR I-2927, para. 58. 
127 See Case C-275/02, Ayaz [2004] ECR I-8765, paras. 34 and 35 and Case C-325/05, Derin [2007], ECR I-6495, 
para. 64. 
128 With the entry of Romania and Bulgaria to the EU, the last of these Europe Agreements have been superseded by 
the provisions of the EU/EC Treaties. 
 110 
 The Europe Agreements, the EEC/Turkey Agreement and the SAA all contain provisions 
on the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment. The ECJ, applying the 
principle from the Royer case, has held that a right of entry and stay are the necessary corollaries 
of these freedoms.129 Since however the Association Agreements are merely intended to create a 
framework for these countries gradual integration into the Community, the freedom to provide 
services and the freedom to provide establishment cannot merely because of a similar wording be 
given the same interpretation as under the Treaties.130 Therefore these rights are not absolute and 
their exercise may be limited by the rules of the host Member State regarding entry, stay and 
establishment.131 The Court did hold that these freedoms must be extnded, as far as possible, to 
eliminate restrictions on the freedom to provide servic s between contracting parties.132 
Moreover, the power of the host Member State to apply its domestic rules regarding entry, stay 
and establishment of natural persons is expressly subject to the condition that it does not impair 
the benefits accruing under these agreements.133  
 Important rights may also flow from the directly effective standstill clauses in these 
agreements. Article 41 Paragraph 1 of the Additional Protocol to the Turkey/EEC Agreement 
provides that: “Contracting Parties shall refrain from introducing between themselves any new 
restrictions on the freedom of establishment and the freedom to provide services.”134 The Court in 
its recent Soysal judgment decided that the imposition of a visa requirement, in this case a 
Schengen visa on the basis of Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, constitutes such a restriction where 
a visa was not required on the date of entry into force of the Protocol, 1 January 1973.135 The 
Court reiterated that even if the standstill clause was not capable of conferring on Turkish 
nationals a right of establishment or, as a corollary,  right of residence, nor a right to freedom to 
provide services or to enter the territory of a Memb r State, it did prohibit making the exercise of 
those economic freedoms on the territory of that Memb r State subject to stricter conditions than 
those which applied at the time of entry into force of the Additional Protocol with regard to the 
                                                
129 Case 48/75, Royer [1976] ECR 497, paras. 31-32. See for instance Cas -37/98, Savas [2000] ECR I-2927, paras 
60 and 63, Case C-257/99, Barkoci and Malik [2001] ECR I-6557, para. 50, Case C-235/99, Kondova, [2001] ECR 
I-6427, para. 50, Case C-63/99, Gloszczuk [2001] ECR I-6369, para. 47. 
130 See inter alia Case C-257/99, ibid., paras. 51-52 and the case law cited therein.  
131 See inter alia Case C-257/99, ibid., para. 54.  
132 Joined Cases C-317/01 and C-369/01, Abatay and Sahin [2001] ECR I-12301, para. 112. 
133 See inter alia Case C-257/99, supra note 129, para. 57.   
134 Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement, OJ 1972, L293/1.  
135 Case C-228/06, Soysal [2009] ECR I-0000, nyr.  
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Member State concerned.136 This is because a visa requirement is likely to interfere with the 
exercise of the freedom to provide services, “in particular because of the additional and recurrent 
administrative and financial burdens involved in obtaining such a permit which is valid for a 
limited time.”137  
 If one is to interpret the freedom of services as the Court has done under the EC Treaty, 
including the receipt of services, the Soysal judgement must mean that a visa requirement cannot 
be imposed by those Member States that did not impose it at the time of entry into force of the 
Additional Protocol, or - the case of Member States that acceded to the EU afterwards - from the 
moment the Protocol came into effect in relation to these Member States. It means that the 
general visa obligation for Turkish nationals has become a patchwork obligation, which in view 
of the borderless Schengen area will be difficult to maintain. The absence of a visa requirement 
does not however mean an automatic right of entry. At the Community’s external borders, 
Schengen Member States may still apply the SBC and the UK and Ireland their national rules, in 
order to see whether the Turkish national fulfils other requirements for entry. Of course these 
other requirements will also have to comply with the standstill obligation.       
 
A possible extension of the free movement rights was initially foreseen under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). The ENP was first outlined in the Commission Communication on 
Wider Europe, followed by the Strategy Paper on the ENP.138 In line with the security objective 
of “promoting a ring of well governed countries” around the EU, the ENP set the goal of creating 
a “ring of friends” around the EU, focussing on both the southern and eastern neighbours.139 The 
countries falling under the ENP do not (yet) have th prospect of EU Membership, but the 
Commission’s Communication on the Wider Neighbourhood does not explicitly exclude this 
possibility for countries such as Ukraine and Moldova.140 The ENP intended to create partnership 
by offering the ENP countries a share in the internal market without (immediate) membership of 
the EU.  
                                                
136 Ibid., para. 47 and the case law cited therein. 
137 Ibid., para. 55. 
138 COM(2003) 104 final, Commission Communication, Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New Framework for 
Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours and COM(2004) 373 final, Commission Communication on the 
European Neighbourhood Policy - Strategy Paper. 
139 ‘A Secure Europe in a better world - The European Security Strategy’, adopted by the European Council i  
Brussels, 12 December 2003, 8; COM(2003) 104 final, bid., 4. 
140 COM(2003) 104 final, ibid., 4-5. 
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 The Commission in its Wider Europe Communication stated that free movement of 
people and labour could be a possible long-term objective.141 In the Communication on the ENP 
a year later its tone is already more careful: the goal should be to facilitate movement of persons, 
whilst maintaining or improving a high level of security.142 In practice the (limited) free 
movement of persons has become a means, rather than an objective, which is shown for instance 
between the direct link between visa facilitation on the one hand and increased border controls 
and readmission agreements on the other. The Commission in its 2006 Communication on 
“Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy” admitted that “an enhanced ENP (…) 
require[s] a very serious examination of how visa procedures can be made less of an obstacle to 
legitimate travel from neighbouring countries to the EU (and vice versa).” It then however 
immediately linked this possibility of facilitated travel to cooperation on migration control, 
border management and readmissions agreements. The initial promise by Romano Prodi of 
“everything but institutions” seems to have been long forgotten.143  
 
4. Free Movement Rights of Third Country Nationals under Title IV EC 
 
Article 63(3)(a) EC gives the Community the power to legislate measures on immigration policy 
as regards the conditions of entry and residence. This legal basis has been used by the 
Community legislator to grant certain categories of TCNs independent, albeit very limited, free 
movement rights.144 It should emphasized that this legislation is adopted under Title IV EC, not 
on the basis of the free movement provisions of the Treaty. Therefore it is subject to provisions of 
the Protocols attached to the Treaty of Amsterdam on the position of the UK and Ireland, and the 
position of Denmark.145  
 So far five directives that are of relevance for ou discussion have been adopted. The first 
regulates the status of a TNC who has lived regularly and continuously for a minimum of five 
                                                
141 COM(2003) 104 final, supra note 138, 10. 
142 COM(2004) 373 final, supra note 138, 17. 
143 Speech by former Commission President Romano Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to
stability’ (Brussels, Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002), SPEECH/02/619. 
144 See on the relation between this secondary legislation nd the Association Agreements discussed above: Pe rs, S., 
‘EU Migration Law and Association Agreements’, in: Martenczuk, B. and Van Thiel, S. (Eds), Justice, Liberty and 
Security: New Challenges for EU External Relations (Brussels, ASP/VUB Press, 2009), 53-88. 
145 Note that Article 4 of the Protocol on the position f the UK and Ireland allows these Member States to opt-in to 
legislation adopted under Title IV. Only in one case, the Directive on Researchers, has Ireland opted in.   
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years in a Member State, granting him/her the statu of long term residents (LTR).146 The second 
provides for a minimum harmonization of the rules on family reunification.147 Two directives 
regulate the admission, understood as the entry and residence, of students and scientific 
researchers.148 A final directive has been adopted in the framework f the Commission’s policy 
plan on legal migration: the Council Directive on the conditions of entry and residence of third-
country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment.149 A proposal for a Council 
Directive on a single application procedure for a single permit for third-country nationals to 
reside and work in the territory of a Member State nd on a common set of rights for third-
country workers legally residing in a Member State is still pending.150 Two further proposals that 
were announced in the Commission’s policy plan on legal migration, on seasonal workers and 
Intra-Corporate Transferees, have not yet been tabled.151  
 
Although the LTR’s Directive aims to bring the position of the LTR closer to that of the EU 
citizen, it far from gives the LTR the same free movement rights. Under Article 5 of the 
Directive, a LTR has a right of residence in other Member States for more than 3 months, on the 
condition that s/he has stable and regular resources which are sufficient to maintain him/herself 
and the members of his/her family, without recourse to the social assistance of the Member State 
concerned. A LTR is allowed to be joined by his spouse and minor children, but only where the 
family was already constituted in the first Member State.152  
 The Directive is silent on the right of entry into the Member State. However, it seems 
clear that a right of residence cannot be effective without an accompanying right of entry.153 
Interestingly, the LTR Directive also does not explicitly grant LTRs a right of free movement 
                                                
146 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term resid nts, OJ 
2003, L16/44. 
147 Council Directive 2003/86/EC, supra note 103. 
148 Council Directive 2005/71/EC, on a specific procedure for admitting third-country nationals for the pur oses of 
scientific research, OJ 2005, L289/15 and Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-
country nationals for the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary servic , OJ 2004, 
L 375/12. 
149 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes 
of highly qualified employment, OJ 2009, L155/17 (“Blue Card Directive”). 
150 COM(2007) 638 final, Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on a single application procedure for a 
single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of a Member State and on a common set 
of rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State.  
151 COM(2005) 669 final, Commission Communication, Policy Plan on Legal Migration. 
152 Article 16, Council Directive 2003/109/EC, supra note 146. 
153 Compare in this respect Case 48/75, supra note 129. 
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within the Community for periods not exceeding three months. One could argue that a right of 
entry and stay for periods not exceeding three months is implied in Article 5, although it is worth 
noting that a proposal that would have explicitly allowed for free movement of LTR for periods 
of less than six months was never adopted and eventually withdrawn by the Commission.154 It is 
true that within a borderless Schengen area the absnce of such a right would not be too 
problematic, but it might become so in the case of a LTR who wants to visit a part of the 
Community in which the Schengen acquis is not yet applicable.155 A residence permit of one of 
the Member States would substitute a visa requirement under the rules of the SBC, but would not 
automatically imply a right of entry.156  
 
The directives that harmonise the conditions for the entry of TCNs in the context of family 
reunification, students and researchers all grant rights of entry and residence in relation to the 
territory of a single Member State. At most, in thecase of researchers, research may be carried 
out for a period not exceeding three moths in a second Member State.  
 A different approach can be seen in the Blue Card Di ective. Recital 14 of the Directive 
states that TCNs who are in possession of a valid tr vel document and an EU Blue Card issued by 
a Member State applying the Schengen acquis in full, should be allowed to enter into and move 
freely within the territory of another Member State pplying the Schengen acquis in full, for a 
period of up to three months. It is interesting however that this right of free movement, 
presumably including a right to enter through the territory of the other Member States by crossing 
an external border, is linked to the territory in which the Schengen acquis is fully applied, rather 
than to the territory of the Member States in which the Directive applies. Presumably an 
amendment of the SBC is required to allow for such a right to become effective. Moreover, in the 
operative part of the Directive, Article 7(4)(a) refers only to the right to re-enter and stay in 
relation to the Member State issuing the Blue Card.  
 The Commission proposal for a directive that would introduce a single application 
procedure and a single residence and work permit, also stated in recital 8 that there would be a 
                                                
154 COM(2001) 388 final, Commission Proposal for a Council Directive relating to the conditions in which t ird-
country nationals shall have the freedom to travel in the territory of the Member States for periods not exceeding 
three months, introducing a specific travel authorisation and determining the conditions of entry and movement for 
periods not exceeding six months. 
155 Not that in non-Schengen Member States UK and Ireland, the LTR Directive does not apply in any case.  
156 Article 5(1)(b), SBC. 
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right of free movement for a period not exceeding three months in the territory of the Member 
States applying the Schengen acquis in full. However, in Article 11 of the proposal, this right 
seems limited to a right to (re)-enter and stay in the issuing Member State, and a right of passage 
through other Member States. While the explanatory memorandum explicitly mentioned that the 
right contained in Article 11 were of particular relevance in those Member States which do not 
apply the Schengen acquis in full, in a later draft the right of passage through other Member 
States has been deleted.157 This shows once more Member States’ reluctance to give up the power 
to decide who they wish to allow to enter and resid in their territory. Also interesting in this 
respect is the ‘Returns Directive’, which in Article 6(2) states that a TCN who is found to stay 
illegally on the territory of a Member State, but holds a valid residence permit or other 
authorisation offering a right to stay issued by another Member State shall be required to go to 
the territory of that other Member State immediately.158 However, when it comes to excluding 
TCNs from the common territory of the Member States, r cital 14 of the Directive states that an 
entry ban issued in connection with a return decision hould be given a “European dimension” by 
prohibiting entry and stay on the territory of all Member States. Indeed, Article 2(6) of the 
Directive defines an entry ban as applying to the territory of the Member States (plural). 
 It is interesting that the internal market logic that underpins the secondary legislation in 
the area of free movement of persons, is absent in the legislation on the position of TCN legal 
migrants. In this respect is should be questioned i how far the Court’s case law on the free 
movement rights, can be transferred to the situation of a TCN with limited free movement rights 
under the directives adopted under Title IV EC. We would argue that the exceptions on the basis 
of public policy, public security and public health, which can be found in all of the adopted 
directives, should be interpreted in a similar manner as the exceptions to the right of free 
movement of EU citizens.159 Support for this position can be found in the Tampere Conclusions, 
                                                
157 Council Document 8145/1/09. 
158 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals (“Returns Directive”), OJ 2008, L348/98.  
159 The Commission proposals for the LTR Directive still ated that these exceptions were largely drawn from the 
ECJ’s case law on the exceptions to the provisions on free movement for EU citizens (COM(2001) 127 final, 19). 
The original proposal for the Family Reunification Directive also pointed out the similarity with the concept in the 
Community rules on free movement (COM(99) 638 final, 17). The proposals for the TCN Students and TCN 
Researchers Directives stated that decisions on the basis of the exceptions must relate exclusively to the personal 
conduct of the TCN and that regard must be had to the individual’s specific situation and of the proportionality 
principle (COM(2002) 548 final, 17 and COM(2004) 178 final, 18). The proposal for the Blue Card Directive is 
silent on the interpretation of the exceptions (COM(2007) 637 final). 
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which called for the Community to approximate the legal status of long term resident TCNs to 
that of Member States’ nationals.160 Recital 2 of the LTR Directive makes explicit reference to 
these conclusions.161 Likewise, where a TCN arrives at the external border without the requisite 
visa, but can nevertheless furnish evidence of for instance the authorization for family 
reunification and family ties with the sponsor, theCourt’s reasoning in MRAX should apply.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has highlighted and refined the dichotomy that exists in the way the EU’s external 
border rules treat individuals presenting themselves at the external border, whether or not this 
border coincides with the Schengen external border. Since for the EU citizen the right of entry 
into another Member State is in principle independent from whether s/he enters the border of that 
Member State by passing an internal or external border, extensive attention has been paid to rules 
on crossing internal borders as well as the way in which these rules have been interpreted by the 
ECJ.  
 If we consider that the reinforcement of controls at the external border is often justified as 
a prerequisite of attaining internal free movement, as well as the Treaty objective of attaining an 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, a few remarks must be made.  
First, the right of internal free movement is limited to EU citizens and a small number of 
TCNs of “privileged” status. The category of TCNs of such status consists of certain family 
members of the EU citizen, as well as nationals of countries with which the EC and its Member 
States have concluded agreements on the extension of the free movement of persons. Despite 
transitional arrangements for the nationals of the newly acceded Member States, their position of 
EU citizen and concomitant rights is unquestionable. This means that any enforcement of 
national rules which are allowed to remain in force during the transitional period cannot be 
enforced at the internal border.  
Second, the derived nature of the free movement righ s of TCN family members means 
that these rights are not only dependent on the EU citizen family member, but also that they are 
potentially more limited. This is particularly the case if the Court were to extend its ruling in the
                                                
160 European Council Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999, point 21. 
161 Peers, S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, OUP, 2006), 221. 
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Cikotic case to the right of entry which would then be limited to the state in which the EU citizen 
exercises his/her free movement rights.  
After a rather careful judgment in Jia, the Court in Eind ruled that there is no requirement 
of previous legal residence of the TCN family member in the home Member State of the EU 
national before s/he can invoke a derived right of free movement. While both Jia and Eind 
seemed to leave intact a requirement of legal entry i o the EU, the Court in Metock finally 
removed all remaining doubt, explicitly overruling Akrich. Even though this judgment is limited 
to the narrow category of TCN family members of EU citizens, it does mean an important 
restriction on the right of the Member States over th  access to their territory of TCNs. 
Some categories of TCNs have independent free movement rights on the basis of 
association agreements of their country of nationalty with the Community. This is the case for 
the EFTA countries. Association agreements with other ird countries do confer important rights 
on the nationals of these countries, however only once admitted. Under Title IV EC the 
Community has the power to regulate the conditions of access for TCNs, possibly granting them 
independent free movement rights. As we have shown, these rights are however limited to 
specific categories of TCNs, such as qualified workers, and the approach taken is very much 
linked to admission to a single Member State’s territory, evidencing the sensitivities of the 
Member States in relation to their power to decide who to allow to enter and stay in their 
territory. This approach however seems at odds withthe existence of the borderless Schengen 
area, in as far as the right to enter and move freely for periods not exceeding three months is 
concerned.  
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VI. The Schengen Border Crossing Regime 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter we examined how the Community rules on free movement grant 
border crossing rights to EU citizens and certain ctegories of third country nationals (TCN). 
As such, these rules condition the regime at the ext rnal borders of all EU Member States. 
This chapter will focus instead on the substantive rules of the Schengen acquis which 
determine the border crossing regime at the Schengen external borders. The two most 
important measures in this respect are the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and the Regulation 
on local border traffic (LBT).1 
 The objective of the SBC is “the establishment of rules applicable to the movement of 
persons across borders.”2 It provides the legal framework for controls at the external borders. 
These controls consist of border checks and border surveillance. This chapter will focus on 
the position of the individual at the external borders, concentrating on the rules for border 
checks.3 Although the SBC differentiates between people who enjoy the right of free 
movement on the basis of Community law and those who do not, it is self-evident that the 
majority of TCNs will fall into the latter category. The majority of TCNs cannot claim border 
crossing rights and the SBC itself does not provide for any such right. Article 5 of the SBC 
merely sets out the preconditions for the entry into Schengen territory.  
 This chapter will first of all examine these conditions for entry. It will proceed to 
establish the relationship between the Schengen borders egime and the free movement rights 
under EC law. It will then examine the relationship between the Schengen borders regime and 
the Community legislation on asylum. These rules, establishing a Community approach 
towards the obligations incumbent on the Member States under international refugee law, 
were originally within the scope of the Schengen acquis. They have however come to be dealt 
with separately, first as an “area of common interest” under Article K.1 TEU and currently 
under Title IV EC. Although some of the non-Schengen Member States have opted into these 
                                                
1 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ 2006, L105/1 (hereinafter: ‘SBC’) and Regulation (EC) No 
1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States, OJ 2006, 
L405/1 (hereinafter: ‘LBT Regulation’).  
2 Recital 19, SBC. 
3 See Chapter IV for a discussion of the provisions f the SBC that do not relate directly to the act of cr ssing a 
Schengen external border, including surveillance. Se in Chapter III for a discussion of the rules on the
temporary reintroduction of checks at the internal borders.    
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rules, they will be discussed here, because of how cl sely related they are to the Schengen 
regime. Finally, a closer look will be had at the possible implications for the Schengen 
borders crossing rules of some of the Commission’s proposals contained in its 2007 
Communication “Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union.”4 
 
2. From Common Manual to Schengen Borders Code 
 
When the Schengen acquis was integrated in the EU legal order, its definition proved to be a 
more difficult job than expected for it consisted not only of the Schengen agreements but also 
of a host of Decisions by the Schengen Executive Committee.5 This was also true for the rules 
on controls at the external borders. The basic rules w re found in Articles 3-8 of the Schengen 
Implementing Convention (CISA). The most important Decision of the Executive Committee 
complementing these rules was the Common Manual for Border Guards.6 It was partly 
declassified and published, but only after its integration into EU law.7 The Schengen 
provisions on borders were either assigned to Article 62(2)(a) EC specifically or more broadly 
to Article 62.8 Interesting to note is that the Common Manual was assigned not only to Article 
62 EC, but also Article 63 EC, the legal basis for measures on irregular migration.  
 Already before their integration into the EU legal order the status of the Common 
Manual and the related decisions on the external borders was rather unclear. Arguably, they 
were neither decisions of an international organisation, nor international agreements. Being 
incorporated into the EU legal framework as such, doubts as to their legal status persisted 
since they could not be classified as any of the legal instruments listed in Article 249 EC.  
 The Vienna Action Plan adopted in 1998 by the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
Council did not foresee any specific new measures o amendments to the rules on the external 
                                                
4 COM(2008) 69 final, Commission Communication, ‘Preparing the next steps in border management in the 
European Union.’  
5 Monar, J., ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, in: Edwards, G. and Wiessala, G. (Eds), The European Union 1998: 
Annual Review of Activities (JCMS, Oxford, Blackwell, 1999), 165.  
6 Common Manual, OJ 2002, C 313/97. 
7 Council Decision 2000/751/EC on declassifying certain parts of the Common Manual adopted by the Executive 
Committee established by the Convention implementing he Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 2000, 
L303/29 and Council Decision 2002/353/EC on declassifying Part II of the Common Manual adopted by the 
Executive Committee established by the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, 
OJ 2002, L123/49. 
8 Council Decision 1999/436/EC determining the legal b sis for each of the provisions or decisions which 
constitute the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/17. 
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borders.9 In 1999, the Council’s Frontiers Working Party did raw up a Schengen regulations 
Action Plan, which provided for regulations concerning local border traffic and common 
standards for the surveillance of land and sea borders.10 The plan’s time path foresaw in the 
development of rules for local border traffic as one of the first measures to be taken in 2000 
still, while rules on common standards were foreseen for 2002, both falling within the five 
year deadline set by Article 61 EC. It should be noted though, that already under Article 3 
CISA the Executive Committee had been under an obligation (“shall”) to adopt rules on local 
border traffic.   
 The legislative output was however limited to a regulation in which the Council 
reserved the power to update the Common Manual and its annexes to itself, a Decision on the 
signs to be used at border crossing points and a regulation on the systematic stamping of 
TCNs’ passports upon entry and exit. 11 The Council further adopted a range of non-binding 
Council conclusions, including a Schengen Catalogue of Recommendations and Best 
Practices on external border control, removal and rea mission.12  
   A first reference to the establishment of a “common corpus of legislation” was made 
in the Commission communication of 2002 on the Integrated Management of the External 
Borders of the Member States of the EU.13 It announced a proposal for a regulation, recasting 
the Common Manual’s provisions and clarifying their l gal status, as well as for a Regulation 
on local border traffic. The SBC was proposed in May 2004 on the basis of Articles 62(1) and 
(2)(a), and adopted in March 2006. It provides a comprehensive legal framework for the 
management of the external borders, including the rul s for checks at the Schengen external 
borders.14 
  
 
                                                
9 Action Plan of the Council and Commission on how best to implement the provisions of the Treaty of 
Amsterdam on an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice, JHA Council, 3 December 1998, OJ 1999, C19/1. 
10 Council Document 12479/99. 
11 Regulation (EC)  No 790/2001 reserving to the Council implementing powers with regard to certain detail d 
provisions and practical procedures for carrying out border checks and surveillance, OJ 2001, L116/5; Council 
Decision 2004/581/EC determining the minimum indications to be used on signs at external border crossing 
points, OJ 2004, L261/119; Council Regulation (EC) No 2133/2004 on the requirement for the competent 
authorities of the Member States to stamp systematically the travel documents of third country nationals when 
they cross the external borders of the Member States nd amending the provisions of the Convention 
implementing the Schengen agreement and the common manual to this end, OJ 2004, L369/5. 
12 EU Schengen Catalogue, External border controls, removal and readmission: Recommendations and best 
practice: http://ue.eu.int/uedocs/cmsUpload/catalogue20EN.pdf. See for an updated version: Council Document 
15250/2/08. 
13 COM(2002) 233 final, 12. 
14 It repeals the relevant parts of the CISA, as well as the Common Manual and subsequent amendments made 
thereto (see Article 39, SBC), but also includes parts of the Schengen acquis that were previously contained in 
other decisions, for instance regarding the re-instatement of checks at the internal borders. 
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3 Checks at the External Borders 
 
The SBC states that external borders may only be crossed at designated border crossing points 
and only during fixed opening hours.15 Cross-border movement at the external borders are 
subject to checks by border guards. Article 7(2) of the SBC determines that all persons 
crossing the Schengen external border must undergo a minimum check in order to establish 
their identity on the basis of the production of their travel documents. These checks may 
cover the means of transport and objects in the possession of the person crossing the border, 
but in that case national law applies to any searches arried out. 
 It was the European Parliament, for the first time nvolved in the adoption of an act on 
external borders as co-legislator, that insisted on the inclusion of an obligation on border 
guards to respect human dignity, to respect the princi le of proportionality and not to 
discriminate on grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or 
sexual orientation.16  
 
3.1 Persons enjoying the Right of Free Movement under Community Law 
 
Article 7(2) of the SBC states that a minimum check is the rule for persons enjoying the 
Community right of free movement. As we saw in the pr vious chapter, any formality other 
than the production of a valid identity card or passport at whatever place or time and in 
whatever form would contrary to the rules on the free movement of persons.17 Nevertheless, 
the minimum check must be considered as more comprehensive than the “Bangemann Wave” 
which was applied in the 1990s at the UK and Irish borders, in that it establishes identity 
rather than nationality.  
 The category of persons enjoying the Community right of free movement is defined in 
Article 2(5) of the SBC. It is composed of EU citizens, TCNs that can claim free movement 
                                                
15 There are 1792 designated EU external border crossing points with controls (665 air borders, 871 sea borders 
and 246 land borders): Commission, ‘New tools for an integrated European Border Management Strategy’ 
(MEMO/88/85, 13 February 2008). Article 4(2), SBC contains a limited number of exceptions for pleasure 
boats, seamen, requirements of a special nature or cases of unforeseen emergency. The Commission Proposal 
included an exception for a Member State’s own natio ls, but this was deleted by the Council: Article 4(2)(d), 
COM(2004) 391 final. 
16 Article 6, SBC. EP Report on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council 
establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons across borders (A6-
0188/2005), 65. Co-decision was made applicable by Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain reas 
covered by Title IV of Part Three of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the 
procedure laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, OJ 2004, L396/45. 
17 Case 157/79, Pieck [1980] ECR 2171, para 10. 
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rights on the basis of Directive 2004/38/EC and TCNs who are nationals of countries with 
which the EC and its Member States have concluded agreements on the extension of the free 
movement of persons, i.e. the EFTA countries. Note that this category does not include TCNs 
with more limited free movement rights on the basis of secondary legislation adopted under 
Title IV EC.  
Article 7(2) of the SBC states that border guards may consult national and European 
databases in order to ensure that such persons do not represent a genuine, present and 
sufficiently serious threat to the internal security, public policy, international relations of the 
Member States or a threat to public health.18 The proviso that this may only be done on a non-
systematic basis seems to ensure conformity with the Court’s ruling in Commission v 
Belgium.19 Practice seems to indicate that there is a systematic computer checking of 
passports, in particular at airports, even if the purpose of these checks is rather to verify the 
authenticity of the documents.   
The result of a consultation of databases shall not je pardise the right of entry of 
persons enjoying the Community right of free movement into the territory of the Member 
State concerned as laid down in Directive 2004/38/EC.20 This would have to mean that where 
a person who enjoys the Community right of free movement is considered a threat to the 
international relations of the Member States, s/he cannot be refused entry on this ground, 
since this ground for refusal is not included in the list of derogations in Directive 2004/38.21 
However, it could probably be brought under the category of public policy, bearing in mind 
however that this concern has to be assessed in relation to the Member State invoking it.22 
 
3.2 Third Country Nationals  
 
Article 5 of the SBC lists the conditions of entry for TCNs for stays not exceeding three 
months. For the purpose of the SBC, a TCN is defined as any person who is not an EU citizen 
and who does not have a right of free movement under Community law.23  
                                                
18 Note how the reference to “European databases” is vague, allowing for the development of new databases in 
the future, see Chapter VIII. 
19 Case 321/87, Commission v Belgium [1989] ECR 997, para. 15. 
20 Article 7(2), SBC. A more correct formulation would have been the rights of persons enjoying the Community 
right of free movement, since Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family 
members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States, OJ 2004, L158/77 does not apply 
to Switzerland.  
21 Chapter VI, Directive 2004/38/EC, ibid. 
22 Case C-33/07, Jipa [2008] ECR I-0000, nyr, para. 25, see Chapter IV. 
23 Article 2(5) read in conjunction with Article 5(6), SBC.  
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Valid Travel Document and Visa 
 
A TCN must first of all be in possession of a valid travel document. Article 10 of the SBC 
provides that the travel documents of TCNs shall be systematically stamped on entry and exit. 
This applies also to TCN family members of an EU citizen who do not present their residence 
card.24 Article 11 determines that the absence of an entry stamp in the travel document of the 
TCN leads to the (rebuttable) presumption that the holder does not fulfil, or no longer fulfils, 
the conditions relating to the duration of stay.25 
 If the TCN is a national of a country included in A nex I of Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 s/he will further require a visa.26  The Common Consular Instructions (CCI) 
contain the conditions governing the issue of visas by the Member States’ consulates.27 
Despite the existence of the CCI, there is considerabl  difference in the way in which 
consulates handle requests for visas.28 Point V of the CCI gives a list of very broad crite a to 
be taken into consideration when examining a visa application: the security of the Contracting 
Parties, the fight against illegal immigration as well as other aspects relating to international 
relations. In fact the Schengen visa system is one of mutual recognition of national visas.29 It 
should be recalled that “[m]ere possession of a uniform visa does not entitle automatic right 
of entry.30 
 The CCI contains rules as to the Member State responsible for deciding on a visa 
application.31 This is either the Member States of main destinatio  or, in the absence of a 
main destination, the Member State of first entry. However, once a visa is issued, the SBC 
does not seem to impose any restrictions as to where t  Schengen external borders may be 
crossed. The proposal to recast the CCI in a regulation establishing a Community Visa Code 
                                                
24 Article 10(2), SBC. Article 10(3) of the SBC contai s further specific exceptions including Heads of States, 
pilots, seamen and the inhabitants of Andorra, Monac  and San Marino. 
25 Article 11, SBC. 
26 Article 1(1), Council Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 listing the third countries whose nationals must be in 
possession of visas when crossing the external borders and those whose nationals are exempt from that 
requirement, OJ 2001, L81/1.  
27 Common Consular Instructions on Visas for Diplomatic Mission and Consular Posts, OJ 2002, C313/1 
(hereinafter: ‘CCI’).  
28 Guiraudon, V., ‘Garanties financières exigées pour les demandeurs indiens de visas de court séjour (visite ou 
tourisme) : quelques exemples européens’, Cultures & Conflits 50 (2003), 49-52; Jileva, E., ‘La mise en oeuvre 
de Schengen : la délivrance des visas en Bulgarie’, Cultures & Conflits 50 (2003), 31-48. See also ‘Visa Policies 
of European Union Member States - Monitoring Report’ (Warsaw, Stefan Batory Foundation, June 2006). 
29 Guild, E. and Bigo, D., ‘La politique commune des vi as : les luttes pour l'homogénéisation ou le maintien 
d'un réseau hétérogène ?’, Culture & Conflits 49 (2002), 71-81. 
30 I.2.1, CCI. 
31 Part II, Article 1, CCI. 
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would mean an important improvement.32 Article 23(1) of the draft Regulation contains a 
number of precise criteria for refusing a visa. The grounds for refusing a visa under the 
proposal largely overlap with the grounds for refusal of entry under the SBC. Article 23 
would furthermore introduce a duty to provide the reasons for refusal in written and the right 
to an appeal against such refusal in accordance with national law. Recently, JLS 
Commissioner Barrot has suggested that the national Schengen visa be replaced with a 
Community Schengen visa, possibly to be issued by a Common Community Consular 
Authority.33  
 
Article 11 CISA distinguishes between a travel visa and a transit visa. A travel visa is valid 
for one or more entries, provided that neither the length of a continuous visit nor the total 
length of successive visits exceeds three months in any half-year from the date of first entry. 
A transit visa authorises the holder to pass through the territories of the Contracting Parties 
once, twice or exceptionally several times from one third country to another, provided that 
transit does not exceed five days. Visas used for a period of more than three months are 
national visas, but shall nevertheless, for a period of not more than three months from their 
initial date of validity, be valid as uniform short-stay visas if they were issued in conformity 
with the Schengen rules for the issuing of short term visas. If not, the long term visa shall be 
valid as a visa allowing for transit to the Member State that issued it.34  
 Article 13 CISA determines that the period of validity of a travel document must 
exceed that of the visa, taking account of the period of use of the visa.35 A uniform 
application of the Schengen rules may be compromised where not all Member States 
recognize the validity of travel documents from a certain third country. Article 14(1) of the 
CISA provides that in such cases the visa affixed to the travel document is only valid for the 
Contracting Parties that recognize the validity of the travel document.  
 A visa with limited territorial validity is affixed in exceptional cases to a passport, 
travel document or other document which entitles the holder to cross the border, where the 
                                                
32 COM(2006) 403 final, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Community Code on Visas. 
33 ‘Bruxelles veut mettre en place un visa européen unique’ (Le Monde, 10 June 2009). 
34 Article 2, Council Regulation (EC) No 1091/2001 on freedom of movement with a long-stay visa, OJ 2001, 
L150/4. 
35 The decision whether to subject the nationals of a particular third country to a visa duty is made on the basis of 
a set of criteria which are grouped under three headings: illegal immigration, public policy and international 
relations, see COM(2000) 27 final, 9. 
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visit is authorized only in the national territory of one or more contracting Parties, provided 
that both entry and exit are through the territory f these Contracting Parties.36  
 The repealed Common Manual stated in point 3.2.2 that “a visa with limited territorial 
validity is a national visa whose validity is limited to the territory of the State(s) which issued 
it. This visa does not enable its holder to invoke Article 19 of the Convention [on free 
movement within territory of the Contracting Parties] for the purposes of staying in the 
territory of the other Contracting Parties.” The SBC does not seem to provide for a right of 
transit in the case where a TCN presents his/herself at the external border of Member State X 
with a visa with limited territorial validity for Member State Y.  
 In accordance with Article 5(4)(b) of the SBC, the TCN who fulfils all conditions for 
entry, except the visa requirement may be authorised a visa at the border in accordance with 
Council Regulation (EC) No 415/2003 on the issue of visas at the border, if s/he can show 
proof that it was impossible to apply for a visa in advance, that there are “unforeseeable and 
imperative reasons for entry” and return to the third country will be guaranteed.37  
 Two Council Decisions introduced a simplified regime for the control of persons at the 
external borders by qualifying certain documents as equivalent to national visas and 
unilaterally recognising certain residence permits issued by Switzerland and Liechtenstein for 
the purpose of transit through their territory.38 The recitals to these decisions justified the 
measures from a need to decrease the administrative burd n on the consulates of the Member 
States and the lack of a risk of immigration from the category of travelers concerned. One of 
the documents that could be considered as equivalent to a national visa by the Member States 
that acceded to the EU in 2004 and did not yet fully apply the Schengen acquis is the 
residence permit issued by another Member State. In the case of a TCN family member of an 
EU citizen this seems to be a duty rather than a possibility having regard to Article 5(2) of 
Directive 2004/38/EC.39  
 
                                                
36 Part I, Article 2.3, CCI. 
37 Article 1(1), Council Regulation (EC) No 415/2003 on the issue of visas at the border, including the issue of 
such visas to seamen in transit, OJ 2003, L64/1. 
38 Decision No 895/2006/EC introducing a simplified regime for the control of persons at the external borders 
based on the unilateral recognition by [EU-10 Member States] of certain documents as equivalent to their 
national visas for the purposes of transit through their territories, OJ 2006, L67/1 and Decision No. 896/2006/EC 
establishing a simplified regime for the control of persons at the external borders based on the unilateral 
recognition by the Member States of certain residence permits issued by Switzerland and Liechtenstein for the 
purpose of transit through their territory, OJ 2006, L167/8. 
39 Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 20. 
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A separate visa list exists for a small group of TCNs who pass through an international airport 
located in an EU Member State and are required to be in possession of an Air Transit Visa 
(ATV) on the basis of Joint Action 96/197/JHA and Annex III to the Common Consular 
Instructions (CCI).40 Recital 4 of the Joint Action clearly identifies the risk of illegal 
immigration by nationals from these countries as the main motivation for their inclusion on 
the list. The ECJ has held that in the case of transit, a TCN does not pass the legal external 
border.41 Although it would be logical to conclude from this judgment that the SBC does not 
apply to the category of passengers that remain in a transit area on airports, the SBC does 
contain in Annex VI, point 2.1.3 rules for this category of TCNs. Checks are normally not 
carried out on the aircraft, at the gate or in transit areas, unless this is justified on the basis of 
an assessment of the risks related to internal security and illegal immigration. Within the 
transit area checks may be carried out to see whether persons subject to the duty to have an 
airport transit visa are in possession of one.  
  
Article 5(1)(b) of the SBC exempts the TCN holders of a valid residence permit from having 
a visa. A valid residence permit is defined in Article 15(a) as a residence permit issued by the 
Member States according to the uniform format laid down by Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 
and all other documents issued by a Member State to hird country nationals authorising a 
stay in, or re-entry to, its territory, with the exc ption of temporary permits issued pending 
examination of a first application for a residence permit under Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 
or applications for asylum.42 
 Regulation (EC) No 539/2001 was amended so as to exempt recognised refugees, 
stateless persons and other persons who do not hold he nationality of any country who reside 
in a Member State and are holders of a travel document issued by that Member State.43 The 
amendment was deemed necessary to broaden the exemption contained in Article 5(1)(b) of 
the SBC to those categories of people living in a Member State to which the Schengen acquis 
did not yet apply in full.44 The broadening of the exemption has primarily benefited the “non-
citizen” population of Latvia and Estonia, holding a so-called “grey-passport”, before the full 
                                                
40 Joint Action 96/197/JHA on airport transit arrangements, OJ 1996, L63/8. Annex III, CII, which applies 
between the Schengen Member States, lists the same countries as Joint Action 96/197/JHA, namely Afghanistan, 
Congo (Democratic Republic), Eritrea, Ethiopia, Ghana, Iraq, Iran, Sri Lanka, Nigeria and Somalia, with the 
exception of Bangladesh and Pakistan which have since been added. 
41 Case C-170/96, Commission v. Council (“Air Transit Visas”) [1998] ECR I-3655, para. 23. 
42 Council Regulation (EC) No 1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residence permits for third-country 
nationals OJ 2002, L157/1. 
43 Council Regulation (EC) No 1932/2006, amending Regulation (EC) No 539/2001,OJ 2006, L405/23. 
44 Recital 6, ibid. 
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application of the Schengen acquis in those Member States. The fact that this amendmet was 
deemed necessary is significant, as it seems to confirm that the term Member State in the SBC 
needs to be interpreted throughout the text as applying only to those Member States that fully 
apply the Regulation. One could argue that a TCN holding a residence permit from either the 
UK or Ireland and who is under an obligation to hold a visa in order to cross the Schengen 
external borders could still be exempted from the visa requirement by holding a residence 
permit from the UK or Ireland since both countries have opted into Regulation (EC) No 
1030/2002. It may however be questioned if the same holds true for other documents issued 
by these Member States authorising stay or (re-)entry i to their territory. 
 
A specific transit regime is in force for residents of Kaliningrad, the Russian enclave enclosed 
by EU Member States. Council Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 provides for a Facilitated 
Transit Document (FTD) and a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD).45 They have the 
same value as transit visas and are territorially va id for the issuing Member State and other 
Member States through which the facilitated transit takes place.46 
 Resident of the Moroccan provinces of Tetuan and Na or have always been subject to 
“specific arrangements for visa exemptions for local border traffic” with the Spanish enclaves 
of Ceuta and Melilla. These exemptions have remained i  force under the declaration made by 
Spain at the time of its accession to the Schengen A reements.47  
 
Other conditions for entry 
 
Although a valid visa may well be considered the most important condition for entry, it is 
certainly not the only one. Article 5 of the SBC further requires that the TCN 1) justifies the 
purpose and conditions of his/her intended stay, 2) disposes of sufficient means of 
subsistence, 3) has not been alerted in Schengen Information System (SIS) for the purposes of 
refusing entry, 4) is not considered a threat to public policy, internal security, public health or 
the international relations of any of the Member States.   
 
                                                
45 Council Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 establishing a specific Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), a 
Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and amending the Common Consular Instructions and the Common 
Manual, OJ 2003, L99/8 and Council Regulation (EC) No 694/2003 on uniform formats for Facilitated Transit 
Documents (FTD) and Facilitated Rail Transit Documents (FRTD) provided for in Regulation (EC) No 
693/2003, OJ 2003, L99/15.  
46 Article 3(1), Regulation (EC) No 693/2003, ibid. 
47 Final Act, Part III, Article 1(b), Spanish Act of Accession to the Schengen Agreements (OJ 2000, L 239/73). 
 129 
The current functioning of the SIS, which since theinclusion of new Member States in the 
system is referred to as SIS1+, is still governed by the CISA. Article 96 CISA lays down the 
criteria for making an entry in the SIS. Entries must be “resulting from decisions taken by the 
competent administrative authorities or courts in accordance with the rules of procedure laid 
down by national law.” They can be based on the “threat to public policy or public security or 
to national security” that a person’s presence within e Schengen territory may pose, or on 
the basis of a decision under the immigration laws of a Contracting Party regarding the 
deportation, refusal of entry or removal of this person. The term threat to public policy is not 
defined. Neither is threat to public security, inter al security or the international relations of 
any of the Member States in the SBC. In the SBC only the threat to public health has been 
defined, in the same way as it has in Directive 2004/38/EC. One may however assume that a 
Member State’s discretion in determining a threat to public health, public policy or public 
security in relation to TCNs is broader than under Directive 2004/38/EC.48 Under Directive 
2004/38/EC public policy is an exception to a fundamental Treaty freedom of free movement, 
whereas there is no right to cross the Schengen extrnal borders. 
 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 governs the new SIS (IS II) in respect of matters 
falling within the First Pillar.49 The Regulation has not significantly changed the rul s for 
making an entry.50 It does add the proviso that national decisions to issue an alert should be 
taken “on the basis of an individual assessment.”51 This should be read together with the 
proportionality requirement of Article 21 which reinforces the obligation already present in 
Article 94(1) CISA, that a case should be “important e ough to warrant the entry of the alert 
in the SIS” by requiring that an entry is “adequate” and “relevant.”52 Article 26 adds a ground 
for making an entry in relation to TCNs who are subject to restrictive measures preventing 
entry or transit in accordance with Article 15 EU, including measures implementing travel 
bans issued by the UN Security Council.  
 It should be regretted that there are still no precise criteria for listing persons to be 
denied entry. As the House of Lords EU Committee noted, in some Member States, anyone 
                                                
48 We would argue that an exception would have to be made for TCN who have (limited) free movement rights 
on the basis of secondary legislation adopted under Titl  IV EC, see Chapter V and below. 
49 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II), OJ 2006, L381/4. Council Decision 2007/533/JHA (OJ 2007, L205/63) does so in 
respect of Third Pillar legislation,. 
50 Article 24(2) and (3), Regulation 1987/2006. 
51 Article 24(1), Regulation 
52 See in more detail: Brouwers, E., ‘The Other Side of Moon - The Schengen Information System and Human 
Rights: A Task for National Courts (Brussels, CEPS Working Document No. 288, April 2008). 
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issued with an expulsion decision, as well as failed asylum-seekers, are automatically made 
the subject of an “alert” to stop them from entering any other Member State.53  
  Article 11 of the “Returns Directive” requires tha  return decisions are accompanied 
by an entry ban if no period for voluntary departure has been granted, or if the obligation to 
return has not been complied with. In all other cases a return decision may, but need not, be 
accompanied by an entry ban.54 The minutes of the Council at the moment of the adoption of 
the Directive state the Commission’s declaration that e review of the SIS II, as envisaged by 
Article 24(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006) would be the opportunity to propose an 
obligation to register entry bans issued under this Directive in the SIS.55  
 
A TCN who does not fulfil all conditions from Article 5(1) of the SBC may still be authorised 
to enter if s/he holds a residence permit or re-entry visa from one of the Member States (or 
where required both) on the basis of Article 5(4)(a). Entry is for the purpose of transit, 
allowing them to reach the Member State in question. Entry can still be denied if the TCN is 
on a national list of alerts of the Member State whose external borders (s)he attempts to cross 
and the alert is accompanied by instructions to refuse entry or transit.  
 
Border checks  
 
Article 7(3) of the SBC states that TCNs shall be subject to thorough checks upon both entry 
and exit. Specific rules for the various types of border and means of transport used for 
crossing the external borders are set out in Annex VI. Entry controls comprise the verification 
of the conditions for entry set out above, and where applicable, of documents authorising 
residence and the pursuit of professional activity. Under Article 8, a relaxation of checks on 
entry and exit is possible. These must be temporary and priority must be given to entry 
checks. 
 
                                                
53 Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘Schengen Information System II (SIS II)’ (HL 
Paper 49, Session 2006-07, 9th Report, 2 March 2007), 23-24. 
54 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country, OJ 2008, L348/98 (hereinafter: ‘Returns Directive’). 
55 Council Document 16166/08 ADD 1 REV 1. 
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The adoption of the Regulation on the Visa Information System (VIS), necessitated an 
amendment to the SBC in relation to the verification of the visa requirement.56 The VIS 
should facilitate checks at the external border crossing by allowing border guards access to 
data included in the system by Member States’ visa authorities.57 In accordance with Article 
18 of the VIS Regulation, border guards have access to search the VIS for the purpose of 
verification of the identity of the holder of the visa and of the authenticity of the visa, by 
consulting the system using the number of the visa sticker or the fingerprints of the visa 
holder in order to verify the identity of the visa holder, the authenticity of the visa and 
whether the conditions for entry to the territory of the Member States in accordance with 
Article 5 of the SBC are fulfilled. This formulation is rather odd. Of course possession of a 
visa, where required, is an entry condition, yet th reference to all entry conditions listed in 
Article 5 seems much broader and would allow the VIS to become a data base with a broader 
purpose than verifying the validity of the visa.  
 Regulation (EC) No 81/2009 amending the SBC adds in Article 7(3) that thorough 
checks on entry shall include a check of the VIS.58 It limits however the purpose of such 
checks to verifying the identity of the visa holder and authenticity of the visa.59 On the 
initiative of the Parliament the obligation to systematically check the VIS may be limited at 
specific border crossing points to a check of the visa number alone, checking it at random in 
combination with the finger print.60 This may be done when waiting times are excessive, 
resources have been exhausted and there is no risk for internal security and irregular 
immigration.61 Although the concern of the Parliament that a systematic check of the VIS 
could lead to long queues at the border is justified, the latter condition is ill-defined and 
leaves too much room for diverging interpretations.  
 Under Article 18(4) of the VIS Regulation, a match on the basis of the fingerprints or 
visa-sticker will allow the border guard access to a broader range of information taken from 
the application form, as well as photographs and data entered in relation to visa(s) issued, 
annulled, revoked or whose validity is extended or shortened. In case the verification of the 
                                                
56 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data 
between Member States on short-stay visas, OJ 2008, L218/60 (hereinafter: ‘VIS Regulation’); COM(2008) 101 
final.  
57 Article 2(d), VIS Regulation. 
58 Article 1, Regulation (EC) No 81/2009 amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as regards the use of the Visa
Information System (VIS) under the Schengen Borders Code, OJ 2009, L35/56. 
59 Article 7(3)(aa), SBC. 
60 EP Report on the proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 as regards the use of the 
Visa Information System (VIS) under the Schengen Borders Code (A6-0208/2008). 
61 Article 7(3)(ab), SBC. 
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visa holder or visa is unsuccessful, or when there are doubts as to the identity of the visa 
holder, the authenticity of the visa or travel document, Article 18(5) determines that “duly 
authorised staff of those competent authorities” may access the VIS in accordance with 
Article 20(1) and (2) of the VIS Regulation.  
 Article 20 holds that for the sole purpose of identification of a person who may not 
fulfil the conditions for entry, stay or residence, the authorities responsible for checks at the 
external borders and within the Member States’ territory may search the VIS in order to check 
whether indeed this person does not fulfil these conditions. If the person is listed in the VIS, 
the competent authority is given access to information aken from the application form, as 
well as photographs and data entered in relation to visa(s) issued, annulled, revoked or whose 
validity is extended or shortened.  
 
Exit controls comprise the verification of the validity of the travel documents and wherever 
possible whether the TCN is considered a threat to public policy, internal security or the 
international relations of any of the Member States. Exit checks may further include a check 
to see whether the TCN is in possession of a visa where this would be required by Regulation 
(EC) No 539/2001 and whether s/he overstayed this visa. Regulation (EC) No 81/2009 
amending the SBC, has added to Article 7(3)(c)(i) that this verification may include a 
consultation of the VIS in accordance with Article 18 upon exit.62   
 A new Article 7(3)(d) of the SBC gives border guards the general competence to 
consult the VIS “for the purpose of identification f any person who may not fulfil, or who 
may no longer fulfil, the conditions for entry, stay or residence on the territory of the Member 
States” in accordance with Article 20 of the VIS Regulation.63 Oddly enough this possibility 
is not explicitly included for checks upon entry, but reading Article 18 in combination with 
Article 20, can only lead one to conclude that also up n entry border guards may consult the 
VIS on the basis of Article 20 for the purpose of identification of someone they believe does 
not fulfil the conditions for entry, stay or residence.  
 Under the CCI, visa overstay means that a visa applicant can be considered a risk from 
an immigration point of view. Presumably however, the fact that a TCN has overstayed 
his/her visa would follow only from the exit stamp in the passport, which upon requesting a 
                                                
62 Article 2, Regulation (EC) No 81/2009, supra note 58. 
63 Article 3, ibid. 
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new visa could be circumvented by presenting a new id ntity document.64 It is unclear what 
action would have to be taken when a TCN is found to have overstayed his/her visa.65 Border 
guards are not amongst the authorities that have the possibility to enter data in the VIS.66 
Under Article 6(1) of the Returns Directive Member States must issue a return decision to any 
TCN staying illegally on their territory. If departu e is however imminent this seems 
superfluous.67 It seems that in this case Member States may refrain om issuing a return 
decision on the basis of the exception contained in Article 6(4) of the Directive which allows 
them to grant an authorisation to stay at any time.68 As Peers notes, if at any point the entry-
exit system is to be linked to the issuing of a return decision under the Returns Directive, or 
an entry ban under Article 11 of that Directive and the SIS/SIS II, this would require the 
Community legislator to lay down a uniform definition of overstay and define the situations in 
which overstay is excusable.69 
 Exit control may also comprise a consultation of alerts on persons and objects 
included in the SIS and reports in national data files. Annex II to the SBC includes 
registration of “persons apprehended and complaints (criminal offences and administrative 
breaches)” amongst the information that is to be recorded at border crossing points.  
 
Upon request of the TCN and where facilities exist, thorough checks are carried out in a 
private area. In the case of so-called second line checks, i.e. checks carried out away from the 
location at which persons are generally checked, the TCN will be informed of the purpose and 
procedure of such check. The information must be avail ble in the official Union languages 
and the languages of the bordering countries and should indicate that the TCN has the right to 
request the name or service identification number of the border guards carrying out the second 
line check, the name of the border crossing point and the date on which the border was 
crossed. 
 Article 13(1) of the SBC states that a TCN not fulfilling the requirements set out in 
Article 5 will be refused entry. However, it should be stressed that even when all conditions in 
                                                
64 This is one of the reasons for which the Commission is contemplating the introduction of an entry-exit system: 
COM(2008) 69 final, supra note 4, 5. 
65 Not to mention practical difficulties border guards may have in establishing overstay, where for instance 
different travel documents are used or entry stamps are illegible: ibid., 5.  
66 Article 6(1), VIS Regulation. 
67 In fact only one Member State seems to consider ovstay alone a reason for issuing a deportation order 
(Council Document 13403/08). 
68 Note that under Article 2(2)(a) of Directive 2008/115/EC, supra note 54, Member States may decide not to 
apply the Directive to a refusal of entry. 
69 Peers, S., ‘Proposed New EU Border Control Systems’ (EP Briefing Paper, June 2008, PE 408.296), 8. 
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Article 5 are fulfilled, the SBC does not provide for a right of entry. This has been rightly 
criticized by Peers, who argues that far from creating a “human right to enter”, this would 
simply ensure legal certainty and respect for the rul  of law in this area of EC competence.70 
 Article 13(2) of the SBC states that entry may only be refused by a substantiated 
decision of an authority empowered by national law, stating the precise reasons for refusal. In 
the context of joint operational activity of Member States’ border guards authorities this may 
only be a border guard of the Member State whose border the TCN attempted to cross.71 In 
accordance with Annex II of the SBC border crossing points must record refusals of entry.
 Persons refused entry have a right to appeal under the law of the Member State in 
question. This appeal does not have a suspensive effect.72 One could wonder to what extent 
these procedural rights apply where persons are apprehended attempting to cross the external 
border outside the designated border crossing points. Considering the wording of Article 
13(2) (“may only be refused”) and the importance of a substantiated decision in writing for 
the accountability and transparency of border guards’ work a broad interpretation of this 
Article is justified. The fact alone that a TCN attempted to cross the external border outside 
the designated border crossing points cannot suffice, in particular in view of the possible 
exception contained in Article 4(2) and the obligation to verify any claims for asylum.  
 
4. The  Local Border Traffic Regime 
 
On 20 December 2006 the Community legislator adopted R gulation No 1931/2006 laying 
down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders.73 The LBT Regulation 
derogates from the SBC for the benefit of border residents, aiming to prevent the imposition 
of the Schengen border controls from disrupting local border economies. TCN border 
residents may be issued a LBT permit, which allows them to cross the border under the LBT 
                                                
70 Peers, S., Justice & Home Affairs Law (Oxford, OUP, 2006), 150. 
71 Article 10(10), Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management 
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004, 
L349/1 (“Frontex Regulation”). 
72 Article 13(3), SBC. 
73 The legislative history of this Regulation shows quite nicely the effects of the transitional period t  which Title 
IV EC was subject. An initial proposal, COM(2003) 502 final, was based on Articles 62(2)(a) (external borders) 
and Articles 62(2)(b)(ii) and (iv) (visas). As of 1 May 2004 however measures based on Article 62(2)(b)(ii  and 
(iv) fell under the co-decision procedure in accordance with Article 67(4) EC, while measures based on Article 
62(2)(a) were still to be adopted unanimously by the Council. For this reason the Commission drafted two new 
proposals, which however were merged into COM(2005) 56 final after the Council adopted Decision 
2004/927/EC, supra note 16. 
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regime established under this Regulation.74 Importantly, border residents are allowed an 
uninterrupted stay of a maximum of three months in the border area. Regulation (EC) No 
539/2001 exempts TCNs who hold a LBT card from a visa duty.75 Compared to the 
Commission’s proposal the approach that was adopted in the final version of the Regulation 
has the advantage of establishing a more generalised LBT regime, facilitating the actual 
border crossing, rather than merely mitigating the visa requirement by providing a special 
multi-entry visa for border residents.76  
 A border resident is defined as a TCN who has been lawfully resident in the border 
area of a third country neighbouring a Member State for a period of at least a year.77 The 
border area comprises an area not extending more than 30 kilometres from the border, 
including local administrative districts, parts of which extend between 30 and 50 km from the 
border line.78  
The conditions for issuing a LBT permit are that the border resident is in possession of 
a valid travel document, produces proof of his/her status as border resident, provides proof of 
legitimate reasons to frequently cross the external land border and does not have an alert 
issued in the SIS for the purpose of refusing entry. Moreover, s/he may not be considered a 
threat to public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of any of 
the Member States or be signalled for these reasons in Member States’ national databases for 
the purpose of refusing entry.79 Unlike the proposal, Article 12 of the Regulation allows 
Member States to determine administrative authorities allowed to issue the permit in addition 
to consulates, thus no longer excluding the possibility of issuing the permit at the external 
border. The Regulation does not affect the specific arrangements applied in Ceuta and 
Melilla, leaving in place existing visa exemptions without introducing the more advantageous 
local border traffic regime.80 
 The entry conditions for the holders of the LBT permit are essentially the same as for 
the issuing of the permit itself, although Member States may do away with the requirement of 
having a valid travel document and the permit holder oes not have to prove legitimate 
                                                
74 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the 
Member States and amending the provisions of the Scngen Convention, OJ 2006, L405/1 (hereinafter: ‘LBT 
Regulation’). 
75 Article 1(2), Regulation (EC) No 539/2001, supra note 26. 
76 Article 8, COM(2005) 56 final. 
77 Article 3(6), ibid. 
78 Article 3(2), ibid. The original proposal only included local administrative districts, parts of which extended a 
maximum of 35 km from the border line, Article 3(b), COM(2005) 56 final.  
79 Article 9, LBT Regulation. 
80 Article 16, ibid. 
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reasons to frequently cross the external land border.81 The permit allows local border residents 
a maximum uninterrupted stay of three months.82 Member States are held to carry out entry 
and exit checks on border residents, in order to ensure that they fulfil the entry conditions.83 
No entry or exit stamps are affixed to the LBT permit.84  
 For the implementation of the LBT Regulation, indivi ual Member States are 
authorised to conclude bilateral Agreements with their neighbouring third countries, subject to 
the provisions of the Regulation.85 Such agreements must be reciprocal.86 Under Article 15 
they may provide for an easing of border checks for holders of a LBT permit. The easing may 
consist of the establishment of specific border crossing points for local border residents only 
or special lanes at ordinary crossing points. At such points, persons who regularly cross the 
external land border and who are, by reason of their fr quent crossing of the border, well 
known to the border guards should be subject to random checks only and occasionally to 
unannounced thorough checks.87 Under exceptional circumstances border residents may be 
authorised to cross the external borders at defined places other than authorised border 
crossing points and outside opening hours. 
 The fact that the LBT Regulation gives only a general legislative framework within 
which the Member States may negotiate agreements with their neighbouring countries can be 
explained from the division of competences between the EC and its Member States.88 A 
rights-based approach would however have left less di cretion to the Member States, 
providing border residents with a more harmonised st of rights. It is to be hoped that the 
Commission will take seriously its obligation to make public “by all appropriate means” the 
content of the bilateral agreements, so that border residents will be aware of their rights.89 It is 
unclear to which authority a border resident can appe l in case of a refusal to grant a LBT 
permit. Presumably this is left to national law. Where entry in accordance with the LBT 
regime is refused, the provisions of the SBC on refusal of entry should apply, although this is 
not explicitly stated.    
 
                                                
81 Article 4, ibid. 
82 Article 5, ibid. 
83 Article 6(1), ibid. 
84 Article 6(2), ibid. 
85 Article 13, ibid. 
86 Article 14, ibid, speaks of “comparability of treatment.” 
87 Thorough check should be understood as consisting of a verification that all entry conditions are fulfilled 
under Article 6(1) of the LBT Regulation, not in the sense of the Article 7(3), SBC.   
88 See in more detail Chapter X. 
89 Article 19, LBT Regulation. 
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5. The Relationship between the Schengen Rules and the EC Free Movement 
 
The SBC is very clear on the precedence of the EC right of free movement. In Article 3(a) it 
explicitly states that it is without prejudice to the rights of persons enjoying free movement 
under Community law. As we noted above the consultation of national and European 
databases is without prejudice to these free movement rights. Article 7(6) clearly states that 
checks on a person enjoying the Community right on free movement shall be carried out in 
accordance with Directive 2004/38/EC.90 This seems to be an indication that for an EU citizen 
there should be no difference in crossing either an internal or external border. Nevertheless, as 
we noted above the minimum check foreseen by the SBC seems to be more extensive then 
would be allowed at the internal border. 
 Also the CISA stated clearly in Article 134 that it would apply only in so far as it is 
compatible with Community law. After the integration f the CISA into EC law, the ECJ in 
Case C-503/03 was asked to clarify the relationship between the two regimes.91 The case 
concerned two Algerian nationals, both married to Spanish nationals (and thus EU citizens) 
living in a non-Schengen EU Member State. Mr. Bouchoir, living with his Spanish spouse in 
the UK, was refused a Schengen visa to Spain. Mr. Farid, living with his Spanish spouse in 
Ireland, was refused entry to Spain upon arrival from Algeria. Both refusals were based on an 
alert in the SIS. Such an alert is reason for refusal of entry into the Schengen area under 
Article 5 CISA, currently Article 13(1) of the SBC. However, as was discussed in the 
previous chapter, the EC provisions on free movement of persons give the TCN spouse of an 
EU citizen a derivative right of entry and residenc.   
Within making explicit reference to Article 135 CISA, the Court understandably 
reaffirmed the fundamental status of the freedom of m vement in EC law, holding that a 
Contracting State may issue an alert for a national f  third country who is the spouse of a 
Member State national only after establishing that e presence of that person constitutes a 
genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of 
society within the meaning of Directive 64/221/EEC.92  
In such a situation an entry in the SIS is a ground for refusal of entry into the 
Schengen area. However, the entry must be corroborated by information enabling the Member 
State consulting the SIS to determine whether indeed th  presence of the person concerned 
                                                
90 Directive 2004/38/EC, supra note 20. 
91 Case C-503/03, Commission v Spain [2006] ECR I-01097. 
92 Case C-503/03, ibid., para. 52. 
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constitutes such threat.93 In the case at hand the necessary information was not provided. 
Under the Regulation governing the operation of SISII, it is explicitly provided that an alert 
on a third-country national in possession of free movement rights shall be in conformity with 
the rules adopted in the implementation of Directive 2004/38/EC.94 
 
A similar question as the one at hand in Commission v Spain could arise regarding the 
relationship between the Schengen acquis and the secondary legislation granting (limited) 
free movement rights to specific categories of TCNs. Let us imagine the situation of a LTR 
who wishes to exercise his/her right to reside in another Member State and for that purpose 
needs to cross a Schengen external border. The possssion of a residence card would exempt 
him/her from a visa requirement. S/he could however be stopped on the basis of a hit in the 
SIS upon a non-systematic consultation thereof. Drawing a parallel to the Court’s ruling, such 
refusal would only be possible if it fulfills the criteria of the exceptions foreseen in Articles 17 
and 18 of Directive 2003/109/EC.95  
 Unfortunately, the SBC does not explicitly include the TCNs covered by this 
legislation as persons enjoying the Community right of free movement. However, as was 
argued already in the previous chapter, they do - albeit to a more limited extent - possess such 
rights. They should therefore be treated accordingly and the case law of the ECJ in the area of 
free movement should apply mutatis mutandis. 
 
6. The Relationship between the Schengen Rules and Rules on Asylum    
 
As we saw in Chapter II, the 1951 Geneva Convention does not provide for a right to asylum, 
nor does any other international instrument. Nonethel ss, there is the obligation of non-
refoulment, which applies also at the border. Rules on the responsibility for asylum claims 
initially formed part of the CISA. These provisions have been superseded by the 1990 Dublin 
Convention, an agreement based on Article K.3 TEU, which after the Amsterdam Treaty was 
incorporated into EU law as Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 (“Dublin II Regulation”) 
                                                
93 Ibid., para. 53. 
94 Article 26, Regulation (EC) No 2006/1987, supra note 49. 
95 Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-term resid nts, 
OJ 2003, L16/44.  
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based on Article 63(1)(a) of Title IV EC.96 The Dublin II Regulation stipulates that a Member 
State shall examine the application for asylum made at the border or in their territory.97 It is 
important to note that this Regulation also applies to the UK and Ireland, Denmark as well as 
the Schengen Associated Countries (SAC). 98    
 The CISA stated in Article 135 that its provisions are subject to the 1951 Geneva 
Convention.99 Article 3(b) of the SBC stipulates that the Regulation will apply without 
prejudice to the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in 
particular as regards non-refoulement. Article 4(3) of the SBC provides that the obligaton for 
Member States to introduce penalties for unauthorised border crossing is without prejudice to 
the Member States’ international protection obligations. Article 13, on the refusal of entry of a 
TCN not fulfilling the conditions for entry, states that the article shall be without prejudice to 
the application of special provisions concerning the right of asylum and to international 
protection or the issue of long-stay visas. Accordingly, Article 5(4)(c) states that a Member 
State may admit a TCN not fulfilling all entry conditions on the basis of humanitarian 
consideration and international obligations. It may therefore be concluded that the Schengen 
rules as such do not affect an asylum seeker’s right to request asylum in one of the Member 
States.  
 
The real problem for asylum seekers and persons in eed of international protection is indeed 
of a different nature. The broader instruments of imm gration control, namely visa obligations 
and carrier sanctions, are essentially means to prevent asylum seekers from actually arriving 
at the territory of the Member States, thereby preventing the responsibility of the Member 
States from arising.100 An example is the Airport Transit Visa (ATV).101 From the ten ATV 
                                                
96 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national, OJ 2003, L50/1 (“Dublin II Regulation”). 
97 Article 3(1), ibid.  
98 The UK and Ireland have opted in to the Regulation. U der its opt-out Denmark could not participate, but
remained bound by the Dublin Convention instead (recitals 18-19, ibid.). It has now associated itself through a 
separate agreement (OJ 2006, L66/38). Norway and Iceland associated themselve  with the Dublin rules in 2001 
(OJ 2001, L93/40), Switzerland did in 2008 (OJ 2008, L53/5). Norway, Iceland and Switzerland are bound vis-
à-vis each other in relation to the Dublin rules by a separate agreement between these countries.  
99 Peers states that this provision has not been integrated into EU law: Peers, S., ‘Revising EU Border Control 
Rules: A Missed Opportunity?’ (Statewatch Analysis, 2005), 3. However, the integral Schengen acquis, 
including the CISA Convention, has been integrated into EU law by the Schengen Protocol. The Council merely 
deemed it unnecessary to assign a legal basis to this Article: Article 2(a) read in conjunction with Annex B, 
Council Decision 1999/435/EC concerning the definitio  of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/1. In any case 
Community law will always be subject to the international obligations and human rights requirements, even 
where this is not made explicit.  
100 See in detail: Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Offshoring and 
Outsourcing of Migration Control (PhD thesis, Aarhus University, 2009). 
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countries, in 2008 five were in the top ten of countries of origin of asylum applicants in the 
EU.102 In addition, border controls are increasingly “extra-territorialised”, meaning that they 
take place outside Schengen territory, for instance on the high seas or in third country 
territorial waters in agreement with the coastal stte.103   
 For a TCN who is required to be in possession of avis , the de facto border of the 
Schengen Area may actually lie beyond the territorial Schengen border.104 This can first of all 
be the consulate of the Schengen Member State in the country in which s/he applies for a 
Schengen visa. Secondly, it can be the check-in desk of airports, train stations or seaports. 
Article 26 CISA requires the Schengen States to impose penalties on carriers who transport 
aliens who do not posses the necessary travel documents. The result is that persons whose 
travel documents are not in order will not be allowed to board and will not even arrive at the 
actual Schengen border. In May 2001 a directive wasadopted in order to harmonise the 
sanctions against carriers.105  
While the Directive on carrier sanctions states that t e provisions on penalties for 
carriers are without prejudice to Member States obligations where someone asks for 
international protection, the practical effect of this provision is unclear.106 The SBC obliges 
Member States to collect statistics on the number and nationality of persons refused entry, the 
grounds for refusal and the type of border (land, air or sea) at which refusal took place. A 
similar obligation for carriers could give an insight into the extent to which people with 
justified protection claims are being prevented from boarding.107 
 
Specific rules on the position of asylum seekers at the border can be found in the “Procedures 
Directive.”108 The Procedures Directive is one of the building blocks of the first phase of the 
creation of a European Common System for Asylum in which the Member States aim to 
harmonise national legislation and provides for mini um procedural standards for the 
                                                                                                                                              
101 Joint Action 96/197/JHA, supra note 40. 
102 Juchno, P. and Albertinelli, A, ‘Asylum applicants and decisions on asylum applications in Q4 2008’, 
(Eurostat, Data in focus, 8/2009), 6 
103 See in detail Chapter X. 
104 See inter alia Guild, E., ‘Moving the Borders of Europe’ (Inaugural Lecture, University of Nijmegen, 30 May 
2001) and Guiraudon, V., ‘Before the EU Border: Remote Control of the “Huddled Masses”’, in: Groenendijk, 
K.., et al. (Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), 191-214. 
105 Council Directive 2001/51/EC supplementing the provisi ns of Article 26 of the Convention implementing 
the Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 2001,  L187/45. 
106 Article 4(2), Directive 2001/51/EC, supra note 105. 
107 Article 13(5), SBC. 
108 Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, OJ 2005, L326/13 (hereinafter: ‘Procedures Directive’). 
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granting and withdrawing of the refugee status.109 Both the UK and Ireland have opted in to 
the Directive. Article 35 of the Directive deals with procedures at the border or in transit 
zones. First of all it should be noted that the Directive applies in full to these areas.110 This is 
in line with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights which has held that under 
the ECHR the transit zones do not have extra-territorial status.111  
Border procedures apply mainly to those applicants who do not meet the conditions 
for entry into the territory of the Member States.112 Article 35(1) provides that Member States 
may introduce procedures to decide on asylum applications in border/transit zones, subject to 
the basic principles of the Directive. Where such procedures do not exist, they may maintain 
procedures that deviate from these principles in order to decide on applications in 
border/transit zones. Paragraph 3 of the same article does require these procedures to be in 
accordance with a number of safeguards, the most important being the right to remain at the 
border or transit zone. Moreover, in case permission to enter is refused by a competent 
authority, this authority has to state the reasons in fact and in law for why the application for 
asylum is considered as unfounded or as inadmissible. This provision seems to lack all 
procedural safeguards against easy and arbitrary rejections of asylum claims. Presumably, this 
decision would have to be in writing as required by Article 13 of the SBC.  
To prevent people from remaining in a sort of “no-man’s land”, Article 35(4) states 
that Member States must ensure that a decision is taken within a reasonable time. If a decision 
is not taken within four weeks, the applicant for asylum must be granted entry to the territory 
of the Member State in order for his/her application t  be processed in accordance with the 
other provisions of the Directive.  
The Procedures Directive further allows Member States o decide on asylum 
applications at locations in the proximity of the border, in case of a massive influx of third 
country nationals making it practically impossible to decide at the border itself. However, this 
may be done only where and for as long as these persons are accommodated normally in these 
locations.113 It would therefore exclude for instance the possibility of the processing of 
asylum claims on board vessels.  
                                                
109 European Council Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999, point 14. The UK and Ireland have opted-in 
to the ‘Procedures Directive’, Denmark does not take part (recital 33,  ibid). 
110 Note the difference in Case C-170/96, Commission v Council [1998] ECR I-3655, paras. 23-24, in which the 
Court held that Joint Action 96/197/JHA on airport transit arrangements, OJ 1996, L63/8 was rightly taken under 
the Third Pillar, as airport transit did not concern the crossing of external borders. 
111 Amuur v France (Appl. No. 19776/92), ECtHR, 25 June 1996, para. 52. 
112 Recital 16, Procedure Directive. 
113 Article 35(5), Procedures Directive. 
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7. The Next Steps in EU Border Management 
 
In February 2008 the Commission tabled three Communications which together were labelled 
“the EU Border Package.”114 One of these Communications, “Preparing the next steps in 
border management in the European Union,” contains various options for the future 
management of the external borders which would not so much change the rules under which 
people cross the Schengen external borders, as the way in which they do.115 Although each of 
these “new tools” still needs to be worked out in detail in legislative proposals, a survey 
amongst Member States as regards one, the introducti n of an entry-exit system, already 
garnered a broad support amongst the Member States.116  
 The Commission first of all proposed the introduction of a “Registered Traveler 
Status.” This would somewhat mitigate the sharp distinction between EU citizens and TCNs. 
A registered traveler status would prove that a TCN, be it from a country under visa 
obligation or not, is a bona fide traveler. In their respect the verification of certain entry 
conditions at the border could be waived.117 Automated gates would facilitate the entry for 
both these registered travelers as well as EU citizens in possession of an e-passport, i.e. 
containing biometric identifiers.118  
 One should realize however that the obligation to hold a visa for TCN of countries that 
are on the visa list will not be affected in any way.119 Guild has pointed out that, although the 
list does not directly discriminate on the basis of GDP, the wealth of nations does form an 
important additional factor of distinction.120 The registered traveler status seems to fit well 
with this observation, considering that the well-off elite of countries on the visa list are likely 
to be the first to benefit from such status. TCNs could apply for the registered traveler status 
at any of the Member States’ consulates. If the system is not to be perceived as arbitrary, a 
                                                
114 COM(2008) 67-69 final. 
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well-known complaint in relation to visa application procedures, it would need clear rules on 
grounds for registration, withdrawal and appeal. 
 The Commission Communication continues with a discus ion of the possible 
introduction of an entry-exit system. This would entail “the automatic registration of time and 
place of entry and exit of third country nationals.” 121 The Commission envisages a system that 
covers all TCNs, presumably with the exceptions that are currently contained in Article 10 
SBC on the stamping of TCN travel documents.122 It would store the biometric data of TCN 
border crossers. TCNs which are under a visa obligation would have already provided their 
fingerprints when requesting a visa and the Commission uggests that, presumably additional, 
biometric data could be included in the system at th point.123 TCNs that are not under a visa 
obligation would have to provide their data upon first entry, recognising that this could lead to 
delays at busy border crossing points.124   
 It would probably be easier to introduce a system hat would only apply to TCNs 
under a visa obligation. It could then be introduced by way of amendments to the VIS 
Regulation and the SBC. The VIS would have to be ext nded so as to include an entry-exit 
database and the SBC would have to make checks upon exit mandatory. In that case however, 
exceptions would have to be made for those TCNs coming from countries that are on the visa 
list, but who are exempt from the visa-duty. This category would most importantly include 
TCNs in possession of a Member State’s residence card, as well as recognised refugees and 
stateless persons resident in any Member State and holding a travel document issued by that 
Member State.125  
 A last option the Commission wishes to explore, th one that is least developed, is the 
introduction of an electronic system of travel authorisation (ESTA).126 This system would 
apply to TCNs coming from countries that are not on the visa list. They would be required to 
make an electronic application supplying, in advance, data identifying the traveller and 
specifying the passport and travel details. These data could then be used for “verifying that a 
                                                
121 COM(2006) 69, supra note 4, 7. 
122 Article 10(3) SBC. Logically, also the exception for a TCN for whom insertion of an entry-exit stamp in the 
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person fulfils the entry conditions before travelling to the EU, while using a lighter and 
simpler procedure compared to a visa.”127 
 It is not clear whether the Commission would envisage that the denial of travel 
authorisation would mean an automatic refusal of entry and whether this would be enforced 
by carriers, as is the case of the EU’s visa policy, or only at the external border itself. Under 
the US electronic system for travel authorization (ESTA), applicable to nationals from 
countries whose visa duty is waived, someone who is denied authorization could still apply 
for a visa.128 The introduction of such a system would in any case require new legislation, and 
probably an amendment of the SBC. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
A true “Area of Free Movement” independent of status seems to exist only for those admitted 
to the Schengen Area for a period of less than three months. The conditions for entry into this 
area have been laid down in the SBC and the LBT Regulation. They reflect once more the 
sharp distinction between those that may claim a right of free movement on the basis of EC 
law, predominantly EU citizens, and TCNs.  
 One may wonder to what extent the logic of attaining internal free movement allows 
for checks on EU citizens at the Schengen external borders to be more extensive than at the 
non-Schengen internal borders. Even before the adoption of the SBC, the ECJ in Commission 
v Spain, gave clear precedence to the EC right of free move ent in relation to the Schengen 
acquis. Since this case not merely concerned the intra-Community movement of crossing a 
Schengen border, but also the crossing of an EU external border, this case supports the 
position that where an individual is endowed with the right to cross the EU’s internal borders, 
s/he must be allowed to cross the external borders under the same conditions. Nevertheless, 
the SBC seems to allow for (slightly) more extensive checks at the external Schengen borders, 
even though it is clearly stated that the rules contained in the regulation are to be without 
prejudice to the community right of free movement ad therefore the Schengen rules on the 
crossing of the external borders should be read in conformity with the EU law rules on free 
movement of persons. 
                                                
127 Ibid. 
128Department of Homeland Security, Bureau of Customs and Border Protection: Changes to the Visa Waiver 
Program to Implement the Electronic System for Travel Authorization (ESTA) Program (Federal Register Vol. 
73, No 111, 9 June 2008), 32440.   
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 It becomes clear from the discussion of the SBC and the LBT Regulation that the 
Schengen external borders form the last point of control before entry to the Schengen area. In 
the case of a TCN who is under a visa duty, the checks at the external border essentially re-
assess whether the conditions for granting a visa are still fulfilled. Likewise, the checks on a 
TCN border resident in possession of a LBT permit, control whether the conditions for the 
issuing of such permit are still valid. Second, there is a large margin of discretion for the 
Member States’ competent authorities to bar a TCN’s access to the Schengen territory, be this 
at the border itself, by inclusion in the SIS databse or the denial of a visa. In this respect it is 
to be regretted that the SBC does not provide for aright of entry once all conditions that could 
bar such entry are not applicable.  
 A number of specific categories TCNs have been given (limited) free movement 
rights. Although they clearly fall outside the SBC’s definition of persons enjoying the 
Community right of free movement, at the Schengen external borders their treatment should 
leave fully effective the rights that they have been accorded under secondary Community 
legislation. This would justify treatment, which is a far as possible - taking into account of 
course the more limited nature of their rights - similar to that of the Community right of free 
movement of persons.   
 In the absence of a true Common European Asylum System, the Member States 
remain competent to decide on the entry of asylum seekers, even if they do so within the 
limits imposed by the Procedures Directive and obligations under international law. The SBC 
explicitly states that its application is without prejudice to the right to ask for asylum. This 
chapter has pointed at the most important problem for people in need of international 
protection may actually be reaching that border. The Commission’s proposal for new 
instruments for border management, such as the ESTA, may only add to this difficulty. 
 While the measures envisaged by the Commission in its proposal on the future of 
European border management are in reality instruments for the broader purpose of 
immigration control, their introduction would change practice at the external borders and 
would need to be accommodated in the SBC. Although they are presented as facilitating 
movement across borders and mitigating the somewhat blatant difference in treatment 
between EU citizens and TCNs, their introduction would not fundamentally change the 
position in law of TCNs. The introduction of an ESTA and an entry-exit system is even more 
likely to slow down traffic at the external borders.  
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VII. The Rationale of EU Border Management Revisited 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 
In the previous two chapters we have discussed the substantive rules that govern the 
movement of people across the external borders of both Community and the Schengen area 
from the point of view of the individual. The Community competences in the area of external 
border management, although relating exclusively to the Schengen external borders, 
essentially aim to ensure respect for these rules.  
 So far, the transfer of powers for the purposes of the management of the Schengen 
external borders to the EU was described as the necssary corollary of the lifting of controls at 
the internal borders between Member States. Indeed, this official rationale has become close 
to an “unchallenged truth”, which finds explicit expression in Article 61(a)(c) EC qualifying 
measures on the external borders as “directly related flanking measures” to the free movement 
of persons.1 
 However, before we embark on a discussion of the substantive and institutional 
questions raised by use the EU has made of its competences in the field of external borders 
management, it is necessary to (re)consider this official rationale. Despite the EU’s insistence 
on the internal market rationale, many have come to question the idea that the EU’s border 
policy is exclusively linked to the free movement of persons. Most importantly, this 
explanation cannot account for exclusionary nature of this policy area, nor the importance that 
is has been given.  
 As early as 1997, so even before the entry into force f the Treaty of Amsterdam, the 
European Council called upon the Council to consider ways and means to reinforce the 
security of external borders.2 Since then the European Council has on many occasions 
repeated this call for reinforced controls and enhanced operational cooperation at the external 
borders.3 Without exception these calls have been linked to the fight against irregular 
migration and to a lesser extent terrorism and organised crime. The 2007 German presidency 
                                                
1 Bigo, D, ‘Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?’, in: Bigo, D. and Guild, E. (Eds), 
Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), 68. 
2 European Council Conclusions, Vienna, 11-12 December 1998, point 91. 
3 The conclusions of twenty-two out of the thirty-six ordinary European Council meetings held since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam refer to the management of the external borders, the majority of which in 
terms of calling for increased operational cooperation.   
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declared its aim to “further develop the operability of the European Border Management 
Agency Frontex in order to improve the protection of the external borders of the European 
Union and intensify border police cooperation.”4  
 The importance of external border management within e EU’s overall activities is 
evidenced by the financial resources made available for this purpose. With a commitment of 
over 282 million euro in the 2008 budget, the policy area covering external borders formed 
the most important expenditure of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). 
Commitments under this heading amounted to 39.6 percent of the total commitments for the 
AFSJ, with those for the external borders fund amounting to 23.8 percent of the total, for 
Frontex 9.5 percent and the Schengen Information System (SIS) 3.7 percent.5  
 Many commentators have argued that a security logic rather than the free movement 
of persons forms the real driving force behind the EU’s preoccupation with the external 
borders and cooperation in justice and home affairs (JHA) in more general.6 As part of the 
AFSJ, the policing function of borders, borders being regarded as important sites of law 
enforcement, has undoubtedly been given a self-standing importance. An important factor 
here is the (implicit) linking of irregular migration with security threats. Still, this chapter will 
not argue that the free movement of persons has become a mere pretext for the reinforcement 
of the external borders.7 Rather the internal market rationale needs to be considered together 
with these and other explanations. One should not forget that the security function of borders 
forms part of the broader symbolic value of the external borders for both the Member States 
and the EU. In addition, a lack of progress in related areas of JHA may have contributed to 
the focus on the external borders as an area in which progress could be more readily achieved.  
 
2. The Internal Market Rationale 
 
According to the official rationale the lifting of internal borders necessitated the external 
borders to take over the function of “controlling and filtering the entry and identity of persons 
and ensuring internal security within their territory.”8 The Member States that were to give up 
                                                
4 German Ministry of the Interior, ‘Interior Ministers strengthen European Border Management Agency Frontex 
in the fight against illegal migration’ (Press Releas , 20 April 2007). 
5 With over 166 million, the budget heading “Migration Flows”, covering common migration and asylum 
policies, comes second, with commitments amounting to 23.4 percent of the overall figure for the AFSJ. 
6 See inter alia Bigo, D., supra note 1 and the authors quoted below. 
7 Bigo, D., ibid., 68. 
8 See for instance the Council’s website: 
http://consilium.europa.eu/cms3_fo/showPage.asp?lang=en&id=460&mode=g&name= . 
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control over their borders would have an interest in the controls at the external borders taking 
place under jointly agreed rules and procedures in order to overcome the possible negative 
consequences of regulatory decisions made by the Member States responsible for the 
management of their respective part of the external borders.9  
 The above argument gains force where there is lack of trust between the Member 
States that give up control over their borders and the Member States that become responsible 
for the management of the common external border. Not without reason the Commission’s 
Communication of 2002 identified mutual confidence between Member States as one of the 
major needs for the EU’s external borders policy.10  
 The issue of trust became particularly important in he context of the EU’s 2004 and 
2007 enlargements. The requirement to fully implement the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis meant that the acceding countries had not only to ad pt the relevant legislation, but 
also to develop the institutions and infrastructure at their external borders, which under 
Communism had been relatively open. Moreover, the ext rnal borders became both longer, 
and also shifted to “a regional environment which is frequently more difficult.”11 The decision 
to lift controls at the internal land and sea borders of 9 out of the 10 Member States that 
acceded in 2004 was only taken at the end of 2007, nearly a year later than originally 
foreseen.12 Despite the fact that positive evaluations of the Council’s Schengen Evaluation 
Working Party lay at the basis of the decision, for many of the EU-10 Member States this still 
meant taking “a leap of faith.”13 
 The EU’s enlargements also focussed attention on the question of burden sharing, or 
more generally solidarity, in the area of management of the external borders. As the 
Commission noted “[t]he EU faces the challenge of managing land borders stretching to some 
6,000 kms, and maritime borders to 85,000 kms. Thisc allenge is distributed unevenly: 7 of 
the new Member States represent 40 % of our land external borders.”14 To this it should be 
                                                
9 Stetter, S., ‘Regulating migration: authority delegation in justice and home affairs’, 7 JEPP 1 (2000), 83. 
10 COM(2002) 233 final, Commission Communication ‘Towards Integrated Management of the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union’, 4.  
11 Ibid. 
12 Council Decision 2007/801/EC on the full application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2007, 
L323/34.  
13 Walker, N., ‘The Problem of Trust in an Enlarged Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Conceptual 
Analysis’, in: Police and Justice Co-operation and the New European Borders (The Hague, Kluwer Internatio l, 
2002), 31. That this trust is left to be desired can be inferred from various accounts. See e.g. ‘Tighten borders, 
new EU members told’ (The Financial Times, 9 October 2007), ‘Nine new members prepare to join free 
European travel club’ (The Times, 19 December 2007), ‘Visegrad Four presidents vow c mmon stand on 
Schengen zone entry’ (Radio Prague, 18 September 2006). See also Jordan, B., et al., ‘Contextualising 
immigration policy implementation in Europe,’ 29 JEMS 2 (2003), 198. 
14 COM(2004) 487 final, Commission Communication on the Financial Perspectives 2007-2013, 9. 
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added that Member States at the external borders may face different migratory pressures 
depending on their geographical location.15 The Hague Programme mentioned solidarity as 
one of its underlying principles and in relation to b rders in particular referred to a “fair 
sharing of responsibility including its financial implications.”16 The Lisbon Treaty will 
introduce in Article 67(2) TFEU the principle of solidarity between the Member States as the 
basis for its common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control. 
 The idea of burden sharing was only explicitly introduced in the Commission’s 2002 
Communication on Integrated Border Management.17 Until then it had been largely absent, 
not only from the discussion on the internal market (n ither the Commission’s White Paper on 
the Internal Market, nor the 1988 and 1992 Communications referred to burden sharing), but 
also from the Schengen cooperation.18 An explanation for this could be found in the more 
limited number of Member States having a more homogeneous level of development.19 In the 
case of the five initial Contracting Parties of Schengen, only one country, Luxemburg, did not 
have external land or sea borders. 
 The 2003 and 2005 Acts of Accession provided for the so-called Schengen Facility, a 
pre-accession financial instrument for the implementation of the Schengen acquis and border 
control activities on the new EU external borders.20 This however constituted pre-accession 
aid and was meant to bring controls at the external borders up to standard, rather than to 
provide for a more permanent instrument of burden sharing. It should be pointed out that, not 
                                                
15 The impression is often that most migration takes place by African immigrants trying to cross either the 
Mediterranean or Atlantic. According to officials of Frontex however in terms of numbers the migratory pressure 
by air (from South America) and over land (from Asia, transiting the Balkan countries) is much more significant: 
‘Ich weiß, für einige sind wir die Bad Guys’ (Suddeutsche Zeitung, 6 December 2007). This does not take away 
from the fact that migration at the southern maritime borders puts a particular heavy burden on the rec ption 
capacities of certain Member States (Malta) or regions (Lampedusa, Canary Islands).  
16 The Hague Programme, Annex to the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, point 
1.7.1. 
17 COM(2002) 233, supra note 10, in particular at 24. 
18 Two exceptions can be found in Articles 24 and 119CISA. Article 24 determines that Contracting Parties shall 
compensate each other for any financial imbalances which may result from the obligation to expel an alien who 
no longer fulfils the condition for regular stay where such expulsion cannot be effected at the alien's xpense. 
Article 119 states that the cost for the SIS are to be born jointly by the Contracting Parties, on the basis of the 
rate for each Contracting Party applied to the uniform basis of assessment of value added tax within the meaning 
of Article 2(1)(c) of the Decision of the Council of the European Communities of 24 June 1988 on the system of 
the Communities’ own resources. In neither case however is the question of burden sharing based upon factors 
related to the obligation to manage parts of the comm n external borders itself. 
19 Hobbing, P., ‘Management of External EU Borders: Enlargement and the European Border Guard Issue’, in: 
Caparini, M. and Marenin, O. (Eds), Borders and security governance: managing borders in a globalised world 
(Zurich, Lit, 2006), 174. 
20 Article 35, Act of Accession of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, 
Poland, Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, OJ 2003, L236/33 and Article 32, Act of Accession of Bulgaria and 
Romania, OJ 2005, L157/203. 
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in the least due to budgetary constraints, redistributive instruments have been adopted only 
rarely, usually in the context of complex package deals.21  
 When in the early 1990s several Member States faced  considerable influx of asylum 
seekers, this did not result in a call for more burden sharing in the area of border management, 
nor did a rise in immigration at the southern maritime borders in the late 1990s.22 In the 
summer of 2006 however, the migratory pressure experienced by the Mediterranean Member 
States was said to have created a “sufficient critical mass” in the Council for a financial 
burden sharing agreement, the External Borders Fund.23  
 
The internal market rationale draws on the neo-functio alist theories on European integration 
in which cooperation on the management of the external borders forms the spill-over from the 
non-controversial internal market project to other sectors of possible greater political 
salience.24 The UK’s persistent opposition to the lifting of internal border checks shows 
however that this was itself a question of great political salience, rather than a mere technical 
element of the internal market project.  
 Former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher fomulated the UK’s opposition in 
her famous Bruges speech as follows: “[…] it is a mtter of plain commonsense that we 
cannot totally abolish frontier controls if we are also to protect our citizens from crime and 
stop the movement of drugs, of terrorists, and of illegal immigrants.”25 What is interesting 
then is that the spill-over from internal market to external borders could only take place on the 
basis of a similar logic: the idea that the lifting of internal borders triggered a security 
question.26 
                                                
21 Thielemann, E., ‘Symbolic Politics or Effective Burden-Sharing? Redistribution, Side-payments and the 
European Refugee Fund’, 43 JCMS 4 (2005), 808. 
22 Instead, in the early 1990s solutions were sought wit in the rules on asylum, with the signature of the Dublin 
Convention (OJ 1997, C254/1), establishing the Member State responsible for an asylum claim, and the 
application of the safe third country concept (see e.g. Council Resolution of 30 November 1992 on a harmonised 
approach to questions concerning host third countries, “London Resolution”). In the late 1990s one does s e the 
first calls for a reinforcement of the external borders appear in the conclusions of the European Council 
meetings.  
23 Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the 
General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migrat on Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/22. Monar, J., ‘Justice 
and Home Affairs’, in: Sedelmeier, U. and Young, A. (Eds), JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 
2007 (Oxford, Blackwell, 2008), 113. 
24 See inter alia: Anderson, M. et al., Policing the European Union (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), 93-96, 
Huysmans, J., The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London, Routledge, 2006), 87, 
Lodge, J., The European Community and the Challenge of the Future (London, Pinter, 1993), Introduction, xix, 
Müller, T., Die Innen- und Justizpolitik der Europäischen Union – Eine Analyse der Integrationsentwicklung 
(Opladen, Leske + Budrich, 2003), 104 ff. It should be recalled that the Single European Act did not pr vide the 
EC with express competences for the regulation of the external borders. 
25 Opening Lecture College of Europe, Bruges, 20 September 1988. 
26 Huysmans, J., supra note 24, 87. 
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 As was already stated in the introduction, the intr al market rationale alone fails to 
explain the importance attributed to this policy field. Neither does it account for the nature of 
EU action in this area. The focus of the EU’s policy for the management of the external 
borders is very much on a strict application of the Schengen rules, the prevention of irregular 
migration and a reinforcement of controls. Yet, as Costello has put it: “any internal market 
rationale is agnostic as to the restrictiveness or otherwise of external barriers, but simply 
requires the application of common rules.”27 Likewise, the link between the lifting of checks 
at the internal borders, enlargement and burden sharing alone cannot fully explain the 
adoption of solidarity instruments.  
   
3. The Police Function of Borders 
 
While the UK opposed the lifting of checks at the internal border, it was never against  
increased cooperation on the external borders itself, as was recently evidenced by its wish to 
fully participate in the Regulation establishing the EU’s border agency Frontex.28 As Bigo has 
noted, the disagreement in the debate on the conclusion of the Schengen Agreements 
concerned the effectiveness of cooperation in law enforcement, in particular as regards 
controls at the external borders as a substitute for internal border controls.29 It is interesting 
that in its White Paper on the completion of the int r al market, the Commission on the one 
hand downplayed the importance of controls at the int rnal borders in stating that they were 
“by no means the only or indeed the most effective measures in relation to terrorism and 
drugs,” yet on the other hand argued that improved controls at the external borders could form 
an alternative means of protection against such threa s.30 
 As the Council has stated: “[f]irst and foremost, border management is an area of 
policing, where security interests have to be met […].” 31 It can be argued that the border’s 
police function gained importance after the collapse of Communism. First of all the border 
                                                
27 Costello, C., ‘Administrative Governance and the Europeanisation of Asylum and Immigration Policy,’ in: 
Hofmann, H. and Türk, A., EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), 289-290. 
28 Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-1145. 
29 Bigo, D, supra note 1, 68. 
30 COM(85) 310 final, 10. COM(88) 640 final, the Commission Communication on the abolition of controls of 
persons at the Intra-Community borders, stated in even stronger terms: “Anyone with intimate knowledge of 
these matters knows that the present frontier controls are ineffective,” 3. A similar contradiction exists for the 
UK government, whose main support for the Common Travel Area with Ireland seems to have been informed by 
the realisation of practical impossibility of fully controlling the UK-Ireland land border: Ryan, B., ‘The Common 
Travel Area between Britain and Ireland’, 64 MLR 6 (2001), 870. 
31 SCIFA Room Document, Non-paper from the Presidency on integrated border management, 5 July 2006 
(Council Document 11901/06). 
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lost much of its military character.32 Secondly, security became a much wider concept, as the 
focus of concern shifted from military threats to new risks, such as political, societal, 
economic and ecological threats.33 As Grabbe put it: “the fear of tanks and missiles arriving 
from across the Iron Curtain [was] supplanted by anxiety about uncontrolled migration and 
cross-border crime.”34 In this process, concerns of external security became increasingly 
linked to questions of internal security, i.e. external security threats, whilst no longer 
jeopardizing the territorial integrity of the state, were increasingly perceived to endanger 
internal security.  
 The perception that borders can act as barriers to ou side threats to internal security 
shows clearly in the global response to terrorism. UN Security Council Resolution 1373 
(2001), adopted shortly after the 9/11 attacks, decided that all States should prevent the 
movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls. The Conclusions of the 
Extraordinary Justice and Home Affairs Council meeting held in Brussels on 20 September 
2001 echoed the approach taken in the UN Security Council by inviting the competent 
authorities of the Member States to strengthen controls at external borders.35 In the United 
States the 9/11 Commission Report put much emphasis on the improvement of the US’ border 
and immigration system.36 The Report also stated that extending standards for screening 
travellers to other governments could “dramatically strengthen America’s and the world’s 
collective ability to intercept individuals who pose catastrophic threats.”37 Many of the 
measures the EU has introduced since, or that are cur ntly being prepared, are similar to 
legislative developments in the US, such as the exchange of Personal Name Record (PNR) 
data, the introduction of biometric data in travel documents and the establishment of an entry-
exit system.38 
                                                
32 Bigo, D., supra note 1, 55. 
33 Buzan, B., People, States and Fear, An Agenda for International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era 
(London, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991), 208. 
34 Grabbe, H., ‘The Sharp Edges of Europe: extending Schengen eastwards’, 76 International Affairs 3 (2000), 
520. 
35 Conclusions of the Extraordinary JHA Council, Brussel , 20 September 2001, point 24 (Council Document 
SN 3926/6/01 REV 6). 
36 Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (Washington D.C., 26 
July 2004), 383 ff. 
37 Ibid., 387. 
38 See for the content of these measures Chapter VIII. For more detail: Argomaniz, J., ‘When the EU is the 
‘Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US Border Security 
Norms’ 31 JEI 1 (2009), 119-136. The author identifies three interrelated stages: unilateral and forceful norm 
advocacy by the USA, negotiation and bargaining and, eventually, norm mirroring. See also Zaiotti, R.,Cultures 
of Border Control: Schengen and the Evolution of Europe‘s Frontiers (PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 2008), 
285 ff. and Hobbing, P. and Koslowski, R., ‘The Tools called to support the ‘Delivery’ of Freedom, Security and 
Justice: A Comparison on Border Security Systems in the EC and in the US’ (EP Briefing Paper, February 2009, 
PE 410.681). 
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 The link made between terrorism and the movement of pe ple across borders is 
evident in many of EU policy documents. The Laeken European Council conclusions stated 
that the better management of the external borders would not only help fight terrorism, but 
also illegal immigration networks and the traffic in human beings.39 In the Declaration on 
combating terrorism of 25 March 2004, shortly after the Madrid bombings, the European 
Council emphasised that “improved border controls and document security play an important 
role in combating terrorism.”40 The 2005 European Union Counter-Terrorism Strategy, stated 
that Union had to “enhance protection of [its] external borders to make it harder for known or 
suspected terrorists to enter or operate within theEU.”41 The impact assessment 
accompanying the Commission’s Communication on the setting up of a European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR), stressed that “[a]n effective border management system 
both at national and European level contributes significantly to reducing the risks of known or 
suspect terrorists entering the European Union from the outside and is also a valuable tool for 
fighting cross-border crime.”42  
 
As Guild has correctly noted in relation to the emphasis on borders in relation to the fight 
against terrorism, by placing security in a territoial framework, the right to cross borders has 
become a security issue.43 Borders have always been “the sites at which the sovereign 
authority of the state to exclude is exercised.” In this respect the function of borders is not 
merely one of policing, but also of regulating the entry and exit of bona fide travellers.44 
According to Sassen the sovereignty of the state and border control are at the heart of 
developed countries’ policies for the regulation of migration.45 Since border management is 
seen as part and parcel to migration management, whenever migration rises up the political 
agenda border management is likely to follow suit. One of the reasons then for the growing 
salience of migration is its framing in terms of a security question. This in turn has reinforced 
the police function of borders as opposed to their regulatory function.   
 
                                                
39 European Council Conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, point 42. 
40 European Council Declaration on combating terrorism, Brussels, 25 March 2004, point 6. 
41 Council Document 14469/4/05. 
42 SEC(2008) 151, 12. 
43 Guild, E., ‘International Terrorism and EU Immigration, Asylum and Border Policy: The Unexpected Victims 
of 11 September 2001’, 8 EFARev 3 (2003), 332. 
44 Geddes, A., ‘Europe’s Border Relationships and International Migration Relations’, 43 JCMS 4 (2005), 788. 
See also Chapter II.  
45 Sassen, S., Losing Control: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (New York, Columbia University Press, 
1996), 69.  
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4. The Securitisation of Migration  
 
It is striking to see that in the Commission’s White Paper on the Internal Market migration did 
not explicitly feature as a security problem that would result from the lifting of internal border 
checks.46 The statements attached to the Single European Act (SEA) do refer to the need to 
“control migration”, but there is not yet talk of “the fight against irregular migration.” Even 
the 1988 Commission Communication gives the reason for identity checks at the external 
borders as being to combat drug trafficking, terrorist activities and organized crime “by non-
Community or Community nationals”.47 The initial Schengen Agreement only contained three 
references to immigration, although “irregular migration” was as such juxtaposed to security 
issues as crime, terrorism and drugs traffic.48 In the negotiations leading up to the conclusion 
of the Convention Implementing the Schengen Agreement (CISA) migration as a security 
concern came to dominate the discussion of the fourSchengen groups in charge of the 
implementation agreement.49 
 
The process of securitisation of migration has been d scribed in detail by social scientists.50 
Huysmans has argued that security knowledge is political y significant as an instrument in 
struggles for political power and legitimacy as well as an important resource for policy 
making and implementation.51 Securitisation may take place at the level of political discourse 
or policy praxis. Put differently it can take place at two distinct levels of the political system, 
namely the systems of politics and administration.52 Securitisation at either of these levels can 
occur in two ways. The first takes the form of a speech act, which frames migration as an 
existential threat and legitimises exceptional policies, the second takes the form of a security 
practice, which ties together various disparate security concerns into a single “(in)security 
                                                
46 COM(85) 310 final, Commission White Paper, ‘Completing the Internal Market.’  
47 COM(88) 640 final, supra note 30, 11. 
48 Articles 7 and 17 of the Schengen Agreement. 
49 Guiraudon, V., ‘The EU “garbage can”: Accounting for policy developments in the immigration domain’ 
(Paper presented at the Conference of the European Community Studies Association, Madison, 29 May-1 June 
2001), 10. 
50 See inter alia Huysmans, J., supra note 24, Bigo, D., ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the 
Governmentality of Unease’, 27 Alternatives, Special Issue (2002), 63-92, Kostakopolou, T., ‘The “Protective 
Union”: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-Amsterdam Europe’, 38 JCMS 3 (2000), 
497-518, Ceyhan, A., and Tsoukala, A., ‘The Securitisation of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent 
Discourses and Policies’, 27 Alternatives (Special Issue) (2002), 1-39, Ibrahim, M., ‘The Securitisation of 
Migration: A Racial Discourse’, 43 IM 5 (2005), 163-187. 
51 Huysmans, J., supra note 24, 42. 
52 Boswell, C., ‘Migration Control in Europe After 9/11: Explaining the Absence of Securitisation,’ 45 JCMS 3 
(2007), 591. 
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continuum,” facilitating the transfer of security practices from one policy area to another.53 
The first has been referred to as “the politics of exception”, the latter as the “politics of 
unease.”54 The two levels may influence one another in different ways. A political discourse 
may provide legitimacy to certain policies, while security actors may participate in the “verbal 
or non-verbal reproduction of a security discourse” when implementing policy.55 Huysmans 
has further argued that security practices and available technologies often already exist in one 
form or another and as such inform policy decisions rather than being the result thereof.56   
 
It may be argued that there is an additional level at which securitisation may take place, 
namely that of the law. Although legally binding norms can be considered a product of 
politics, which are then applied by the administration, laws do not necessarily have to 
coincide with political discourse. Moreover, it is the law that sets the boundaries within which 
administrative action is legitimate.  
 The clearest example of securitisation in the law would of course be the 
criminalisation of certain activities which were previously legal, such as irregular entry or 
stay. More subtly however, the law can bring together disparate security concerns within one 
single legal framework, creating a security continuum, as was the case with the Maastricht 
Treaty. The law may also be used to legitimize previously existing security practices.  
 Securitisation in law does however not always have to take the shape of law making. It 
may rather manifest itself in the interpretation and application of the law. The use of 
migration law in place of criminal law for instance has largely taken place without any 
substantive changes in the law.57  
 
It is commonly accepted that Schengen was largely shaped by security professionals who 
“mobilize and institutionalize security knowledge and routines.”58 Schengen brought together 
the internal security officials of the various rather disconnected ad hoc bodies and working 
                                                
53 Huysmans, J. and Buonfino, A., ‘Politics of Exception and Unease: Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism in 
Parliamentary Debates in the UK’, 56 Pol Stud 4 (2008), 782, Bigo, D., supra note 50, 65, Buzan, B. et al., 
Security:  A New Framework for Analysis (London, Lynne Rienner, 1998), 26. 
54 Huysmans, J. and Buonfino, A., ibid., 767. 
55 Boswell, C., supra note 45, 593, Diez, T., ‘Opening, Closing: Securitisation, the War on Terror and the Debate 
about Migration in Germany’ (Paper for discussion at the MIDAS/SWP workshop on Security and Migration, 
Berlin, 9 March 2006), 6. 
56 Huysmans, J., supra note 24, 8-9. 
57 Dauvergne, C., ‘Security and Migration Law in the Less Brave New World’, 16 Soc & Leg Stud 4 (2007), 541. 
533-549. See also Brouwer, E., ‘Immigration, Asylum and Terrorism: A Changing Dynamic, Legal and Practic l 
Developments in the EU in Response to the Terrorist Attacks of 11.09’, 4 EJML 4, 399-424. 
58 Huysmans, J., supra note 24, 82. Bigo, D., supra note 50, 77. 
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groups that had developed in the area of JHA cooperation since the mid-1970s, first in the 
negotiations on the CISA, then within the various working groups under the umbrella of the 
Schengen Executive Committee.   
 Guiraudon has described how politicians showed little nterest in the negotiations on 
the CISA and how the Ministries of the Interior took n an increasingly important role, at the 
expense of the Ministries of Foreign Affairs.59 She has argued that for the Ministries of the 
Interior, Schengen formed a new policy venue which was sheltered from national legal 
constraints and conflicting policy goals.60 A more banal, but nevertheless important element 
should be added, namely the fear of many professionals of internal security, in particular 
border and customs police, that they might loose their jobs at the (internal) border.61 
 The creation of a security continuum in the CISA was mirrored in the Prüm 
Convention, concluded on 27 May 2005 by seven EU Member States – the Benelux countries, 
Germany, Austria, France and Spain.62 In their own understanding, the Contracting Parties 
sought to play a pioneering role in the reinforcement of cross-border cooperation in the area 
of the fight against terrorism, cross-border criminal activities and illegal immigration. The 
Prüm Treaty is also referred to as Schengen III. Indeed, the treaty is given legitimacy under 
the very same logic as the Schengen Agreements, namely as a laboratory for future European 
integration.63 An important difference with the initial Schengen Agreements is not so much 
the more explicit linking of terrorism, cross-borde crime and illegal migration, but the clear 
policing objective of the Treaty.64 
 
                                                
59 Guiraudon, V., supra note 49, 13.  
60 Guiraudon describes the incorporation of the Schengen acquis by the Treaty of Amsterdam as a “revenge” by 
the Ministries of Foreign Affairs, who negotiate Treaty amendments, ibid., 10. See on the conflicts of 
competence in relation to the Schengen Agreements between the Federal Chancellery and the Ministry of the 
Interior: Baumann, M., Der Deutsche Fingerabdruck: Die Rolle der deutschen Bundesregierung bei der 
Europäisierung der Grenzpolitik (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006), 147 ff. 
61 Bigo, D., supra note 29, 67. 
62 Convention between Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Luxembourg, The Netherlands and Austria on the 
stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal 
migration, signed in Prüm (Germany), 27 May 2005 (See for an English translation of the Treaty: Council 
Document 10900/05 of 7 July 2005). Most provision of the Treaty have now been incorporated in EU law by 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating 
terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ 2008, L210/1 and Framework Decision 2008/616 on the implementation of 
Decision 2008/615/JHA, OJ 2008, L210/12. 
63 Monar, J., ‘‘The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Institutional and Substantial Dynamics in the 
perspective of the European Union’, 22 Collegium (December 2001), 13. See the preamble and Article 1(4) of 
the Prüm Convention, ibid. 
64 There is only a loose reference to the free movement of persons in the first preamble, stating that in an area of 
free movement it is important to enhance cooperation on crime, terrorism and irregular migration.  
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5. The Practice of Securitisation in the European Union 
 
In the EU Member States one can observe a securitisation of migration from the 1990s 
onwards. The fear of “hordes of immigrants” coming from former Communist countries was 
soon replaced by a fear of “floods” or “waves” of immigrants arriving from the African 
continent by boat. A country in which this rhetoric has been particularly strong is Italy, where 
Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi in 2002 declared a st te of emergency in response to the 
“continuous, massive inflow of foreigners that reach Italy irregularly.”65 In terms of 
securitisation in practice, one of the clearest examples can be found in Spain. In 2002 the 
Spanish government inaugurated a high-tech 300-million-euro border surveillance system 
called SIVE for the Strait of Gibraltar which has since been expanded along its southern 
borders.66 Furthermore, one can observe an increasing involvement of paramilitary and 
military forces in the management of borders in the Mediterranean and the Atlantic.67 
 
At the EU level, the securitisation of migration has predominantly taken the form of a security 
practice creating an “(in)security continuum” linkig security problems such as terrorism, 
drugs and cross-border crime with questions of migration and asylum.68 The construction of 
the Third Pillar of the European Union introduced for the first time a security continuum, 
analogous to that created by Schengen, into the EU’s constitutional structure. After the 
transfer of policies relating to migration and asylum to the First pillar, the introduction of the 
AFSJ preserved this continuum by bringing it under a single EU objective. The Lisbon Treaty 
will subject this continuum to an increasingly uniform substantive and institutional legal 
framework.  
 Examples of the security continuum in EU policy documents are not hard to find. The 
Commission in its Communication on the development of a European Border Surveillance 
System (EUROSUR) stated that: “Border surveillance has not only the purpose to prevent 
                                                
65 ‘Immigrati, deciso lo stato di emergenza, Fini: il governo riferisca a Montecitorio’ (Corriere Della Sera, 25 
July 2008). In 2002, 23.719 irregular migrants disembarked on the Italians coasts: Coslovi, L., ‘Breve note 
sull’immigrazione in Italia e in Spagna’ (Rome, CeSPI, January 2007). The “state of emergency” has since 
become virtually permanent through its continued extensions. See latest: Decreto del Presidente del Consiglio 
dei Ministri, 18 December 2008, Proroga dello stato di emergenza per proseguire le attività di contrasto 
all'eccezionale afflusso di extracomunitari, GU No 1, 2 January 2009.   
66 ‘Spain’s Border Surveillance System Remains Controve sial’ (Deutsche Welle, 29 October 2007). This 
expansion is reflected in the changing meaning of the abbreviation SIVE: whereas it initially stood for Integrated 
System for the Vigilance of the Strait, it now stands for Integrated System of Exterior Vigilance. 
67 Lutterbeck, D., ‘Between Police and Military: The New Security Agenda and the Rise of Gendarmeries’ 39 
Cooperation and Conflict 1 (2004), 52 and Lutterbeck, D., ‘Policing Migration in the Mediterranean’, 11 
Mediterranean Politics 1 (2006), 65.  
68 Huysmans, J., supra note 24, 71 and Bigo, D., supra note 24, 65 
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unauthorised border crossings, but also to counter cross-border crime such as the prevention 
of terrorism, trafficking in human beings, drug smuggling, illicit arms trafficking, etc.”69 It 
echoes the Hague Programme which called for “a continuum of security measures” 
strengthening the fight not merely against illegal immigration, but also helping to prevent and 
control crime, in particular terrorism and which held that “Freedom, justice, control at the 
external borders, internal security and the prevention of terrorism should henceforth be 
considered indivisible within the Union as a whole”.70  
  
In order to illustrate the securitisation of migration at EU level it may be interesting to look 
more closely at the EU’s approach to one of the most publicized immigration questions it has 
been faced with over recent years, namely the perilous journey undertaken by immigrants in 
an attempt to reach Europe over the Mediterranean or the Atlantic.71 
 On the one hand the discourse at the EU level frames the situation at the EU’s 
southern maritime borders predominantly as a humanitarian crisis.72 Without exception the 
European institutions have qualified the situation as a tragedy.73 On the other hand however, 
notwithstanding its humanitarian nature, the mere fact that the situation is qualified as a crisis 
or emergency is itself significant.74  
 A solution to this humanitarian problem is without exception linked to the fight 
against irregular migration.75 JLS Commissioner Franco Frattini has in this respect referred to 
the European borders as a first “line of defence” to control illegal migration.76 The EU’s 
repeated commitment to the rules on international protection and non-refoulement have 
                                                
69 COM(2008) 68 final, Commission Communication, ‘Examining the creation of a European Border 
Surveillance System (EUROSUR)’, 3. 
70 The Hague Programme, supra note 16, point 1.7.2. and Introduction. 
71 Reports in the media on the arrival of boat migrants at the southern maritime border are numerous. The 
website http://www.noborder.org/dead.php documents incidents where immigrants have died while trying to 
enter Europe on the basis of such reports. See for an in-depth analysis: De Haas, H., ‘The myth of invasion: 
Irregular migration from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union’ (Oxford, IMI Research Report, 
October 2007). 
72 See for instance the Draft Council Conclusions on rei forcing the EU's Southern Maritime Borders (Council 
Document 13559/06) and the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 18-19 June 2009, point 37. 
73 See for instance The Hague Programme, supra note 16, point 1.6.1, the Draft Council Conclusion on further 
reinforcing the EU's Southern Maritime Borders (Council Document 12712/1/07 REV 1), the public hearing on 
‘Tragedies of Migrants at sea’ held by the LIBE Committee of the European Parliament, 3 July 2007 and 
COM(2006) 733 final, Commission Communication on the Reinforcing the management of the European 
Union's Southern Maritime Borders, 3. 
74 The Committee of the Regions for example declared that: “Europe is undergoing the “greatest migratory 
emergency in its history”: Opinion of the Committee of the Regions on the Policy Plan on legal migration, fight 
against illegal immigration, future of the European Migration Network, OJ 2007, C146/3. See also the European 
Council Conclusions, Brussels, 18-19 June 2009, point 36. 
75 European Council Conclusions, ibid. 
76 ‘Recent developments of immigration and integration in the EU and on recent events in the Spanish enclave in 
Morocco’ (speech at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Brussels, 3 November 2005).  
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occasionally been offset by a questioning of the mixed nature of the migrant flows.77 The 
European Border Agency Frontex, which coordinates joint patrols by the Member States in 
the Atlantic and the Mediterranean has repeatedly pointed out that search and rescue activities 
are outside their scope of competence.78  
 Frontex considers that most irregular migration is orchestrated by organised crime 
groups.79 Research by Pastore et al. concludes that the smuggling organisations active in the 
organisation of crossings by sea to Italy are “often little more than loose networks linking 
largely independent clusters of practical competences”.80 Although such loose networks 
would still fit the definition of organised criminal Group under the UN Convention against 
Transnational Organised Crime, the image that is invoked by the reference to organised crime 
is rather one of a hierarchically structured organis tion.81 The Palermo protocols to this 
convention, on human trafficking and smuggling respectively, have been referred to as a legal 
basis for action against irregular migration by sea and it has been proposed that they be 
“complemented and strengthened by bilateral or regional instruments inspired by existing 
examples regarding the fight against terrorism and against the smuggling of drugs.”82 
 The language used, in particular by the Commission and Frontex, on occasion evokes 
the image of a battle. “We want boats, helicopters, planes in order to be ready for spring, and 
no later than that,” Commissioner Franco Frattini stated at the beginning of the informal JHA 
Council Meeting in Dresden in January 2007.83 During joint operations coordinated by 
Frontex military vessels and aircrafts have been deploy d.84 There is moreover a strong focus 
on the introduction of surveillance technology.85  
                                                
77 This mixed nature is recognised by the Commission in its Communication on the Reinforcing the management 
of the European Union's Southern Maritime Borders: COM(2006) 733, supra note 73, 4. Frontex Executive 
Director Ilkka Laitinen has however been quoted: “Das sind keine Flüchtlinge, sondern illegale Migranten”: 
‘Frontex ist ein Sündenbock’ (Der Standard, 21 December 2006).  
78 Ilkka Laitinen, Executive Director Frontex, ‘Frontex: Facts and Myths’ (Frontex Press Release, 11 June 2007). 
See in more detail Chapter IX.  
79 See for instance the references to organised crime in the Report of the Frontex-led EU Illegal Immigration 
Technical Mission to Libya, 28 May-5 June 2007. 
80 Pastore, F. et al., ‘Schengen’s Soft Underbelly? Irregular Migration a d Human Smuggling Across Land and 
Sea and Sea Borders to Italy’, 44 IM  4 (2006), 114. 
81 Article 2(a), UN Convention against Transnational Organised Crime: “a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting i concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a 
financial or other material benefit”. See also: UNODC, ‘Organized Crime and Irregular Migration from Africa to 
Europe’ (July 2006), 13. 
82 SEC(2007) 691, Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Study on the international law instruments in relation 
to illegal immigration by sea’, point 2.4.2. See in detail Chapter X. 
83 ‘Frattini urges Interior Ministers to strengthen FRONTEX’ (Agence Europe, 16 January 2007). 
84 This may be in part explained by the extra-territoialisation of controls from the territorial waters to the high 
seas (see Chapter X), which requires different equipment that the military (naval forces) are more likely to 
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  This sense of urgency is underlined by the application of the European Rapid 
Reaction Mechanism, set up to provide for immediate responses to crisis situations which 
threaten to destabilise third countries.86 The need for the EU to develop the capacity to 
respond swiftly has also been the driving force behind the adoption of Regulation (EC) No 
867/2007 providing for a mechanism for the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams. 
These teams consist however of border guards rather than of aid workers or asylum experts.  
 It may be concluded that in relation to the situaton at the southern external borders the 
securitisation of migration is visible in discourse, law and practice. While it must be 
predominantly qualified as a “politics of unease” linking migration with other security threats 
in a rather subtle way, the imagery used by law andpolicy makers and the adoption of 
legislation for “exceptional situations” also shows that elements of the “politics of exception 
are present.”87  
 
The securitisation theory has received critical attention recently from authors who argue that 
the migration policy in the EU is less securitised than is generally assumed.88 Boswell argues 
that both politicians and security officials have a limited interest in securitising migration, 
since policy goals may be conflicting, and their credibility may be at stake when they do not 
manage to deliver upon expectations.89 An interesting example here is that Italy agreed to the 
lifting of internal border checks with 9 of the 10 new Member States at a time at which 
national politicians and the media were speaking of a “security crisis”, triggered by the 
violent murder of an Italian woman by a Romanian natio l.90 In response to this crisis, the 
Government adopted a Decree-Law on the expulsion of foreign nationals, including EU 
citizens.91 The Italian government did not raise the point that t e lifting of internal border 
                                                                                                                                              
possess. Nevertheless, linking the military to migration control clearly contributes to the establishment of a 
“security continuum.”  
85 COM(2005) 621 final, Commission Communication on Priority actions for responding to the challenges of 
migration: First follow-up to Hampton Court, 5: “the EU must look into the technical feasibility of establishing a 
surveillance system to eventually cover the whole of the Mediterranean Sea” and COM(2008) 68 final, supra 
note 69, 5 referring to the the creation of “a common information sharing environment between the relevant 
national authorities.” See chapter VIII. 
86 Commission Press Release, ‘Mauritania: new measures to combat illegal immigration towards the EU’, 10
July 2006 (IP/06/967). 
87 As Huysman, J. and Buonfino, A., supra note 53.  
88 See e.g. Boswell, C., supra note 52 and Leonard, S., ‘The “Securitisation” of Asylum and Migration in the 
European Union: Beyond the Copenhagen School’s Framework’ (Paper presented at the SGIR Sixth Pan-
European International Relations Conference, Turin, 12-15 September 2007). 
89 Boswell, C., ibid., 592. 
90 Council Decision 2007/801/EC, supra note 12 of 6 December 2006.  
91 Decreto-Legge, No 181, 1 November 2007, Disposizion  urgenti in materia di allontanamento dal territoio 
nazionale per esigenze di pubblica sicurezza, GU No 255, 1 November 2007. See: Pastore, F., ‘Se un delitto fa 
tremare l’Italia: Come si affronta una security crisis’, Italiani Europei 5 (2007), 19-32. According to the Italian 
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controls would render its policy of expulsion less effective, which is not difficult to 
understand in view of the highly symbolic significan e of the decision and the political 
repercussion this would have had.92  
 At the EU level however, the question of conflicting interests may be less pronounced 
since a security discourse may be beneficial to foster integration in the field of irregular 
migration, while progress in the area of regular migration is much more difficult to achieve.93 
As Walker has noted, the achievement of successful solutions is more probable where 
concurrent national interests within the collective framework can be mobilised against 
external threats to those interests.94 
 Boswell further warns not to read too much rationality into organisational action.95 
One may indeed wonder why, if agencies indeed have an interest in expanding their fields of 
competence, the European Border Agency Frontex has been extremely cautious about 
accepting tasks that relate to the search and rescue of irregular migrants at sea. However, this 
task is only remotely related to the field of law enforcement and the Agency has sought to 
increase its involvement in the field of police cooperation, also participating in various 
meetings of JHA agencies.96  
 
6. The Symbolic Function of Borders  
 
One must realise that there are important practical limits which prevent the control of every 
single person passing the border. A lack of appreciation for the complexity of the movement 
of people across boundaries is evident in the Commission’s Policy Plan on Asylum, which 
states that the EU should “focus its efforts on facilit ting the managed and orderly arrival on 
the territory of the Member States of persons justifiably seeking asylum (…).”97 In fact, those 
                                                                                                                                              
government the decree-law stayed within the limits of the provisions on expulsion of Directive 2004/38/EC on 
the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States, OJ 2004, L158/77.  
92 Note however that this decision did not include thlifting of border checks with Romania. The new Italian 
Minister of the Interior Maroni, shortly after the coming into power of the centre-right government of Prime 
Minister Berlusconi in May 2008, did publicly call for the reinstatement of border controls, in respone to the 
alleged criminal activity by the Roma minority of Romanian nationality: ‘Maroni, un piano anti-romeni: 
“Ridiscuteremo le regole Ue”’ (La Repubblica, 10 May 2008). 
93 See below, Section 8. 
94 Walker, N., ‘In search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A constitutional Odyssey’, in: Walker, N. 
(Ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), 20.  
95 Boswell, C., supra note 52, 593. 
96 See Chapter IX. 
97 COM(2008) 360 final, Policy Plan on Asylum: An integrated Approach to Protection across the EU, 10-11. 
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that argue against a fortress Europe and those that are arguably constructing it are both 
mistaken in their “overestimation of the regulatory capacities of modern states”.98  
 In the case of increased border controls “the cure may actually be worse than the 
disease” resulting in considerable delays at the border resulting in damage to the economy.99 
It is also worth recalling that it is widely assumed that many, if not most, irregular immigrants 
enter EU territory legally and only become irregular immigrants after having accessed EU 
territory by overstaying their visa.100 The perpetrators of terrorist activity may well be
nationals or long-term residents of the countries in which they intend to strike, as was the case 
with the London bombings of 2005.  
 The real importance of the EU’s external borders can therefore be said to be symbolic 
rather than real. This significance is linked to, but goes beyond the perceived security function 
of these borders. In Chapter II it was argued that sovereignty and its key element territory, 
continue to have great importance. These notions inform law and policy making not only at 
Member State level, but also underpin the objective of an Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice.   
 We already noted that borders are typically sites of territorial exclusion. European law 
has limited a Member State’s right to deny entry to persons of a nationality other than its own, 
to a right to deny entry of non-EU citizens. The underlying logic of physically excluding the 
“other” is however the same. It is this logic which is not only transposed to the external 
border, but is also reflected in Member States’ reluctance to give up the power to decide to 
whom give access to their territory.101 Moreover, the Italian “expulsion-decree” discussed 
earlier underlines how the idea of excluding unwanted aliens from a Member State’s territory 
continues to inform policy making and public opinio even within a “borderless” Europe.102 
 Even if the effectiveness of border controls may be questioned, it was already noted in 
Chapter II that “states generally have no choice but to assert the prerogative of sovereignty 
                                                
98 Harvey, C., ‘Dissident Voices: Refugees, Human Rights and Asylum in Europe’, 9 Soc Leg Stud 3 (2000), 378 
and Bigo, D., supra note 1, 75. 
99 Flynn, S., ‘Beyond Border Control’, 79 Foreign Affairs 6 (2000), 58. 
100 Düvell, F., ‘Undocumented Migration in Europe: a Comparative Perspective’, in: Düvell, F. (Ed.), Illegal 
Immigration in Europe. Beyond Control (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 175. The Pw Hispanic 
Centre has estimated that in the US as much as 45% of the total unauthorised migrant population entered the 
country legally with visas allowing temporary stay: ‘Modes of Entry for the Unauthorized Migrant Population’ 
(Fact Sheet, 22 May 2006). In Australia, which has comprehensive checks on arrivals and departures, 
overstayers were by far the biggest category of irregular migrants: House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, 
‘A Common Policy on Illegal Migration’ (HL Paper 187, Session 2001-02, 37th Report, 28 November 2002), 
11. 
101 This is well illustrated by the case law regarding the right of first entry of TCN family members of EU 
citizens and the legislation granting TCNs (limited) free movement rights. See Chapter VI. 
102 See also: Cornelisse, G., ‘European Integration and Immigration by Third-Country Nationals: The Obduracy 
of the National Border’ (December 2007). 
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against the recognition of their failure to control migration flows.”103 In the words of 
Anderson et al. “a myth of control over borders is essential to the maintenance of state 
authority and the credibility of state sovereignty”.104 In the Schengen context this symbolic 
function of borders has retained its relevance for the participating Member States, who have a 
common interest in showing their citizens to be “in control” notwithstanding the lifting of 
checks at the internal borders. Moreover, Member States situated at the external borders now 
uphold this myth also vis-à-vis the other Schengen M mber States.  
 
For the EU itself the idea of common external borders has no less symbolic significance. The 
Commission in its 2002 Communication puts it as follows: “coherent, effective common 
management of the external borders of the Member States of the Union will boost security 
and the citizen’s sense of belonging to a shared ara nd destiny.”105 Mitsilegas has pointed 
out that the notion of a single territory, implied in the AFSJ objective, is “inextricably bound 
with the concept of a common border”.106 In Lindahl’s view, “the very possibility and 
concrete realisation of the values of Freedom, Security and Justice, whether separately or 
jointly, depends on boundaries that determine the territorial unity of a legal community”.107 
He underscores that values are the constitutive featur  of territoriality.108 To Lindahl territory 
means the concrete unity between the normative and physical dimension.109 At this point 
however, one may ask how this unity relates to the distinction between the EU-wide objective 
of an AFSJ and the more restricted Schengen area. 
 Lindahl argues that “the spatial unity of a political community arises when, as the 
result of a closure, a legal-political order manifests itself to its members as an inside.”110 This 
can be linked with the process of securitisation examined above, which is however concerned 
with the creation of an outside. As Huysmans points out, security policy asserts the “unity and 
                                                
103 Boaventura de Sousa Santos, C., Toward a new legal common sense: law, globalization and emancipation 
(London, Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002), 223. 
104 Anderson, M. et al., Policing the European Union (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), 152.  
105 COM(2002) 233, supra note 10, 2. 
106 Mitsilegas, V., ‘The implementation of the EU acquis on illegal immigration by the candidate countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe: challenges and contradic ions’, 28 JEMS 4 (2002), 667. See also Lindhal, H., 
‘Finding a place for freedom, security and justice: the European Union’s claim to territorial unity’, 29 ELRev 4 
(2004), 461-484. 
107 Lindhal, H., ibid., 474. 
108 Ibid., 468. 
109 Ibid., 477. 
110 Lindhal, H., ‘Jus includendi et excludendi: Europe and the Borders of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 16 
King’s College Law Journal 1 (2005), 239. This seems in line with Arendt’s con eption of the polity as inward 
looking: Arendt, H., The Promise of Politics (NewYork, Schocken Books, 2005), 170. 
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autonomy” of the political community by placing it in a hostile environment.111 In this respect 
it is significant that the “security continuum” features prominently in the Berlin Declaration, 
done at the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the signature of the EU treaties.112 In the 
words of the Commission, the external borders are a place where “a common security identity 
is asserted.” The following passage from the Tampere Milestones shows both importance of 
territory and borders in the definition of the Unio’s own values, as well as the definition of 
the other: 
  
 “This freedom should not, however, be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the Union's own 
citizens. (…) It would be in contradiction with Europe’s traditions to deny such freedom to 
those whose circumstances lead them justifiably to seek access to ur territory. This in turn 
requires the Union to develop common policies on asylum and immigration, while taking into 
account the need for a consistent control of external borders to stop illegal immigration and to 
combat those who organise it and commit related international crimes. (…).”113  
 
The EU has by simultaneous definition of its own values and the construction of a dangerous 
outside created dividing lines of which the external borders are the physical expression.114 
 
7. Balancing “Freedom” and “Security” 
 
Before the introduction of the AFSJ objective in the EU treaty, the notion of freedom in the 
EU treaties referred exclusively to the four freedoms. The free movement of persons was 
firmly linked to the status of national of a Member State. The Schengen area extended this 
freedom in a very limited way to TCNs, who in possession of a Schengen visa may move 
freely in the Schengen area. Security was not, at le st not as such, mentioned as a value, 
neither in the Schengen acquis, nor in the EU. Under the Schengen agreements, it was implied 
in the notion of compensatory measures deemed necessary to curb a perceived security deficit 
resulting from the full implementation of the freedom of movement of EU citizens.  
                                                
111 Huysmans, J., supra note 24, 51 This is more in line with Schmitt’s coneption of the polity as a response to 
external threats: Schmitt, C., The Concept of the Political (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 29-
30. 
112 Declaration on the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the signature of the Treaties of Rome (“The Berlin 
Declaration”), which states: “We will fight terrorism, organised crime and illegal immigration together.” 
113 European Council Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999. Emphasis added. There is some irony in the 
statement that freedom cannot be regarded as the exclusive preserve of the EU citizen, whereas its centre piece, 
the free movement of persons, is exactly that, see Chapter V. 
114 Mitsilegas, V., supra note 106, 668. 
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 The EU, lacking the necessary competences, never presented itself as an (internal) 
security actor alongside its Member States. A firstchange took place with the construction of 
the Third Pillar by the Maastricht Treaty, when theintergovernmental cooperation in JHA in 
relatively informal and secretive working groups such as TREVI was brought within the EU’s 
constitutional framework.115 The restructuring of the pillars and the incorporati n of the 
Schengen acquis, including the notion of “flanking measures” by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
gave new impetus to the EU’s activities in the provision of internal security, whilst at the 
same time broadening the notion of freedom beyond the free movement of persons.  
 The Commission in its Communication on how best to implement the provisions of 
the Amsterdam Treaty on an AFSJ stated that the freedom included:   
 
 “the freedom to live in a law-abiding environment i the knowledge that public  authorities are 
using everything in their individual and collective power (nationally, at  the level of the Union 
and beyond) to combat and contain those who seek to deny or abuse that freedom. Freedom 
must also be complemented by the full range of fundamental human rights, including 
protection from any form of discrimination.”116 
 
The Tampere Milestones stated that the challenge of Amsterdam was “to ensure that freedom, 
which includes the right to move freely throughout the Union, can be enjoyed in conditions of 
security and justice accessible to all.117  
 The way in which the Commission Communication was structured, in separate 
headings titled an Area of Freedom, an Area of Security and an Area of Justice, seems to 
imply that the Freedom, Security and Justice are connected, yet independent notions.118 Under 
the heading “An Area of Security”, the Commission repeats that “the full benefits of any area 
of freedom will never be enjoyed unless they are exrcised in an area where people can feel 
safe and secure.”119 The Treaty of Amsterdam then provides “for the institutional framework 
to develop common action among the Member States in the indissociable fields of police 
cooperation and judicial cooperation in criminal matters.”120 
                                                
115 The Rome European Council of 1975 created the TREVI group, which was a network of national officials 
from Ministries of Justice and the Interior. It developed a range of working groups that reported to occasional 
ministerial meetings. One of these working groups, Trevi 92, dealt with the security issues of the free movement 
of people, including compensatory measures needed for the relaxation of intra-EC border controls. 
116 COM(98) 459 final, Commission Communication, ‘Towards an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, 5. 
117 Tampere Milestones: Tampere European Council Conclusions, 15 and 16 October 1999, point 2.  
118 COM(98) 459 final, supra note 116, 1. 
119 Ibid, 7. Note the subjective element to this definition of security. 
120 Ibid. 
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 One could argue that with the advent of the AFSJ “security” has become a “categorical 
endogenous value of the Community” as opposed to be implied in the notion of flanking 
measures to the free movement of persons.121 It is true that measures for the crossing of the 
external borders are still presented as flanking measures adopted for the purpose of free 
movement of persons. This shows for example in the EU budget, where external border and 
visa policy fall under the same budget heading as free movement of people, as well as in the 
Hague Programme where border management measures are li ted as “Measures for Freedom 
of Movement.”  
 At the same time however the legal basis for these flanking measures has lent itself for 
measures that seem to go beyond what is necessary for the achievement of the free movement 
of persons, serving the rather problematic purpose of security and potentially limiting the 
wider concept of freedom. A good example here is the Regulation on the inclusion of 
biometric security features in the passports of EU Member States.122 Importantly, the 
Schengen Protocol allows the UK and Ireland to opt-in to parts of the Schengen acquis, in 
practice resulting only in opt-ins to Schengen flanking measures. As Peers has noted, the UK 
participates in all measures on asylum and most measur s on illegal migration.123 These 
measures may contribute to the free movement of persons within the Schengen area in 
general, but in relation to the UK and Ireland they merely allow these Member State to 
exercise an enhanced control over unwanted migratory flows. 
  
The discussion on the relation between “Security” and “Freedom” in the AFSJ has often been 
framed in terms of a balancing of the two.124 In the words of the Commission “[m]aintaining 
the right balance between [Freedom, Security and Justice] must be the guiding thread tor 
Union action.”125 This idea of balancing also underlies the argument, often voiced in the post-
                                                
121 Kostakopoulou, T., “The Protective Union: Change and Continuity in Migration Law and Policy in Post-
Amsterdam”, 38 JCMS 3 (2000), 508. A striking illustration here is the comment made by the EU’s external 
border agency’s Executive Director, Illka Laitinen, only hours before the lifting of internal border checks at the 
land and sea borders of nine Member States. Rather than sharing in the festive mood surrounding this historic 
event, he voiced the concern that the EU would “lose a very effective instrument to fight illegal immigration”: 
‘Security fear as EU drops borders’ (BBC News, 20 December 2007).  
122 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and 
travel documents issued by Member States, OJ 2004, L 385/375. 
123 Peers, S., ‘British and Irish opt-outs from EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) law’ (Statewatch Analysis, 
2007), 5. 
124 See e.g. Apap, J. and Anderson, M., ‘Striking a Balance between Freedom, Security and Justice in an 
Enlarged European Union’ (Brussels, CEPS, 2002), Garcia-Jourdan, S., L’émergence d’un espace européen de 
liberté, de securité et de justice (Brussels, Bruylant, 2005), 39, Balzacq, T. and Carrer , S., ‘The Hague 
Programme: The Long Road to Freedom, Security and Justice’, in: Balzacq, T. and Carrera, S., ecurity Versus 
Freedom?: A Challenge for Europe’s Future (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2006), 1-34. 
125 COM(1998) 459 final, supra note 116, 1. 
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9/11 world, that in order to achieve a certain state of security, there is the necessity to impose 
restrictions on certain fundamental rights and civil liberties,.126 This however evidences a very 
narrow conception of security, limited to freedom from physical harm. It also portrays 
freedom and security as “antithetical values.”127 As such the image of balancing freedom and 
security has been interpreted as a form of securitisation.128  
 One should rather advocate the position that security measures should always stand at 
the service of freedom, since security can only be “th result of guaranteeing respect for 
fundamental freedoms and rights through the rule of law.”129 By such definition striving for a 
situation of security would constitute a valid objective. The danger however exists that the 
enforcement measures come to be seen as the sole precondition for such situation or worse as 
a substitute thereof.  
 Even if we were to accept the idea that restrictions n freedom may be offset by an 
increase in security in a more narrow sense, arguments can still be made against such 
balancing acts.130 The real effects of measures restricting freedom fr the purpose of greater 
security may be unclear, so that they may only have  mere symbolic effect. While the 
restrictions may enable the state to ensure security bet er against for instance terrorist threat, 
at the same time people may be less protected from abuses of power by the state. Importantly 
also the restrictions on freedom may actually be felt disproportionately by some people for the 
benefit of the security of others. This may be in particular the case for migrants and asylum 
seekers. In the EU, restrictions on entry limit thefreedom to travel of TCNs, or more gravely 
the right to seek asylum, in the name of the security of those within the AFSJ.131 
 
It may be argued that in Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05, the ECJ brought back to the fore the 
free movement rationale of the Schengen cooperation in relation to the UK and Ireland.132 In 
these cases the ECJ upheld the UK’s exclusion from Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 
establishing Frontex and Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 on standards for security features 
                                                
126 Note in this respect how the introduction to the Hague Programme’s refers to the 9/11 and 11/3 attacks in 
order to support the point made that the security of the EU and its Member States has acquired a new urgency, 
supra note 16.  
127 Guild, E. and Carrera, S, ‘The Hague Programme & the EU’s agenda on freedom, security and justice: 
delivering results for Europe’s citizens?’ (Brussel, CEPS, 18 March 2008). 
128 Ibid. 
129 CHALLENGE, ‘A Response to the Hague Programme : Protecting the Rule of Law and Fundamental Rights 
in the Next Five Years of an EU Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ (December 2004). 
130 See for a full discussion of the arguments summarised below: Waldron, J., ‘Security and Liberty: The Image 
of Balance’,  11 JPP 2 (2003), 191-210. 
131 See for instance Guild, E., supra note 43. 
132 Case C-77/05, UK v Council, supra note 28, and Case C-137/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-11593. See also 
Rijpma, J., ‘Annotation to Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05’, 45 CMLRev 3 (2008), 835-852.  
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and biometrics in passports issued to citizens of the Union, since they formed a development 
of those parts of the Schengen acquis in which the UK had not opted into previously.133  
 For the UK participation in these measures would not have promoted in any way the 
free movement of persons, but merely have enhanced its capacities to control the movement 
of persons. Advocate General Trstenjak in her opinins to the cases argued that any Member 
State that cooperates to some extent in the Schengen acquis should accept both the advantages 
and the burdens inherent in cooperating in that part of the acquis.134 This reasoning however 
reverses the logic of the Schengen cooperation in which the free movement of persons is 
intended to be the advantage, rather than the burden. It forms a good example of how flanking 
measures have come to be seen as the real advantage of participation in the Schengen acquis.   
 The Court however did not only refer to the need for a prior acceptance of the 
provisions of the Schengen acquis, but also of the principles underlying this acquis. It must 
be assumed that these principles relate to the free movement of persons. This reading is 
confirmed by the limited scope the judgments leave for the application of the Title IV 
Protocol. In interpreting the concept of “proposals nd initiatives to build upon the Schengen 
acquis” broadly, most measures that find their legal basis in Title IV EC will be covered by 
the Schengen Protocol, rather than the Title IV Protoc l. Under the Title IV Protocol the UK 
and Ireland would have had an automatic right to opt-in, while Denmark would be excluded 
from participation.135 Denmark however does subscribe to the principle of a borderless area 
for the free movement of persons and participates fully in the Schengen acquis, albeit under 
public international law. The Court’s judgments also cast doubt on the Council’s past 
practice of allowing the UK and Ireland to participate under Article 3 of the Title IV Protocol 
in measures such the ARGO programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of 
asylum, visas, immigration and external borders and Directive 2001/40/EC on mutual 
recognition of expulsion decisions.136  
 Although the Court does well in reminding the Member States of the objectives of the 
Schengen cooperation, one could argue that the partici tion of the UK and Ireland would 
                                                
133 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004, L 349/1; Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, supra note 122. Case C-77/05, ibid., para. 68 and Case C-137/05, ibid, para. 50. 
134 Opinion of AG Trstenjak in Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-11593, para. 113 and Case C-137/05, 
UK v Council [2007] ECR I-11593, para. 110, delivered 10 July 2007. 
135 Denmark’s possibility to opt-in is limited to measures building on the Schengen acquis: Art. 5, Protocol on 
the Position of Denmark. 
136 Council Decision 2002/463 adopting an action programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of 
external borders, visas, asylum and immigration (ARGO programme), OJ 2002, L 161/11; Council Directive 
2001/40/EC on the mutual recognition of decisions o the expulsion of third country nationals, OJ 2001, L 
149/34. 
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have benefited from cooperating full. Moreover, having considered above that “security” has 
become a more self-standing value, the UK participation in the measures could have 
contributed to the EU’s wider objective of establishing an AFSJ. This is particularly true for 
Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004 which could be applied independent of any other Schengen 
rules and which could have contributed to more secure travel to, from and (to a more limited 
extent) within the EU.137  
  
8. The External Borders: Walls and Gates to the Neighbourhood 
 
The fear has often been expressed that the implementation of the Schengen acquis by the new 
Member States of Central and Eastern Europe could create new dividing lines in post-
communist Europe by restricting cross border economic and cultural links which developed 
after the fall of the Iron Curtain.138 In particular the Schengen visa regime and strict controls 
at the external borders could jeopardize informal cross-border trade, contacts between 
national minorities, as well as more as more structured forms of cross-border cooperation.139  
The Commission however considered that efficient border management, besides being 
vital to fight threats such as terrorism and organised crime, would contribute to good relations 
between neighbouring states.140 This latter point finds some support in research showing that 
the perception of the Polish-Ukrainian border as a barrier to social and economic interaction, 
is more related to the technical aspect of crossing the border - long queues and inefficiency of 
the border guards - than with the visa regime.141  
 The EU has been sensitive to the concerns raised regarding possible negative 
externalities of its Schengen borders regime.142 It has provided important financial and 
                                                
137 Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, supra note 122. 
138 Amato, G. and Batt, J., ‘Final Report of the Reflection Group on the Long Term Implications of EU 
Enlargement: The Nature of the New Border’ (Florence, EUI RSCAS, 1999), 9. One has commonly referred to 
the iron curtain being replaced by a “paper curtain”, referring to the visa requirements, or alternatively by a 
“glass window”, clearly showing the disparities betw en insiders and outsiders: DeBardeleben, J., ‘Introduction’, 
in: DeBardeleben (Ed.), Soft or Hard Borders: Managing the Divide in an Enlarged Europe (Aldershot, 
Ashgate, 2005), 3. 
139 See e.g. Wolczuk, K., ‘‘The Polish-Ukrainian Border: On the Receiving End of the EU Enlargement, 3 PEPS 
2 (2002), 262. 
140 COM(2005) 491 final, supra note 118, 4. 
141 Scott, J. and Matzeit, S. (Eds),  ‘Lines of Exclusion as Arenas of Co-operation: Reconfiguring the External 
Boundaries of Europe - Policies, Practices, Perceptions’ (EXLINEA, Final Project Report, February 2006), 6. 
See also Kindler, M. and Matejko, E., ‘“Gateways to Europe”: a friendly border?’ (Warsaw, Batory Foundation 
Policy Brief, January 2009). 
142 The Copenhagen European Council Conclusions stated hat: “The Union remains determined to avoid new 
dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and beyond the new borders of the Union, 
12-13 December 2002, point 22. 
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practical support in the form of pre-accession aid to the candidate countries, its regional 
development programmes, as well as its programmes funded under the European Regional 
Development Fund. All of these have included provisi n  on cross border cooperation going 
beyond mere reinforcement of checks at the external borders.143  
 In two cases the European legislator has adopted legislation in order to mitigate the 
possible consequences of the imposition of the Schengen acquis in an enlarged EU. First of 
all it established a specific transit regime, providing for a Facilitated Transit Document 
(FTD) and a Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) for residents of Kaliningrad, the 
Russian enclave surrounded by EU territory since the 2004 enlargement.144 In late 2006, the 
Council adopted a Regulation laying down rules on lca  border traffic at the external 
borders.145  
 The objective of avoiding new dividing lines in ane larged EU was also an important 
impetus for the development of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). This policy aims 
to develop the countries in the near neighbourhood, creating a “ring of friends” around the EU 
by allowing these countries to participate in the internal market.146 However, as we shall see 
in Chapter X, the freedom of movement for the nationals of the ENP countries is advanced 
only to a very limited extent, and has rather become a means to control movement of people 
towards the EU.   
 
9. An Additional Explanation for the Focus on the EU’s External Borders 
 
The internal market logic, the securitisation of migration, the symbolic function of borders, 
the introduction of the AFSJ objective, EU enlargements and the need to prevent the 
Schengen borders from becoming new dividing lines, all these have contributed to the focus 
that is placed by European law and policy makers on the management of the EU’s external 
borders. Here it is submitted that there is yet another factor that contributes to the emphasis 
                                                
143 This will continue to be the case under the new financial instruments for external action. See Chapter X. 
144 Council Regulation (EC) No 693/2003 establishing a specific Facilitated Transit Document (FTD), a 
Facilitated Rail Transit Document (FRTD) and amending the Common Consular Instructions and the Common 
Manual, OJ 2003, L99/8 and Council Regulation (EC) No 694/2003 on uniform formats for Facilitated Transit 
Documents (FTD) and Facilitated Rail Transit Documents (FRTD) provided for in Regulation (EC) No 
693/2003, OJ 2003, L99/15. It was a stated EU objective to adopt this legislation prior to the signing of the 2003 
Accession Treaty.  
145 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 laying down rules on l cal border traffic at the external land borders of the 
Member States and amending the provisions of the Scngen Convention, OJ 2006, L405/1, see Chapters VIII 
and X.  
146 COM(2003) 104 final, Commission Communication on the Wider Europe - Neighbourhood: A New 
Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours, 4. 
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on the external borders within the AFSJ. This is the continuing importance of the notion of 
flanking measures, of which measures at the external borders are most prominent as a result 
of a lack of progress in more substantive areas of JHA. 
 Anderson et al. identified two themes at the core of the debate ov r the removal of 
checks at the internal border.147 The first was that of the compensatory measures which, 
although it could have long-term consequences, was directly linked to the abolishment of 
controls at the external borders. The second theme related to the fact that internal borders 
separate the different criminal and justice systems of the EU Member States. Anderson et al. 
predicted this theme to last into the foreseeable future. The Commission in its 1988 
Communication on the abolition of controls of person  at the Intra-Community borders 
argued that it was an immediate priority to define what actions were indispensible for the 
abolition of checks at the internal border and which could be a long term objective. It argued 
that the abolition of internal borders could be achieved on the basis of a “more limited 
programme”, encompassing only the flanking measures, such as controls at the external 
borders and the short term visa regime, leaving more substantive harmonisation of Member 
States’ legislation in the area of criminal and migration law for a later date.148    
 Although it is difficult to see how the Commission could have proposed anything 
other than a more limited programme, this approach has proven unfortunate. More than a 
decade after the lifting of internal boarder controls, the focus of law and policy making in the 
AFSJ still lies on the adoption of flanking measure. This is mainly because it has proven 
much more difficult to achieve progress in more substantive areas which would minimise the 
differences in legal systems of the Member States, but also because the legal bases for these 
flanking measures have lent themselves for measures that serve the control of movement 
rather than the freedom thereof.  
 Both legally and politically, Member States have not been able to establish a truly 
common European immigration and asylum system. In the field of asylum progress has been 
limited to the harmonisation of minimum standards and a mechanism for determining 
responsibility for asylum claims.149 Member States such as Malta, have made consistent 
appeals for greater burden-sharing, not merely in financial terms and not merely in the area of 
                                                
147 Anderson, M. et al., supra note 24, 131-132. 
148 COM(1988) 640 final, supra note 30, 5. 
149 See Chapter VI. Progress was initially hindered also by the unanimity requirement, now replaced by qualified 
majority voting: Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain areas covered by Title IV of Part Three of 
the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure laid down in Article 251 of 
that Treaty, OJ 2004, L396/45. 
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external border management.150 Similar suggestions were made by four southern Member 
States, united in the so-called Quadro Group.151 Although the European Council has 
reaffirmed that European solidarity and fair sharing of responsibilities are the guiding 
principles in managing the EU's external borders, little concrete action has been taken.152  
 The Commission in its Policy Plan on Asylum for the first time recognised that some 
Member States “who find themselves under particular migratory pressures because of their 
geographical location” face additional burdens under th  Dublin Rules.153 A solution was 
however sought in the facilitation of “internal re-allocation, on a voluntary basis, of 
beneficiaries of international protection from one Member State to another in cases of 
exceptional asylum pressure.”154  
 As regards legal migration, Article 63(3)(a) and (4) EC remains subject to unanimity, 
and the mere consultation of Parliament. Only one Dir ctive has been adopted so far within 
the framework of the Commission’s policy plan on legal migration.155 The Lisbon Treaty 
brings about an important change in that it broadens the scope of the articles dealing with 
migration and asylum, providing for a common immigration and asylum policy rather then 
minimum standards, to be decided on under the “ordina y legislative procedure”, i.e. co-
decision.156 Still, the Lisbon Treaty in a new provision explicit y confirms that the Member 
States are ultimately responsible for the number of immigrants they allow to enter their 
                                                
150 ‘True Burden Sharing’ (Times of Malta, 26 September 2007). 
151 The Quadro Group brings together the ministers of the interior of Cyprus, Greece, Malta and Italy and was 
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balanced.” 
154 COM(2008) 360 final, ibid., 9. The same solution is proposed by the European Council in its Conclusions of 
18-19 June 2009, point 37. 
155 See COM(2005) 669 final, ‘Policy Plan on Legal Migration’; Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the 
conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment 
(“Blue Card Directive”), OJ 2009, L155/17, see Chapter V. 
156 Articles 79(1) and (2), TFEU. 
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territory.157 The legislation that should facilitate the free movement of TCNs is largely limited 
to the economically beneficial and rather uncontrove sial categories of migrant workers such 
as scientific researchers, seasonal workers and highly skilled workers.  
 In the absence of a truly European regulatory system for the management of migration 
and asylum, the focus of the EU’s policy remains on fla king measures, in particular border 
controls, which are essentially aimed at keeping TCNs out. For the reasons discussed in the 
previous sections of this chapter this is the type of legislation on which Member States can 
more readily agree. 
 Not only within Title IV EC, but also within the Third Pillar of the EU, substantive 
progress confronting the difference in the criminal and justice systems of the Member States 
has been slow.158 Progress in police cooperation has been largely limited to the activities of 
Europol, CEPOL and the rather obscure Police Chiefs Operational Task Force.159 Under the 
Third Pillar, initiatives are generally subject to cl ser scrutiny by the Member States because 
of concerns over sovereignty and importantly, subject to a unanimity requirement. The Prüm 
Treaty can be regarded as the response of a limited number of Member States eager to make 
progress in this area, resulting in an agreement under public international law rather than 
within the legal framework of the EU. If however the Prüm Treaty is to be considered as a 
laboratory for further European integration in this area, so should the measures related to the 
management of the external borders adopted under Titl  IV EC.  
 The Hague Programme stated that “[a]n optimal level of protection of the AFSJ 
requires multidisciplinary and concerted action both at EU level and at national level between 
the competent law enforcement authorities, especially police, customs and border guards.160 
Since border management is the only “police power” covered by the First Pillar, the 
coordination of operational cooperation between natio l border guard services may serve as 
a testing ground for future legislation on police cooperation and the building of trust between 
law enforcement authorities.161 Since the joint operational activity at the external borders will 
affect the rights of TCNs far more than those of EU citizens, this may trigger the sovereignty 
                                                
157 Article 79(5), TFEU. 
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afin d’accroître l’effecacité et la légitimité de l’action de l’Union européenne dans le domaine de la sécurité 
intérieure, in: De Kerckhove, G. and Weyembergh, A. (Eds), Quelles réformes pour l’espace penal 
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concerns of the Member States and the concerns of EU citizens for their civil liberties to a 
much lesser extent than other forms of police cooperation.  
 
10. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has aimed to explain not only the ration le behind the EU´s policy on the 
external borders, but also why the focus of the broader cooperation in the AFSJ remains to a 
great extent on external border controls. We would argue that each of these rationales has its 
own explanatory value. Whilst each may independently contribute to the salience of external 
border management, more often these rationales reinfo ce each other. Therefore, only when 
considered together can one come to a better understanding of the importance attached to 
external border management by European law and policy makers.  
 The internal market, and the interpretation given to this notion by most Member States 
as an area without internal border controls, has undo btedly formed the initial impetus for the 
development of a common policy on the external borders. The concerns accompanying the 
enlargement of the EU in 2004 have contributed to a gre ter degree of burden sharing in both 
financial, technical and, to a more limited degree, in terms of human resources.  
 With the fall of the Berlin wall the relative importance of borders for achieving 
defence purposes decreased. Their police function however became more important in view of 
the broadening of the concept of security. While borders have always been considered as site 
of regulatory enforcement of migration laws, the securitisation of migration meant that in this 
policy area the police function of borders also became pre-dominant.  
 The framing of migration as a security problem raised the political salience of this 
policy area. At the EU level, the securitisation of migration has predominantly taken shape in 
the creation of an “ (in)security continuum”, bring security problems such as terrorism, 
drugs and cross-border crime with migration and asylum within one substantive and 
institutional framework. Since borders are seen as an important instrument of migration 
control, the increased importance of migration on the political agenda, has also raised the 
importance of border controls. Although the actual effectiveness of border controls may be 
doubted, their symbolic function is of great importance to both the individual Member States 
and the European Union as a whole.  
 While border controls were initially represented as fl nking measures for the freedom 
of movement, with the introduction of the AFSJ, they have been given a more self-standing 
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importance serving the purpose of “security” rather than the broader concept of freedom 
implied in this Union objective. Although one should realise that there is a fundamental 
difficulty in portraying freedom and security as independent and opposing values, it could 
nevertheless be argued that the ECJ in Cases C-77/05 and C-137/05 has shifted the balance 
between these two back in the direction of freedom, albeit in its more restricted meaning of 
free movement of persons.   
 Enlargement has also forced the EU to take into account some of the more negative 
consequences of the implementation of the border acquis to the new Member States and the 
danger that it could create new dividing lines. The EU has been sensitive to this argument and 
has, through financial assistance programmes, the dev lopment of the ENP and the adoption 
of specific legislation, aimed at softening some of the consequences of a hard Schengen 
Border.   
 An additional explanation that is suggested in this chapter is that the prominent role of 
external border management in the AFSJ is to some extent by default rather than by choice. 
Both within Title IV EC and Title VI EU, progress on more substantive harmonisation and 
cooperation has been slow. The external borders, not in the least by reason of the other 
rationales examined in this chapter, forms one of the areas within Title IV EC in which policy 
integration is more achievable. At the same time, th  operational cooperation for the purpose 
of the management of the external borders may serve as a testing ground for areas of 
cooperation that for now still fall under the Third Pillar, in particular police cooperation. In 
the following chapter we will link the rationales discussed in this chapter to the way in which 
the EU has used its competences in the area of external border management, both through 
legislative and executive action.  
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VIII.  The Schengen External Borders Acquis: Legislation and Execution 
 
1. Introduction 
 
After having discussed the transfer of competences for the management of the Schengen 
external borders and the main rules governing the crossing of these borders by individuals, 
this chapter will look at the use the EU has made of these competences in order to ensure the 
correct application and respect for the EU rules on crossing the external borders. It is at this 
point that we truly start to examine the question of how the EU manages its external borders, 
also in the light of the different rationales discused in the previous chapter.  
 The Reflection Group preparing the 1996 Amsterdam intergovernmental conference 
argued in response to the lack of transparency and accountability of the Third Pillar under the 
Maastricht Treaty that “matters relating to the security of citizens require legal protection and, 
therefore, a legislative framework.”1 As we have seen, the Treaty of Amsterdam brought 
about the partial communitarisation of competences in the Area of Freedom, Security and 
Justice (AFSJ), including those in the area of external borders management. Even so, most 
commentators continue to characterise the AFSJ as a whole as dominated by executive action 
and operational coordination as opposed to the “legislation-centred constitutional logic of the 
EU.”2 The aim of this chapter is to see to what extent this remains true in respect of the EU’s 
management of the external borders. To what extent is legislation at the heart of the 
development of this policy? To what extent does Community action in this field remain 
distinct from that in other areas covered by the First Pillar?  
 These questions are important for a number of reasons. The management of the 
external borders potentially affects the rights of those who (aim to) cross these borders and 
therefore require legal protection and accountability mechanisms. An understanding of the 
relationship between legislation and executive action contributes to an understanding of the 
EU’s role in the provision of internal security and in this respect its relationship with the 
Member States and the institutional balance. Considering that the Lisbon Treaty will merge 
the First and the Third Pillar, effectively communitar sing the whole of the AFSJ, the way in 
                                                
1 Report by the Reflection Group: A Strategy for Europe (“Westendorp Report”, Brussels, 5 December 1995), 
point 48. 
2 Walker, N., ‘In Search of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: A Constitutional Odyssey’, in: Walker, N. 
(Ed.), Europe’s Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (Oxford, OUP, 2004), 21-22. 
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which the EU’s policy for the management of the external borders is taking shape under the 
First Pillar may inform the future integration in justice and home affairs (JHA). 
 This chapter will start with a look at the distinction between legislation and executive 
action in the EU legal order in general and in the AFSJ in particular. It will proceed by taking 
stock of the progressive construction of a Schengen external borders acquis based on the 
intergovernmental foundations of the Schengen cooperation. Although the crossing of the 
external borders is regulated for the most important p rt in the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) 
and the Regulation on Local Border Traffic (LBT), these Regulations form part of a broader 
and rapidly expanding body of legislation, creating the legal framework within which the 
management of the Schengen external borders takes place.  
 After the discussion of the legislation governing the management of the external 
borders, the focus will shift to the EU’s executive action. It will be shown that the gradual 
communitarisation of powers for the management of the external borders is reflected not only 
in the way in which the Schengen external borders acquis is implemented, but also in the way 
in which operational cooperation is developing. This will lead to a discussion of how the 
Lisbon Treaty accommodates the executive character of the AFSJ. The chapter will conclude 
with a critical examination of the legislative measures that were proposed by the Commission 
in its “Border Package” of  February 2007. 
 
2. Defining Executive Action 
 
In order to examine the relationship between legislation and executive action in the EU’s 
policy for the management of the external borders, one must first define what is understood 
by either of these terms. Contrary to the situation in the Member States’ legal orders, in the 
Community legal order the separation between acts of a legislative nature and executive 
action is not easy to draw. For both recourse is had to the instruments of Article 249 EC, so 
that the choice of instrument (decision, directive, regulation) does not say anything as to the 
nature of its content.3 One may nevertheless define legislation in form by reference to its 
adoption under a legislative procedure.4 
                                                
3 Lenaerts, K. and Desomer, M., ‘Towards a Hierarchy of Legal Acts in the European Union? Simplification f 
Legal Instruments and Procedures’, 11 ELJ 6 (2005), 746. 
4 Legislation in form as opposed to legislation in sub tance, which is based on the notion of the general 
applicability of acts: Türk, A., The concept of legislation in European Community Law (Alphen aan de Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2006), 238-239.  
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 Walker in his discussion of the legislative/executive nature of the AFSJ places 
legislation in opposition to executive and operational action, without distinguishing the latter 
two.5 He argues that both refer to the “post-legislative (or in some cases non-legislation-
based) phase of policy application and implementation.” On the one hand executive is used to 
refer to “high” governmental activity and operation to “low” bureaucratic or policy 
professional activity.6 In the discussion on the executive nature of the AFJS one tends to 
underline the “on the ground” or “practical” nature of EU activity. In that context however, 
the reference to “executive” often carries with it the notion of law enforcement authorities’ 
powers of coercion.7  
 Here it is argued that whilst legislation needs to be distinguished from execution, a 
further distinction needs to be made between two different types of executive action. On the 
one hand there is the implementation of legislation through executive decision making. This is 
the type of executive action Crum referred to when  considered the policy area of the Third 
Pillar as one of the “crucial test cases” for future legislative-executive relations in the EU.8 On 
the other hand there is the executive action which consists of scientific, technical and 
operational cooperation at the EU level. This is the type of executive action referred to by the 
Convention’s working group on Freedom, Security andJustice when it advocated a separation 
between “legislative” and “operational” tasks.9 
 
Implementation of legislation 
 
Not unlike domestic Member State legislation, Community legislation often requires 
implementation. The prime responsibility for implemntation lies with the Member States, 
even if this is nowhere stated explicitly in the current Treaties.10 Where however uniform 
conditions for implementation have been a requisite, mplementation at the central, 
Community level has become almost as important.  
 The third indent of Article 202 EC states that the Council can confer on the 
Commission, in the acts which it adopts, powers for implementation of the rules which the 
                                                
5 Walker, N., supra note 2, 21-22. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 Crum, B., ‘Legislative-Executive Relations in the EU’, 41 JCMS 3 (2003), 377. 
9 Final Report of Working Group X on Freedom, Security and Justice, European Convention, CONV 426/02, 3. 
10 This can also be inferred from Article 5 EC (principle of subsidiarity) and Article 10 EC (principle of sincere 
cooperation). The Lisbon Treaty states it explicitly in Article 291(a) TFEU.  
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Council lays down.11 Article 211 EC, fourth indent, lists as one of theCommission’s tasks the 
exercise of the powers conferred on it by the Council for the implementation of the rules laid 
down by the latter. The Court has interpreted the concept of implementation broadly. It 
encompasses the power to supplement and amend non-esse tial elements of legislative acts.12 
Moreover, it covers “both the drawing up of implementing rules and the application of rules 
to specific cases by means of acts of individual application.”13  
 
Comitology 
 
The third indent of Article 202 EC, states that theCouncil may, in “specific cases” reserve 
implementing powers to itself. Moreover, it may impose certain requirements in respect of the 
exercise of implementing powers. This proviso, inserted by the Single European Act, 
confirmed a practice that had developed in the early 1960s under which the Commission 
exercises the implementation powers under the supervision of a committee consisting of 
Member State representatives.14 The Court had already in 1970 given its approval of the so-
called comitology system, arguing that since the Council could delegate implementing powers 
to the Commission, it was also allowed to determine “any detailed rules to which the 
Commission is subject in exercising the power conferred on it.”15 Although there is agreement 
that comitology functions as a control mechanism in the inter-institutional relations, there is 
disagreement over the workings in practice. Although comitology continues to play an 
important role in inter-institutional battles for influence, some observers have described its 
day-to-day reality as one of consensual deliberations between national experts, rather than 
“mini-council meetings.”16  
 There are four types of committees distinguished by the procedure they follow: 
advisory, management, regulatory and regulatory with scrutiny. In the case of an Advisory 
Committee, the Commission is only required to take th opinion of the committee into 
consideration.17 In case of a differing opinion of a Management Committee, the Commission 
                                                
11 The reference to the Council must now be interpreted as a reference to the Community legislator. 
12 Case 25/70, Köster [1970] ECR 1161, para. 6; Case C-240/90, Germany v Commission [1992] ECR I-5383, 
para. 36. 
13 Case 16/88, Commission v. Council [1989] ECR 3457, para 11. 
14 Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedur s for the exercise of implementing powers conferred 
on the Commission, OJ 1999, L184/23, as amended by Council Decision 2006/512/EC, OJ 2006, L200/11. 
15 Case 25/70, supra note 12. 
16 Blom-Hansen, J., ‘The EU Comitology System: Who Guards the Guardian?’ (Paper presented at the APSA 
Annual Meeting, Boston, 28 August 2008), 1. 
17 Article 3, Council Decision 1999/468, supra note 14. 
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can adopt the implementing measure, but must inform the Council, which can then take a 
different decision by qualified majority.18 In case of a differing opinion by a Regulatory 
Committee, the Commission cannot adopt the measure, b t must refer it to the Council and 
inform the European Parliament. The Council can adopt the proposal by qualified majority or 
reject it. If the Council neither adopts the proposal, nor rejects it, it is adopted by the 
Commission.19  
 The Regulatory Committee with scrutiny is the most heavy procedure, introduced in 
2006 to give the European Parliament, as co-legislator,  role in the comitology procedure.20 
This procedure applies where the Commission proposes to supplement or amend certain non-
essential elements of legislative acts. It allows the European Parliament and the Council to 
oppose a proposed implementing measure by simple and qualified majority, respectively, 
even if the Committee’s opinion is in accordance with the Commission’s proposal.   
 
Implementation under the Third Pillar 
 
It should be recalled that competences in border management were transferred from the First 
to the Third Pillar by the Treaty of Amsterdam and that there remains a close link between 
these competences and the subject areas covered by the Third Pillar.21 It is therefore 
informative to have a brief look at the exercise of p wers within the Third Pillar. 
 Even more than in the First Pillar, implementation n the Third Pillar is dependent 
upon the Member States’ administrations.22  The Council may however adopt implementing 
measures itself on the basis of Article 34(2)(c) and (d) EU. It must decide with a two-thirds 
majority when adopting measures implementing Conventions and with qualified majority 
when adopting measures implementing Decisions. In addition two-thirds of the Member 
States must be in favour and a Member State may ask for a verification of whether the 
qualified majority represents at least 62% of the Union’s total population. If this is not the 
case the decision will not be adopted.23 Owing to the absence of a system comparable to tha 
                                                
18 Article 4, ibid. 
19 Article 5, ibid. 
20 Article 5a, ibid. 
21 See Chapter III. 
22 Den Boer, M. and Wallace, W., ‘Justice and Home Affairs: Integration through Incrementalism?’, in: Wallace, 
H. and Wallace, W. (Eds), Policy Making in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2000), 511. 
23 Article 34(3) EU. 
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of comitology under the First Pillar, the execution f measures is often the responsibility of 
Council bodies and is managed at Working Party level.24  
 
Delegating powers to agencies 
 
With regards to the possibility of delegation of powers to other Community bodies other than 
the Community institutions, the Court in the 1950s laid down an anti-delegation doctrine.40 
This doctrine is based on the idea that the delegation of discretionary power involving a 
margin of political judgment would upset the balance of powers assigned to the institutions. 
According to the Court, delegation must be limited o implementing powers clearly defined 
and entirely supervised by the delegating institution on the basis of specific and objective 
criteria.25   
Under the Meroni doctrine the delegation of powers to other Community bodies is 
limited to tasks involving technical or scientific assistance.26 Such bodies can only be granted 
decision-making power in narrowly defined technical areas.27 This has not prevented the 
Commission from setting up a considerable number of agencies since the mid-1970s.28 These 
agencies assist the Commission in the preparation and execution of EC regulatory policies.  
                                                
24 Council document 15515/01, 5. 
25 Case 9/56, Meroni [1957] ECR 11 at 147-149 and Case 10/56, Meroni [1958] ECR 53 at 169-171. Although 
the Meroni cases were related to the European Coal and Steal Community (ECSC), their applicability has been 
generally accepted and confirmed by the ECJ in Joined Cases C-154/04 and C-155/04, Alliance for Natural 
Health, [2005] ECR I-6451, para. 90.  
26 See inter al. Vos, E., ‘Reforming the European Commission: What Role to play for European Agencies’, 37 
CMLRev 6 (2000), 1122-1123, Yataganas, X.A., ‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union - 
The Relevance of the 46. American Model of Independent Agencies’ (Jean Monnet Working Paper 03/01, New 
York, 2001), 30 and Geradin, D. and Petit, N., ‘The D velopment of Agencies at EU and National Levels: 
Conceptual Analysis and Proposals for Reform’ (Jean Mo net Working Paper 01/04, New York, 2004), 15. 
27 See also: Article 54 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to 
the General Budget of the European Communities, OJ 2002, L248/1: “The Commission may not delegate to 
third parties the executive powers it enjoys under th  Treaties where they involve a large measure of discretion 
implying political choices. The implementing tasks delegated must be clearly defined and fully supervis d as to 
the use made of them.” Currently four agencies have decision making powers: the Community Plant Variety 
Office (CVPO), the Office for the Harmonisation of the Internal Market (OHIM), European Aviation Safety 
Agency and the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA). They decide on either trademarks or on licences in their
respective field of competence. 
28 Dehousse notes that by the end of 2007 there were 28 agencies, with a cumulative budget of over 1 billion 
euro. Over a third of the posts created under the Commission since 1992 were assigned to regulatory agencies. 
Dehousse, R., ‘Delegation of powers in the European union: The need for a multi-principals model’, 31 WEP 4 
(2008), 789-790. The Commission has however announced a thorough evaluation of all agencies by 2009-2010 
and will not propose any new regulatory agencies in the meantime: COM(2008) 135 final, Commission 
Communication, ‘European Agencies - The Way forward,’ 9. 
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There is no definition of the concept of an agency in EC legislation.29 Agencies are 
generally characterised as bodies set up by an act of secondary legislation, having legal 
personality, governed by European public law and distinct from the Community Institutions.30 
The Commission initially distinguished between two types of agencies: regulatory agencies 
and executive agencies. Executive agencies are set up by a Commission decision and are 
responsible for purely managerial tasks, i.e. to assist the Commission in implementing the 
Community’s financial support programmes.31 Regulatory agencies are those agencies that 
are “required to be actively involved in exercising the executive function by enacting 
instruments that contribute to regulating a specific sector.”32  
 Regulatory agencies lack a legal basis in the EC Treaty. In the past they have been set 
up in an ad hoc manner on the basis of Article 308 EC. Current practice has established 
agencies on the basis of the Treaty provision that constitutes the specific legal basis relevant 
for the policy in question.33 Within regulatory agencies, the Commission previously made a 
distinction between executive agencies and decision-making agencies. This distinction was 
however confusing and should be read as regulatory agencies with and regulatory agencies 
without decision-making powers.34  
 In its most recent Communication on European Agencies a more elaborate 
classification was proposed, distinguishing between agencies with decision-making powers, 
agencies providing direct technical or scientific assistance to the Commission, agencies 
responsible for information gathering, analyzing and disseminating information and agencies 
in charge of operational activities.35 Presumably in view of the Lisbon Treaty’s merging of 
the First and Third Pillar, the Commission for the first time included also the agencies set up 
by the Council under the EU’s police and justice cooperation in criminal matters.36  
                                                
29 Report by the Working Group ‘establishing a framework for decision-making regulatory agencies’ (group 3a) 
in preparation of the White Paper on European Governance, Work Area 3, Improving the exercise of executive 
responsibilities (June 2001), 6. 
30 www.europa.eu.int/agencies.  
31 Council Regulation (EC) No 58/2003 laying down the statute for executive agencies to be entrusted with
certain tasks in the management of Community programmes, OJ 2003, L11/1. 
32 COM(2002) 718 final, Commission Communication on the operating framework for the European regulatory 
agencies, 4.  
33 The Court has confirmed the legality of this practice in Case C-217/04, ENISA [2006] ECR I-3771, paras 42-
45. 
34 As noted also by D. Geradin and Petit, N., supra note 26, 47.  
35 COM(2008) 135 final, supra note 28, 7. Cf. Craig, P., EU Administrative Law (Oxford, OUP, 2006), 154 ff.  
36 Currently, there are three of these so-called Third Pillar Agencies: Europol, Eurojust and European Police 
College (CEPOL).   
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 As early as 2002, the Commission made an attempt to rationalise the establishment of 
regulatory agencies.37 A draft inter-institutional agreement was however halted in the 
Council.38 A 2008 Communication by the Commission announced the withdrawal of the 
proposal, launching an “inter-institutional discussion” instead.39 Still, the structure of the 
agencies that have been set up since 2002 have largely followed the Commission’s proposal, 
with the exception of the size and composition of the Agencies’ governing bodies.40 Most 
interesting and probably a sign of a more careful approach towards the setting up of agencies, 
is the Commission’s announcement that awaiting the results of an evaluation of existing 
agencies, it will refrain from proposing the establishment of new agencies.41 
 
The legal effect of “executive action” 
 
Instead of focussing here on the - contestable - distinction between political and a-political 
tasks which could or could not be delegated to regulatory agencies in the light of the Meroni 
doctrine, we would like to emphasise the distinction between executive action which has 
effects in law, i.e. which creates enforceable rights and obligations for third parties, and 
executive action which does not. Implementation of legislation by the Commission, the 
Council or regulatory agencies with decision-making power, would fall under the former. 
Technical and scientific assistance, as well as operational coordination, be it by the 
Commission, the Council or a regulatory agency, would be covered by the latter.  
 As Hoffman has argued the extent of the European administrative space can only be 
appreciated by looking beyond administration’s implementation activity.42 By defining the 
nature of EU executive action more precisely, the distinction proposed between executive 
action which has legal effect and that which does not allows us to do just that. Considering 
that the EU functions as a system of multi-level or network governance, also in the AFSJ, a 
                                                
37 COM(2002) 718 final, supra note 32. 
38 COM(2005) 59 final, Draft interinstitutional agreem nt on the operating framework for the European 
regulatory agencies, 3; see also SEC (2004) 1153, Commission Report on European Governance (2003-2004), 8. 
39 COM(2008) 135 final, supra note 28, 6. 
40 The Commission had argued in favour of a more limited size of the agencies’ governing boards, meaning that 
not all Member States would be represented: COM(2002) 718 final, supra note 37, 9. The only exception is the 
European Food Safety Agency (EFSA). 
41 Note that agencies already under inter-institutional discussion, as well as planned agencies in the AFSJ and 
changes in the scope of existing agencies would continue: COM(2008) 135 final, supra note 28, 9. This would 
include the establishment for an agency for the management of large-scale IT-databases in the AFSJ 
(COM(2009) 293 final) and a European Asylum Support Office (COM(2009) 66 final). Presumably it would 
also cover the proposals for the future development of the European Border Agency Frontex (COM(2008) 6 
final). 
42 Hoffman, H., ‘Mapping the European administrative space’, 31 WEP 4 (2008), 665 
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distinction based on the legal effect of EU administrative activity is preferred over a 
distinction based on the level at which this executive action takes place.43  
 It will be shown that while there are clear rules in place regarding the implementation 
of legislation through legally binding acts, this is much less the case in terms of the more 
“factual” or “physical” EU activity, which lacks the intention to have effects in law. This 
could prove problematic in relation to operational coordination in the AFSJ, where the 
cooperation between Member States may involve the exercise of coercive powers. 
 We will first examine the use that the Community legislator has made of the various 
legal bases provided for in the Treaties, which have llowed it to adopt measures for the 
management of the external borders. We will observe in detail the various pieces of 
legislation adopted, including the provisions made for their implementation.  
 
3. The Building of a Schengen External Borders Acquis 
 
In the first years following the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, there was 
relatively little legislative activity in the field of external borders management. Regulations 
concerning local border traffic and common standards for the surveillance of land and sea 
borders envisaged in the 1999 “Schengen Regulations Action Plan” of the Council’s Frontiers 
Working Party were not adopted until 2006.44 Of course, a considerable acquis was already in 
place in the form of those parts of the Schengen acquis that were incorporated in the EU legal 
order by the Treaty of Amsterdam and that were assigned to the new legal bases provided for 
by that Treaty.45  
 The impending enlargement, reinforced by the sharp increase in sub-Saharan 
migration across the Mediterranean from 2000 onwards and the events of 9/11 brought 
borders back on the EU’s agenda.46 In December 2001 the JHA Council agreed to: 1) 
                                                
43 Kohler-Koch, B. and Rittberger, B, ‘Review Article: The “Governance Turn” in EU Studies,’ in: Sedelmeier, 
U. and Young, A., JCMS Annual Review of the European Union in 2005 (Oxford, Blackwell, 2006), 27-49. See 
also: Eder, K. and Trenz, H.-J., ‘The Making of a European Public Space: The Case of Justice and Home 
Affairs,’ in Kohler-Koch, B. (Ed.), Linking EU and National Governance (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2003), 111-134.  
44 Council Document 12479/99.  
45 Council Decision 1999/435/EC concerning the definitio  of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/1 and 
Council Decision 1999/436/EC determining the legal b sis for each of the provisions or decisions which 
constitute the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/17. 
46 Monar, J., ‘Justice and Home Affairs’, in: Miles, L. (Ed.), JCMS The European Union: Annual Review 
2002/2003 (Oxford, Blackwell, 2003), 124. See also De Haas, H., ‘The Myth of Invasion: Irregular migration 
from West Africa to the Maghreb and the European Union’ (Oxford, IMI Research Report, October 2007), 15, 
who links this increase to a major anti-immigrant backlash in Libya in 2000.  
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strengthen and standardise European border controls 2) a sist candidate States in organising 
controls at Europe’s future external borders, by instituting operational cooperation 3)  
facilitate crisis management with regard to border control and 4) prevent illegal immigration 
and other forms of cross-border crime.47 Subsequently, the Laeken European Council 
Conclusions of 14 and 15 December 2001 asked the Council and the Commission to:  
 
 “(…) work out arrangements for cooperation between services responsible for external 
border control and to examine the conditions in which a mechanism or  common services to 
control external borders could be created (...).”48  
 
In response, the Commission came forward with its 2002 Communication on the integrated 
management of the external borders. In this Communication for the first time reference is 
made to the establishment of a “common corpus of legislation” in relation to the management 
of the common Schengen borders.49 In the short term, the most important measures envisaged 
remained the recasting of the Schengen acquis in a Schengen Borders Code and the long 
overdue adoption of measures on local border traffic (LBT).50  
 For the medium term, the Commission was more ambitious. It envisaged a formalised 
process of exchanging and processing data and information between authorities operating at 
the external borders and those operating within the common area of freedom of movement. 
This system, called PROSECUR, would “aim to establish direct links and exchanges between 
the authorities concerned with security at external borders.”51 In the long term this process 
would have to be formalised in a legal instrument which would lay down not only the rights 
and obligations of border guards, but also of other police and judicial authorities. Although 
the Commission considered that such an instrument could be based on either Article 62(1) or 
62(2)(a) EC, this may be doubted in so far as the consultation and exchange would have the 
purpose of general crime prevention and would regulate the rights and obligations of general 
law enforcement authorities in this regard.52   
                                                
47 Results of the JHA Council, 6-7 December 2001 (Council Document 14581/01), 13. 
48 European Council Conclusions, Laeken, 14 and 15 December 2001, point 42. 
49 COM(2002) 233 final, Commission Communication, ‘Towards Integrated Management of the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union’, 12. 
50 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of 
persons across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ 2006, L105/1 (hereinafter: ‘SBC’) and Regulation (EC) No 
1931/2006 laying down rules on local border traffic at the external land borders of the Member States, OJ 2006, 
L405/1 (hereinafter: ‘LBT Regulation’). 
51 COM(2002) 233 final, supra note 49, 15. 
52 See the discussion below on the exchange of Personal Name Record (PNR) data and the harmonisation of 
criminal law under the First Pillar.   
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 The Communication further stated, by having recourse to Article 66 EC, that the 
Community budget should contribute to the financing of a common policy. A financial burden 
sharing system should be established as a run-up to the creation of a complementary 
operational burden sharing mechanism. The operational mechanism was to take the shape of a 
European Corps of Border Guards; a body endowed with a “genuine operational inspection 
function”, which it could exercise either at the requ st of a Member State or of its own 
initiative.53 The Council’s Action Plan for the Management of the External Borders of the 
Member States largely took over the Commission’s proposals, but was understandably much 
more careful as regards the setting up of a European Corps of Border Guards.54 It generally 
put much less emphasis on the eventual need for common legislation and financing, focussing 
instead on measures of an operational rather than legal nature, giving the plan a very 
“pragmatic” orientation.55 
 Nevertheless, a wide range of legislative instruments has been adopted which 
determines, either directly or indirectly, the way in which the Schengen external borders are 
managed. These measures do not necessarily relate exclusively to the act of crossing an 
external border, nor do they fully coincide with those envisaged in the Commission 
Communication or the Council’s Action Plan. This is f rst of all because the Court has 
construed the notion of “Schengen developing measurs” broadly, to the effect that all 
measures that judged by their content and purpose rende  more effective parts of the 
Schengen acquis qualify as such.56 As a result, measures developing the Schengen acquis on 
the external borders adopted on the basis of Articles 62(2)(a) EC and Article 66 EC cover a 
broad range of legislative initiatives from the establishment of the EU’s border agency 
Frontex to common requirements regarding EU passports. Moreover, a considerable number 
of measures that find their legal basis in other aras of EU competence under Title IV EC 
(such as irregular migration, visa or asylum) or under the Third Pillar, include provisions 
which affect the way in which the Schengen external borders are managed. As such, the rules 
that make up the “Schengen external borders acquis” are to be found across a broad range of 
measures, which can be roughly divided into five categories.57 These are the Schengen 
                                                
53 COM(2002) 233 final, supra note 49, 13. 
54 Council Document 10019/02, point 120. The plan was officially endorsed in the European Council 
Conclusions, Seville, 21-22 June 2002, point 27. 
55 Monar, J., ‘The Project of a European Border Guard’, in: Caparini, M. and Marenin, O., Borders and Security 
Governance: Managing Borders in a Globalised World (Münster, LIT Verlag, 2006), 200. 
56 Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-1145, para. 85 and Case C-137/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-
11593, para. 56, see Chapter IV. 
57 This categorisation will include agreements concluded with third countries, although the relationship between 
the management of the external borders and third countries will be discussed in more detail in Chapter XI. This 
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borders acquis in a narrow sense, measures for financial burden sharing, measures for 
surveillance by technological means, measures penalising irregular entry, human smuggling 
and trafficking, and measures for the coordination of operational cooperation.  
 
3.1 The Schengen Borders Acquis in a Narrow Sense 
 
One may first identify a Schengen borders acquis in a narrow sense: the core measures that 
establish the legal regime for controls at the Schengen external borders. Most important is of 
course the SBC. Its adoption on the basis of Articles 62(1) and (2)(a) EC can be seen as the 
logical consequence of the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the EU legal order, 
which necessitated the recasting of the previously existing Schengen rules as legislative 
instruments. In the case of the LBT Regulation, the second most important measure in this 
category, effect was given to an obligation flowing from the original Schengen Implementing 
Convention (CISA).58 
 Both Regulations establish the legal regime governing the crossing of the external 
borders by individuals as was discussed in Chapter VI. However, the SBC is more than that, it 
constitutes a more comprehensive legal framework fo the management of the external 
borders, containing provisions on surveillance, cooperation between border guard authorities, 
the reinstatement of internal border controls and practical rules as regards for instance the 
infrastructure of border crossing points or forms to use.  
 The fact that the ultimate responsibility for the management of their respective part of 
the Schengen external borders continues to lie with the Member States makes that the rules on 
surveillance are of a very general character.59 Article 12 of the SBC sets out the purpose of 
border surveillance, as being “to prevent irregular bo der crossings, to counter cross-border 
criminality and to take measures against persons who have crossed the border illegally.” 
Member States shall survey the border deploying mobile and stationary units, and possibly 
technical means.60 They shall deploy sufficient financial and human resources and ensure that 
                                                                                                                                              
categorisation is limited to measures which find their legal basis in the AFSJ, although of course there may be 
links between the management of the external borders and measures adopted under other parts of the Treaties, 
such as the internal market (art. 95 EC), development policy (art. 179 EC) or transport (Art. 80 EC). An example 
of an instrument adopted on the basis of Article 80 EC is Regulation (EC) No 300/2008 on common rules in the 
field of civil aviation, OJ 2008, L97/72.  
58 Article 3 CISA.  
59 Article 12(5) read in conjunction with Article 33(2) SBC does state that the provisions on surveillance may be 
supplemented by rules adopted under comitology (regulatory procedure). 
60 Article 12(2) and (4), SBC. 
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their border guards are specialised, trained professionals.61 Also as regards the provisions on 
cooperation between border guard authorities, the SBC provides more for a general 
framework of Member State action, whilst referring in Article 16(2) to the secondary 
legislation regulating the coordination of operational cooperation by the European Border 
Agency, Frontex.62   
 
3.2 Financial Burden Sharing 
 
A second category of legislative measures consists of measures that aim at achieving a degree 
of financial burden-sharing. In the previous chapter the need to share the burden for the 
management of the external borders between the Member States, in both financial and 
operational terms, was identified as one of the ration les behind the EU’s involvement in 
border management. The Commission Communication on the integrated management of the 
external borders identified burden-sharing as a core component of a common policy.63 
However, where in 2002 the Commission still very much presented financial burden-sharing 
as a “run-up” to operational burden-sharing, it has now taken on a more independent 
importance with the creation of the External Borders Fund (EBF).64  
 
Odysseus Programme 
 
A first instrument setting up a system that would contribute to the funding of cooperation 
between national administrations was adopted under the Maastricht Treaty. A Joint Action 
established the Sherlock Programme, providing for funding for training, exchange and 
cooperation in the field of the security of identity documents.65 This programme was then 
subsumed into the broader Odysseus Programme, funding cooperation in the area of border 
control, as well as immigration and asylum.66 Article 9 of the Odysseus Joint Action 
                                                
61 Articles 12(3), 14 and 15(1), third paragraph, SBC. 
62 See on Frontex, below and Chapter IX. 
63 COM(2002) 233 final, supra note 49. 
64 Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the 
General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migrat on Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/22 (hereinafter: ‘EBF’). 
COM(2002) 233 final, ibid., does speak of supplementing the financial burden-sharing mechanism, rather than 
substituting it.  
65 Joint Action 96/637/JHA introducing a programme of training, exchanges and cooperation in the field of 
identity documents (Sherlock), OJ 1996, L287/7. 
66 Joint Action 98/244/JHA introducing a programme of training, exchanges and cooperation in the field of 
asylum, immigration and crossing of external borders (Odysseus-programme), OJ 1998, L99/2.  
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specifically referred to projects concerning “organising the practicalities of controls, including 
matters concerning the security of identity documents.” In this respect problems on a thematic 
or geographical basis were to be given special attention. Article 11 stipulated that in order to 
qualify for financing, projects were required to have a “demonstrable interest to the Union” 
and involve a minimum of two Member States.67  
 
ARGO Programme 
 
The Odysseus Programme expired in 2002. In the meantime the Treaty of Amsterdam had 
come into force. The 2002 Commission Communication, while introducing the need for 
financial burden sharing, was very clear that this “should not have as an objective the integral 
financing of all checks and surveillance at the external borders through the community 
budget,” but should rather take the form of a financi l redistribution mechanism.68 
Community schemes should however avoid financial contributions set by bilateral agreements 
between Member States which would quickly become “complex and inequitable.”69  
 A First Pillar Council Decision replaced the Odysseu  Programme with the 
establishment of the Community funding programme called ARGO.70 It was adopted on the 
basis of Article 66 EC, shortly after the publication of the 2002 Commission Communication. 
It is interesting to note that there is no explicit mention of the term burden sharing or 
solidarity in the ARGO decision. Nevertheless, in le with the Communication, the 
programme was to be considered “a modest forerunner of more extensive activities in this 
field.”71 The programme would also cover projects involving acceding Member States, in 
view of the impeding enlargement, as well as other Third Countries.72 The decision 
specifically allowed agencies of Member States thatdid not participate in the Decision (i.e. 
Ireland and Denmark) to be associated with projects funded under the ARGO programme.73   
 A mid-term evaluation of the implementation of the ARGO programme showed that 
between 2002 and 2004 the focus on external borders inc eased enormously. The use of the 
                                                
67 Under the Sherlock Programme there was a required minimum of three Member States, Article 7, Joint Acion 
96/637/JHA, supra note 65. 
68 COM(2002) 233 final, supra note 49, 20. 
69 Ibid. 
70 Council Decision 2002/463/EC adopting an action programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of 
external borders, visas, asylum and immigration (ARGO programme), OJ 2002, 161/11. 
71 Recital 3, ibid. 
72 Article 10(1)(a), ibid. 
73 Article 10(2), ibid. 
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budget in this category nearly quadrupled from 2003 to 2004.74 Initially there was only 
limited use made of the available funds. Both the mid-term evaluation and the Commission’s 
first annual report on the implementation of ARGO pointed at the unfamiliarity of national 
administrations with the existence of the Programme and the Community financial rules on 
grants, as well as a lack of experience in cooperating with partner institutions in other 
Member States.75 
 In December 2004, the Council amended the ARGO decision, increasing the number 
of actions in the area of external borders “to promote the general objectives of the ARGO 
Programme.”76 For the first time explicit reference was made to “a wider definition of 
solidarity that would include, inter alia, Community support in the management of external 
borders.”77 What exactly justified the priority given to projects in the area of the external 
borders over visas, asylum, migration remains however unclear. While the original ARGO 
decision still stated that individual action by each administration was incapable of achieving 
uniformity between the practices of the Member States, the amending decision aimed to 
facilitate access to the programme by making funding available also for projects in a single 
Member State.78 Such action would need to promote one of the general objectives of the 
programme and contribute to integrated border management “by addressing specific structural 
weaknesses at strategic border points, identified on the basis of objective criteria.”79   
 
External Borders Fund 
 
In spring 2005, the Commission proposed three new framework programmes for the AFSJ for 
the period 2007-2013: Security and safeguarding Liberties, Fundamental Rights and Justice 
and the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows. The latter was to give effect to the 
Hague Programme’s call for “solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility including its 
financial implications between the Member States”.80 It encompassed the creation of four 
                                                
74 ‘Mid-term evaluation of the ARGO Programme’ (Antwerp, Yellow Window Management Consultants, 20 
July 2006), 6. 
75 Mid-term Evaluation, ibid, 37 and SEC(2004) 211, Commission Staff Working Paper, First annual report on 
the implementation of the ARGO programme (2002-2003), 6. This puts the Commission’s assertion that bilateral 
agreements would soon become too complex in perspective, supra note 49. 
76 Recital 5, Council Decision 2004/867/EC, amending Decision 2002/463/EC adopting an action programme for 
administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and immigration (ARGO programme), 
OJ 2004, L/371/48. 
77 Recital 3, ibid. 
78 Recital 6, Council Decision 2002/463/EC, supra note 59. 
79 Article 1, Council Decision 2004/867/EC, supra note 76. 
80 The Hague Programme, Annex to the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, point 1.2. 
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separate funds: a European Refugee Fund, a European Fund for Integration, a European 
Return Fund and an External Borders Fund (EBF).81 Not only was the Solidarity Framework 
Programme the most important of the three framework p ogrammes, but within this 
programme the EBF was allocated a lion’s share of the reserved budget. It entailed in any 
case a considerable and more structural increase in th  Community funding for this purpose.82 
 In May 2007, the decision establishing the EBF wasadopted against the background 
of the continuing attempts of irregular migrants to reach Europe by boat.83 By December 
2006, the European Parliament had already created a prep ratory action (budget line 18 03 12) 
for the implementation of actions in 2007 with the aim of assisting the concerned Member 
States. 
 Article 3 of the decision lists a number of general objectives, which are elaborated in 
specific objectives in the following article. The general objectives are not limited to the 
improvement of border controls at the external borders or the uniform application of the 
Schengen rules, but also aim “beyond the border” with the improvement of the activities of 
consular and other services of the Member States in third countries, for instance in the area of 
visas or pre-border controls.  
 The Fund may contribute to the financing of technial assistance either at the initiative 
of a Member State or the Commission. The most important part of resources is allocated to 
the Member States (shared management).84 Funding of national actions may not exceed 50 
percent of the total cost of the action, or in case of projects addressing specific objectives 
identified in the Strategic Guidelines, 75 percent.85  
 Eligible actions are proposed by the Member States in annual programmes, which in 
turn are based on strategic multiannual programmes. The multiannual programmes are drawn 
up by the Member States in consultation with the Commission on the basis of the 
Commission’s Strategic Guidelines, which define the priorities for the implementation of the 
                                                
81 COM(2005) 123 final, Commission Communication establishing a framework programme on Solidarity and 
the management of Migration Flows for the period 2007-2013. 
82 Cf. the Argo Programme’s budget of 25 million euro for the period 2002-2006, with that of the External 
Borders Fund (1820 million euro for the period 2007-2013), bearing in mind also the more limited scope f the 
EBF. 
83 Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the 
General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migrat on Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/22. Although the actual 
numbers of landings in Italy and the Canary Islands had been decreasing in comparison to previous years, the 
media attention and political tension was mounting in par with the number of casualties reported. The very same 
day of the adoption of the EBF Decision a boat carrying 57 people disappeared (La Reppublica, 24 May 2007). 
A day later images of immigrants clinging onto tuna baskets  made headlines (La Reppublica, 26 May 2007). 
See also: ‘Even in death, migrants were let down by Europe’ (The Independent, 4 June 2007).   
84 Article 5, EBF. 
85 Article 16(4), EBF. 
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EBF. The Strategic Guidelines are adopted under the egulatory comitology procedure with 
scrutiny.86 Both the Multiannual and Annual Programmes, as well as the annual list of 
selected actions, are adopted by the Commission under the management comitology 
procedure.87  
 The distribution of the annual resources available between the Member States is done 
on the basis of Article 14. The total amount available is divided between land borders (30%), 
sea borders (35%), air borders (20%) and consular offices (15%). These sums are then further 
broken down between the Member States. For land and sea borders this is done on the basis of 
their length (70%), calculated, on the basis of weighing factors for each specific section, and 
workload (30%). The weighing factor is determined on the basis of a risk analysis by Frontex, 
the External Borders Agency, determining the threat l vel for irregular migration.88 For air 
borders the workload alone is the determinant and for consular the number of offices and the 
workload (50-50).  
 Under Article 7, the Commission can use up to 6% of available resources for 
transnational actions or actions of interest to the Community as a whole (direct management). 
These actions must concern one of the following objectives: enhancement of the activities of 
Member States’ consular and other services in third countries, the progressive inclusion of 
customs, veterinary and phyto-sanitary controls in integrated border management activities 
and the provision of support in duly substantiated emergency situation requiring urgent action 
at the external borders.89 It is not entirely clear from the decision what would constitute such a 
situation, but in line with reference to emergency situations in the EC Treaty and secondary 
legislation, it can be assumed that this entails a sudden and massive influx of third country 
nationals.90 An annual work plan, adopted under the management comitology procedure, lays 
down the priorities for such Community action. Morev r, each year, the Commission, under 
article 19, establishes a list of specific actions to be implemented by the Member States which 
contribute to the development of the European common-integrated-border management 
system by addressing weaknesses at strategic border points. 
                                                
86 Article 56(1), EBF, establishes the ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’ Committee. 
87 Article 9 and Chapter IV, EBF. Also the adoption of annual work plans under the Odysseus (note: Third Pillar) 
and the ARGO Programme was subject to scrutiny by a committee consisting of Member States representatives.  
88 Article 15, EBF. Note here the use of the value-laden word “threat,” portraying irregular migration as  
security risk.  
89 Note the link between the first two objectives and the elements of the EU’s Integrated Border Management 
Strategy as defined by the JHA Council: Results of the JHA Council, Brussels, 4-5 December 2006 (Council 
Document 15801/06), 27. 
90 Article 64(2) EC and Article 8a, Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for 
the Management of Operational Cooperation at the Ext rnal Borders of the Member States of the European 
Union, OJ 2004, L349/1 (hereinafter: “Frontex Regulation”). 
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 Unlike the ARGO programme, which was based on Article 66 EC, the EBF is based 
on Article 62(2) EC. Even if the fund does not provide for any substantive measures on the 
external borders or visa, this choice seems correct. Unlike its predecessors, the EBF is less 
concerned with cooperation between Member State authorities than with improving the 
functioning of these authorities independently.  
 The logical consequence of this choice of legal basis nd the fact that the EBF is to be 
considered a Schengen developing measure, is the exclusion of the UK and Ireland.91 
Considering the important sums of money involved, it is useful to recall that in accordance 
with Article 5 of the Schengen Protocol, the UK and Ireland are to bear no financial 
consequences from the measure, apart from the administrative expenses for the use of the 
institutions. Denmark has opted-in to the decision, which also applies to the Schengen 
Associated Countries. For the period 2007-2009, Member States Bulgaria and Romania will, 
in addition to contributions from the EBF, continue to benefit from a temporary instrument 
under the 2006 Act of Accession, the Cash flow and Schengen Facility. 
 
The legislative instruments aimed at achieving a degre  of financial solidarity for the 
management of the external borders show two interesting developments. First, and most 
obvious, is the consistent increase in the amount of m ney that is reserved from the 
Community budget for this purpose. Second, there is a somewhat contradictory development 
with on the one hand more funding for individual Member States, rather than for joint projects 
and on the other hand a stronger Community element. While the initial programmes still 
required the participation of a minimum number of Member States, the EBF benefits Member 
States on an individual basis, reinforcing the fund’s aim of redistribution. It could be seen as 
clear recognition that the guarding of the external borders remains the responsibility of the 
individual Member States. On the other hand, the Commission has been given the important 
task of establishing Strategic Guidelines, ensuring overall coherence of the fund’s spending 
within the broader framework of the EU’s policy for the management of the EU external 
borders. Importantly, it can now independently finance Community-wide actions, albeit in a 
limited number of fields and subject to scrutiny by a Member State Committee. 
 
 
                                                
91 One may wonder to what extent this has been a factor taken into account in deciding the legal basis, 
considering that at the time of the adoption of the EBF decision, Case C-77/05 and Case C-137/05, supra note 
56, were still pending before the ECJ. 
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3.3  Databases, Biometrics, Information Exchange. 
 
Already in the previous chapter the reliance on technological surveillance was identified as an 
important indicator as well as a catalyst for the securitisation processes. The Hague 
Programme emphasised the importance of biometrics and information systems as a tool for 
migration management, as well as crime control and prevention.92 
 Until 2007, when the Commission presented its communication on the EUROSUR 
system (see below), few concrete steps were taken towards the development of the 
PROSECUR concept coined by the Commission in its 2002 Communication.93 Instead one 
could witness the proliferation of European-wide datab ses, as well as an increase in rules for 
information exchange within the AFSJ as a whole. Information exchange does not only take 
place at the central level, through EU-wide databases or networks, but also between Member 
States directly, for instance through access to infrmation contained in (existing) national 
databases, as well as between private parties and Member State authorities. In fact the Hague 
Programme seems to prioritise this more decentralised type of information exchange, stating 
that: “[n]ew centralised European databases should nly be created on the basis of studies that 
have shown their added value.”94  
 An important principle to be applied in respect of decentralised information exchange 
is the principle of availability, meaning that “authorities responsible for internal security in 
one Member State or Europol officials who need information to perform their duties should 
obtain it from another Member State if it is accessible there.”95 This principle is particularly 
important in relation to subject matters covered by the Third Pillar.96 
 However, in the area of migration and border management, covered by the First Pillar, 
there is a primacy of centralised information exchange. A first database was established as 
early as 1998, still on the basis of Article K.3 TEU. The scope of the so-called European 
Image Archiving System (FADO) was still very limited. It allowed for the computerised 
exchange of information which the Member States would include in this database on false 
                                                
92 The Hague Programme, supra note 80, point 1.7.2. 
93 COM(2002) 233 final, supra note 49, 15.  
94 The Hague Programme, supra note 80, point 2.1. 
95 COM(2005) 597 final, Commission Communication on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and 
synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs, 3. 
96 See Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and intelligence betwen 
law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2006, L386/89; Framework 
Decision 2008/615/JHA on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism and 
cross-border crime OJ 2008, L210/1; Framework Decision 2008/616 on the implementation of Decision 
2008/615/JHA, OJ 2008, L210/12; the latter two measures essentially ncorporate the provisions of the Prüm 
Treaty into the EU legal order. See also COM(2005) 490 final, Commission Proposal for a framework decision 
on the exchange of information under the principle of availability.    
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documents.97 The Joint Action was adopted with reference to article K(1)(3) TEU on 
immigration policy, rather then Article K(1)(2) on the external borders. There would be no 
personal data stored, let alone biometric identifiers. 
  
3.3.1 Centralised Databases 
 
Three of the most important European-wide databases in the AFSJ, the Schengen Information 
System (SIS), the Visa Information System (VIS) andthe EURODAC are, if not fully, then in 
part, covered by the First Pillar. These databases w re the subject of scrutiny in a 2005 
Commission Communication on improved effectiveness, enhanced interoperability and 
synergies among European databases in the area of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA).98 While 
the SIS still finds its legal basis in the CISA, its successor SISII and the two other databases 
have been established on the basis of Community legislation. Their development and 
relevance for the management of the external borders will be discussed here.  
 
Schengen Information System 
 
The first and most prominent database to be examined is the Schengen Information System 
(SIS), rightly described as the “backbone” of free movement within AFSJ.99 The SIS contains 
information on persons and goods, including vehicles. Article 101 of the CISA regulates 
access to the SIS. Authorised are the authorities responsible for border checks, as well as the 
authorities responsible for police and customs checks within the Schengen area. In addition 
visa and migration authorities have access to data entered under Article 96 CISA (alerts for 
the purpose of refusing entry). Authorised authorities may only search those data they need 
for the performance of their specific task. The SIS only contains “alphanumeric” data (i.e. 
                                                
97 Since the end of 2007, the FADO system now also contains two multilingual systems containing unclassified 
subsets of information: iFADO (Intranet False and Authentic Documents Online) for control authorities only and 
PRADO (Public Register of Authentic Documents Online), accessible to the general public via the Council 
homepage (Council document 9665/08). See furthermore the Common Position on the transfer of data to Interpol 
on lost, stolen or misappropriated passports, OJ 2005, L27/61. 
98 COM(2005) 597 final, supra note 95. 
99 Hobbing, P., ‘An assessment of the proposals of regulation and decision which define the purpose, 
functionality and responsibilities of the future SIS II’ (EP Briefing Paper, 15 February 2006, 
IP/C/LIBE/FWC/2005-08), 1. 
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consisting of letters and numbers). Upon a positive match, national authorities can exchange 
further data through the so-called SIRENE bureaus.100   
 Provisions of the SIS apply simultaneously to data concerning migration control as 
well as crime control, thus putting the SIS in a limbo between the First and Third Pillar. When 
the Schengen acquis was integrated into the EU legal framework, disagreement on which 
would constitute the correct legal basis, the SIS came to fall under the Third Pillar by 
default.101 However, all subsequent legislation related to the SIS has been adopted on a dual 
legal basis. In line with the UK and Ireland’s parti l participation in the Schengen acquis, 
these Member States have been granted access to the SIS in relation to data under the Third 
Pillar, but are not authorised to search migration data.  
 New functions, including in the fight against terrorism, were introduced in a regulation 
in 2004 on the basis of Article 66 EC. In 2005 a similar decision was adopted under the Third 
Pillar on the basis of Articles 30(1)(a) and (b) and 31(a) and (b) EU.102 Most importantly, the 
2004 Regulation granted access to national judicial authorities, including those responsible for 
the initiation of public prosecutions in criminal proceedings and judicial inquiries prior to 
indictment. One could argue that as far as criminal proceedings are concerned the broadening 
of access to judicial authorities should not have be n achieved under the First Pillar. In any 
case this forms yet another example of the linking of terrorism with migration measures. The 
2005 Decision confirmed the position of these authorities, whilst also granting further access 
to Europol and Eurojust. The latter two were however excluded from access to data inserted 
under article 96 CISA.103  
 As early as 2001 the decision was taken to further develop the SIS.104 The most 
important reason for this SISII was to expand the maxi um capacity of the system of 18 
Member States to accommodate the upcoming enlargement. At the same time however it 
allowed for a widening of the grounds for making an entry into the system, as well as of the 
                                                
100 The SIRENE (Supplementary Information Request at National Entry) system is not mentioned in the CISA. It 
was given a legal basis in Article 92(4), Council Regulation (EC) No 871/2004 concerning the introduction of 
some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in the fight against terrorism, OJ 2004, 
L162/29.  
101 Article 2, Protocol integrating the Schengen acquis into the framework of the European Union. 
102 Council Regulation (EC) No 871/2004, supra note 100 and Council Decision 2005/211/JHA concerning the 
introduction of some new functions for the Schengen Information System, including in the fight against 
terrorism, OJ 2005, L68/44. 
103 See further Regulation 1160/2005 amending the CISA, as regards access to the SIS by the services in the 
Member States responsible for issuing registration certificates for vehicles, OJ 205, L191/18. 
104 Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001 and Decision 2001/886/JHA on the development of the second generation 
Schengen Information System (SIS II), OJ 2001, L328/1 and 4. Strikingly the UK also participated in the 
adoption of the Regulation, despite its non-participation in the Schengen acquis on the external borders.  
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categories of data that could be included.105 The responsibility for the development of the 
system under both the First and Third Pillar was given to the Commission, under the control 
of a comitology committee acting under either the management procedure or the regulatory 
procedure.106 Rather than simply declaring the comitology decision applicable, the Third 
Pillar decision copies the relevant procedures from that decision.   
 In 2006, the legislative measures on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation SIS were adopted under the First and Third Pillar.107 Until this very day however, 
the system is not operative.108 The most significant change from its predecessor i that the 
categories of data that can be entered on persons on wh m an alert is issued will now include 
photographs and fingerprints.109 In the same way as for the development measures, th  
Regulation and Decision give the Commission the power to take implementing measures 
under the supervision of a regulatory comitology committee.110 The day-to-day management 
of the system is officially handed over to the Commission for a transitional period, until a so-
called Management Authority has been set up.111   
 In view of the Commission’s goal of a truly integrated border management, it is useful 
to note here that the SIS has its counterpart in the field of customs legislation in the Customs 
Information System (CIS).112 Its purpose is to facilitate cooperation between Member States’ 
authorities in the prevention, investigation and prosecution of breaches of customs legislation. 
The CIS stores information on commodities, means of transport, persons and companies for 
the purpose of sighting and reporting, discreet surveillance or specific checks. 
                                                
105 Recitals 2 and 3, Regulation (EC) No 2424/2001, ibid. 
106 Article 5 and the references to that Article, ibid.    
107 Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006 on the establishment, operation and use of the second generation Schengen 
Information System (SIS II), OJ 2006, L381/4 and Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, 
operation and use of the second generation Schengen I formation System (SIS II), OJ 2007, L205/63. These 
decisions repeal all provisions from the CISA regarding the SIS with the exception of those granting access to 
the SIS for vehicle registration authorities.   
108 A temporary solution was found in the form of an extended SIS I, the so-called SISI4all or SIS1+, see
Chapter VI. The fact that this was possible shows the importance attached by the Member States to the 
possibility of adding new functionalities to SIS II. One of the main delaying factors were problems during the 
public procurement process: House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘Schengen Information System II 
(SIS II)’ (HL Paper 49, Session 2006-07, 9th Report, 2 March 2007), 12-13. However the project has also been 
plagued by major technical difficulties: ‘Test nieuw systeem grenscontrole mislukt volkomen’ (Volkskrant, 15 
January 2009). 
109 Article 20 of the Regulation and the Decision, supra note 107. See Chapter VI for an overview of the grounds 
upon which a person can be listed.  
110 See Article 51 and the references to that Article in Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, as well as Article 67 and 
the references to that Article in Decision 2007/533JHA, supra note 107. 
111 Article 15(4), Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, ibid. However, during the transitional period the Commission 
may delegate that task to national public-sector bodies, in two different countries. Presumably this wll be French 
and Austrian authorities, since the SIS is physically located in Strasbourg, France, with a back-up in Sankt 
Johann im Pongau, Austria. 
112 See the EU’s Integrated Border Management Strategy, supra note 89. 
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 Like the SIS, it has a dual legal basis. On the on hand there is a First Pillar Regulation 
establishing the CIS in relation to breaches of Community customs and agricultural 
legislation.113 On the other hand, there is a Third Pillar, K.3. Convention in relation to 
breaches of national laws in the application of which Member States’ customs authorities 
have total or partial competence, in particular those n restrictions on the free movement of 
goods under Article 30 EC and the arms trade derogation of Article 296 EC.114  
 
Visa Information System 
 
The Council Decision to develop a so-called Visa Information System (VIS), which allowed 
for the necessary appropriations to be made in the general budget, was taken in 2004.115 It 
established the main structure of the system, consisti g of a central VIS with national 
interfaces. The Commission was made responsible for the development central infrastructure, 
the Member States for the national parts.116 The Commission was given implementing powers 
under the supervision of the committee set up by the SIS II development Regulation, acting 
under either the management or the regulatory procedure.117  
 A regulation concerning the VIS and the exchange of data between Member States on 
short-stay visas was adopted in 2008.118 The VIS’s stated objective is to improve the 
implementation of the common visa policy, consular cooperation and consultation between 
central visa authorities by facilitating the exchange of data between Member States on 
applications and on the decisions made in relation to these applications.119 It is interesting to 
see that priority has been given by the EC legislator to the adoption of this Regulation rather 
than to the recasting of the Common Consular Instructions (CCI) in a Community Code on 
Visa.120 One could argue that the VIS should have a supporting function in the application of 
the EU’s visa rules and that such Visa Code would contribute more to a common visa policy 
than the establishment of the VIS. 
                                                
113 Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 on mutual assistance between the administrative authorities of the 
Member States and cooperation between the latter and the Commission to ensure the correct application of the 
law on customs and agricultural matters, OJ 1997, L82/1. 
114 Convention drawn up on the basis of Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union, on the use of information 
technology for customs purposes, OJ 1995, C316/34. 
115 Council Decision 2004/512/EC establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), OJ 2004, L213/5. 
116 Article 2, ibid. 
117 Article 5, ibid. 
118 Regulation (EC) No 767/2008 concerning the Visa Information System (VIS) and the exchange of data 
between Member States on short-stay visas, OJ 2008, L218/60 (hereinafter: “VIS Regulation”).  
119 Article 2, VIS Regulation. 
120 COM(2006) 403 final, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a Community Code on Visas. 
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 On receipt of a visa request, the visa authorities will create an application file in the 
VIS, entering a set of data in the system, including photographs and fingerprints in 
accordance with the Common Consular Instructions (CCI). Regulation (EC) No 390/2009 has 
amended the CCI to this effect.121 Additional data are to be added by the visa authorities when 
the visa is issued or refused, when the application pr cess is discontinued or where the visa is 
annulled, revoked or its validity shortened. Competent visa authorities must consult the VIS 
for the purposes of the examination of applications a d the decisions relating to those 
applications.122  
 The Commission is endowed with implementing powers under the supervision of the 
same committee set up by the SIS II Regulation, acting under either the management or the 
regulatory procedure.123 Although the VIS is developed on “a centralised architecture and a 
common technical platform” with SIS II, the two are to remain “two different systems with 
strictly separated data and access.”124 As with SIS II, the Commission has been given the 
responsibility for the management of the system during a transitional period, until the 
establishment of a Management Authority.125 
 
The VIS Regulation allows a number of Member State authorities who are competent to carry 
out checks within the Member State territory or at the border access to the system’s data for 
the purpose of verifying the identity of the visa holder, the authenticity of the visa or whether 
the conditions for entry to, stay or residence on the erritory of the Member States are 
fulfilled.126 What is more important is that “duly authorised staff” of the same authorities 
may, in accordance with Article 20, access the VIS in order to identify a person for the 
purpose of identifying a person who may not fulfil the conditions for entry, stay or residence 
in the Member States.  
 Although Article 20(3) clearly provides that recourse to Article 20 is only had if 
Articles 18 or 19 do not apply, it becomes clear tht is article renders the VIS a database for 
the identification of persons for the purpose of immigration control on the basis of their 
                                                
121 Regulation (EC) No 390/2009 amending the Common Cosular Instructions on visas for diplomatic mission 
and consular posts in relation to the introduction of biometrics including provisions on the organisation of the 
reception and processing of visa applications, OJ 2009, L131/1. 
122 See Chapter VI on the entry and use of data by visa authorities.  
123 See Article 49 and the references made to that Article, VIS Regulation.  
124 Council Conclusions on the development of the Visa Information System (VIS), 19 February 2004 (Council 
Document 6535/04), 8. 
125 Article 26(4), VIS Regulation. Again during a transitional period the Commission may delegate its powers to 
two national public-sector bodies in two different Member States. Because SIS II and the VIS will be sharing a 
common platform it is likely that this will again be French and Austrian authorities.  
126 Articles 18 and 19, VIS Regulation. See also Chapter VI.  
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fingerprints. Moreover the reference to “duly authorised staff of those competent authorities” 
in Articles 18 and 19, is much more restricted than the general “authorities competent for 
carrying out checks at external border crossing points n accordance with the Schengen 
Borders Code” referred to in Article 20.  
  
EURODAC 
 
A database which from the outset provided for the inclusion of biometric data is EURODAC. 
The Regulation establishing this database was adopte  in 2000 and the system became 
operational on 15 January 2003.127 The database is linked to the application of the Dublin 
Regulation, which establishes a series of criteria on the basis of which the responsibility for 
examining an asylum application is allocated to onef the Member States.128 Its legal basis is 
therefore Article 63(1)(a) EC concerning the criteria and mechanisms for determining which 
Member State is responsible for considering an application for asylum. The EURODAC 
Regulation is a measure developing a part of the Schengen acquis in which the UK and 
Ireland have opted in. Denmark and the Schengen Associated Countries (SAC) have become 
associated with the Dublin rules, including EURODAC through agreements under public 
international law.129  
 The competent authorities, which are designated by the Member States, are required to 
take the fingerprints of all asylum applicants in their territory over 14 years of age, as well as 
all third country nationals over 14 years old who are found to cross their border irregularly.130  
This includes cases where “an alien is apprehended beyond the external border, where s/he is 
still en route and there is no doubt that s/he crossed the external border irregularly.”131 This 
may serve as proof in determining responsibility under Article 10(1) of the Dublin II 
Regulation which states that where an asylum seeker has irregularly crossed the border into a 
Member State by land, sea or air having come from a third country, the Member State thus 
entered shall be responsible for examining the application for asylum. Since this 
                                                
127 Council Regulation (EC) No 2725/2000 concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for the comparison of 
fingerprints for the effective application of the Dublin Convention, OJ 2000, L316/1 (hereinafter: “EURODAC 
Regulation”). 
128 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national, OJ 2003, L50/1 (hereinafter: “Dublin II Regulation”). 
129 See Chapter VI. 
130 Article 4 and Article 8, EURODAC Regulation. 
131 See the statements entered in the Council’s minutes pon the adoption of the EURODAC Regulation 
(Council Document 12314/00 Add 1, 2).  
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responsibility ceases 12 months after the date of border crossing, the retention period of two 
years must be considered disproportionate.132 Member States may choose to include a third 
category of fingerprints, namely those of third country nationals found to be irregularly 
present in their territory.133  
 The fingerprints and related data are transmitted to a Central Unit within the 
Commission, which is responsible for the operation of the central database and which will 
compare them with already stored data. The data on irregular border crossers are only 
recorded for the purpose of comparison with data of subsequent applicants for asylum and not 
with any other data submitted in relation to the irregular crossing of a border, whether 
previously or subsequently.134 Under article 11(1) Member States may however compare the 
fingerprints of an alien found to be irregularly present within the Member State with 
previously lodged data on asylum.135 General grounds for comparing the data include the 
situation in which an alien declares that s/he has lodged an asylum application, but does not 
indicate in which Member State, where the alien does not ask for asylum but objects to his/her 
return claiming that this would constitute a danger to him/her or where the alien seeks to 
prevent removal by refusal to cooperate in establishing his/her identity. Here we again see 
that a database which has been set up for a seemingly very specific purpose, is in reality an 
identification tool for the purpose of migration control. 
 In Article 22, the Council retained important powers for the implementation of the 
Regulation. First of all regarding the collection, transmission and comparison of fingerprints. 
Second, in relation to the blocking of data where a person has been recognised as a refugee 
and the drawing up of specific statistics for the purpose of a decision on whether to erase the 
data on persons recognised as refugees. The EURODAC Regulation was implemented by 
Council Regulation (EC) No 407/2002.136 
  In recital 13 the Council justifies this retention f implementing powers by reference 
to the ultimate responsibility of Member States for identifying and classifying the results of 
comparisons transmitted by the Central Unit as well as for the blocking of data relating to 
                                                
132 Peers, S., EU Justice and Home Affairs Law (Oxford, OUP, 2006), 324. Note that the reference to the border 
here extends to the borders of the UK, Ireland, Denmark and the Schengen Associated Countries.   
133 Article 11(1), Council Regulation (EC), EURODAC Regulation. 
134 Article 9(2), EURODAC Regulation. 
135 Arguably this article also covers the situation of an alien that is found on the territory of the Member States 
just after having crossed a border irregularly, although this situation would under the Council’s interpr tation be 
covered by Article 8, EURODAC Regulation.  
136 Council Regulation (EC) No 407/2002 laying down certain rules to implement Regulation (EC) No 
2725/2000 concerning the establishment of “Eurodac” for the comparison of fingerprints for the effective 
application of the Dublin Convention, OJ 2002, L62/1. 
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persons admitted and recognised as refugees. It further states that the particularly sensitive 
area of the processing of personal data, which could affect the exercise of individual 
freedoms, should allow the Council to take implementing measures, in particular to the 
adoption of measures ensuring the safety and reliability of such data. The latter argument, 
whilst recognising the need for data protection measures, does not explain why these powers 
could be better exercised by the Council, rather than the Commission. The Commission was 
only given implementing powers in relation a possible expansion of statistical data to be 
collected by the Central Unit, subject to a regulatory committee procedure.137    
 The Commission in its joint evaluation of the EURODAC and Dublin System of 2007 
noted some important problems in relation to the submission of data. It referred to long delays 
in transmission (up to 30 days).138 Moreover, the low number of fingerprints of apprehended 
irregular border crossers raised doubts about Member States’ compliance with this 
obligation.139 Peers notes that from the outset there were widespread doubts whether border 
guards would be willing to take the fingerprints of all irregular border crossers.140 Aus speaks 
of a deliberate non-compliance, in particular by the southern Mediterranean Member States. 
These Member State would have to take responsibility for asylum claims lodged in other 
Member States where the claimant first entered the Union at their borders.141 A Commission 
proposal aims to remedy the problems identified in the joint evaluation. It sets stricter 
deadlines for the transmission of data, requires a cle rer specification of the responsible unit 
of the national authorities that have access to EURODAC and the connection between their 
competences and the purpose of the database, and a better management of the deletion of 
data.142 The proposal would also align the storage period fr data on TCNs who have 
irregularly crossed the external borders with the period in which the Dublin II Regulation 
allocated the responsibility for an asylum claim.143  
 
                                                
137 Articles 3(4) read in conjunction with 23(1), ibid. The Commission on the adoption of the Regulation 
declared that in its view the reasons for the retention of implementing powers by the Council had not been 
adequately or appropriately substantiated and that it would reserve its rights under the Treaty (Council Document 
12314/00 Add 1, 2). 
138 COM(2007) 299 final, Report from the Commission on the evaluation of the Dublin system, 9. 
139 Ibid. 
140 Peers, S., supra note 132, 324. 
141 Aus, J., ‘Eurodac: A Solution Looking for a Problem?’, 10 EIoP 6 (2006), 12. 
142 COM(2008) 825 final, Commission Proposal for a Regulation concerning the establishment of ‘Eurodac’ for 
the comparison of fingerprints for the effective application of Regulation (EC) No […/…] [establishing the 
criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for 
international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless per on], 5-
6. 
143 Ibid., 5. 
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Europol Information System 
 
The Europol Information System (EIS) is mentioned here for the sake of being 
comprehensive. The EIS formed an integral part of the Article K.3. Convention establishing 
Europol, now replaced by Council Decision 2009/371/JHA.144 Its legal basis, scope and 
objective are too indirectly linked to the management of the external border to qualify as a 
measure falling under the Schengen borders acquis. It is however the fourth important central 
database in the AFSJ. It should also be realised that in those cases in which Europol staff has 
been given access to any of the three previously mentioned databases, information from these 
databases could become included in the EIS.145 
 The EIS contains data necessary for the performance of Europol’s tasks to improve 
Member State’s law enforcement authorities in the fight against serious crimes. These crimes 
include illegal immigrant smuggling and trade in human beings.146 In so far as Member 
States’ border guard authorities are endowed with competences in preventing and combating 
criminal offences, they could be allowed to make a query to the EIS. The result of such a 
query will only indicate whether the requested data is available in the EIS. Further 
information may then be obtained via the Europol natio l unit.147  
 
3.3.2  The Use of Biometrics  
 
On various occasions the European Council has stressed the importance of biometrics. In the 
Thessaloniki Conclusions it stated that: “a coherent approach is needed in the EU on 
biometric identifiers or biometric data which would result in harmonised solutions for 
documents for third country nationals, EU citizens’ passports and information systems (VIS 
and SIS II)”.148 The Hague Programme called for a “coherent approach and harmonised 
solutions in the EU on biometric identifiers and data.”149 
                                                
144 Title II, Council Act drawing up the Convention based on Article K.3 of the Treaty on European Union,  
the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol Convention), OJ 1995, C316/1; Article 11, Council 
Decision 2009/371/JHA establishing the European Police Office (Europol), OJ 2009, L121/37. 
145 Article 21, Council Decision 2009/371/JHA, ibid. See also Geyer, F., ‘Taking Stock: Databases and Systems 
of Information Exchange in the Area of Freedom,  Security and Justice’ (Brussels, Challenge Research Paper 9, 
May 2008), 19. 
146 Article 4(1), ibid. 
147 Article 3 read in conjunction with Article 13(6), ibid.   
148 European Council Conclusions, Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003, point 11. 
149 The Hague Programme, supra note 80, point 1.7.2. 
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 Biometric data are considered an important tool in terms of document security 
(allowing for a so-called “one-to-one comparison”). There is moreover an obvious connection 
between the use of biometrics and the enhancement of databases, since biometric data will 
only be of value for the purpose of “one-to-more” comparisons, where they are readily 
available in databases.150 
 As we have observed above, the categories of data th  may be included in European 
wide-databases have either from the outset (EURODAC, VIS), or through subsequent 
legislation (SISII), included the possibility of storing biometric data. In addition, the 
Commission has made various proposals which have included the use of biometrics as a 
means of improving document security.  
  Notwithstanding an explicit exclusion of the possibility to harmonise passports in 
Article 18(3) EU, the Council has on the basis of Article 62(2)(a) adopted Regulation (EC) 
No 2252/2004 on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and travel 
documents issued by Member States.151 The USA’s demand that travellers from countries 
covered by the US visa-waiver carry a biometric pass ort has certainly played an important 
role here.152 
 A proposal to amend both the uniform visa format as well as the uniform format of 
third country national residence permits was made in 2003.153 However, the technical 
infeasibility of the project, essentially including biometric identifiers on a sticker to be 
attached to the visa/residence permit, necessitated th  amendment of the proposal.154 The 
modified proposal, still pending, provides for the issuance of the residence permit as a stand-
alone card including biometrics.155 At the same time, the inclusion of biometric data in the 
                                                
150 Mitsilegas, V., ‘Contrôle des étrangers, des passagers, des citoyens : surveillance et anti-terrorisme’, Cultures 
& Conflits 58 (2005), point 58. 
151 Council Regulation (EC) No 2252/2004, on standards for security features and biometrics in passports and
travel documents issued by Member States, OJ L385/375, amended by Regulation (EC) No 444/2009, OJ 2009, 
142/1. The UK unsuccessfully challenged the exclusion of the UK and Ireland from this regulation, which was 
qualified as a Schengen developing measure, in Case-137/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-11593, see Chapter 
IV. See for a critique on the choice of legal basis: Peers, S., ‘The legality of the Regulation on EU Citizens’ 
passports’ (Statewatch Analysis, 2004).  
152 Section 303, Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173 (H.R. 
3525). See on how the USA influences European security and border policies in more general: Argomaniz, J., 
‘When the EU is the ‘Norm-taker’: The Passenger Name Records Agreement and the EU’s Internalization of US 
Border Security Norms’ 31 European Integration 1 (2009), 119-136. The author identifies three interrelated 
stages: unilateral and forceful norm advocacy by the USA, negotiation and bargaining and, eventually, norm 
mirroring. 
153 COM(2003) 558 final, Commission proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 1683/95 
laying down a uniform format for visas and a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 1030/2002 laying 
down a uniform format for residence permits for thid-country nationals. 
154 See Council Document 14534/04.  
155 COM(2006) 110 final, Modified Commission proposal for a Council Regulation amending Regulation (EC) 
1030/2002 laying down a uniform format for residenc permits for third-country nationals. 
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VIS substitutes their inclusion on the visa itself. The logical consequence of this is that upon 
entering the EU, comparisons between the person presenting the visa and the information in 
the VIS can only be made by comparing the data in the VIS with the fingerprints and facial 
characters of these people, which could seriously di rupt passenger flows.  
 
3.3.3  Databases beyond Control? 
 
It has already been noticed that both the VIS and EURODAC Regulation include provisions 
which render these databases identification tools for the general purpose of migration control. 
At the same time one can observe the granting of access rights to increasingly broad 
categories of “competent authorities.”156 Access to the SIS has been widened to include 
national judicial authorities, as well as Europol and Eurojust. The proposal for the Regulation 
on SISII added asylum authorities and authorities responsible for expulsion to this list.157 The 
final text however, retains the more general definitio  of Article 110 CISA.158  
 Europol and Eurojust remain excluded from access to da a entered in the SISII under 
Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, yet a similar restraint is absent in relation to the VIS. Under 
Article 21 of the VIS Regulation asylum authorities have a right of access. Moreover, 
Decision 2008/633/JHA, the so-called VIS police access decision, grants “designated 
authorities of the Member States” and Europol access to the VIS for the purpose of 
prevention, detection and investigation of terrorist offences and other serious criminal 
offences.159 Here it is interesting to note that the UK and Ireland have been excluded from 
participation in this decision. The Council considers it to be a Schengen developing measure, 
which however seems to fail to appreciate the true nature of the measure in question. The UK 
has brought an annulment proceeding, in which it argues correctly that the decision is a police 
matter covered by Title VI EU. This would mean that the UK and Ireland should be allowed 
to participate. If the measure was considered as developing the Schengen visa acquis, it 
                                                
156 It should be noted that the notion of “competent” or “designated authorities” itself may be interpreted 
extensively and Member States’ practice shows considerable divergences in this respect: Geyer, F., supra note  
145, 7. 
157 Article 18, COM(2005) 236 final, Commission Proposal for a Proposal for a Regulation on the establishment, 
operation and use of the second generation Schengen i formation system (SIS II). 
158 Article 27, Regulation (EC) No 1987/2006, supra note 107. According to Peers this broad definition c uld 
however be interpreted so as to include these authorities: Peers, S., ‘Schengen Information System (SIS) I ’ 
(Statewatch Summary, June 2006), 6. 
159 Decision 2008/633/JHA, concerning access for consultation of the Visa Information System (VIS) by 
designated authorities of Member States and by Europol for the purposes of the prevention, detection and
investigation of terrorist offences and of other serious criminal offences, OJ 2008, L218/129.   
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should have been adopted under Title IV EC, althoug this would gravely disregard the true 
nature of the measure.160 It is interesting to note that Ireland mentions that it has been agreed 
in principle that both the UK and Ireland will eventually have limited access to VIS.161  
 For some time now there has been discussion on the possibility of extending the scope 
of EURODAC “with a view to use its data for law enforcement purposes and as a means to 
contribute to the fight against illegal immigration.”162 The Council has already concluded that 
“the biometric information contained in EURODAC may be under specific circumstances the 
only information available to identify a person suspected of committing or having committed 
an act of terrorism or other serious crime.”163 While the German delegation was said to be 
drafting a proposal for a Council decision, it was the Commission that in July 2009 tabled 
such a proposal.164 This is a text-book example of how a security continuum is created in 
which asylum is being linked to terrorism and crime, which may subsequently be confirmed 
in legislation.   
 As Mitsilegas has correctly pointed out, the interoperability of databases deprives of 
all effect the safeguards based on the principle that access and use and limited for a specific 
purpose.165 This holds true in general terms where the access to, the use of and the categories 
of data that are included are consistently broadene. The European Data Protection 
Supervisor (EDPS) has pointed out in his reaction to the 2005 Communication on the inter-
operability of databases that making access to or exchange of data technically feasible, which 
is highly probable where databases use a common technical platform, this may become a 
“powerful drive for de facto acceding or exchanging these data”.166 This echoes Huysman’s 
argument that security practices may inform policy decisions rather than vice-versa.167  
 A strong push towards a uniform management of these various databases, 
notwithstanding their different purposes, cross-pillar nature and the variable geometry, is 
given in the Commission’s 2009 proposal for the establishment of a regulatory agency for the 
                                                
160 Case C-482/08, UK v. Council (Council Document 16111/08). 
161 Council Document 13403/08. 
162 COM(2007) 299 final, Report from the Commission on the evaluation of the Dublin system,  11. 
163 Council Document 8688/07, Draft Council Conclusion on access to Eurodac by Member State police and 
law enforcement authorities. 
164 Council Document 16982/06; ‘Commission wants to open up Eurodac database to police’ (European Voice, 2 
July 2009). At the time of writing this proposal was not yet publicly available.  
165 Mitsilegas, V., supra note 150, point 62. 
166 EDPS, Comments on the Communication of the Commission on interoperability of European databases 
Brussels, 10 March 2006), 2: 
http://www.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/webdav/site/mySite/shared/Documents/Consultation/Comments/2006/06
-03-10_Interoperability_EN.pdf 
167 Huysmans, J., The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, migration and asylum in the EU (London, Routledge, 2006), 
8-9. 
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operational management of large-scale IT systems in the AFSJ.168 The Agency would create a 
“joint operational management structure” and constitute the “management authority” referred 
to in the founding acts of the databases.169 The option of a regulatory agency was preferred 
over that of management by a Member State, as is currently the case for the SIS, the 
Commission or an existing Agency.170 It forms a clear example of the delegation of 
“technical” tasks which do not entail an autonomous decision making power to an 
independent administrative body outside the Commission.  
 The development of EU databases in the AFJS also shows an opportunist use of the 
competences in the area of migration and border management. While it would have probably 
been much more difficult to establish a centralised database containing biometric data for the 
purpose of justice and police cooperation alone, once these database had been established 
under the Title IV EC, their use could be expanded relatively easily in areas covered by the 
Third Pillar. The securitization of migration has not only facilitated this expansion into Third 
Pillar territory, but in turn is likely to have been reinforced by this development.   
 Without discussing at length here the rules on data protection, it should be stressed 
that the sheer amount of data stored, the nature of these data (personal, biometric), the 
numerous access points and broad access rights, all raise legitimate concerns in terms of data 
protection. An example of where these concerns seem to be justified is the application of 
Article 18 of the EURODAC Regulation. This article allows for so called “special searches” 
carried out by Member States at the request of data subjects to check information on their own 
data. The Commission in its evaluation of the Dublin system reports a “surprisingly high 
number” of searches which it seems to interpret, albeit not explicitly, as a sign that improper 
searches have been carried out.171  
                                                
168 The Council Conclusions on the Commission’s 2008 “Border Package” had called upon the Commission to 
come forward with legislative proposals for the purpose of the long term operational management of SIS II, VIS 
and EURODAC (Council Document 9873/08, point 20). 
169 COM(2009) 292 final, Commission Communication, ‘Legislative package establishing an Agency for the 
operational management of large scale IT systems in the area of freedom, security and justice. This legis ative 
package in fact contains two proposals, one for a Regulation establishing the Agency and covering the First 
Pillar elements of the databases (COM(2009) 293 final) and one for a Council Decision conferring upon that 
Agency the tasks regarding the operational management of SIS II and VIS in application of Title VI of the EU 
Treaty (COM(2009) 294 final). 
170 COM(2009) 293 final, ibid., 7. See also Hobbing, P., ‘An Analysis of the Commission Communication 
(Com(2005) 597 Final of 24.11.2005) on Improved Effectiveness, Enhanced Interoperability and Synergies 
among European Databases in the Area of Justice And Home Affairs’ (EP Briefing Paper, 31 January 2006, 
IP/C/LIBE/FWC/2005-08), 4. He has already argued that such an agency could be responsible for further elated 
databases, considering that the joint management of the SISII, VIS and EURODAC alone may be “too limited to 
achieve a full-size management structure” 
171 COM(2007) 299 final, supra note 162, 10. 
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 Article 8 ECHR on the right to privacy, enshrining a principle common to the 
constitutional traditions of the Member States, would form a broadly formulated guarantee for 
the protection of data under both the First and Third Pillar.172 The separate legal bases for the 
establishment of the databases, as well as the rules on access to them, mean however that they 
are covered by a fragmented data protection regime.173  
 Within the First Pillar data held by the Member States fall under Directive 95/46/EC 
on the protection of individuals with regard to theprocessing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data.174 Those held by the EU institutions are covered by Regulation (EC)  
No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data by 
the Community institutions and bodies and on the fre  movement of such data.175 However, 
the databases’ founding regulations contain many “specifications” to these rules.176 
 Under the Third Pillar, the Convention of the Council of Europe of 28 January 1981 
for the protection of individuals with regard to automatic processing of personal data is made 
applicable.177 The Framework Decision on data protection in police and judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters (DPFD) applies also to processing of data under those parts of the SIS II 
covered by the Third Pillar and by the VIS police access decisions.178 However, the proposal 
for the Framework Decision has already received harsh c iticism for failing to provide for an 
adequate level of protection, due to its limited scope and lowest common denominator 
approach.179 Moreover, the DPFD is to have no application where in previously adopted acts 
specific conditions have been introduced as to the use of such data by the receiving Member 
State.180 
 
                                                
172 Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, para. 32. See on the right to family life as covered by Article 8 ECHR 
inter al. Case C-60/00, Carpenter [2002] ECR-I 6279, para. 41.  
173 Hobbing, supra note 99, 5 and Mitsilegas, V., supra note 150, point 63. 
174 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data, OJ 1995, L281/31. 
175 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the Community institutions and bodies and on the fre  movement of such data, OJ 2001, L8/1. Article 7 
regulates the exchange of personal data between Community institutions or bodies. 
176 See Chapter VI of the SIS II, VIS and EURODAC Regulations.  
177 See for instance Article 57, Council Decision 2007/533/JHA, supra note 107 and Article 8, Council Decision 
2008/633/JHA, supra note 159.  
178 Recital 21, Decision 2007/533/JHA, ibid. and Recital 9, Council Decision 2008/633/JHA, ibid. Framework 
Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data processed in the framework of 
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ 2008, L350/6 (hereinafter: “DPFD”). 
179 See in particular the Third opinion of the EDPS on the proposal, OJ 2007, C139/1, as well as the Declaration 
adopted by the European Data Protection Authorities in Cyprus on 11 May 2007: 
http://europoljsb.consilium.europa.eu/documents/37AECF0B-3D0F-4DAA-95F2-C3890C28F3D3.pdf 
180 Article 28 on the Relationship to previously adopted acts of the Union, DPFD. 
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3.3.4 ICO-Net 
 
A decentralised mechanism for the exchange of information relating to migration 
management was set up by Council Decision 2005/267/EC establishing a secure web-based 
Information and Coordination Network for Member States’ Migration Management 
Services.181 A detailed decision specifying the functioning of the system was adopted by the 
Commission under the advisory comitology procedure.182    
 ICO-Net is essentially a web-based intranet site, managed by the Commission, through 
which strategic, tactical or operational information f r the purpose of migration management 
can be exchanged. It does not contain any personal dat . Access is reserved to migration 
management authorities, which in the Commission’s implementing decision are defined as 
“any governmental, administrative or law enforcement authorities of the Member States 
responsible for execution of management.”183  
 The ICO-Net includes first of all the early warning system on illegal immigration and 
facilitator networks, which was set up by a Council Resolution of 27 May 1999.184 It 
furthermore encompasses a network of immigration liaison officers (ILOs), information on 
the use of visas, borders and travel documents in relation to illegal immigration and return-
related issues.185 In as far as the ICO-Net is used for the exchange of information on false 
documents there is an obvious overlap with the FADO system. A recent Commission 
Proposal would amend the Regulation establishing the ILO network, obliging Member States 
to make information regarding the posting of ILOs and the information obtained by these 
ILOs available on the ICO-Net.186   
 
                                                
181 Council Decision 2005/267/EC, OJ 2005, L83/48.  
182 Commission Decision of 15 December 2005, laying down detailed rules for the implementation of Council 
Decision 2005/267/EC establishing a secure web-based Information and Coordination Network for Member 
States’ Migration Management Services. 
183 Article 2(a), ibid. 
184 This early warning system was originally managed by the so-called Centre for Information, Discussion and 
Exchange on the Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI). This “Centre” was set up in by the JHA 
Council Conclusions of 30 November 1994. It is compsed of experts from the Member States which meet 
monthly with logistical support from the General Secretariat of the Council. The CIREFI forms a good example 
of the “executive role” of the Council. 
185 Immigration liaison officer is defined in accordance with Article 1(1) of Council Regulation (EC) No 
377/2004 on the creation of an immigration liaison officers network, OJ 2004, L64/1: a representative of one of 
the Member States, posted abroad by the immigration service or other competent authorities in order to establish 
and maintain contacts with the authorities of the host country with a view to contributing to the prevention and 
combating of illegal immigration, the return of illegal immigrants and the management of legal migration. 
186 Article 1(1), COM(2009) 322 final, amending Articles 3(1) and 3(3) of Regulation (EC) No 377/2004, ibid. 
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3.3.5 Advanced Passenger Information 
 
Information exchange for the purpose of border management also takes place between private 
parties and Member States’ authorities. Directive 2004/82/EC obliges air carriers to transmit 
so-called Advanced Passenger Information (API) to the border guard authorities of the 
Member States of destination. API includes all data elements which travellers have to present 
at the border control in the destination country, such as identity, nationality, travel documents, 
visa.187 It could be described as a “pre-arrival manifest sent to the border authorities of the 
destination country.”188 In the words of the Commission it serves to “alert the border guard 
authorities on risky passengers.”189 API data cannot be used for the purpose of preventing a 
person from arriving at the border crossing point of he Member State of destination.190 API 
should be distinguished from Personal Name Record (PNR) data which airlines have always 
stored in relation to flight reservations and include a wide range of information such ticketing 
information, payment/billing information (e.g. credit card number), itinerary, etc.  
 The Directive finds its legal basis in Articles 62(2) and Article 63(3) EC. The double 
legal basis has enabled the UK and Ireland to participate in the measure. The Directive was 
proposed by a Member State, Spain, during the transi io al period and adopted right before 
the expiry thereof, thus under unanimity.191 The fact that the Directive had to be adopted 
before the end of the transitional period, since otherwise the proposal would fall, meant that 
not only was there considerable pressure on the Member States to endorse the proposal, it also 
meant that the Parliament was not consulted.192  
 It should be noted that, unlike PNR, API were not previously collected.193 As such 
there is an additional burden for the industry, which in case of non compliance is subject to 
carrier sanctions.194 Although the API under the Directive are only collected in relation to 
flights in-bound for the European Union, they are collected for all passengers, including 
                                                
187 Directive 2004/82/EC, on the obligation of carriers to communicate passenger data, OJ 2004, L261/24. 
188 Hobbing, P., ‘Tracing Terrorists: The EU-Canada Agreement in PNR Matters’ (Brussels, CEPS Special 
Report, September 2008), 9. 
189 COM(2008) 69, Commission Communication, ‘The Next Steps in Border Management in the European 
Union’, 3. Risky should be read here in terms of irregular migration, but inevitably evokes associations with 
crime and terrorism.   
190 Ibid. 
191 This means that the argument made in the previous chapter, namely that Member States have used Title IV 
legislation in order to circumvent the unanimity requirements from the Third Pillar does not hold in this 
particular case.  
192 Mitsilegas, V., supra note 150, point 16. 192 Recital 5 of Directive 2004/82/EC, supra note 187, states that the 
Council had exhausted all possibilities to consult the Parliament. 
193 Hobbing, P., supra note 188, 9. 
194 Article 4, Directive 2004/82/EC, supra note 187. 
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persons who have a Community right to free movement, O e could argue that this systematic 
collection of data on EU citizens is contrary to the free movement provisions of the EU treaty, 
in particular in relation to the information that border guards may require from EU nationals 
upon entry.195 In view of the official purpose of the Directive, namely migration management, 
the collection of API from EU citizens is not necessary.  
 The Directive serves to show that many of the measures adopted under Title IV EC 
have a strong security logic, which extends beyond immigration and border management to 
crime control. Article 6(1) of the Directive provides that after entry of the passenger, 
authorities must delete the data within 24 hours after transmission by the airline, “unless the 
data are needed later for the purposes of exercising the statutory functions of the authorities 
responsible for carrying out checks on persons at external borders.” Moreover, Member States 
may also use the personal data for law enforcement purposes. The latter purpose is 
particularly vague and the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party has advocated that 
Member States apply this derogation restrictively by clearly setting out the specific cases in 
which the data may be used for this purpose.196 The House of Lords openly questioned the 
value of the collection of API as a tool to combat organised crime or threats to national 
security.197 However, since not all Member States have yet impleented the Directive, an 
evaluation of the usefulness of these data cannot be made yet.198 
 The security logic of the Directive is also very much present in the political discourse 
both before and after its adoption. The second recital of the Directive specifically refers to the 
European Council’s declaration on combating terrorism, in which it stressed the need for the 
adoption of the Directive. Giving evidence before th  House of Lords EU Committee, an 
official from the UK Home Office was quoted saying that the proposal “is all about border 
control, whether it is illegal immigration or criminals coming in, or people who are a threat to 
national security”.199 The Commission consistently lists the Directive as one of the measures 
the EU has adopted in the fight against terrorism.200 As Mitsilegas has pointed out the framing 
of the proposal as a security measure also colours the assessment of the proportionality of the 
                                                
195 See by analogy Case 157/79, Pieck [1980] ECR 2171, para 10 and Case C-68/89, Commission v. Netherlands 
[1991] ECR I-2637, para. 13. See chapter V.  
196 This Working Party was set up on the basis of Article 29 of Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 174. See Opinion 
9/2006 on the Implementation of Directive 2004/82/EC of the Council on the obligation of carriers to 
communicate advance passenger data (27 September 2006).
197 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘Fighting illegal immigration: should carriers carry the burden?’ 
(HL Paper 29, Session 2003-04, 5th Report, 12 February 2004), 7. 
198 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘The Passenger Name Record (PNR) Framework Decision’ (HL 
Paper 106, Session 2007-08, 15th Report, 11 June 2008), 13. 
199 Ibid.  
200 Commission, ‘Commission Activities in the Fight against Terrorism’ (12 March 2007, MEMO/07/98). 
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proposal which should be made by reference to its purpose of immigration and border 
management rather than terrorism and crime control.201  
   
Directive 2004/82/EC and the collecting of API is a eparate issue from the collection of PNR 
data. PNRs contain more data elements and are available n advance of API data. They are 
considered an important tool for risk assessments, to obtain intelligence and to profile 
people.202 PNR data are being exchanged with the USA, Canada an  Australia on the basis of 
agreements concluded by the EU.203 All three agreements have however also included th 
exchange of API. 
 As the Commission stated, the transmission of PNR data takes place for the purpose of 
preventing terrorism and organised crime, not for the sake of border checks. Nevertheless, the 
agreements with the US and Canada were initially adopted under the First Pillar, on the basis 
of Article 95 conferring upon the institutions the power to adopt legislation for the 
harmonisation of the internal market. This was essentially done because the Commission 
considered that Directive 95/46/EC, which has as its legal basis in Article 95 EC, was 
applicable to the Agreement.204 In an action for annulment brought by the Parliament, the 
Court held however that its subject matter covered “public security and the activities of the 
State in areas of criminal law”, which were outside th  material scope of the Data Protection 
Directive.205 It did not engage in an analysis of whether Article 95 could have served as a 
legal basis independently from the Directive and the Courts assumption that the agreement 
would have to be terminated, seems to imply that the scope of the agreement was outside the 
                                                
201 Mitsilegas, V., supra note 150, point 10. 
202 The House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, which was very critical of the API Directive, in relation to 
PNR data reluctantly stated that “having received no evidence to the contrary” it was prepared to believ  in their 
usefulness as a means of fighting terrorism and serious crime: House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘The 
EU/US Passenger Name Record (PNR) Agreement’ (HL Paper 108, Session 2006-07, 21st Report, 5 June 2007), 
12. In a second report however it concluded on the basis of additional, not published data, that “PNR data, when 
used in conjunction with data from other sources, can significantly assist in the identification of terrorists, 
whether before a planned attack or after such an att ck”: House of Lords, supra note 198, 19. 
203 Agreement between the EU and the USA on the processing and transfer of PNR data by air carriers to the 
United States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) (2007 PNR Agreement), OJ 2007, L204/18; Agreement 
between the EC and the Government of Canada on the processing of API and PNR data, OJ 2006, L 82/15; 
Agreement between the EU and Australia on the processing and transfer of EU sourced PNR data by air carriers 
to the Australian customs service, OJ 2008, L 213/49. 
204 Directive 95/46/EC, supra note 174, in particular Chapter IV on the transfer of personal data to third 
countries. 
205 Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04, European Parliament v Council and Commission (“PNR”) [2006] ECR 
I-4721, para. 56. See Article 3(2), Directive 95/46/EC, ibid. 
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First Pillar altogether. Indeed, later agreements have been adopted under the Third Pillar 
instead.206  
 The PNR scheme is now likely to be duplicated at EU level in an EU PNR Framework 
Decision. The original proposal covered only EU inbound air transport and PNR was only to 
be collected for the purpose of fighting terrorism and organised crime.207 In the Council 
however there have been discussions on extending the purpose of the PNR exchange also to 
serious crime, which could then include also the facilit tion of unauthorised entry and 
residence.208 Moreover, some Member States have been in favour of using PNR for the 
broader purpose of customs and immigration management.209 The Commission however 
signalled that in view of Article 47 EU it would be difficult to include such provisions in 
Third Pillar legislation, as these are clearly covered by the First Pillar.210 
 
3.4 Measures Penalising Illegal Entry, Smuggling and Trafficking 
 
In the area of migration and border management, the European legislator has been much 
aware of the distinction between the First and Third Pillar, mindful also of the Court’s 
affirmation that “in principle criminal legislation and the rules of criminal procedure are 
matters for which the Member States are responsible.”211 As we will see however, this may 
change now that the Community has successfully claimed a (limited) competence in matters 
of criminal law, ancillary to its powers under the First Pillar.  
 Whilst the activities caught under the heading of human trafficking have for a long 
time constituted serious offences under the criminal law of the Member States, the dominant 
perspective on irregular entry and stay, as well as on human smuggling, has only more 
recently become that of criminal law.212  
 
                                                
206 Cremona, M., ‘EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective’ (Florence, EUI Law Working 
Paper 24, 2008), 17. See also: Gilmore, G. and Rijpma, J.J., ‘Annotation Joined Cases C-317/04 and C-318/04’, 
44 CMLRev 4 (2007), 1081-1099.  
207 COM(2007) 654 final, Commission Proposal for a Council Framework Decision on the use of Passenger 
Name Record (PNR) for law enforcement purpose. 
208 House of Lords, supra note 198, 37-38. 
209Ibid. 
210 Ibid. 
211 Case 203/80 Casati [1981] ECR 2595, para. 27, and Case C-226/97 Lemmens [1998] ECR I-3711, para. 19 
212 Van Liempt, I., ‘Inside Perspectives on the Process of Human smuggling’ (IMISCOE Policy Brief 3, August 
2007).  
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Illegal entry 
 
Article 3(2) of the CISA obliged Contracting Parties to introduce penalties for the 
unauthorised crossing of external borders at places other than crossing points or at times other 
than the fixed opening hours. Although this article did not require sanctions under criminal 
law, under the jurisprudence of the European Court f Human Right (ECtHR), not the 
classification, but the general character of the rul  and purpose of the penalty, being both 
deterrent and punitive, determine the criminal nature of the offence.213 The SBC, which 
replaces Article 3(2) CISA in Article 4(3), adds the often repeated formula that penalties shall 
be “effective, proportionate and dissuasive”. This does not exclude criminal sanctions, 
bearing in mind that “infringements of Community law re penalized under conditions, both 
procedural and substantive, which are analogous to those applicable to infringements of 
national law of a similar nature and importance.”214 
 
Smuggling 
 
Article 27 CISA obliged Member States to “impose appropriate penalties on any person who, 
for financial gain, assists or tries to assist an alien to enter or reside within the territory of one 
of the Contracting Parties in breach of that Contracting Party’s laws on the entry and 
residence of aliens.” Although both Article 3 and Article 27 were assigned a legal basis under 
the First Pillar (Article 62(2) and Article 63(3) EC respectively), the Council Decision did 
explicitly add “whilst recognising that the determination of the nature, modalities and severity 
of the penalty provisions required under this article is a matter for the Member States”.215 
Reflecting this caveat, the Council in 2002 adopted a directive defining the facilitation of 
unauthorised entry, transit and residence on the basis of Articles 61(a) and Article 63(3)(b) 
                                                
213 Engel and others v. The Netherlands (Appl. No. 5100/71), ECtHR, 8 June 1976, para. 81-82 and Ozturk v. 
Germany (Appl. No. 8544/79), ECtHR, 21 February 1984, para. 50-53. Even so, in a number of EU Member 
States, including Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy and the UK, irregular entry and stay are 
classified as criminal offences. Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights has recently spoken out 
against the criminalisation of migration: Thomas Hammarberg, ‘It is wrong to criminalize migration’ 
(Viewpoints, 29 September 2008) 
214 Case 68/88, Commission v Greece (“Greek Maize”) [1989] ECR 2965, para 24. 
215 Council Decision 1999/436/EC, supra note 45. 
 216 
EC and a Framework Decision on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and resid nce under the Third Pillar .216 
 There is a clear link between the Directive and the Framework Decision. The 
Framework Decision in Article 1(1) refers back to the offences as defined in the Directive. 
Under Article 1(1) of the Directive each Member State must adopt “appropriate sanctions” on 
any person who intentionally assists a person who is not a national of a Member State to 
enter, or transit, the territory of a Member State in breach of the laws of the State concerned 
on the entry or transit of aliens. There is no requirement of financial gain. Article 1 of the 
Framework Decision prescribes the imposition of criminal sanctions and harmonises 
maximum penalties.  
 Article 1(2) of the Directive states that the Member States may decide not to impose 
sanctions where the aim of helping someone to enter th  Member State was to provide 
humanitarian assistance. This is however not an obligation and the Directive lacks any 
reference to the protection afforded to refugees and sylum seekers in accordance with 
international law and human rights instruments. TheFramework Decision does contain such 
reference in Article 6. It should be recalled that although international refugee law does not 
grant a right to asylum, it does grant a right to ask for asylum and the principle of non-
refoulement applies also to rejection at the border.217  
  
Human Trafficking 
 
A 2002 Framework Decision on combating the trafficking in human beings for the purposes 
of labour exploitation or sexual exploitation address s the related issue of trade in human 
beings.218 Peers rightly notes that, although there is no cross-border element required for the 
offence, in practice this is often the case, which is why it is mentioned here.219  
 The main difference between smuggling and trafficking is the consent of the person 
being smuggled and the coercion of the person being trafficked. In Dauvergne’s words: 
                                                
216 Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitat on of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ 2002, 
L 328/17 and Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the str ngthening of the penal framework to prevent the 
facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and resid nce, OJ 2002, L328/1.  
217 See also Chapters II and VI. 
218 Framework Decision 2002/629 on Combating Trafficking in Human Beings for the Purposes of Labour 
Exploitation or Sexual Exploitation, OJ 2002, L203/1. 
219 Peers, S., supra note 132, 270. 
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“drawing the line between trafficking and smuggling is about assigning guilt.”220 A person 
being smuggled has knowingly and willingly infringed migration laws.  
 The dividing line between smuggling and trafficking is however less strict than may 
appear from the law. Often a situation of trafficking flows from the smuggling of migrants. 
Framework Decision 2002/629 imposes the same maximum penalties as Framework Decision 
2002/946/JHA, which in view of the relative gravity of the offence is remarkable.221 It is 
however clear that the emphasis of both measures is on law enforcement, rather than on what 
one would wish to be the case for the Framework Decision on Trafficking, the protection of 
the victims.222 
 
The Palermo Protocols 
 
Under public international law the Protocol on the smuggling of persons and the Protocol on 
the trafficking of persons, the so-called Palermo Pr tocols attached to the UN convention on 
organised crime, aim to reinforce the fight against these activities under an instrument of 
public international law.223 Articles 6 of the Smuggling Protocol and Article 5 of the 
Trafficking Protocols oblige contracting parties tocriminalise human smuggling and 
trafficking. Article 5 of the Smuggling Protocol does state that the persons smuggled should 
not themselves become liable to criminal prosecution. However, both Protocols are essentially 
security measures, which in the case of the Trafficking Protocol may be concealed to some 
extent by the (limited) concern for the protection of the victims of trafficking.224 
 Of particular importance for the purpose of the management of the external borders 
are the provisions of Chapter Three of both Protocols, titled “Prevention, Cooperation and 
other measures.” Article 11 deals with border measures specifically, calling for a 
strengthening of border controls as necessary to prevent trafficking and smuggling. In 
accordance with Article 11(6) Contracting Parties must consider the strengthening of the 
cooperation between border control agencies. Of importance is further Chapter Two of the 
Smuggling Protocol which deals with the smuggling of migrants at sea, calling upon 
                                                
220 Dauvergne, C., Making People Illegal: What Globalization means forMigration and Law (Cambridge, CUP, 
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222 Obokata, T., ‘EU Action against Trafficking of Human Beings: Past, Present and the Future’, in: Guild, E. 
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223 The Smuggling Protocol entered into force on 28 January 2004, the Trafficking Protocol on 25 December 
2003.  
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Contracting Parties to “cooperate to the fullest extent possible to prevent and suppress the 
smuggling of migrants by sea”.225  
 
Since the Protocols cover subjects that are in partCommunity competence and in part 
Member State competence, both the Community and the Member States have become 
parties.226 The Commission initially proposed a decision for the conclusion of the protocols 
on the basis of the implied powers under Articles 62(2) and 63(3) EC.227 In the mean time 
however a number of legislative measures were adopte  in ernally, covering various elements 
of the Protocols. Most important were the AENEAS Programme, based on Articles 179 and 
181a EC (development cooperation and cooperation with th rd countries) and the Regulation 
establishing the External Borders Agency Frontex, based on Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC.228 
The Commission therefore decided to add Articles 179, 81a EC and 66 EC to the legal basis 
of the proposal.229  
 Eventually, the Council decided to adopt two separate decisions for each of the  
Protocols: one dealing with the aspects falling under the Community’s development policy, 
fully applying to the UK, Ireland and Denmark and one on the basis of its competences in 
Title IV EC, applying to the UK, Ireland and Denmark only in as far as they have opted in to 
legislation internally.230 For all other parts the UK and Ireland, as well as Denmark, are bound 
on the basis of their  signature and ratification under public international law. All SAC are 
parties to the Palermo Protocols under public international law. 
  
What should be emphasised here is that, notwithstanding the fact that the Protocols 
criminalise certain behaviour, they have been concluded by the Community on the basis of 
Title IV EC only. On the one hand, one could argue that these provisions fell within Member 
State competence. On the other hand, the existence of EU legislation criminalising trafficking 
                                                
225 We will return to these provisions in Chapter X. 
226 The Protocols are therefore “mixed agreements”. 
227 COM(2003) 512 final. See for a full overview of internal legislation and the question of legal basis Council 
Document 7603/05. 
228 Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), OJ 2004, L80/1 and the Frontex Regulation, supra 
note 90. 
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and smuggling would have justified signature by theEU, in addition to signature by the 
EC.231 In this respect it is interesting to note that thediscussion on the declaration on 
Community competence to be attached to the Protocols was conducted in the CATS, rather 
than SCIFA, confirming once more the security objectiv  of these protocols.  
 In the Environmental Penalties case the ECJ held the Community legislator is not 
precluded from prescribing criminal sanctions when it considers this to be necessary in order 
to ensure the respect for and efficacy of the Community rules in an area of EC competence.232 
Rather, Article 47 EU precludes the possibility of adopting such measures under the Third 
Pillar where the aim and content of the measure are cov red by a First Pillar legal basis.233 
 This issue was however not at all raised by the Member States, while at the time of the 
adoption of the Decisions, they had far from accepted the consequences drawn by the 
Commission from the Court’s ruling in Environmental Penalties. In the Ship Source Pollution 
case, dating from after the adoption of the Decision  n the Palermo Protocols, as many as 19 
Member States intervened arguing against the imposition of criminal sanctions by the 
Community.234 It could of course be argued that the imposition of criminal sanctions in the 
particular case of the Palermo Protocols did not mat er much to the Member States since they 
were already obliged to impose criminal sanctions o the basis of the Framework Decisions. 
Yet, the fact that the fight against migrant smuggling is seen as being of major importance in 
the fight against irregular migration and that particular attention was paid to the smuggling of 
migrants by sea, may have played a bigger role.  
 The Court in Ship Source Pollution confirmed its earlier ruling in Environmental 
Penalties, even if it did find that “the determination of the type and level of the criminal 
penalties to be applied does not fall within the Community’s sphere of competence.”235 The 
conclusion therefore is that under the law as it stands, the provisions of Title IV EC on 
irregular migration and border management may include the criminalisation of certain 
activities.236 The Palermo Protocols were correctly adopted under th  First Pillar and in 
                                                
231 As was the case, for instance, when the Schengen Association Agreement was signed with Switzerland: 
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retrospect the prescription of criminal sanctions in Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA could, 
or rather should, have been included in Directive 2002/90/EC. An unintended result of the 
Court’s case law is therefore that in the area of migration management it allows for a 
reinforcement of the security continuum, linking migration and crime in a single instrument.  
  
3.5 Institutional Measures for the Coordination of Operational Cooperation 
 
Article 16 of the SBC provides that “Member States shall assist each other and shall maintain 
close and constant cooperation with a view to the eff ctive implementation of border 
control.”237 Operational cooperation has been one of the cornerstones of the EU’s policy for 
the management of the external borders. Many of the legislative measures discussed so far, 
either enable or facilitate operational cooperation between border guard authorities, through 
financial support or information exchange.  
 The 2002 Commission Communication put much emphasis on the concept of 
operational burden sharing, pooling not only financi l but also human and technical resources 
and proposing the establishment of a European Corps f Border Guards.238 The Council’s 
Action Plan on the External Borders was more careful. Reluctantly it concluded that 
“institutional steps could be considered”, which “could include a possible decision on the 
setting up of a European Corps of Border Guards.”239 Rather it advocated the establishment of 
a “polycentric” network structure consisting of ad-hoc centres specialising in different areas 
of border management.240 It called for joint operations of national border guard agencies at the 
external borders and the creation of national contact points. It further followed the 
Commission’s suggestion to set up a Common Unit of External Border practitioners falling 
under the Council’s Strategic Committee on Immigration, Frontiers and Asylum (SCIFA).  
 The Common Unit (or SCIFA+) consisted of the members of SCIFA and the heads of 
Member States’ border control services. Its task was to oversee the development of a common 
policy on the external borders and act as a coordinator for the network structure and the joint 
operations proposed in the Action Plan. It was explicitly mentioned that SCIFA+ did not 
                                                
237 See also Article 7, CISA and Point 4, Common Manual, OJ 2002, C313/13. 
238 COM(2002) 233, supra note 49. 
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encroach upon the Commission’s powers in this field, stating that it would not involve 
legislative proposals nor implementing measures in the meaning of Article 202 EC.”241 
 Between July 2002 and March 2003, SCIFA+ approved a total number of 17 different 
programmes, ad-hoc centres, pilot projects and joint perations.242 The Council always 
maintained that these constituted intergovernmental cooperation arrangements between 
Member States. The presidency’s report on the impleentation of the joint activities 
expressly referred to a lack of legal basis for the setting up of ad-hoc centres and the carrying 
out of common operations.243 It further listed a number of concerns in relation to the 
operational cooperation which ranged from a lack of suitable planning, preparation and 
central operational coordination to adequate evaluation.244  
 The Commission in the run up to the Thessaloniki European Council noted that the 
limitations of SCIFA+ as a working party had been demonstrated.245 These limitations related 
to its large membership and wide agenda, but presumably also to a lack of a common 
approach.246 The Commission proposed that while “certain more st ategic co-ordination tasks 
could remain with SCIFA+, the more operational tasks could be entrusted to a new permanent 
Community Structure”.247 Consequently, SCIFA+ was substituted by the Practitioners’ 
Common Unit (PUC), consisting of only the heads of Member States’ border guard services. 
It would deal exclusively with operational issues, while SCIFA would remain responsible for 
the general strategy to set up an integrated border management system.248  
 The Thessaloniki European Council emphasized the importance of determining a more 
structured framework and the necessity for creating new institutional frameworks in order to 
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enhance operational cooperation for the management of he external borders.249 The 
Commission seized the opportunity and proposed the creation of a “European Border 
Agency” in November 2003.250 Twelve months later, the Council adopted Regulation (EC) 
No 2004/2007 establishing Frontex on the basis of Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC.251 The 
Agency has been operational since October 2005 from its headquarters in Warsaw, Poland.252 
 The Frontex Regulation constitutes a development of that part of the Schengen acquis 
in which the UK and Ireland do not participate and consequently they have been excluded 
from participation in the Agency.253 In relation to the SAC it constitutes a development of the 
rules on the crossing of the external borders as covered by Article 1(a) of Council Decision 
1999/437/EC.254 The participation of the SAC is foreseen in Article 21(3) of the Frontex 
Regulation.  
 The content of the Frontex Regulation, and the RABIT Regulation amending it, will 
be examined in detail in the next chapter. What is important for the purpose of this chapter is 
to point out that the Frontex Regulation for the first time provided the operational cooperation 
for the management of the external borders with a basis in secondary Community legislation. 
Although the management of the external borders hadalready become a Community 
competence with the Treaty of Amsterdam, it was only with the advent of Frontex that 
implementation of this policy lost most of its intergovernmental character. In particular, the 
Commission has increased its importance in this policy area, due to its influence within the 
agency.255 It should however be noted that the emphasis is onassistance to the Member States 
rather than the Commission or the Council, which bears witness to the enduring 
intergovernmental character of this cooperation. 
 While the Commission more generally seems to be taking over SCIFA’s role of 
mapping out a general strategy for the integrated management of the external borders, the 
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Council continues to be responsible for the evaluation of the implementation of the Schengen 
acquis.256 In respect of the competences falling under Title IV EC, including the management 
of the external borders, this can be considered a remnant of the intergovernmental origins of 
the Schengen cooperation. Logically, the Commission as guardian of the Treaties, would be 
the Institution that should monitor compliance, rather than the Council. The Commission has 
already suggested that Frontex could “provide added value to these [Schengen] evaluations 
through its independent status, its expertise on external border control and surveillance and its 
activities on training and risk analysis.”257 
 
4. Operational Cooperation  
 
This section will focus on the nature of operational cooperation in the AFSJ. It will examine 
why operational cooperation has been so important for the development of the AFSJ and why 
this is likely to continue to be the case in the field of external borders management. It will 
also point out why operational coordination as a substitute for legislative action may be 
problematic in terms of legitimacy and accountability. 
 A “common corpus of legislation” was only one of a number of elements which the 
Commission identified in its 2002 Communication as central to a policy for the management 
of external borders. The other components were of a much more practical nature and included 
the establishment of common co-ordination and operation l co-operation mechanisms, 
common integrated risk analysis and the training of sta f in a European dimension.258 Indeed 
the Council’s Action Plan for the Management of the External Borders and the 
implementation thereof, were characterized by the “absolute prominence of the operational 
dimension.”259  
 In the previous chapter it was suggested that the Commission’s considering that the 
lifting of checks at the internal borders could be established on the basis of a limited 
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programme of flanking measures, forms part of the explanation for the focus that is had on the 
external borders. The Commission’s 1988 Communication also tells us something about the 
nature of these flanking measures. The Commission, in relation to the question of the level at 
which action should be taken, stated that it was:  
 
 “fully aware of the delicate nature and exercise of this kind, and it considers thatattention 
should be focused on practical effectiveness rather than on matters of legal doctrine. Therefore 
(…) the Commission proposes that Community legislation in this field be applied only to 
those cases where the legal security and uniformity provided by Community law constitutes 
the best instrument to achieve the desired goal.”260 
 
This means that all other action was to be left to in ergovernmental cooperation. Of course the 
approach advocated here can be explained by the lack of ompetence at the time to proceed 
with Community legislation. At the same time, however, it underlines the importance of 
Member States’ sovereignty concerns and the emphasis on “practical effectiveness” in 
response thereto. The Communication continues to state that there would be a “large scope 
left to cooperation among Member States.” That this cooperation took place more on the basis 
of ad hoc informal contacts between administrations, rather an within an international treaty 
framework is evidenced by the host of informal, secretive bodies that developed in the field of 
JHA from the mid-1980s.261   
 The Schengen cooperation formed an exception to the extent that it was based on a 
legal framework, albeit an intergovernmental one. However, as Guiraudon has pointed out 
this framework was never meant to create a “constrai ing set of rules with monitoring 
mechanisms”, but much rather to escape such legal control and constraints at the national 
level.262 In respect of the communitarised parts of the AFSJ, this was remedied by the Treaty 
of Amsterdam, and to a lesser extent in respect of the parts that were brought under Title VI 
EU. Nevertheless, Walker has rightly noted that Memb r States’ sovereignty concerns are 
likely to be triggered more by “familiar and more symbolically loaded legislation centred 
indices of national authority”, than by other forms of policy cooperation.263 The history of the 
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development of Frontex, and the continuing resistance of some Member States to a more 
centralised model of border agency, shows that this remains the case under Title IV EC.264 
 
Fostering European integration in the AFSJ by focusing on the “merely technical” 
cooperation between Member States’ competent authorities fails to acknowledge the highly 
political and value-laden nature of the competences that are grouped in this policy field. Or 
more correctly, it acknowledges this highly political nature by masking it as non-political. Of 
course, as Schmitt has argued, “any decision about whe her something is unpolitical is always 
a political decision”.265 However, the coordination of operational cooperation in the AFSJ 
should not be allowed to substitute policy and lawmaking processes as defined in the EU 
Treaties and according to which the future direction of the European project in a given area 
normally would be determined.  
 It would be moreover be incorrect to consider the coordination of operational 
cooperation itself as a value-neutral or merely “technical” exercise. Steinberger has rightly 
argued that it is “all too easy to eliminate discourse by reference to the “expert-character” of 
the problems involved.”266 The Council itself has noted that intelligence-led law enforcement 
includes the setting of political priorities.267 The question of the extent to which this should be 
the task of unaccountable working groups or non-majorit rian bodies is an important one. 
Since operational coordination does not entail the taking of legally binding acts, it escapes not 
only democratic, but also judicial scrutiny. The more general concern that regulatory agencies 
“might stray into areas more properly the domain of the policy-making branches of the EU” is 
equally, if not more valid, in relation to those agencies that have the task of coordinating 
operational activity.268     
 Lastly, Member States may fail to appreciate the extent to which operational 
cooperation may “penetrate national systems and challenge statist prerogatives.”269 This may 
relate to both the organisation of Member States’ law enforcement agencies, as well as the 
way in which they operate. In the field of the management of the external borders clear 
examples of both can be found in the Commission Communication on the setting up of a 
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European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR). First, it “invites” Member States to set 
up “one-single co-ordination centre”.270 Second, it refers to the establishment of a group f 
experts that should elaborate guidelines for the tasks of and the cooperation between these 
national coordination centres.271  
 The Court has never explicitly recognised a principle of institutional autonomy as 
such, but it has held in relation to the Member States’ implementing powers that in the 
absence of Community legislation it is up to each state’s constitutional system how these 
powers are exercised and to which specific national bodies they are entrusted.272 One may 
wonder if Community legislation could fully pre-empt Member States’ powers. Article 4(2) 
TEU states that the Union shall respect Member States’ national identities, inherent in their 
fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-
government. and safeguarding national security. This seems to suggest that the institutional 
autonomy of the Member States constitutes a more fundamental value.273 An example of how this 
may translate in legislation can be found in the EBF. The Decision allows Member States to 
designate several certifying and audit authorities or delegated authorities for the 
implementation of the money provided by the fund, on the condition there is “a clear 
allocation of functions for each of these authorities.”274 While it seems nevertheless obvious 
that legislation can at least limit Member States’ institutional autonomy, the question is to what 
extent operational cooperation should be allowed to do the same.275 
 One of the characteristics of the different forms of operational coordination that have 
emerged under the AFSJ is that these originate in practical cooperation arrangements between 
the law enforcement agencies of a number of individual Member States. Monar has argued 
that these “common, rather informal structures, play an important role as points of encounter 
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and information exchange between officials from different Member States, especially after 
enlargement.”276 
 It would seem logical to assume that legislation on operational cooperation forms the 
codification of bottom-up developments. Very often however, on-the-ground cooperation 
originates in and is coordinated by Council working groups, which consist of senior law 
enforcement staff of the Member States.277 Curtin has in this respect highlighted the evolving 
autonomous executive role of the Council and other non-majoritarian bodies alongside the 
Commission.278 At the same time, in the area of the management of the external borders, there 
is an increasingly important role for the Commission as policy initiator and for Frontex as 
coordinator of operational activities. JHA agencies have recently emphasised the importance 
of being heard in the legislative process.279 This would ensure that where amendments are 
made to their structure or tasks, account is taken of their specific needs and experience. 
Although agencies are of course important stakeholders in the legislative process, care should 
be had that they are not allowed to dictate it, thereby setting their own rules and potentially 
pursuing their own interest rather than the general interest. 
 
Operational cooperation is generally given a legal basis once a certain level of trust has been 
achieved and there is the need to remedy the shortcomings of a more intergovernmental 
approach, linked to concerns of transparency and accountability, but also compliance and 
coordination. Frontex forms a case in point in this re pect. The Council in its more recent 
Draft Conclusions on the principle of convergence and the architecture for internal security, 
seems to show for the first time a greater sensitivity to the need for a legislative dimension to 
operational cooperation in JHA. It not only calls for closer cooperation between personnel and 
the harmonization of equipment and practice, but also for the harmonization of legal 
frameworks, including the establishment of common legislative instruments “where these 
represent added value for the Member States.”280 In the case of EUROSUR however, future 
legislation is likely to confirm rather than shape its development, considering the important 
steps have already been taken under the heading of operational coordination. This is to be 
                                                
276 Monar, J., ‘Justice and Home Affairs after the 2004 Enlargement’, 38 International Spectator 1 (2003), 16. 
277 See Aden, H., ‘Administrative Governance in the field of EU Police and Judicial Cooperation,’ in: Hofmann, 
H. and Türk, A. (Eds), EU Administrative Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2006), 351. This is trueas 
much for the Third Pillar, as it is for the field of external borders management under the First. 
278 Curtin, D., ‘European Union Executive Actors Evolving in the Shade?’, in: De Zwaan, J., et al. (Eds), The 
European Union: an ongoing Process of Integration, Liber Amicorum A. Kellerman (The Hague, T.M.C. Asser 
Press, 2004), 99-101. 
279 Council Document 11644/08, 2. 
280 Council Document 13459/08, 3-4. 
 228 
regretted, since projects of such importance, and financially so, deserve a proper legislative 
iter guaranteeing accountability and legitimacy. 
 
It should be recalled that even where legislation is adopted for the purpose of regulating 
operational cooperation, this does not detract from the intrinsically operational nature of law 
enforcement tasks themselves. The law can only provide the legal basis for enforcement 
powers and a framework for their exercise, providing for appropriate checks and balances. 
The use of these powers however will always take place in unique situations. For this reason 
alone the operational dimension of the AFSJ will remain a prominent feature under Title IV 
EC, in any case where the management of the external borders is concerned. 
 Operational cooperation in the AFSJ has the specific haracteristic that it focuses on 
compliance with national rules and regulations, rather than Community legislation. This is in 
particular so under the Third Pillar. However, even when operational cooperation is aimed at 
ensuring compliance with Community legislation, such as the SBC, it does not of itself create 
rights and obligations for third parties. An example here is a joint patrol carrying out border 
surveillance in the context of a Frontex joint operation, attempting to prevent irregular border 
crossings.   
 It should be stressed that in the AFSJ neither the Commission staff, nor the staff of any 
of the agencies, be it under the First or Third Pillar, is endowed with autonomous law 
enforcement powers, let alone powers of coercion. In reality, operational activity at the EU 
level is therefore limited to the coordination of operational activities of national law 
enforcement agencies by EU bodies and institutions. Article 66 EC clearly refers to the 
cooperation in the areas covered by Title IV EC as between the relevant departments of the 
administrations of the Member States. Likewise, Article 30(1)(a) EU provides that police 
cooperation shall include operational cooperation between competent authorities. The 
coordination at EU level also does not replace bi- or multi-lateral initiatives between Member 
States themselves. This is underlined in the Frontex R gulation in Article 2(2), as well as in 
Article 16(3) of the SBC. The Lisbon Treaty would include a provision to this effect in 
Article 73 TFEU. 
 In line with Article 230 EC, the Court can only revi w the legality of measures 
intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties.281 In relation to acts brought by 
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individuals it has long held that “only measures, the legal effects of which are binding on, and 
capable of affecting the interests of, the applicant by bringing about a distinct change in his 
legal position may be the subject of an application f r annulment.”282 The fact that the 
coordination of operational activities does not entail the taking of such measures means that 
these activities escape review by the EJC.283 The extension of the Court’s jurisdiction in the 
Lisbon Treaty to review the acts of bodies, offices and agencies of the Union would not 
change this.284 The Court has however held in a case relating to the adoption of non-binding 
guidelines by the Commission, that the fact that a measure is non-binding is not sufficient to 
confer on an Institution the competence to adopt it and that account must still be had of the 
division of powers and institutional balances as laid down in the Treaties.285 
 Moreover, the non-binding nature of operational activities vis-à-vis third parties does 
not mean that in the course of such activities rights and obligations cannot arise. For instance, 
if during a joint patrol a police officer arrests a suspected criminal or a border guard denies a 
third country national access to EU territory this of course has effects in law. In the first case 
however, the decision is taken on the basis of natio l law. In the second case, it is taken on 
the basis of the SBC, but by law enforcement personnel endowed with public authority on the 
basis of national law.286 Here it should however be noted that border guards from one 
Member State that participate in joint operations/the deployment of a Rapid Border 
Intervention Team in another Member State may use force in accordance with the rules and 
regulations of the guest Member State.287 
 Importantly, operational activity could constitute a tort or criminal offence under 
Member States’ domestic law. Here one could think of the (accidental) sinking of migrant 
boats or the shooting of irregular border crossers. This possibility is recognised in the RABIT 
Regulation which for the purpose of civil and criminal liability equates visiting border guards 
with national border guards.288 A wrongful act that would be directly imputable tohe 
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coordinating activities of the EU could result in non-contractual liability of the EU on the 
basis of Article 288(2) EC. This non-contractual libility extends beyond the institutions to 
other Community bodies established by the treaties. Community legislation often specifically 
provides for non-contractual liability in similar terms as those of Article 288(2) EC, for 
instance in the founding regulations of many EC agencies.289  
 Under the International Principles of State Liability the Member States could be held 
responsible for fatalities that are a direct result of specific border control measures.290 A 
parallel responsibility of the EU, under the Principles of the Responsibility of International 
Organisations, could be assumed where these measures are a direct result of the EU’s 
coordinating activities.291 Member States could furthermore be held responsible for violations 
of human rights in the course of operational activity under the European Convention on 
Human Rights. 
 The approach taken above with regard to the possible responsibility of the EU for its 
coordinating activity is of course highly theoretical. For instance, in the case of wrongdoings 
by Member States’ border guards in the course of Frntex coordinated operational activity, it 
would be very difficult to actually attribute responsibility to the EU. Yet, it may be argued 
that whenever the EU acts as coordinator of operation l activity, it has a positive obligation to 
ensure that all participating Member States fully respect fundamental rights, such as the right 
to life. This is all the more so, bearing in mind that respect for these rights is one of the 
Union’s foundational values listed in Article 6 EU, one of the Copenhagen criteria for 
accession and a condition in its external relation with third countries.292  Without jurisdiction 
of the ECJ the affirmation in recital 22 of the Frontex Regulation that it respects fundamental 
rights become empty words.  
 One could argue that the ECJ should have the right to review Member States 
operational activity during joint operations for compatibility with fundamental rights. Of 
course the limitation of jurisdiction in Article 68(2) EC and Article 35(5) EU could be used as 
an argument against the Court exercising jurisdiction over the operations of Member States’ 
border guards, leaving this review to the national courts of the Member States, with a 
possibility of appeal to the ECtHR.  
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 However, if one applies by analogy the Court’s established case law in relation to 
Member States’ national rules to Member States’ operational activities, these would have to 
be compatible with fundamental rights as an obligation of Community law as soon as they fall 
within the scope of Community law, which for the management of the external borders would 
be obvious.293 On a more cautious approach one could argue that the Court should assume 
jurisdiction when there are indications of “serious and persistent violations, which highlight a 
problem of a systematic nature in the protection of fundamental rights in the Member States,” 
since this could effectively undermine not only theCommunity rules on the crossing of the 
external borders, but also free movement rights more generally.294  
 
5. The Exercise of Implementing Powers  
 
The above discussion of operational cooperation for the management of the external borders 
shows that the coordination thereof is gradually losing its intergovernmental traits. In this 
section we will see to what extent the same can be said for the exercise of implementing 
powers under Title IV EC. In many of the legal instruments discussed above, the Commission 
has been endowed with implementation powers to be exercised under the supervision of the 
comitology procedure. Even in the case of some Third Pillar measures, “comitology-like” 
provisions have been included, which could be regarded as a move towards the application of 
Community practices under the Third Pillar.295 The Schengen/Dublin Associated Countries 
have all been associated with the Commission’s work in implementing the Schengen 
acquis/Dublin rules.296 They have however the status of observer, which means they have the 
right to speak, but not vote. Although most decision making in committees is by consensus, it 
does show that the partial participation of the SAC amounts to some extent to unequal 
participation.297 
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 On a number of occasions, the Council has been reluctant to delegate implementing 
powers to the Commission, reserving the right to exercise implementing powers to itself, for 
instance in relation to the EURODAC Regulation.298 In Case C-257/01, the Commission 
contested two Regulations in which the Council had reserved the right to exercise 
implementing powers both to itself, as well as to the Member States.299 The first Regulation 
concerned the right to amend certain provisions and practical procedures for the examination 
of visa applications in the Common Consular Instructions (CCI).300 The second Regulation, 
predating the adoption of the SBC, concerned the power to amend detailed provisions and 
practical procedures for carrying out border checks and surveillance of the Common 
Manual.301 The Regulations established two procedures. Under Article 1 of the Regulations, 
the Council could amend certain procedures unanimously.302 Under Article 2, the Member 
States could communicate amendments to the annexes to the CCI and the Common Manual to 
the Secretary-General of the Council, who would then inform the Council and the 
Commission.  
In its judgment in Case 16/88, the Court had already held that the Council must state 
in detail the reasons for a decision to retain imple enting powers.303 In paragraph 51 of Case 
C-257/01, the Court added that “the Council must prope ly explain, by reference to the nature 
and content of the basic instrument to be implemented, why exception is being made to the 
rule (…).” In both Regulations, the Council had in identical terms, referred to the enhanced 
role of the Member States in these areas and the sensitivity thereof. Advocate General Léger 
in his opinion to the case argued that the requirement of specificity prevented the Council 
from reserving implementing powers in an entire field, for an unlimited time and that it had 
failed to establish the specificity of the situation in which the implementing powers were to be 
reserved.304 The Court qualified the Council’s reasoning as “general and laconic”, but 
nevertheless accepted it, when “assessed in its proper context”.305  
The ECJ put forward two arguments. First, it recalled that before the Treaty of 
Amsterdam the aspects of visa policy in question, as well as external border policy fell under 
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Title VI EU.306 Although this may serve to underline the sensitivity of the subject areas, it 
ignores the fact that the Member States in Amsterdam made a conscious choice to transfer 
these matters to the First Pillar. Second, the Court refers to the transitional period foreseen in 
the Treaty of Amsterdam. This argument has more force for it underlines the continuing 
sensitivity of the matter after the entry into force of the Amsterdam Treaty, which could 
justify the retention of implementing powers by the Council for, at least, the duration of the 
transitional period.307  
 As regards the possibility for Member States to unilaterally make amendments to the 
annexes of the CCI and Common Manual, the Court noted that these instruments were 
adopted by the Schengen Executive Committee as part of intergovernmental cooperation. 
Their integration into the framework of the EU did not, of itself, mean that Member States 
would lose the powers which they were entitled to exercise under those instruments in order 
to ensure their proper implementation.308 This reasoning shows the need to recast these 
instruments as Community measures, at which point the Member States could presumably be 
“stripped”, in the Court’s words, of these powers. The ECJ’s further held that the information 
subject to amendment by the Member States was factual and could only provided effectively 
by the Member States, as only they possessed this information. Since the Commission had not 
argued that there was the need for a uniform updating procedure in order to ensure proper 
implementation, this could be considered simply a form of implementation by the Member 
States.  
 The  SBC has now substituted both the Common Manual and the contested Regulation 
on the amendment of the Common Manual. It confers all implementing powers on the 
Commission subject to the regulatory comitology procedure.309 The Regulation regarding visa 
policy remains however in force and leaves all implementing powers to the Council and the 
Member States.  
 In case C-133/06 the Court was asked to pronounce itself once more on a provision 
which reserved certain decision making powers to the Council.310 Although the case did not 
relate to a measure concerning the external borders, it did concern a regulation adopted under 
Title IV, namely the so-called Asylum Procedures Directive.311 Article 29(1) and (2) of the 
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309 Article 33(2) and the references made to that Article, SBC. 
310 Case C-133/06, European Parliament v. Council [2006] ECR-I 3189. 
311 Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status, OJ 2005, L326/13.  
 234 
Directive provided that the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consultation of the European Prliament, was to adopt a minimum 
common list of so-called safe third countries, for the purpose of the assessment of an asylum 
request. It could then amend this list by qualified majority on a proposal from the 
Commission and after consultation of the European Parliament.  
 The Directive was adopted on the basis of Article 63(1)(d) EC which is not covered by 
the co-decision procedure, but by consultation. However Article 67(5) EC stated that after the 
transitional period measures provided for in Article 63(1) and (2)(a) EC would be covered by 
co-decision, provided that the Council had previously adopted Community legislation 
defining the common rules and basic principles governing these issues. The Commission and 
the Parliament argued that with the adoption of the Dir ctive it had done exactly that, and that 
therefore the adoption of the safe third country list and its amendment should be covered by 
the co-decision procedure.312  
 The Court first of all examined whether, on the assumption that the establishment and 
amendment of the list are “non-essential and relate to a specific case,” the Court could have 
reserved implementing powers to itself.313 The Council, in recital 19 had referred to the 
political importance of the designation of safe countries of origin and in recital 24 the 
potential consequences of the safe third country concept for asylum applicants. The Court 
agreed with the AG that this would justify consultation of the Parliament but that it did not 
justify sufficiently a reservation of implementing powers to the Council.314 Moreover, the 
Council had not advanced any argument to the effect that in its view this actually constituted 
the retention of implementing powers.315 
 The Court concluded that Articles 29(1) and (2) of the Directive amounted to the 
creation of secondary legal bases, which would grant the Council a legislative power it was 
not given in the Treaties and which would upset the institutional balance.316 It held that their 
inclusion amounted to an infringement of Article 67 EC.317 In order to avoid any doubt, the 
Court continued by specifying that for the purpose f any future decision the Directive was 
                                                
312 Case C-133/06, supra note 310, paras. 21 and 30. 
313 In fact the AG had argued in favour of a categorisation of the articles as implementing measures: Opinion AG 
Poiares Maduro in Case C-133/06, delivered on 27 September 2007, paras. 18-19. 
314 Case C-133/06, supra note 310, para. 49. 
315 Ibid., para. 50. 
316 Ibid., paras. 56-58.  
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indeed to be regarded as laying down common rules and b sic principles.318 Consequently, 
the co-decision procedure should apply.319  
 While the five-year transitional period provided in by the Treaty of Amsterdam 
allowed the Commission and European Parliament to develop a practice of cooperation with 
the Council, it may be concluded from the cases discus ed above that after the expiry of this 
period, the Court is no longer willing to accept too readily a retention by the Council of 
implementing powers.320 Title IV EC can therefore be considered to have become fully 
communitarised also in respect of the exercise of implementing powers. In view of the 
politically sensitive nature of the area, the Council may still want to retain implementing 
powers more frequently. However, this will no longer be able to serve as a sufficiently 
specific justification and the Court will scrutinize any other reasons put forward by the 
Council.  
 
6. The Commission’s 2008 Border Package: Brave New Border? 
 
The work on the development of the integrated management of the EU borders continues, 
both in legislative as operational terms. In February 2008 the Commission tabled three 
Communications which together were labelled “the EU Border Package”. The first 
communication evaluates Frontex and considers options f r its future development, the 
second is titled “Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union,” the 
third examines the setting up of a European Surveillance System (EUROSUR).321 In chapter 
VI we already discussed the possible effects on the border crossing regime at the Schengen 
external borders, if the ideas put forward by the Commission in its Communication on the 
Next Steps for the Management of the External Borders were to be translated into 
legislation.322 Here we shall focus on the Communication on EUROSUR and the proposed 
introduction of an entry-exit system.323 These proposals evidence once more an almost 
unchecked faith in the capabilities of technology in sealing off the external borders of the 
Schengen area. Although these Communications certainly form part of the continuous 
evaluation of and thinking on the future development of policies in the area of JHA, they are 
                                                
318 Ibid., para. 62-63. 
319 Ibid., para. 66. 
320 Stetter, S., ‘Regulating migration: authority delegation in justice and home affairs’, 7 JEPP 1 (2000), 96. 
321 COM(2008) 67 final, Commission Communication, ‘Report on the evaluation and future development of the 
FRONTEX Agency’; COM(2008) 68 final, supra note 270; COM(2008) 69 final, Commission Communication, 
‘Preparing the next steps in border management in the European Union’.  
322 COM(2008) 69 final, ibid. 
323 The Communication on the future development of Frontex will be discussed in the next chapter. 
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not as such placed within a wider system for evaluation of policies in the AFSJ, as had been 
proposed on earlier occasions.324 
 
EUROSUR 
 
The Communication on EUROSUR sets out a time path for the establishment of European 
border surveillance system that would establish synergies between the Member States’ 
electronic and physical surveillance of the external borders. Although it would cover both 
maritime borders and land borders, it seems safe to assume that the main motivation behind 
the idea of creating this system lies in the continuing irregular migration across the southern 
external maritime borders.325 In 2003 a study carried out at the request of the JHA Council 
had already called for an extension of SIVE-type systems and “intranet networks to 
coordinate the exchange of information (..) between the organisations involved.”326 The 
European Council of 14-15 December 2006 urged that as a matter of priority “the creation of 
a European Surveillance System for the Management of the southern maritime borders” 
would be examined.327 
 EUROSUR’s objectives are threefold: to reduce irregular migration, prevent cross-
border crime and enhance search and rescue capabilities at sea.328 The first two objectives 
confirm the importance that is attached to borders as a means of fighting irregular migration 
and cross-border crime. In the previous chapter we have already put some questions marks to 
this idea. Also the latter objective is disputable. The sealing off of stretches of the 
Mediterranean and Atlantic Coast has had deadly displacement effects in the past, forcing 
migrants to use more dangerous routes. The Communication completely ignores this point. It 
also ignores the question of what would happen were a vessel with potential irregular 
migrants to be detected by the system, as well as the question of what the consequences may 
be for people in need of international protection.329  
                                                
324 COM(2006) 332 final, Commission Communication on the Evaluation of EU Policies on Freedom, Security 
and Justice. 
325 See COM(2006) 733 final, supra note 256, 8. 
326 ‘Feasibility study on the control of the European U ion’s maritime borders’ (Civipol Conseil, Paris, 4 July 
2003), Council Document 11490/1/03, 76. 
327 European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 14-15 December 2006, point 24(b). 
328 COM(2008) 68, supra note 270, 3-4. 
329 We will return to this point in Chapter XI. Jeandesboz fiercely criticises the Commission Communications on 
EUROSUR and FRONTEX for a lack of attention paid to these questions: Jeandesboz, J., ‘Reinforcing the 
Surveillance of EU Borders The Future Development of FRONTEX and EUROSUR’ (Brussels, Challenge 
Research Paper No 11, August 2008), 18. 
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 Frontex has already been setting up a so-called European Patrol Network, coordinating 
Member States patrolling activities in the Mediterranean in order to prevent overlap and 
increase cost-efficiency. It has moreover started work on an organisational structure, 
establishing National Coordination Centres which eventually would be integrated in 
EUROSUR. This work is based on Frontex’ MEDSEA study on the feasibility of a 
Mediterranean Coastal Patrols Network.330 A further study, BORTEC, explored the technical 
feasibility of establishing a surveillance system.331  
 EUROSUR would be established in three phases. The first phase would consist of the 
interlinking and streamlining of national surveillance systems. It would include the 
establishment of a secured computerised communication network between the national 
coordination centres and Frontex, as well as the support to third countries in the setting up of 
their own border surveillance infrastructure. Phase two almost exclusively focuses on the 
improvement and development of surveillance tools and sensors such as earth observation 
satellites and unmanned aerial vehicles, confirming the present-day “fortification, 
militarization and informatization” of borders also in the European Union.332 
 The Commission was expected to report to the Council in Spring 2009 and “assess the 
need for a legislative initiative” with regard the progress made on guidelines for national 
coordination centres.333 It would further make a proposal for the system architecture for the 
communication network. The fact is however that, at le st at the southern maritime external 
borders, much of the groundwork on the EUROSUR is already taking place within the 
framework of the EPN, i.e. under the heading of operational cooperation. Also the impact 
assessment accompanying the communication considered that phase 1 and 2 could be largely 
implemented within the existing legislative framework and based to a large extent on actions 
already under preparation.334  
 The Communication almost reassuringly states that EUROSUR would be set up 
“without affecting the respective areas of jurisdiction, nor replace existing systems”.335 It 
further emphasises the “key operational objective to use information collected by different 
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systems in a more coherent manner.”336 However, as we noted earlier in this chapter, the 
practical effects of “mere” operational cooperation on national systems may be considerable. 
The Commission makes one further and general referenc  to the need for legislative measures 
at the end of the communication where it considers that EU data protection laws would 
require the processing of personal data within the context of EUROSUR to be based upon 
“appropriate legislative measures.”337 
 The third phase of EUROSUR would focus exclusively on the maritime borders, 
creating a common information sharing environment be ween responsible authorities.338 
EUROSUR would form part of a broader overarching information system integrating all 
European maritime reporting and surveillance system, covering all maritime activities from 
maritime safety to border surveillance.339 It becomes clear however that that EUROSUR will 
initially develop separately, focussing solely on border surveillance in a limited number of 
areas characterised by high migratory pressure, namely the Mediterranean, the southern 
Atlantic Ocean (Canary Islands) and the Black Sea.340  
 It is difficult to establish the necessity and proportionality of the EUROSUR system. 
Since the MEDSEA study is only partly accessible to the public and the BORTEC study 
remains secret, it is difficult for anyone without access to these documents to give a reasoned 
opinion on the costs and feasibility of the system. A few critical remarks however need to be 
made. First, borders may only have limited value as instruments against irregular migration 
and crime. Second, there seems to be no attention for the danger of diversion effects or 
questions of international protection. In connection with the EU’s relations with third 
countries, two further issues have been raised. First, one may doubt whether the EU should 
help build the technological surveillance capacity of countries with a less than perfect human 
rights record. Second, the building of electronic fences across the Mediterranean seems to 
contradict the policy goal of Euro-mediterranean partnerships.341 
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Entry-Exit System 
 
Considering that overstay is one of the main sources of irregular migration, the introduction 
of an entry-exit systems seems at first sight a valuable means of combating irregular stay in 
the Schengen countries.342 However, how far should the Commission proposal for an entry-
exit system as outlined in the Communication be considered necessary and proportional for its 
purpose? 
 The system as envisaged by the Commission would cover all TCNs, also monitoring 
the movement of TCNs that are not under a visa obligation even if the number of those who 
overstay from this category is very small.343 The entry-exit system would again require the 
collection of an enormous amount of biometric data. For TCNs that are not under a visa 
obligation and do not have registered traveler statu , these data would have to be collected at 
the moment of border crossing. The Commission quite optimistically states that this “could 
potentially complicate the management of passenger flows,” but that this could be offset by 
the better flow resulting from the use of automated gates.344  
 Although some have argued that the question regarding practical operability is one for 
experts rather than lawyers, technical feasibility and costs of a project should be taken into 
account when making an assessment of its proportionality and necessity.345 In this respect a 
report of the US Accountability Office on a similar system, US-VISIT, shows that even with a 
much more limited number of recognized border points than in the EU and despite 
considerable financial investments, the registration of exit does not yet work properly.346 
Likewise large ICT projects at EU and national leve have often been characterized by delays 
and exceeding costs.347 It is worrying that the Commission has already proposed the system 
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twice previously without engaging in thorough research beforehand.348 Also the “EU future 
group” simply echoes the Commission’s border package.349  
 The Council’s conclusions on the entry-exit system seem slightly more careful. 
Available technology should be used as “a complementary” although “essential measure” to 
improve the management of the external borders and to combat illegal migration.350 It 
emphasises that new systems should fully comply with Community law principles on data 
protection, human rights, international protection and proportionality, and should reflect a 
“cost benefit approach and added value of technology”.351 At the same time, a survey amongst 
Member States as regards the entry-exit system showed almost unanimous support for the 
system itself, as well as for the inclusion of biometric data.352 
 A highly critical approach was taken by the EDPS, whose office, to his dismay, had 
not been consulted on the Border Package. The EDPS pointed out that throughout the 
Commission Communication “some bold statements are made, that are not based on 
undisputable evidence.”353 The EDPS furthermore warned that the unplanned proliferation of 
databases in the AFSJ risks impeding a critical assessment of individual proposals, which 
themselves may be acceptable, yet may not be in synerg  with others.354 This point is 
particularly well taken if one realizes that the so-called Biometric Matching System (BMS), 
currently under development for the VIS, can from an “ rchitectural and structural point of 
view” easily be applied to other systems.355 The Council seems to have picked up on this 
point in its call for an “indicative IT Strategy for all European IT systems in the area of 
Justice and Home Affairs” by the end of 2009.356 
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  The added value of the entry-exit system may be questioned for a number of reasons. 
It would neither be capable of identifying overstayers, nor potential terrorists or criminals, nor 
would it help to locate them within the Schengen area. It would merely enable authorities to 
know if suspected law breakers find themselves in the Schengen area, as well as where and 
when they entered or left, provided of course they did not cross an external border irregularly. 
The impact assessment notes that the entry-exit system may have a deterrent effect, but at the 
same time admits that it may result in overstayers d ciding not to leave at all.357 Moreover, it 
is not unthinkable that irregular migrants may change strategies opting for irregular entry 
rather than applying for a visa at all.358   
 There is a more principled reason for opposing the system, which is again pointed out 
by the EDPS. The entry-exit system puts all travellers under surveillance, considering them a 
priori  as potential law breakers.359 In addition, as Guild et al. note, the “institution of different 
layers of security” as the Commission puts it, will lead to a culture where border guards will 
second-guess the work of the visa issuing authorities and feed a culture of mistrust.360  
 Although the entry-exit system is presented as a me sure for the control of the external 
borders, its potential as an instrument of general immigration control within the Schengen 
area of free movement is much greater. It would moreover be a small step to use the data 
collected as a means of identifying TCNs. From the survey carried out amongst Member 
States it clearly follows that the majority of Member States envisage access not only by the 
competent immigration authorities, but by a much wider range of law enforcement 
personnel.361  
 It is important to note that the system would have to be considered a Schengen 
developing measure, developing a part of the Schengen acquis in which the UK and Ireland 
do not participate, whether the proposal were to be framed as a visa measure or as an external 
borders measure. However, at least one British newspaper reported that the UK may actually 
join the system.362 The only way in which this would not go squarely against the Court’s case 
law is if the proposal were to be made on the legal basis for measures combating irregular 
migration. This would however mean that the system could not be integrated with the SIS, nor 
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the VIS, and it would once more show the prominence of a security rationale underpinning 
the EU’s policy in migration and border management. 
 The measures proposed by the Commission are likely to slow down passenger flows, 
rather than facilitate the movement of people across the external borders. If feasible at all, this 
will be done at an enormous financial cost, at the expense of travellers’ privacy and in 
exchange for security gains that are yet to be proven. While many of the developments mirror 
those in the US, Europe does not seem to question their need, nor to learn from the American 
experience. An examination of the policy documents relating to the Communications gives 
the idea that the Communications indeed lay down the foundations of the EU’s future border 
management policy and that there is broad agreement on them already.  
 In relation to the EUROSUR project, it is likely that future legislation will confirm 
rather than shape its development, considering that important steps have already been taken 
under the heading of operational coordination. This is to be regretted, since decisions of the 
scale proposed in the border package deserve a proper legislative iter guaranteeing 
accountability and legitimacy.  
 
7.  Innovations brought about by the Lisbon Treaty 
 
In Chapter III we considered the relatively modest changes the Lisbon Treaty would bring 
about to the competences for the management of the external borders. Aware that the future of 
the Lisbon Treaty after the Irish no-vote remains ucertain, here we will consider the changes 
that this Treaty would bring about to executive action in the AFSJ in general and the area of 
external borders management in particular. 
 One of the major innovations of the Constitutional Treaty was the introduction of a 
hierarchy of acts, explicitly distinguishing for the first time between legislative and executive 
measures or rather “legislative and non-legislative acts”. This distinction has been maintained 
in the Lisbon Treaty. Article 289(3) TFEU defines a legislative acts all legal acts that are 
adopted under legislative procedure.363  
 There are two types of non-legislative acts. First, Ar icle 290(1) TFEU provides that 
the legislator can by legislative act delegate to the Commission the power to adopt non-
                                                
363 Legislative procedure as such is not defined in the TFEU. From Articles 289(1) and (2) it follows however 
that it covers the adoption of a Regulation, Directive or Decision under the ordinary legislative procedure (the 
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legislative acts of general application to supplement or amend certain non-essential elements 
of the legislative act, so called delegated acts. The objectives, content, scope and duration of 
the delegation must be explicitly defined in the legislative acts. The “essential elements of an 
area” can only be regulated by legislative act and may not be delegated. Both Parliament and 
the Council can veto the entry into force of a delegat d act and can revoke the delegation. 
 Second, Article 291(1) states that Member States shall adopt all measures of national 
law necessary to implement legally binding Union acts. This article codifies the prime 
responsibility of the Member States for the implementation of EU legislation. In fact, it was 
argued that implementing acts would only exceptionally be adopted by the Commission, or 
even more exceptionally the Council.364 It seems unlikely that as regards implementing acts, 
the current system of comitology would cease to exist. The current Article 202(2) EC is taken 
over by Article 291(2) TFEU, stating that that “where uniform conditions for implementing 
legally binding Union acts are needed, those acts shall confer implementing powers on the 
Commission.” It further stipulates that Union acts may in duly justified specific cases confer 
implementing powers on the Council, codifying the Court’s case law in this respect, as well as 
in the cases provided for in Articles 24 and 26 EU on the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy.  
 The difference between delegated and implementing acts has been criticised as being 
unclear, not least because under the current interpretation of the ECJ implementation includes 
the updating and amending of non-essential elements of Community legislation.365 It would 
therefore depend on the definition in the legislative act if a measure is a delegated act or 
implementing act. Ponzano explains the distinction by reference to Member States’ national 
legal systems which differentiate between cases in which the government acts in its own field 
of competence (decrees, implementing acts under the Lisbon Treaty) and cases in which it 
acts in the field of competence of the legislator (decree-laws, delegated acts under the Lisbon 
Treaty).366 
 In relation to the category of delegated acts, the comitology procedure (currently the 
regulatory procedure with scrutiny) would be replaced by a direct oversight of the Parliament 
and the Council. This has been criticized by some for depriving the Commission of necessary 
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expertise, as well as ignoring transnational partnership as a pre-condition for multi-level 
governance.367 It can moreover be expected that the Council will try to retain control over 
delegated acts, in particular in the politically sen itive AFSJ. It could do so through informal 
control mechanisms, which by their nature would be less accountable than the already rather 
opaque comitology procedure. The Council could also, in the legislative process, try to define 
certain acts as implementing rather than delegated and reserve implementing powers to itself.   
 The Convention Working Group on Simplification “broached the idea” of introducing 
in the Constitutional Treaty the possibility of assigning decentralized agencies (or “regulatory 
authorities”) the task of adopting certain implementing acts.368
 
Neither the Constitutional 
Treaty, nor the Lisbon Treaty however makes reference to the execution of Union legislation 
by agencies, effectively ignoring an important institutional reality in the EU.  
 
While the Convention’s Working Group on Simplification examined the distinction between 
legislative and non-legislative acts, the Working Group on the AFSJ grappled with the 
question on how better to separate the legislative and operational tasks of the Council.369 The 
Working Group did not however attempt to define eith r of the two concepts. The legislative 
tasks of the Council appear to have included the imple entation of legislation as well.370 This 
definition would seem to be based on the substantive, rather than formal criteria, namely the 
legal effect vis-à-vis third parties.  
 The Working Group proposed a merging of the various Council working groups 
dealing with internal security and removing the CATS from the legislative process, limiting 
its role to that of co-ordinator of operational co-operation.371 The Constitutional Treaty 
provided for, as does Article 71 TFEU, the setting up of a Standing Committee on Internal 
Security (COSI) which should “ensure that operational cooperation on internal security is 
promoted and strengthened.” It should “facilitate” he coordination of the activities of Member 
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States’ competent authorities. This seems to be a waker formulation than if the article had stated 
that it may itself coordinate these activities. The COSI’s functioning would be without prejudice 
to the powers of the COREPER. Representatives of relevant Union bodies, offices and agencies 
could be involved in its proceedings and the European Parliament as well as national Parliaments 
would have to be kept informed. 
 The COSI has been criticised by some for being an EU interior ministry in the 
making,372 by others as a toothless standing committee373 and again others have asked 
whether it would be necessary at all to formally provide for such a committee.374 Considering 
its potentially important role in the JHA, the mentio ing of the COSI in the Treaty seems 
justified. Bearing in mind that the EU is a system of attributed competences, it is difficult to 
see in which other legal basis the operational activities of the Council could find their 
foundation. In this respect the article on the COSI lacks precision and it will largely be left to 
the Council to decide on the exact definition of its tasks and composition.    
 In a Council Document mapping the preparatory work f  the COSI, internal security 
was broadly defined encompassing both crime prevention and control, anti-terrorism, but also 
the provision of “an integrated management system for external borders as a major factor for 
preventing (certain) forms of crime within the EU.”375 Operational cooperation was defined 
as: 
 
 “action related to concrete cases/events/crisis/phenomena, that require a trans-national 
approach, whereby all the concerned authorities of the Member States competent at national 
level for internal security issues collaborate with each other, i.e. bodies.”376  
 
It was however immediately emphasised that the COSI would not be directly in charge of 
conducting operational activities. The document provided three different options in terms of 
tasks for the new Committee. The first would limit COSI’s tasks to operational planning. The 
second would also include strategic functions, such as the elaboration of an EU plan for 
internal security, evaluation and external relations. A final option, contrary to the history and 
                                                
372 Bunyan, T, ‘The Creation of an EU Interior Ministry’ (Statewatch News, April 2003), 3. 
373 Townsend, A, ‘Can the EU Deliver in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice?’ (Brussels, EPIN Working 
Paper No. 9, September 2003), 11. 
374 Monar, J, ‘A new “Area of Freedom, Security and Justice” for the Enlarged EU? The results of the European 
Convention’, in: Henderson, K., The Area of Freedom, Security and Justice in the Enlarged Europe, 
(Hampshire, Palgrave MacMillan, 2005), 127. 
375 Council Document 6626/05, 2. 
376 Ibid. 
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wording of the article, would reintroduce a role in the legislative process.377 In any case, were 
legislative tasks to remain outside the Committee’s r mit, a separate committee could be 
made responsible for the coordination of all legislat ve work related to “internal security.” 
This would imply that in any case the four-level struc ure of law making in the Council in the 
AFSJ would remain intact under the new Treaty.378  
 The composition of the COSI would depend on the tasks given to it, but the Council 
contemplated fixed members. Representatives of EU bodies and agencies would only be 
present depending on the subject matters on the agend . Interestingly, in the run-up to the 
establishment of the COSI, the Hague Programme had called upon the Council to organise 
half-yearly meetings between the chairpersons of SCIFA, CATS and representatives of the 
Commission, Europol, Eurojust, the European Border Agency (i.e. Frontex), the Police Chiefs’ 
Task Force, and the Joint Situation Centre (SitCEN), thus giving a more permanent position to the 
agencies.379  
 When no-votes halted the ratification process of the Constitutional Treaty, the Council 
considered it inappropriate to continue setting up s ch a body.380 No new structures should be 
created and reference to COSI was to be avoided.381 Rather existing structures should be 
strengthened and made more efficient. A pilot-project was set up in the field of organised 
crime, essentially proposing ways of bringing together Chiefs of Police and the CATS, with 
additional input from relevant agencies and working groups. Here one may raise a question as 
to Frontex’s involvement. As long as the Lisbon Treaty does not enter into force, Frontex’s 
competences are limited to those under the First Pillar. Although this in itself does not stand 
in the way of cooperation on issues such as irregular migration, its involvement in other 
activities combating crime, seems to be beyond its remit.  
 The Council’s document on the Architecture of Inter al Security and the Council’s 
Conclusions of 2008 seem to take only very small steps in the direction of a more centralised 
coordination of operational cooperation at EU level, referring once more to “better 
coordination” and “continuing reflection” on the functioning of the Council’s working 
structures. At the same time, the six-monthly meetings between the JHA agencies and the 
                                                
377 Also the Commission had expressed the view that the COSI should not have legislative tasks (Council 
Document 5573/05). 
378 Monar, J., supra note 371, 135. 
379 The Hague Programme, supra note 80, point 2.5. The SitCen had originally dealt mostly with Second Pillar 
measures, monitoring on a constant basis potential threats. It has however expanded its remit into Justice and 
Home Affairs, providing strategic intelligence-based assessments on counter-terrorism matters: House of Lords 
Select Committee on the EU, ‘After Madrid: the EU’s response to terrorism’ (HL Paper 53, Session 2004-2005, 
5th Report, Session 2004-05), 61. 
380 Council Document 9596/1/06 REV 1, 1. 
381 Council Document 6290/06. 
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presidencies of the CATS and SCIFA have been in place since 2005 and they have been 
intensified upon recommendation by the Council.382 One of the first topics on the agenda has 
been the exchange of information between these agencies. Importantly, it was decided by the 
heads of the EU JHA agencies that from now on the confidentiality rules/security regulations 
of other agencies, including those regulations governing classified information, would be 
considered as equivalent.383  
    
The Lisbon Treaty implicitly confirms the status quo as regards regulatory agencies and it is 
unlikely that they will cease to exist after its entry into force. The explicit reference made to 
agencies throughout the reformed Treaties seems to support this view. It would however be 
going too far to read into these articles an implicit reversal of the Meroni doctrine.384 A sound 
legal basis in the Treaty for the delegation of powers to these agencies, be they implementing 
or delegated, remains lacking.  
 There are two notable exceptions to the constitutional ignorance of agencies. The 
Lisbon Treaty, as did the Constitutional Treaty, provides an explicit legal basis for two of the 
(former) Third Pillar agencies: Europol and Eurojust, both of which have operational rather 
than legislative tasks. This leaves however unanswered the question of an agency such as 
Frontex, which is also endowed with the task of coordinating operational cooperation. As 
Curtin has rightly remarked the Constitutional Treaty fell short of “constitutionalizing” a 
framework for the administration of the Union as a whole, an observation which also applies 
to the Lisbon Treaty.385 In this context it is not surprising that “a common understanding 
between the EU institutions of the purpose and role of agencies” also remains lacking.386 
 More specifically, one may wonder what the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty 
would mean for the coordination of operational cooperation in the area of external borders 
management. One could imagine that the merging of the First and Third Pillar and the 
establishment of a Standing Committee within the Council, would cast an intergovernmental 
shadow over this cooperation, drawing Frontex back into the sphere of influence of the 
Council. Much would depend on the character of the COSI. If it were to function as 
coordinator of operational cooperation, in the area of external borders management this would 
                                                
382 Council Document 16831/06, 5. 
383 Council Document 11644/08. Currently, information exchange between agencies is subject to confidentiality 
agreements. The obligation to conclude such agreements flowed from the agencies’ own security regulations 
which often replicate the Council’s Security Regulations (Council Document 5775/01). 
384 Dougan, M., supra note 365, 651-652.  
385 Curtin, D., ‘Mind the Gap: The Evolving EU Executive and the Constitution’, Walter van Gerven Lecture, 
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven (Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2005), 7. 
386 COM(2008) 135, supra note 28, 2. 
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conflict with the position of Frontex as an independ t agency set up for this purpose. If it 
were to take on more strategic tasks it would essentially take over SCIFA’s current position, 
potentially also weakening the Commission’s role. 
  
8. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has given a comprehensive overview of the legislation adopted under Title IV, 
which forms the legal framework within which the EU’s external borders are managed. 
Although from the outset the EU’s policy for the management of the external borders has 
been operational in character, legislation has taken on an increasingly important role.  
 The legislation discussed here covers a wide range of subject matters and legal bases. 
This has been so because of the Court’s broad definition of a “measure developing the 
Schengen acquis”, but also because of the link made between (irregular) migration and 
asylum and border management. The legislation adopte  illustrates the different rationales for 
a European policy on the external borders which were identified in the previous chapter. 
While only a narrow Schengen borders acquis already discussed in Chapter VI regulates 
border checks and surveillance at the moment of border crossing itself, the other instruments 
aim at increased operational cooperation and solidarity between Member States. There is an 
undeniable focus on security concerns and immigration control. Moreover, most legislation is 
characterised by a firm believe in the possibilities of modern technology for the purpose of 
surveillance and information exchange. A discomforting feature here is the expansion of the 
remit of information systems originally adopted for the purpose of migration management 
into the field of general law enforcement. 
 Under the above legislation, the power to take imple enting measures is now 
generally conferred on the Commission, under the supervision of a comitology committee. 
The amount of Community legislation adopted and the implementation thereof in accordance 
with standard Community practice does not however man that the development of this area 
has become legislation-driven. Such a conclusion does not take account of the fact that in 
many cases operational activity has preceded and moulded legislative developments, as well 
as the undeniably operational character of the EU’s activity carried out on the basis of the 
adopted legislation. 
 The important difference between legislation and its implementation on the one hand 
and the coordination of operational cooperation on the other, is that the latter does not create 
rights and obligations vis-à-vis third parties. This chapter has underlined that operational 
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coordination at the EU level consists of the coordination of operational activities carried out 
by and under the responsibility of the Member States. While in the Third Pillar coordination 
activities are explicitly conferred upon the CATS, a similar article is lacking in the First 
Pillar.  
 It has been argued that the legislation establishing Frontex has in a way 
“communitarised” the coordination of operational activities by removing this activity from 
under the purview of the Council to an independent Community body. In this respect the 
merging of the First and Third Pillar by the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the COSI 
could, depending of the role this standing committee is to be given, draw the management of 
the external borders policy back into the Council’s sphere of influence.  
 Since operational coordination is less likely to raise sovereignty concerns, Member 
States have been more willing to consent to joint operational activity than to the adoption of 
legislation. However, in doing so, they appear to be o livious of the potentially profound 
consequences of “mere” operational coordination. It has been argued that operational 
coordination is not a technical, value-free exercis and that the nature of the competences in 
the AFSJ calls for legislative decision-making. An additional reason for concern is that the 
non-binding character of operational coordination allows it to escape judicial review by the 
ECJ.  
 The Commission’s Communication’s on EURSUR and the future of external border 
management show a clear continuity in evolvement of the EU’s activities in this field. They 
confirm once more the rationales discussed in the previous chapter. The measures proposed 
are not only characterised by their emphasis on practical cooperation, but also by their faith in 
the use of technology for the management of the extrnal borders. This chapter has shown the 
difficulties and dangers of such an approach. The third Communication making up the 
Commission’s border package consists of an evaluation and outlook on the future 
development of Frontex. This agency has beyond doubt become the most important actor at 
EU level for the management of the external borders, if not legally then symbolically. It forms 
the topic of the next chapter. 
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IX. The Institutionalisation of EU Border Management: Frontex 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 “Summing up I would like to remind that Frontex activities are supplementary to those 
undertaken by the Member States. Frontex doesn’t have any monopole on border protection 
and is not omnipotent. It is a coordinator of the op rational cooperation in which the Member 
States show their volition. If some of our critics think it is not enough they should fix their 
eyes on decision takers, as Frontex only executes its duties described in the Regulation 
2007/2004.”1 
 
It is hard not to note the sense of frustration in the words of Frontex’s Executive Director, in a 
press-release he issued in response to the criticism that his agency was not doing enough to 
prevent the drowning of migrants trying to reach Europe by sea.2 
 In the previous chapter Frontex was classified as one of the most important 
developments in the EU’s management of the external borders. From the outset expectations 
of Frontex have been high in terms of its potential to tackle irregular migration. At the same 
time it has been argued that the Agency has been oblivious to the rights of asylum seekers and 
migrants.  
 The Executive Director’s press-release may not show much empathy for the plight of 
irregular migrants and asylum seekers, but does contain an undeniable truth in the argument 
that Frontex’s powers are limited by its founding regulation.3 In order to evaluate how far 
both expectations and criticism on Frontex’s functioning are justified it is necessary to look at 
the legal framework governing the Agency’s activities.  
 Frontex is one of the EC’s independent regulatory agencies. A discussion of the 
rationale behind the creation of these agencies will enable us to assess how Frontex fits within 
the EU’s more general institutional framework and i how far it can be distinguished from 
other agencies.  
 For a correct understanding of the Agency it is indispensable that both its powers and 
organisational structure are explained. This chapter will continue with a more in-depth 
                                                
1 Ilkka Laitinen, Executive Director Frontex, ‘Frontex: Facts and Myths’ (Frontex Press Release, 11 June 2007). 
2 ‘Europe’s shame’ (The Independent, 28 May 2007). 
3 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004, L349/1 (hereinafter: 
“Frontex Regulation”). 
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examination of the coordination by Frontex of Member States’ operational activities. 
Although the importance of the Agency’s other tasks hould by no means be underestimated, 
operational coordination takes up most of its resources and gives rise to important legal 
questions. The discussion of Frontex’s task of operational coordination will include the 
question of accountability of visiting border guards. It will be followed by an examination of 
the oversight mechanisms applicable to the Agency’s overall functioning. A final section will 
scrutinise the Commission’s plans for the future development of Frontex. It will show how 
the Agency continues to advance the integration of European border guard forces, whilst 
continuing to explore its potential of becoming primus inter pares.   
 
2. Frontex as a Regulatory Agency 
 
2.1 The Rationale of Agency Creation 
 
The dominant approach towards the question of delegation to independent regulatory agencies 
is functional. Agency theory looks at the benefits a principal may derive from delegation to an 
agent, by lowering the transaction costs of political decision making.4 The question why then 
these powers are delegated to regulatory agencies, and why these agencies are made 
independent, is “a special case of the more general problem of institutional choice of 
institutional design.”5  
 The most common explanation holds that delegation offers advantages derived from 
the division of labour and specialisation.6 Delegation enables governments to deal with a wide
range of social issues.7 First, delegation lowers decision-making costs by “allowing legislators 
to economise on the time and effort required to identify desirable refinements to legislation 
and to reach agreement on these refinements.”8 Second, it lowers decision-making costs 
                                                
4 Elgie, R., ‘Why Do Governments Delegate Authority to Quasi-Autonomous Agencies? The Case of  
Independent Administrative Authorities in France’, 19 Governance 2 (2006), 208. 
5 Pollack, M., The Engines of European Integration: Delegation, Agency and Agency-Setting in the European 
Union (Oxford, OUP, 2003), 20. See also Horn, M., ‘The Political Economy of Public Administration 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1995), 7 ff. 
6 Coleman, J. Foundations of Social Theory (Cambridge (MA), Harvard University Press, 1990). 
7 Lupia, A., ‘Delegation of Power: Agency Theory’, in: Smelser, N. and Baltes P. (Eds), International 
Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences (Oxford, Elsevier Science Limited, 2001), 3375. 
8 Majone, G., ‘The regulatory state and its legitimacy problems’, 22 WEP 1 (1999), 3. 
 253 
linked to incomplete information.9 In particular in areas of great complexity, governments 
benefit from the technical and/or scientific knowledg  of expert agencies. They respond to the 
“mismatch between the Community’s increasingly complex regulatory tasks and the available 
administrative instruments.”10 Delegation increases the efficiency of rule-making by leaving 
specific problems to be dealt with by the agent.11 
 The establishment of discretionary powers to independent agencies constitutes 
however a move away from the standard “chain of delegation” or “transmission belt” model 
of administrative law, in which the administration implements legislation under the political 
responsibility of the government.12 An explanation can be found in the need for credibl  
policy commitments.13 Credibility can be described as the need for policy consistency in the 
face of political change. By insulating a regulatory policy from the political process, 
governments not only bind themselves to the policy choices they have made, but importantly 
also their successors.14 Gilardi has shown a direct relationship between the amount of political 
uncertainty and the degree of formal independence granted to an agency.15 
  An important third explanation that deserves attention is the concept of blame shifting. 
Here it is argued that governments through delegation to regulatory agencies “avoid or at least 
disguise their responsibility for the consequences of decisions ultimately made”16 This would 
also explain the expansion of regulatory authority beyond the economic sphere and the 
increasing importance of independent regulatory authorities in the management of risk.17 The 
concept of blame shifting can moreover be linked to the argument that considers the increase 
in delegation to regulatory agencies as the response to a decline in trust in more traditional 
economic and political institutions.18 Indeed, in response to widely publicised scandals which 
                                                
9 Pollack, M, supra note 5, 21; Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A., ‘Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-
Majoritarian Institutions’ 25 WEP 1 (2002), 4; Elgie, R., supra note 4, 208. 
10 Majone, G., ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’, 38 JCMS 2 (2000), 275. 
11 Thatcher, M. and Stone Sweet, A., supra note 9, 4. 
12 Strøm, K., ‘Delegation and accountability in parlimentary democracies’ 37 EJPR 3 (2000), 261; Vos, E., 
‘Reforming the European Commission: What Role to play for European Agencies’, 37 CMLRev 5 (2000), 1123.   
13 Majone, G., supra note 8, 4-5. 
14 Ibid, 5. Moe, T., ‘The Politics of Structural Choice: Toward a Theory of Public Bureaucracy’, in: Williamson, 
O. (Ed.), Organization Theory. From Chester Barnard to the Prsent and Beyond (Oxford, OUP, 1995), 124. In 
binding their successors, they avoid so-called “politica  drift”: Kelemen, D., ‘The Politics of “Eurocratic” 
Structure and the New European Agencies’, 24 WEP 4 2002, 96. 
15 Gilardi, F., ‘The Same, But Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to 
Independent Authorities’, 5 CEP (2007), 306. 
16 Fiorina, M., ‘Legislative Choice of Regulatory Forms: Legal Process or Administrative Process?,’ 39 Public 
Choice (1982), 47. 
17 Moran, M., ‘The Frank Stacey Memorial Lecture: From Command State to Regulatory State,’ 15 PPA 4 
(2000), 9-11. Jordana, J. and Levi-Faur, D., The Politics of Regulation: Examining Regulatory Institutions and 
Instruments in the Age of Governance (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2004), 15. 
18 Jordana, J. and Levi-Faur, D., ibid., 13. 
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are likely to have negatively affected public trust in an area of regulation, governments have 
responded with the establishment or consolidation of i dependent regulatory authorities.19 
 
2.2 Application to the EU Context 
 
It should first be recalled that as a consequence of the Meroni doctrine the powers of 
regulatory agencies at EU level are considerably more limited than those of their national 
counterparts.20 Therefore, EC agencies can be considered independent only in terms of their 
own legal personality, autonomous governing bodies and financial independence.21 In 
addition, some authors have argued that the granting of implementing powers to agencies 
does not amount to the delegation of powers by an EC institution, but rather to the extraction 
of powers from national administrations.22  
 Community agencies have generally been created in response to the increased 
requirement for information and co-ordination at the Community level resulting from the 
internal market project.23 They have allowed the EC to expand the scope of its regulatory 
policies, without overstretching the Commission’s administrative capacity. Under the heading 
“Better application of EU rules through regulatory agencies”, the Commission’s White Paper 
on European Governance summed up the advantages of the agency approach as follows:   
 
 “The advantage of agencies is often their ability to draw on highly technical, sectoral know-
how, the increased visibility they give for the sectors concerned (and sometimes the public) 
and the cost-savings that they offer to business. For the Commission the creation of agencies 
is also a useful way of ensuring it focuses resources on core tasks.24 
 
In 2008, the Commission argued along the same linesthat:  
                                                
19 Ibid., 15. 
20 Case 9/56, Meroni [1957] ECR 11 at 147-149 and Case 10/56, Meroni [1958] ECR 53 at 169-171. 
21 All agencies have separate, autonomous budgets, however only a few enjoy financial independence from a 
subsidy from the EC general budget: Vos, E., ‘Agenci s and the European Union, in: Zwart, T. and Verhey, L. 
(Eds), Agencies in European and Comparative Law (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2003), 118.   
22 Geradin, D. and Petit, N., ‘The Development of Agenci s at EU and National Levels: Conceptual Analysis and 
Proposals for Reform’ (New York, Jean Monnet Working Paper 01/04, 2004), 15. Rather, in the EU context 
there are multiple principles, namely national governments, acting as Members of the Council, the Commission 
and the European Parliament: Dehousse, R., ‘Delegation of Powers in the European Union: The Need for a 
Multi-principals’, 31 WEP 4 (2008), 793. See also: Curtin, D., ‘Holding (Quasi-)Autonomous EU 
Administrative Actors to Public Account’ 13 ELJ 4 (2007), 528, as well as Sabel, C. and Zeitling, J., ‘Learning 
from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in the EU,’ 14 ELJ 3 (2008), 304. 
23 Vos, E., supra note 12, 1117. 
24 COM(2001) 428 final, Commission White Paper on European Governance, 24.   
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 “They help the Commission to focus on core tasks, making it possible to devolve certain 
operational functions to outside bodies. They support the decision-making process by pooling 
the technical or specialist expertise available at European and national level. And the spread of 
agencies beyond Brussels and Luxembourg adds to the visibility of the Union.”25 
 
In the European context, the need for credibility in face of the growing politicisation of the 
Commission is often considered to play a key-role in the establishment of regulatory 
agencies.26 This politicisation is a consequence of the transfer of tasks involving the use of 
political discretion to the European level and the increase in Parliament’s powers of control 
and direction over the Commission.27 Moreover, functionalist theories of integration hold that 
integration is most likely to occur within fields that are shielded from the direct clash of 
political, and in the EU often national, interests.28  
 The need for the credibility of EC regulatory policies is also used in the sense that the 
public must be able to have confidence in those policies on the basis of their effectiveness and 
efficiency.29 This point relates more to the issue of trust than to policy consistency, but is 
equally valid. Also at the EU level the occurrence of a crisis has in a number of cases been at 
the basis of the decision to create an agency.30 Examples include the establishment of the 
European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) in the aftermath of the BSE crisis and the European 
Maritime Safety Agency (EMSA) after the sinking of the oil-tanker Prestige.31  
 However, just as functionalist explanations cannot account for the variety in the nature 
and extent of delegation to agencies in Western European countries, the emergence of 
agencies in the EC cannot merely be considered as “the natural response to the expansion of 
                                                
25 COM(2008) 135, Commission Communication on European Agencies - The Way forward, 2. 
26 Everson, M. and Majone, G., ‘Part One: General Principles’, in: Everson, M. et al., ‘The Role of Specialised 
Agencies in Decentralising European Governance’ (Report Presented to the Commission, 1999), 20-21, 
Yataganas, X, ‘Delegation of Regulatory Authority in the European Union: The Relevance of the American 
Model of Independent Agencies’ (New York, Jean Monnet Working Paper 03/01, 2001), 37. 
27 Ibid. See also Curtin, D. and Egeberg, M., ‘Tradition and innovation: Europe’s accumulated executive order’ 
31 WEP 4 (2008), 647. 
28 Everson, M. and Majone, G., ibid. Shapiro refers to this as ‘a kind of “neo-functionalism”’: Shapiro, M., ‘The 
Problems of independent Agencies in the United States nd the European Union, 4 JEPP 2 (1997), 281.   
29 See for instance Majone, G., ‘The Credibility Crisis of Community Regulation’ 38 JCMS 2 (2000), 276. 
30 Report by the Working Group Establishing a Framework f r Decision-Making Regulatory Agencies (Group 
3a), ‘Preparation of Commission White paper on Governance’ (SG/8597/01-EN, June 2001), 6. 
31 See for instance: Vos, E., ‘EU Food Safety Regulation in the Aftermath of the BSE Crisis’, 23 JCP 3 (2000), 
228. Similarly in response to the financial crisis there are calls for increased, centralised supervision: 
COM(2009) 252 final, Commission Communication on European financial supervision, 3.
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the EU’s regulatory role.”32 Often the establishment of small, independent, expert bodies was 
the only viable alternative in areas in which the Mmber States acknowledged the need for a 
Community approach, but opposed an additional transfer of powers and resources to the 
Commission.33 Often the decision to create an agency was also “motivated by the need to 
respond to the particular circumstances of the moment.”34  
 Community agencies generally form the focal point of a network of national 
administrative agencies, confirming the observation by Curtin and Egeberg that “Europe’s 
new administrative order does not replace former orders; instead it tends to be layered around 
already existing orders.”35 This could of course be explained by the urge felt by he Member 
States to protect national bureaucratic interests.36 However, probably as important is the fact 
that the network structure of agencies allows them to function as a permanent venue for 
deliberation between the different levels of governance in a particular regulatory area, 
contributing to a more uniform implementation of EC law.37 Hofmann has argued that the 
emergence of “a system of decentralised, yet cooperativ , administrative structures” is 
intimately linked with the development of the principle of subsidiarity.38 Sabel and Zeitlin 
rather view agencies that function as a network as an expression of “experimental 
governance,” through which broadly formulated policy goals laid down by the Member States 
and Institutions can be implemented by lower level units.39  
 
2.3 Application to Frontex 
 
From the description of Frontex’s genesis in the prceding chapter, one can conclude that 
Frontex is first of all the outcome of a “re-balancing” of powers between the Member States, 
                                                
32 Thatcher, M., ‘Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual 
Mediation’, 25 WEP 1 (2002), 134; Kelemen, D., supra note 14, 94.  
33 Kelemen, D., ibid, 95. 
34 Report by the Working Group Establishing a Framework f r Decision-Making Regulatory Agencies (Group 
3a), supra note 30. 
35 Curtin, D. and Egeberg, M., supra note 27, 640. 
36 Kelemen, D., supra note 14, 110. 
37 Dehousse, J., ‘Regulation by Networks in the European Community: The Role of European Agencies’, 4 
JEPP 2 (1997), 255. Vos, E., supra note 21, 125.  
38 Hofmann, H., ‘Mapping the European administrative space’, 31 WEP 4 (2008), 667-668. Over a decade 
earlier, Kreher considered administrative integration the main motivation for the creation of agencies at EC 
level: Kreher, A., ‘Agencies in the European Community: A Step towards Administrative Integration in Europe’ 
4 JEPP 2 (1997), 242.  
39 Sabel, C. and Zeitling, J., ‘Learning from Difference: The New Architecture of Experimentalist Governance in 
the EU,’ 14 ELJ 3 (2008), 273-4. 
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the Council and the Commission following the communitarisation of this policy area, 
constituting an important shift to a more Community approach.40  
 If one is willing to accept that the coordinating activities of SCIFA+/PUC were purely 
intergovernmental arrangements, the case of Frontex confirms that in the case of delegation to 
agencies, powers are often transferred vertically (from the national to the EU level), rather 
than horizontally (from Community institutions to specialized agencies).41 In this context, 
some authors have argued that the granting of impleenting powers to agencies does not 
amount to the delegation of powers by an EC institution, but rather to the extraction of powers 
from national administrations.42 Even if one considers the coordinating activities of the 
SCIFA+/PUC to have constituted Community activity,  can still be argued that the transfer 
of operational coordination from the PUC to Frontex has entailed a shift from a Member 
States driven coordination within the Council to a more supranational approach within a 
Community agency.  
 The Agency’s establishment formed a way of remedying the failure of 
intergovernmental cooperation in the PUC, shielding the policy area from national politics, 
without having to carry over these powers to the Commission.43 The Commission in its turn 
realised that it did not have the resources to takeon the task of coordinating operational 
coordination itself. It was moreover very much aware of Member States’ sovereignty 
concerns. It is telling that the Commission’s more ambitious plan for the creation of a 
European Corps of Border Guards did not envisage that such Corps would substitute national 
border guard authorities. Recital 4 to Frontex’s founding regulation emphasises that “[t]he 
responsibility for the control and surveillance of external borders lies with the Member 
States.”  
 
However, regarding Frontex solely as the rational outc me of less successful attempts at 
cooperation and the re-balancing of powers between Institutions and Member States, would 
give an incomplete picture of the reasons behind its establishment. As with all agencies, 
Frontex needs to be situated in its proper context, in his case the EU’s wider border and 
                                                
40 See Neal, A., ‘Securitization and Risk at the EU Border: The Origins of FRONTEX’S, 47 JCMS 2 (2009), 
343.  
41 Dehousse, R., ‘Misfits: EU Law and the misfits of European Governance’ (New York, Jean Monnet Working 
Paper 2, 2002), 12. See also the EP Report on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European 
Agency for the Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders, (A5-0093/2004), 30. 
42 Geradin, D. and Petit, N., supra note 22, 15. See in more detail on the difficulty of applying principle-agent 
theory to the delegation to EC agencies: Curtin, D., supra note 22, 528.  
43 Cf. Kelemen, D., supra note 14, 95. 
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migration policy.44 A closer look should be taken at the Agency’s tasks, as well as at the 
background against which it was established. Here on  can find the existing literature on 
agency creation at Community level to be remarkably well applicable.45 
 The management of the external borders is clearly a policy area in which Member 
States fear the transboundary consequences of an uneven application of the Community 
acquis. Not only could this lead to unequal treatment of b th EU citizens and third country 
nationals depending on where they cross the external borders of the European Union, but also 
because the protection of the external borders of the Schengen area is as strong as its weakest 
link.46  
 Article 1 of the Frontex Regulation states that the Agency should improve the 
integrated management of the external borders. It should render more effective the application 
of the Community’s border acquis and contribute to an efficient, high and uniform level of 
control by coordinating Member State’s action for the implementation of this acquis. It should 
further provide the Commission and the Member States with the necessary technical support 
and expertise and promote solidarity between Member States. The agency’s tasks are laid 
down in more detail in Article 2(1): 
 
 a) coordinate operational cooperation between Member States in the field of
 management of external borders; 
 b) assist Member States on training of national border guards, including the 
 establishment of common training standards; 
 c) carry out risk analyses; 
 d) follow up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance of
 external borders; 
 e) assist Member States in circumstances requiring increased technical and operational 
 assistance at external borders; 
 f)  provide Member States with the necessary support in organizing joint return 
 operations; 
 g)  deploy Rapid Border Intervention Teams to Membr States in accordance with 
 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007.  
 
Additionally, under Article 14(8) read in conjunction with Article 15 of the Decision creating 
a European Borders Fund (EBF), the Agency has the task of carrying out a risk analysis for 
                                                
44 See Chapter VII. 
45 See for a different view: Pollak, J. and Slomisnki, P, ‘Experimentalist but not Accountable Governance? The 
Role of Frontex in Managing the EU’s External Borders,’ forthcoming in West European Politics. The authors 
look at the establishment of Frontex through the lens of experimentalist governance. This approach looks at the 
agency in functional rather than structural or institutional terms: Sabel, C. and Zeitling, J., supra note 39, 274. 
46 Magnette has pointed out that agencies have been cr ated in policy areas in which the Member States fear the 
consequences of non-coordination: Magnette, P., ‘The Politics of Regulation in the European Union’, in:
Geradin, D. et al., Regulation through Agencies in the EU: A New Paradigm of European Governance 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2005), 10.  
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the purpose of the annual distribution of resources, reporting annually to the Commission and 
identifying “the current levels of threat at the external borders.”47 Although not explicit in the 
operative part of the Decision, the recitals further state that the agency should be consulted by 
the Commission on draft multiannual programmes and strategic guidelines.48 It may also be 
asked for an opinion in the assessment of the impact of the Fund.49  
 
Frontex can be understood to be an agency with a dual i entity. On the one hand it is a 
“classic” regulatory agency which assists in the implementation of an EC policy through the 
provision of technical and informational assistance. These are the tasks listed under b) and d) 
and to the extent that risk analyses are made for the Member States also c). Also in its 
preparation of advice under the EBF, the Agency can be considered to be fulfilling a role 
similar to that of Community agencies in other areas of regulatory policy.50 The argument can 
be readily made that the involvement of an independent agency contributes to the credibility 
of this financial burden sharing instrument in that it leaves the decision on the weighing 
factors, which ultimately determine the amount of mney allocated to a certain Member State, 
to an a-political, expert agency.51  
 On the other hand, Frontex is an agency endowed with the coordination of operational 
cooperation between law enforcement agencies of the kind one could previously observe only 
under the Third Pillar.52 These are the tasks listed under a), e), f) and g). Rather than forming 
the locus for deliberative policy making, the Frontex network allows for the exchange of 
information, the establishment of contacts between national border guard authorities and the 
fostering of a culture of mutual trust. An additional, distinctive feature of Frontex is the 
pooling of resources, technical and human, of the various participants in the network.  
 Frontex is a coordinating body, forming part of a network consisting of national border 
guard authorities. This network structure not only protects national border guard authorities’ 
prerogatives, it also reinforces them. This is particularly true for those Member States which 
                                                
47 Article 15, Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as 
part of the General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/22 
(hereinafter: “EBF”). 
48 Recital, 16, EBF. 
49 Recital 17, EBF. 
50 For instance in the area of medicine regulation and in the area of food safety, the Commission makes its 
decisions on the basis of scientific advice prepared by regulatory agencies, the European Medicines Agency 
(EMEA) and the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA) respectively.   
51 Geradin, D. and Petit, N., supra note 22, 36. See also Everson, M. and Majone, G., supra note 26, 21. 
52 See the tasks of Europol and Eurojust: Council Decision 2009/371/JHA establishing the European Police 
Office (Europol), OJ 2009, L121/37 and Council Decision 2002/187/JHA setting up Eurojust with a view to 
reinforcing the fight against serious crimes, OJ 2002, L63/1.  
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as a result of the enlargement of the Schengen area no longer have external land borders as it 
grants national border guard authorities a continuing involvement and importance in their area 
of expertise.53 The Agency’s task of providing support to joint reurn operations highlights the 
link between the national border guard authorities and Frontex.54 
 Under the First Pillar, only the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) has 
similar powers of coordination of national enforcement activity.55 The Common Fisheries 
Policy and the External Borders Regime have in commn that Member States may be lacking 
trust in the enforcement authorities of other Member States and their ability to fulfil their 
tasks effectively. This may be the result of a lack of capacity/resources, as was the case in 
some of the accession countries, or a deliberate national policy of non-enforcement.56 Here a 
credibility argument can be put forward that does not relate to the consistency of the 
Community policy itself, but to the need for an effective enforcement in order for any given 
policy to be credible, not merely in the eyes of the public, but in particular for the individual 
Member States.  
 As was argued above, the credibility argument can be linked to the question of trust. In 
the European context, the widely reported arrival of immigrants across the Mediterranean and 
Atlantic, the framing of this phenomenon as constituting a (humanitarian) crisis and the 
authorities’ apparent incapacity to deal with this s tuation has eroded the authority of both 
Member States’ governments and the Commission. Frontex is meant to restore that trust 
within the Member States directly affected by showing that the EU is making a serious effort 
to tackle the situation and give practical meaning to the concept of solidarity.57 In addition it 
should reassure the Member States that are not directly affected that measures are being taken 
to protect the most vulnerable parts of the common external borders.  
                                                
53 Bigo, D, ‘Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who is in Control?’, in: Bigo, D. and Guild, E. (Eds), 
Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), 67. See also:  
Baumann, M., Der Deutsche Fingerabdruck: Die Rolle der deutschen Bundesregierung bei der Europäisierung 
der Grenzpolitik (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2006).  
54 Article 2(1)(f), Frontex Regulation. As follows from recital 11 of the Frontex Regulation, this task was 
included because within the Member States the operational aspects of removal of third-country nationals fall 
within the competencies of the authorities responsible for controlling the external borders. 
55 The Commission in COM(2008) 135 final, 7, divides agencies in a number of categories, one of which is 
“Agencies in charge of operational activities”. It does however not define what is to be understood under 
“operational activities”. The Commission includes in this category the European Police College (Third Pillar), as 
well as the European Railway Agency (ERA) and the European GNSS Supervisory Authority (First Pillar). 
These agencies are however not “operational” in the sense that they coordinate operational cooperation between 
national law enforcement authorities. 
56 See for instance Case C-304/02, Commission v. France [2005] ECR I-6263. 
57 Not without reason the Commission in a leaflet called ‘Europe and You’ presented the tackling of illegal 
immigration under the coordination of Frontex as a prime example of how the EU in 2006 “helped out in global 
hot spots”: http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/others/61/en.pdf. 
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 The Commission presented the proposal for the Agency’s establishment against the 
background of widely reported irregular landings at the EU’s southern maritime borders, and 
its adoption came shortly after another summer witnessing the arrival of irregular migrants by 
sea. Similarly, irregular migration by sea formed an important motivation behind the proposal 
for the Regulation establishing a mechanism for the deployment of so-called Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams (RABIT), allowing the agency to respond swiftly to a “sudden influx” of 
irregular migrants.58 
 Dauvergne has argued that one way in which migration law has been securitised in the 
wake of 9/11 is precisely through the creation of new agencies, dealing with immigration, 
borders and security, moving migration issues into an organisational structure with a different 
governing ethos.59 This was for instance the case in the United Kingdom, Canada and the 
United States.60 It has been argued that regulatory agencies, due to their specialist nature and 
limited mandate, run the risk of taking a one-sided approach to complex problems.61 The fact 
that most Frontex staff are officials recruited from national enforcement authorities or 
seconded national experts (SNEs) is likely to reinforce a particular perception of the 
management of migration.62   
 The creation of these agencies has aimed to restore trust in governments’ capacity to 
effectively guard the borders against a range of security threats and uphold the myth of 
control over borders, and as such they can be considered both a result and a catalyst for the 
securitisation of migration law. The European Council of October 2003 recalled “the common 
interest of all Member States in establishing a more effective management of borders, in 
                                                
58 See in detail below. Neal opposes the application of the “securitisation logic” to Frontex, underlining that the 
Agency’s focus is on risk analysis as a means of ration lizing Member States border controls. He does recognise 
“the return of security” in the demands put upon the Agency and the adoption of the RABIT Regulation: Neal, 
A., supra note 40, 350. 
59 Dauvergne, C., ‘Making People Illegal: What Globalisation means forMigration and Law (Cambridge, CUP, 
2008), 97. 
60 See e.g. the creation of the US Customs and Border Protection in 2003, the Canadian Border Services Agency 
in 2003 and the UK Border Agency in 2008. 
61 Williams, G., Monomaniacs or Schizophrenics?: Respon ible Governance and the EU’s Independent 
Agencies’, 53 Pol Stud 1 (2005), 90 ff. Note however that in the same article Williams refers to the danger of a 
dispersal of powers between agencies, causing problems of coordination. Frontex has been meeting with the 
heads of the Community Fisheries Control Agency (CFCA) and the European Maritime Agency in order to 
coordinate possible activity within the framework of the EU’s maritime strategy: Frontex News, 28 August 
2008.  
62 Shapiro, M., supra note 28, 283. See Article 17(3), Frontex Regulation. The ECRE Report on Defending 
Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe (London, December 2007), 13, notes that the composition of the 
Agency’s staff mirrors the situation in EU Member States where generally the task of migration control is 
separated from the granting of international protection. 
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particular with a view to enhancing the security of their citizens,” welcoming the 
Commission’s intent to present a proposal for the establishment of Frontex.63 
 It becomes clear from looking at Frontex’s tasks that customs operations or (phyto-) 
sanitary controls (First Pillar) and the prevention and detection of crime (Third Pillar) are 
outside its remit. However, should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, one can expect 
Frontex’s competences to eventually be expanded to cover tasks currently covered by the 
Third Pillar.64 Moreover, the emphasis on horizontal integration between border and customs 
authorities as an important step towards achieving a truly integrated border management 
should be read in the light of Dauvergne’s observations.65 Rather than constituting a move 
away from the exclusive focus on irregular migration, one could interpret this to be an 
example of how border and migration management is drawn into a security context, 
considering that customs tasks have expanded from collecting customs duties and indirect 
taxes at import, to goods related security question such as organised crime and terrorism.66 In 
this respect, the proposal to establish a European Asylum Support Office as a separate entity 
should be seen as positive.67  
 Importantly, the creation of Frontex allows the Commission and the Member States to 
effectively shift the blame for the loss of life and human suffering that coincides with ever 
more desperate attempts to evade ever stricter border controls.68 At the same time, a failure to 
kerb irregular migration would be attributed to the Agency rather than the Community 
institutions. Although the Executive Director of Frontex has on more than one occasion 
stressed that Frontex cannot be a panacea against irregular migration, political discussions on 
                                                
63 European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 16-17 October 2003, under III.  
64 In fact the EU Counter-terrorism coordinator, Gilles de Kerchove, has already argued in favour of the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty in order to enable Frontex to cover all security aspects: ‘Europa is kwetsbaar voor 
terrorisme’ (De Standaard, 11 September 2008). 
65 The Hague Programme, Annex to the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, point 
1.7.1 and COM(2008) 67 final, Commission Report on he evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX 
Agency, 9. 
66 COM(2008) 169 final, Commission Strategy for the evolution of the Customs Union, 2. See also the “Security 
Amendment” to the Community Customs Code: Regulation (EC) No 648/2005, amending Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 2913/92 establishing the Community Customs Code, OJ 2005,  L 117/13. 
67 COM(2009) 66 final, Commission Proposal for a Regulation establishing an Asylum Support Office. Also the 
conclusion of a working arrangement with the UNHCR and IOM on the basis of Article 13 of the Frontex 
Regulation should allow for an increased awareness within the Agency of the rights of migrants and refugees. 
The Commission has furthermore called for the development of specialised training courses on relevant 
provisions of European and international rules on asylum, the law of the sea and fundamental rights: 
COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 5.  
68 Fiorina, M., supra note 16, 47. Note that on the internet a range of sites target Frontex rather than the EU’s 
immigration and asylum policy. To name a few:  
http://no-racism.net/article/2401/;  
http://frontex.antira.info/;  
http://www.frontex.info.pl/category/language/english. In June 2008 a protest against the Agency was organised 
at the Frontex headquarters in Warsaw, Poland: http //www.noborder.org/item.php?id=442#programme. 
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ways to tackle irregular migration almost inevitably conclude with a call for a reinforcement 
of the Agency.69 The Agency’s human resources (staff and seconded national experts) have 
been growing from a mere 45 in 2005, to 100 in 2007, surpassing 200 in 2008.70 Its budget 
has increased substantially from 6.2 million euro in 2005 to slightly over 70 million in 2008, 
as high as the 2013 budget initially foreseen for the Agency.71 At the same, the Court of 
Auditors has noted that nearly 70 % of the appropriations available for 2007 were not spent.72  
 
3. Organisational Structure 
 
In order to better understand the Agency’s functioning, it is necessary to study the tasks and 
powers of its organs, as well as its internal organisation. Some authors have argued that the 
institutional design of Frontex “leans” to the Council as a principle.73 However, the Agency’s 
set-up is in reality comparable to that of the majority of Community agencies.  
 Frontex’s most important official is its Executive Director, who represents the Agency 
and is responsible for its management.74 More specifically his/her powers and tasks are list d 
in Article 25(2) of the Regulation. These include the responsibility for the preparation and 
implementation of decisions of the Agency’s governing body, the Management Board, as well 
as for the Annual Working Programme, the Activity Report and the Annual Budget. As 
regards the implementation of the budget, the Executive Director performs the duties of 
authorising officer.75 The Executive Director is also the appointing authori y as regards the 
Agency’s staff. The Executive Director may delegate his/her tasks to other members of the 
Agency’s staff.76  The Executive Director is assisted by a Deputy Executive Director, who in 
                                                
69 See for instance the Results of the JHA Council, Luxembourg, 5-6 October 2006 (Council Document 
13068/06, 16); the Draft Council Conclusions on furthe  reinforcing the EU’s Southern Maritime Borders 
(Council Document 12712/1/07 REV 1, point III.c); the Pact on Immigration and Asylum adopted by the 
European Council at its meeting of 15-16 October 2008 (Council Document 13440/08), 10; European Council 
Conclusions, Brussels, 21-22 June 2007, point 18. 
70 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/faq/. For the number of EC staff see the EC’s general budget, Annex Part C on 
staff. 
71 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/finance/. SEC(2008) 148, Impact Assessment accompanying COM(2008) 68, 
Commission Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency, 8. 
72 Court of Auditors, Report on the annual accounts of Fr ntex for the financial year 2007 together with the 
Agency’s replies (2008/C 311/06), OJ 2008, C 311/34. 
73 Curtin, D., supra note 42, 528 and Neil, A., supra note 40, 343. 
74 Articles 15 and 25, Frontex Regulation. 
75 See Article 33, Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 on the framework Financial Regulation 
for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1605/2002 on the Financi l 
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the European Communities, OJ 2002, L357/72. 
76 Article 25(3)(f), Frontex Regulation. 
 264 
his absence or indisposition replaces him/her.77 In line with most Community agencies, they 
are appointed by the Management Board.78 The Executive Director is appointed on the basis 
of a list of candidates proposed by the Commission.79 Their term of office is five years and is 
renewable once for the same period.80  
 The Executive Director is accountable to the Management Board.81 The Management 
Board consists of the representatives of all Member States and two members appointed by the 
Commission. In practice most national representatives are the operational heads of the 
national services responsible for border guard management, which means that the 
composition of the Management Board largely coincides with that of the PUC. They serve for 
four years, renewable once. The Management Board meets formally at least twice a year.82 
From amongst its Members it appoints a chairperson and deputy-chair person, for a once 
renewable term of two years.83 Initially, the Commission proposed - in line with t e never-
concluded draft interinstitutional agreement on theoperating framework for the European 
regulatory agencies - a smaller Management Board, consisting of twelve members appointed 
by the Council and two members appointed by the Commission.”84 The Parliament, in order 
to reinforce the Community character of the Agency, had proposed that six of these Members 
would be appointed by the Commission and six by the Council.85 Although this has not been 
the case in practice, the Regulation allows for the establishment of an Executive Bureau 
which would assist the Executive Director and could be allowed to take, in case of urgency, 
certain provisional decisions on behalf of the Management Board.86 
 The powers of the Management Board are detailed in Article 20 of the Frontex 
Regulation. The general voting rule laid down in Article 24(1) is absolute majority. The 
appointment (and dismissal) of the Executive Director and his/her Deputy is however decided 
                                                
77 Article 26(3), Frontex Regulation. 
78 Articles 26(2) and (4), Frontex Regulation. 
79 Article 26(1), Frontex Regulation. 
80 Article 26(5), Frontex Regulation. 
81 Article 25(4), Frontex Regulation. See Articles 20 and 21 for the powers of the Management Board and its 
composition. 
82 Article 23, Frontex Regulation. 
83 Article 22, Frontex Regulation. Currently Robert Strondl (Austria) is chairperson. Manuel Jamela Palos 
(Portugal) is deputy chairperson.  
84 Article 18, COM(2003) 687 final, Proposal for a Council Regulation establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders. Note that with the exception of the European 
Food Safety Agency (EFSA) all other Community agenci s have Management Boards consisting of at least one 
representative per Member State.   
85 EP legislative resolution on the proposal for a Council regulation establishing a European Agency for the 
Management of Operational Co-operation at the External Borders (COM(2003) 687 – C5-0613/2003 – 
2003/0273(CNS)), amendment 31. 
86 Article 20(7), Frontex Regulation.  
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by a two-thirds majority.87 The Programme of Work, outlining the Agency’s activities for the 
coming year, is adopted by a three-quarters majority.88 The Management Board’s Rules of 
Procedure allow for a decision to be taken by written procedure, provided that one-third of the 
voting members does not object.89  
 Under Article 16 of the Frontex Regulation, the Management Board can establish 
specialised branches of the Agencies, which should b ild upon the expertise of the ad-hoc 
centres previously established. However, so far, no such branches or “regional offices” have 
been established. Both Parliament and the Executive D r ctor of the Agency have shown 
themselves reluctant towards their creation.90 Nevertheless, the Report on the Evaluation and 
Future Development of Frontex considers that serious consideration ought to be given to this 
option, in view of  “the developments towards permanent operations and the evolution of the 
tasks for the Agency.”91 For some Member States’ the possibility of hosting such a branch 
may be an important motivation for their support, although indeed the focus on joint 
operations at the southern maritime external borders may call for a specialised branch there 
merely from the point of view of cost-efficiency.92  
 Under Frontex’s initial internal organisation six units reported directly to the (Deputy) 
Executive Director. As of 2007 the units have been brought under three separate divisions 
headed by a director: Operations, Capacity Building a d Administration.93 So-called National 
Frontex Contact Points (NFPoCs) were established as soon as the Agency became operational 
in 2005. The RABIT Regulation specifically lays down the obligation for Member States to 
set up a national contact point for communication with Frontex on all matters pertaining to the 
RABITs.94  
                                                
87 Article 26(2), Frontex Regulation.  
88 Article 20(2)(c), Frontex Regulation. 
89 Article 8, Frontex Management Board Decision of 25 May 2005 on Rules of Procedure of the Management 
Board. In case of urgency any means of communication may be acceptable.  
90 Amendment 26, European Parliament Legislative Resolution of 9 March 2004 ((P5_TA(2004)0151), proposed 
the deletion of the Article. 
91 COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 4. The European Parliament has opposed the creation of “a large number 
of decentralised agencies”, but has at the same tim stated that “consideration might be given at thisstage to 
setting up two distinct external offices - one coordinating activities at land borders, the other for sea operations”: 
EP Resolution of 18 December 2008 on the evaluation nd future development of the FRONTEX Agency and of 
the European Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR) (2008/2157(INI)), point 26. 
92 See also the Position Paper on Illegal Migration and Asylum in the Mediterranean Region of 13 January 2009 
by the four southern Member States united in the Quadro Group (Greece, Cyprus, Italy and Malta), 5: 
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/16/0970_Final_paper_Versione_firmata.pdf. 
See for an illustration of the importance attached to the seat of the various Community agencies the discussion at 
the end of the Laeken summit, quoted by Vos, E., supra note 21, 126-127.   
93 http://www.frontex.europa.eu/structure/. 
94 In practice these are the same as the already existing NFCoPs, although some Member States initially 
appointed different contact points.  
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 An important feature of Frontex’s network structure is the exchange of (operational) 
information with and between national authorities. Article 11 of the Frontex Regulation 
stipulates that the Agency may take all necessary measures to facilitate the exchange of 
information relevant for its tasks with the Commission and the Member States. It has been 
associated with the ICO-net through a Memorandum of Understanding with the 
Commission.95 A recent Commission Proposal would enable Frontex to attend the meetings 
organised within the framework of the Immigration Liaison Officers Network.96 A Frontex 
Situation Centre (FSC) has been established as a unit of the Operations Division, tasked with 
monitoring the situation at the external borders on a constant basis. All incoming and 
outgoing operational information is processed through the FSC.97 A secure Frontex 
Information System is being developed for the exchange of classified, strategic information 
and intelligence related to illegal immigration with Europol on the basis of the working 
arrangement concluded with this agency in March 2008.98  
 Although the UK and Ireland have been excluded from participation in the Agency, 
they are invited to and attend the meetings of the Management Board.99 They have also 
established a FNPoC. Article 12 of the Frontex Regulation provides that the Agency shall 
facilitate operational cooperation with the UK and Ireland in matters covered by its activities 
and to the extent required for the fulfilment of its tasks, including joint (return) operations.  
 The Frontex Regulation in Article 21(3) specifically states that Schengen Associated 
Countries (SAC) will participate as members of the Management Board of the Agency, albeit 
with limited voting rights. The modalities for this participation are laid down in an 
international agreement between the EC and Norway and Iceland.100 Article 2 of the 
Agreement states that they shall have voting rights as regards decisions on activities carried 
out at or in the vicinity of their border, as well as activities under the following provisions of 
the Frontex Regulation: Article 3 (joint operations and pilot projects at external borders), 
Article 7 (management of technical equipment), Article 8 (support to Member States in 
                                                
95 Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and FRONTEX concerning the 
development of ICONet, final text as approved by the Commission on 15 February 2007 in written procedur .  
96 Article 1(2), COM(2009) 322 final, amending Article 4(2) of Council Regulation (EC) No 377/2004 on the
creation of an immigration liaison officers network, OJ 2004, L64/1. 
97 Frontex General Report 2008, 13: http://www.frontex.europa.eu/annual_report 
98 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU in its Report on ‘EUROPOL: coordinating the fight against 
serious and organized crime’ (HL Paper 183, Session 2007-08, 29th Report, 12 November 2008), supplementary 
evidence given by the Home Office, Question 47. TheWorking Arrangement has been agreed on the basis of 
Article 13, Frontex Regulation.  
99 Article 23(4), Frontex Regulation. 
100 Council Decision 2007/511/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the Community, of an Arrangement between 
the EC, Iceland and Norway on the modalities of the participation by those States in Frontex, OJ 2007, L188/15. 
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circumstances requiring increased technical and operational assistance at external borders) 
and Article 9(1), first sentence (joint return operations) to be carried out with human 
resources and/or equipment made available by Iceland and/or Norway. They furthermore have 
voting rights under Article 4 of the Frontex Regulation on decisions regarding risk analysis 
which directly affect them and under Article 5 of the Frontex Regulation on decisions 
regarding training activities, except the common core curriculum. It is interesting to see that 
the other provisions of the Agreement, specifically mention parts of the Frontex Regulation, 
for instance in relation to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice (ECJ), that are 
applicable to Norway and Iceland. This shows once more that the SAC cannot be fully 
equated with the Member States. Moreover, in the abs nce of an agreement on the modalities 
for their participation there could be doubts as to which parts of the Frontex Regulation are 
applicable to the SAC and which not.   
 The Schengen Association Agreement with Switzerland was concluded the day before 
the adoption of the Frontex Regulation, which explains the lack of a reference to Switzerland 
in the recitals.101 The Commission was given a mandate in April 2008 to negotiate the specific 
agreement as regards the voting rights of Switzerland nd Liechtenstein.102 The Council is 
expected to adopt the Decision on the signing of this Agreement shortly.103 The provisions of 
the Agreement with Norway and Iceland, including voting rights, apply mutatis mutandis to 
Switzerland and Liechtenstein. In addition, the Agreement makes some provisions from the 
RABIT Regulation applicable.104 Interesting is the attached Joint Declaration which states that 
the voting rights granted to Switzerland do not constitute “a legal or political precedent for 
any other field of cooperation between the parties to the Arrangement or for the participation 
of other third countries in other agencies of the Union. Moreover, “[i]n no circumstances may 
these voting rights be exercised in respect of decisions of a regulatory or legislative nature.” 
This latter statement should however be superfluous since under the Meroni Doctrine Frontex 
itself could not dispose of powers of such nature.  
                                                
101 See however Recital 21, RABIT Regulation. Note that e reference to Council Decision 2004/849/EC, OJ 
2004, L368/26, is superfluous, since this Decision c cerns the parts of the Schengen acquis falling under the 
Third Pillar.  
102 One could argue that since the Agreement with Norway and Iceland was adopted before the RABIT 
Regulation, the voting rights in relation to Article 8 apply only to the original text and not to Article 8(3), 
Frontex Regulation, which was added by the RABIT Regulation.  
103 COM(2009) 255 final, Proposal a Council Decision on the signing, on behalf of the Community, of the 
Arrangement between the EC, of the one part, and Switzerland and Liechtenstein, of the other part, on the 
modalities of the participation by those States in Frontex and Council Document 11819/09. 
104 Article 6(2) and the Joint Declaration on the Application of the Provisions on the Civil Liability, COM(2009) 
255 final, ibid. 
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 Like Romania and Bulgaria before their accession t the EU, Switzerland and 
Liechtenstein were permitted to attend the meetings of the Management Board in the position 
of observer pending the entry into force of the Schengen Association Agreement with these 
countries. The Agency had already concluded a working agreement with its Swiss counterpart 
on the basis of Article 14 of the Frontex Regulation.105 
 
4. Coordination of Operational Cooperation 
 
This section will focus on the Agency’s task of coordinating joint operational activity of the 
Member States.106 Here, the supposedly a-political nature of the agency is most likely to clash 
with the highly politicised environment in which it functions.107 In relation to these tasks the 
RABIT Regulation has brought about fundamental amendments to the Agency’s legal 
framework.108 It illustrates well how a sense of crisis and the urge to show decisive action has 
resulted in legislation that is on the one hand far-re ching and on the other hand of limited 
practical relevance. 
 
4.1 Practice of Joint Operations 
 
Article 3 of the Frontex Regulation determines that the Agency shall “evaluate, approve and 
coordinate” Member States’ proposals for joint operations and “may itself, and in agreement 
with the Member State(s) launch initiatives for joint operations.” Although there is no 
minimum number of Member States mentioned, the concept of “joint” implies the 
involvement of at least two Member States.  
 Member States are in no way prevented from cooperating t operational level with 
other Member States, where such cooperation complements the action of the Agency.109 In 
                                                
105 Memorandum of Cooperation on the establishment of operational cooperation between Frontex and the  
Kommando Grenzwachtkorps from the Eidgenössisches Finanzdepartement EFD of the Swiss Confederation, 
signed 4 June 2007.  
106 Article 2(1)(a),(e),(f) and (g), Frontex Regulation. 
107 Carrera, S., ‘The EU Border Management Strategy: Frontex and the Challenges of Irregular Immigration in 
the Canary Islands’ (Brussels, CEPS Working Document No. 261, March 2007), 9. 
108 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007, establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers, OJ 2007, L199/30 (hereinafter: “RABIT Regulation”). 
109 Article 2(2), Frontex Regulation and Article 16(3) SBC. The TFEU contains a provision to this effect 
applicable to all “competent departments of [Member States’] administrations responsible for safeguarding 
national security”, in Article 73. 
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practice, most joint operations are initiated, at least formally, by the Agency. From the 
Member State point of view an important reason for the involvement of Frontex would be the 
possibility for a financial contribution from the Agency’s budget. Article 3(4) provides that 
the Agency my co-finance operations with grants from its budget. 110  
 The applicability of the Community’s financial rules, has resulted in a practice under 
which the Agency concludes Framework Partnership Agreements (FPAs) with the Member 
States and third countries, following the model of FPAs in areas such as education or 
development cooperation, and which form the framework f r the specific grant agreements.111 
They for instance stipulate the powers of the Court f Auditors and OLAF in checking the use 
made of the Agency’s funding. They are binding under private law. While the agreements 
between the Commission and third country beneficiaries normally make Belgian or 
Luxemburg law applicable to such agreements, the Frontex agreements are silent as to the 
applicable law and merely confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance and, in the event 
of appeal, the Court of Justice regarding interpretation, application or fulfilment of the 
agreement.112 Since the negotiation of the FPAs is time-consuming, the Agency in the course 
of 2008 attempted to substitute the grant agreements with grant decisions. However, an 
amendment to the Community’s financial rules in July 2008 excluded this possibility for 
Community Agencies.113    
 The general framework for the Agencies’ operational activities is the Annual 
Programme of Work, which is adopted by the Management Board each year, before the 30th 
of September.114 It lays down the expected number and estimated timing of joint operations at 
different external borders (land, sea, air), as well as joint return operations.115 Within two 
months after its adoption the UK and Ireland can make a request to participate in the activities 
foreseen by the Annual Plan, upon which the Management Board shall decide whether to 
                                                
110 This could have the undesired effect of Member States pushing for a joint operation, rather than coordinating 
existing national patrols, for instance within the framework of the European Patrols Network (EPN). On the 
EPN: Frontex, ‘European Patrols Network’(Frontex News, 24 May 2007). 
111 See Article 32, Frontex Regulation, read in conjunction with Article 108 of Council Regulation (EC, 
Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicab e to the General Budget of the European 
Communities, OJ 2002, L248/1, Article 75, Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002, supra note 
75, Article 163 of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002 laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of the general Financial Regulation, OJ 2002, L357/1, Article 75 of the Management Board 
Decision of 30 June 2005 establishing the Frontex Financial Regulation applicable to the Budget of Frontex and 
Article 151 of the Management Board Decision of 16 December 2005 establishing the Frontex Financial 
Implementing Regulation.     
112 Article 238 EC. 
113 Article 75(2), Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002, supra note 111, as inserted by 
Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 652/2008, OJ 2008, L181/23.  
114 Article 20(2)(c), Frontex Regulation, also referred to in Article 8c as “working programme”. 
115 See for the 2009 Programme of Work: 
http://www.frontex.europa.eu/gfx/frontex/files/justyna/programme_of_work_2009.pdf. 
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agree to some or all of the activities in that request. 116 In accordance with Article 20(5) of the 
Frontex Regulation, the Management Board must however also decide on each specific 
participation separately. This Decision must clearly state how the participation of either of the 
two Member States “contributes to the achievement of the activity in question.”117 The UK 
and Ireland’s initial request in relation to the Annual Programme of Work does not prevent 
them from requesting to participate in additional joint operations during the year.  
 Frontex cannot organise joint operations within the erritory of the UK or Ireland 
because the Frontex regulation does not apply there. If, as has indeed happened, either of 
them wishes to participate in an operation involving Schengen airports, this is only possible 
by conducting a parallel national operation. There will be no funding for the UK/Irish border 
guards participating in such coordinated activity.118  
 On the basis of Article 20(2)(d), the Management Board has adopted Rules of 
Procedure for the taking decisions related to the op rational tasks of the Agency by the 
Executive Director, which have been elaborated in the Frontex Internal Rules of Procedure.119 
Every first Tuesday of the month a Directorate Meeting is held, with the Executive Director, 
the Deputy Director, the Directors of the Divisions, the Chief Legal Advisor and the Agency’s 
Controller, discussing all current issues. The same people meet every second Tuesday, as the 
so-called Directorate Programme Board, in which proposals for programmes (grouping 
together of projects, operation or other activities) are made. The decision to implement 
activities under these programmes is made either by the Executive Director or the Director of 
the responsible Division, depending on the amount of m ney involved.120 The Operations 
Divisions covers three units: Joint Operations, Risk Analysis and the FSC. The Joint 
Operations sub-unit is further divided into three sctors: land, sea and air borders. 
                                                
116 Management Board Decision of 24 March 2006 on the Frontex Framework Decision on practical 
arrangements for UK participation in Frontex Operational Activities and Management Board Decision No 
31/2007 of 15 November 2007 on the practical arrangements for participation of Ireland in Frontex Operational 
Activities. 
A Decision regarding Ireland was adopted by the Management Board in 2007. 
117 Article 20(2)(5), Frontex Regulation. Initially this condition was rather a dead letter. At the instigation of the 
Commission however, which out of principle voted against the UK’s participation on a number of occasion  for 
lack of motivation of the added value, practice has now changed.  
118 However, a Frontex liaison officer going to the UK airport in order to coordinate the two parallel operations 
would be considered as taking part in the Frontex joint operation and would be eligible for funding.  
119 Management Board Decision No 020/2008 of 4 July 2008 laying down procedures for taking decision related 
to the operational tasks of the agency by the Executive Director, replacing a previous decision of 24 March 2006; 
Executive Director Decision 2008/67 of 12 December 2008 on the Adoption of Frontex Internal Rules of 
Procedure, entry force on 1 January 2009. 
120 The Executive Director has delegated his powers of authorising officer to the Director of the Operations 
Division for amounts with a maximum of  maximum amount 500.000 EUR: Decision of the Executive Director 
No 2008/37 of 8 September 2008 on Delegation of Authori y, applying to the Director of the Operations 
Division.  
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 Once the decision to implement a joint operation has been made an operational plan is 
drafted in close consultation with (possible) participating Member States. It is crucial that all 
participating Member States agree to the plan, since t forms the blueprint for the operation 
and contains important information such as timing, modus operandi, operational area, 
communication channels, available technical means and human resources as well as a detailed 
budget. It is not signed by the participating Member States, but decided upon and signed by 
the Deputy Executive Director. 
 The so-called host Member State, i.e. the Member State on whose territory the 
operation takes place, is responsible for the operation. The Frontex Regulation states in 
Article 20(3) that “proposals for decisions on specific activities to be carried out at, or in the 
immediate vicinity of, the external border of any particular Member State shall require a vote 
in favour of their adoption by the Member of the Management Board representing that 
Member State.”  
 A Frontex Coordinator manages the joint operation. S/he does not have the power to 
take operational decisions, but rather to coordinate cooperation on the spot between host 
Member State and participating Member States. Each operation has an assigned analyst, also 
referred to as the Intelligence Officer who, throughout the operation, gathers and provides 
intelligence relevant for the operation and produces a weekly risk/threat analysis.121 The 
analyst is placed in the FSC, which coordinates the exchange of information during the joint 
operation. On the basis of operational and intellignce reports the Frontex Coordinator can 
propose changes to the operational plan.  
 In sea operations, the host Member State establishes an International Coordination 
Centre (ICC) and provides the ICC coordinator in charge of the centre. The ICC coordinator 
is also the Head of the Joint Coordinating Board (JCB), consisting of representatives of the 
participating Member States (National Officers, NOs) and Frontex experts, including the risk 
analyst. The command and control of the participating assets remains in national hands, 
through the NOs, who are to be given the possibility to consult with their superiors 
beforehand. The ICC coordinator implements the decisions related to operational activities 
taken by the JCB. The tactical command remains under the authority of each specific asset, or 
as directed by national authorities.  
                                                
121 Information derived from the operational plans of j int operations HERA III (Canary Island, January-
February 2007) and Nautilus 2006 (Southern Mediterranean, September 2006) made (partially) accessible to the 
author. See also the Final Report of the External ev uation of Frontex carried out on the basis of Article 33, 
Frontex Regulation (COWI, Kongens Lyngby, January 2009), 34 ff. 
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 Even where there is agreement on the operational plan, in practice problems may still 
arise. An evaluation report of 2008 mentioned how sme participating Member States did not 
allow the NO/JCB to change the patrolling schedules as needed and recommended that 
“Member States should commit themselves in advance to an agreed organizational structure 
and practical arrangement when deploying their means and humans resources during Frontex 
coordinated activities.”122 This is however the raison d’être of the operational plan. 
 The main complicating factor is the uncertain lega st tus of the operational plan. In 
one joint operation a Member State made its participation conditional upon the conclusion of 
an additional bilateral agreement under public international law with the host-Member State, 
who did not however accept this.123 The Member State eventually agreed to its participation, 
considering the host-Member State’s unilateral declarations as sufficiently binding under 
international law. The International Court of Justice has stated that “[it] is well recognized 
that declarations made by way of unilateral acts (...) may have the effect of creating legal 
obligations”.124 Considering however the ECJ’s case law in MOX Plant, the autonomy of the 
Community legal order and the duty of loyal cooperation would seem to prevent an action on 
the basis of a breach of such obligation before a court other than the European Court of 
Justice.125  
 One could consider the operational plan as a decision of the Agency which is binding 
on the participating Member States on the basis of Article 10 EC, the duty of sincere 
cooperation. This would allow the Commission or a Member State to bring an action under 
Article 226 or 227 EC respectively in case of non-cmpliance with the operational plan. 
Under the extension of the Court’s jurisdiction in the Lisbon Treaty, allowing it to review also 
the acts of agencies of the Union, a Member State could in theory challenge an operational 
plan directly.126 
 In practice, English is the language used in joint perations, although legally it would 
be perfectly possible to opt for any other Community language. In earlier joint operations, still 
under the coordination of the PUC, language and communication problems were reported to 
                                                
122 Frontex, Public Except Evaluation Report Joint Operation Hermes 2008, 3. 
123 The issue concerned the responsibility for irregular migrants and asylum seekers taken on board by 
participating vessels. Information derived from informal discussions with Frontex staff and national officials.  
124 Nuclear Tests (Australia/France), ICJ Reports (1974), 253, para. 43 and the Guiding Principles applicable to 
unilateral declarations of States capable of creating legal obligations (Text adopted by the International Law 
Commission at its Fifty-eighth session, in 2006, and submitted to the General Assembly as a part of the 
Commission’s report covering the work of that session (A/61/10). 
125 Case C-459/03, Commission v. Ireland (“MOX Plant”) [2006] ECR-I 4635, paras 154 and 182. 
126 Article 263 TFEU. The Treaty amendment was however inserted to provide a legal basis for making an 
appeal possible against decisions made by regulatory gencies with decision-making powers, such as for instance 
the Office for Harmonisation in the Internal Market - Trademarks and designs (OHIM).   
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cause major practical difficulties.127 Poor language skills of national border guards are also 
mentioned as a problem in the independent evaluation carried out in 2008.128 
 
4.2 The Political Nature of Frontex’s Coordinating Tasks 
 
In relation to Community agencies established in policy areas such as medicine, chemicals 
and food safety regulation, it has been argued that perceptions of risk are of themselves value-
laden and that scientific uncertainty is the rule rather than the exception.129 Likewise, the idea 
that the coordination of operational cooperation is a neutral, non-political exercise, was 
questioned in the previous chapter. Although the nature of the risk dealt with by Frontex, 
namely the occurrence of irregular migration, cannot of course be compared to that of a threat 
to health and safety, a similar critique can nevertheless be made in relation to Frontex’s tasks.
 Both the Commission and Frontex have argued that an independent risk assessment 
should be at the basis of the Agency’ activities.130 In other regulatory areas, such as medicine 
regulation, there may be a danger that powerful industries “capture” this risk assessment.131 In 
the case of Frontex however, it could be the Member States that for political reasons may 
wish to substitute their own assessment of the situation at their external borders for that of the 
Agency or draw different conclusions from the risk assessment made. It may be questioned 
whether the Agency, represented by its Executive Director, would deny a request from a 
Member State or the Community Institutions even where s/he deems that there is no real 
urgent situation at hand or that resources ought to be deployed more urgently in other areas. 
Arguably the Frontex Regulation leaves this decision to the Agency, yet in practice it has not 
hesitated to responded swiftly and positively to requests for assistance made by Member 
States or the Community institutions.132  
 As an example one could point to the Hermes operation carried out in September-
October 2007 off the coasts of Sardinia and the Balearic Islands, which seems to have been 
                                                
127 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘Proposals for a European Border Guard’ (HL Paper 133, 
Session 2002-03, 29th Report, 1 July 2003), 18. 
128 COWI Report, supra note 121, 36. 
129 Shapiro, M., supra note 28, 287. 
130 House of Lords, supra note 140, supplementary evidence given by the Home Office, Question 47. 
131 Vos, E., supra note 12, 1115. 
132 In 2006, the then Commissioner for JLS, Franco Frattini responded positively to a call for additional 
assistance by former Italian Minister of the Interior Guiliano Amato (Commission Press Release, Brussels, 28 
July 2006). Also Spain has been successful in promoting its national priorities at EU level: Hernandez I Sagrera, 
R., ‘FRONTEX: Projection at the European level of the vision of Spain on border control’ (Barcelona, 
Observatory of European Foreign Policy, February 2008), 2. 
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motivated mainly by the need for the EU and the Italian government to take decisive action in 
response to a steep increase in irregular landings in Sardinia in August of that year.133 The 
operation had not been foreseen in the Annual Work Plan, also for the reason that the area 
was already covered by the Agency’s coordinating activities in the framework of the 
European Patrols Network (ENP). The fact that no operation had been planned could either be 
a failure of the part of the Frontex risk analysis unit, or a conscious policy choice of giving 
priority to other areas. The fact is that this operation was planned on very short notice, raising 
doubts as to the thoroughness of its preparation and underlying risk-analysis. During the 
operation, with an estimated budget of 1,890,000 euro, no immigrants were intercepted at the 
Balearic Islands, while thirty people were apprehended attempting to reach Sardinia.134 
 Indeed, an external evaluation of the Agency carried out in 2008, concluded that “[i]t 
seems that Member States’ political considerations in certain cases may overrule decisions 
based entirely on risk analysis.135 The Frontex Internal Rules of Procedure seem to rec gnise 
this by stating that, in addition to an assessment or any other Risk Analysis product, “Council 
Conclusions or any other proposal that supports a Community Policy”, could be at the basis of 
a proposal for a Frontex activity.136 
 One could on the one hand argue that Frontex in following directions from the 
Member States and Institutions, jeopardizes its independence and credibility, amongst the 
very reasons for its creation. On the other hand, the argument could be made that this 
evidences an awareness of the political nature of its tasks. The point could even be made that 
to do otherwise, would constitute an interpretation of the Frontex Regulation that runs counter 
to the Court’s anti-delegation doctrine in the M roni cases in that it would leave too wide a 
discretion to the Agency.137  
 
                                                
133 See for instance: ‘Amato-Frattini su sbarchi Sardegna’ (ANSA, 29 August 2007).The first boats carrying 
irregular migrants had arrived in Sardinia in 2005, since 2007 this migratory route has been consolidating. Il 
traffico di migranti per mare verso l’Italia: Monzii, P, ‘Il traffico di migranti per mare verso l’Italia’ (Rome, 
CeSPI Working Paper 43/2008, September 2008), 39-40.  
134 It is difficult to interpret these data, since Member States and Frontex will argue that the presence of the joint 
operation had a deterrent effect, while other factors such as weather conditions, diversion of routes, or the fact 
that there simply were fewer attempts at border crossing could also have played a role. The Commission itself 
has stated that the “[r]esults of joint operations cannot be summarised solely in quantifiable terms.”: COM(2008) 
67 final, supra note 65, 3. Hermes 2008, with an estimated budget of 1,200,000 euro, focused only on Sardinia, 
yet again “immigrants was not detected in the defined operational area,” while 739 immigrants reached the 
coasts of the island during the operational period: supra note 122, 2 and Frontex Press Kit Volume 2/11. Issue 1. 
135 COWI Report, supra note 121, 41, referring to the Nautilus operation which was approved contrary to the 
results from a risk assessment which had argued that the operation could attract rather than deter irregular 
migration. Risk assessments are confidential, but one may presume that this would be because the presenc  of a 
joint operation would render crossing the Mediterrane n safer.  
136 Article 29, Frontex Internal Rules of Procedure, supra note 119. 
137 Case 9/56, Meroni, supra note 20, at 147-149 and Case 10/56, Meroni, supra note 20, at 169-171. 
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4.3 Centralised Register of Available Technical Equipment (CRATE) 
 
Alongside the FPAs, the specific grant agreements ad operational plans, there is another set 
of “agreements” that regulate the relationship betwe n the Agency and the Member States.138 
These are the Memoranda of Understanding on making available technical equipment as 
concluded between the Agency and some thirteen Member States/SAC. Article 7 of the 
Frontex Regulation states that the Agency shall keep “centralised records of technical 
equipment for control and surveillance.” This equipment belongs to the Member States, but is 
made available on a temporary and voluntary basis to other Member States at their request 
and after a “needs and risks analysis” by the Agency.   
 The so-called CRATE (Centralised Record of Available Technical Equipment or 
“toolbox”), facilitates on the one hand bilateral assistance from one Member State to another, 
the role of the Agency then being limited to making the information available to the Member 
States. On the other hand it provides Frontex with an overview of available equipment that 
can be deployed in joint operations, against payment from the Agency’s budget. CRATE was 
established in 2006 and two years later contained “over a hundred vessels, around 20 aircraft 
and 25 helicopters and several hundreds of border cont ol equipment such as mobile radar.”139 
Nevertheless, concern has been voiced not only as to the number of items of equipment listed, 
but also the fact that their existence on paper does n t mean that they can actually be deployed 
on short notice at all times.140 The Memoranda of Understanding do not have a legally 
binding status and there is no legal obligation on the Member States to make the assets 
available. Moreover, Member States have imposed different conditions on making their 
equipment available. A complicating factor is that much of the equipment requires specialised 
staff for its functioning, which raises questions about the command and control over the 
means that are made available.   
 Article 3(1) of the Frontex Regulation states that the Agency may decide to put its 
technical equipment at the disposal of the Member States participating in joint operations or 
pilot projects, which implies that it can acquire its own equipment. The RABIT regulation has 
made this explicit in Article 8(3) for equipment to be used by Frontex’s experts and during the 
deployment of the Rapid Border Intervention Teams. The Commission Communication on the 
evaluation and future development of Frontex stated that the potential of CRATE could be 
                                                
138 Reference to the Member States should be understood to included the SAC. 
139 COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 4 
140 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU in its Report on ‘FRONTEX: the EU external borders agency’ 
(HL Paper 60, Session 2007-08, 9th Report, 5 March 2008), 35. See also the COWI Report, supra note 121, 56. 
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enhanced if Frontex were to acquire or lease equipment.141 It further proposed the possibility 
of extending the scope of Article 7 to cover equipment for joint return operations, including 
aircraft.142 The Impact Assessment of the Commission’s Communication however explicitly 
referred to “small equipment” and not vessels, aircr ft or helicopters.143 This nuance seems to 
have been lost in the Communication itself and ensuing discussions.144 The acquisition of 
vessels, aircrafts and helicopters would lead to difficult questions of command and control, as 
well as insurance. A possible solution could be found in joint-ownership by an individual 
Member State and the Agency, combined with the legal obligation on the Member State in 
question to keep the asset available for Frontex oprations.  
 
4.4 Joint Return Operations 
 
The proposal to extend the scope of Article 7 to equipment for joint return operations, fits the 
more recent focus on strengthening the agency’s coordinating role in this area.145 Initially, 
joint return operations were not a priority. The European Parliament, which was only 
consulted on the adoption of the Frontex Regulation, argued that an operational structure 
would be premature in the absence of harmonised ruls on return.146 Nevertheless, joint return 
operations were already regulated to some extent by Council Decision 2004/573/EC and 
Council Directive 2003/110/EC.147 Frontex’s Executive Director argued that the existnce of 
a common Framework was of little added value to the Ag ncy’s work in this area, which he 
rather unfortunately referred to as that of an “expedition company.”148  
 With the adoption of the heavily contested Return Directive, Parliament now seems to 
join the Commission and Council’s plea to strengthen the Agency’s role in this area.149 The 
                                                
141 COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 4. 
142 Ibid., 8. 
143 SEC(2008) 148, supra note 71, 32. 
144 COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 10. 
145 See the Draft Council Conclusions on improved operational co-operation on joint return operations by air 
(Council Document 8246/06).  
146 See the EP Report, supra note 41, 31. Amendment 25 of the EP Legislative Resolution, supra note 85, 
proposed the deletion of the relevant articles. 
147 Council Decision 2004/573/EC on the organisation of joint flights for removals from the territory of two or 
more Member States, of third-country nationals who are subjects of individual removal orders, OJ 2004, L261/5 
and Council Directive 2003/110/EC on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal by air, OJ 2003, 
L321/26. See also Article 23, Prüm Convention on assistance with repatriation measures (Council Document 
10900/05).  
148 House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, ‘Illega migrants: proposals for a common EU returns policy’ 
(HL Paper 166, Session 2005-06, 32nd Report, 9 May 2006), 169. 
149 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country nationals, OJ 2008, L348/98. See point 21, EP Resolution, supra note 91. 
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Agency has already increased the number of joint return operations in which it assumes a 
coordinating role.150 Article 9 provides that the Agency may use Community financial means 
available in the field of return. It has interpreted this provision so as to include the possibility 
to co-finance joint return operations. This interprtation is doubtful. Under the European 
Return Fund, the role of the Agency is in any case limited to “ensure that the conditions for an 
effective coordinated return effort between Member States are met, whilst leaving the 
implementation and organisation of the joint return operations to the competent national 
services.151 The House of Lords in its report on Frontex has argued on a more principled basis 
against the enhanced role of Frontex in the field of return, on the ground that in an earlier 
inquiry it found that generally voluntary return is to be preferred over enforced compulsory 
return, not merely for being more humane, but also more cost-effective.152  
 
4.5 “Emergency Situations” 
 
Article 64(2) EC provides that the Council may “in the event of one or more Member States 
being confronted with an emergency situation characte ised by a sudden inflow of nationals 
of third countries” adopt provisional measures for a duration not exceeding six months for the 
benefit of the Member States concerned. 
 Already in 2002, the Commission mentioned the idea of creating a pool of national 
staff which could in the event of a crisis be mobilized at short notice.153 The reference to crisis 
situations in the Frontex regulation was however limited to Articles 2(e) and 8 which provide 
that Member States may ask the Agency for assistance in ases of “circumstances requiring 
increased technical and operational assistance when implementing their obligations with 
regard to control and surveillance of external borders.”  
 Only a month after the adoption of the Frontex Regulation, the Hague Programme 
invited the Commission to present in 2005 a proposal for the creation of teams of national 
experts that could “provide rapid technical and operational assistance to Member States 
requesting it, following proper risk analysis by the Border Management Agency and acting 
                                                
150 The Frontex Annual Programme of Work 2009 foresees 8-10 joint return operations, the same as in 2008, 
compared to 5-6 in 2007. 
151 Recital 28, Decision No 575/2007/EC establishing the European Return Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 as 
part of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/45.  Under 
Article 6(2)(g) Community Actions may fund the development and updating of a common handbook in the area
of return.  
152 House of Lords, supra note 140, 25. 
153 COM(2002) 233 final, Commission Communication ‘Towards Integrated Management of the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union’, 21. 
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within its framework.” The European Council Conclusions of 15 and 16 December 2005 
called upon the Commission to present a proposal by Spring 2006, which eventually it did by 
mid-July 2006. It may come as no surprise that thiswa  at exactly the time of the year in 
which the arrival of irregular migrants by sea reaches peak levels because of more favourable 
weather conditions.154 The Regulation was adopted on the first reading, less than a year after 
the proposal was made and less then two years after the agency had started its work. It 
evidences the sense of crisis surrounding the problem of irregular migration by sea and the 
importance attributed to this by the various actors in the legislative process.155 
 The Regulation establishes “a mechanism for providing rapid operational assistance 
for a limited period to a requesting Member State fcing a situation of urgent and exceptional 
pressure, especially the arrival at points of the external borders of large numbers of third-
country nationals trying to enter the territory of the Member State illegally, in the form of 
Rapid Border Intervention Teams.”156 It forms a good example of how migration and border 
management are dealt with from a control-based perspective without sufficient regard being 
given to questions of international protection and sylum. It is telling that at no point in the 
legislative process the question seems to have been asked under which circumstances such a 
situation would be most likely to arise.  
 In general the mass influx of third country nationals will occur in the event of a natural 
or human disaster provoking the displacement of large groups of people. In such a situation 
however the entry of those people could hardly be considered as illegal. Moreover, it would 
require not border guards, but aid workers and asylum experts instead. The Commission’s 
proposal for an Asylum Support Office, which would include the creation of asylum expert 
teams, seems to form a careful recognition of this standpoint.157  
 Commonly, when a situation of irregular arrivals is characterised as an emergency, 
reference is made to situations in which receiving authorities are overwhelmed by the number 
of third country nationals and reception facilities are inadequate for their reception. Therefore, 
a solution should consist not (only) in increased border control, but in enhancing the reception 
                                                
154 COM(2006) 401 final, Proposal for a Regulation establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism. 
155 See also the Conclusions of the European Council meeting of 14-15 December 2006 calling upon the 
Community legislator to reach “rapid agreement” on the proposal, point 24.c. This speed may not have 
contributed to the quality of the drafting of the Regulation, which is rather poor. One example is that e 
definition of external borders in Article 1a(1), Frontex Regulation is different from the one in Article 2(2) SBC. 
156 Article 1, RABIT Regulation. 
157 Articles 13-21, COM(2009) 66 final, supra note 67. 
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capacity of the Member States’ territories concerned, providing trained staff and an adequate 
infrastructure.158  
 
4.6 The RABIT Mechanism 
 
While the Frontex Regulation left it to the Management Board and the Agency itself to 
develop procedures for decision making on joint operations, the RABIT Regulation 
introduced precise rules into the Frontex Regulation, not only for the procedure for the 
decision to deploy a RABIT (Article 8d), but also fr the operational plan (Article 8e), the 
reimbursement of costs (Article 8h) and the role of the Frontex coordinating officer (Article 
8g). These rules often differ from those adopted by the Management Board applying to joint 
operations. 
 The Executive Director immediately informs the Management Board of a request by a 
Member State. Member States should communicate the number, names and profiles of border 
guards from their national pool which they are able to make available within five days to act 
as members of a RABIT. The Executive Director shall decide on the request within five days, 
taking into account Frontex’s risk analyses, as well as any other relevant information. S/he 
may also send Frontex experts to the requesting Member State to assess the situation. The 
decision must contain the reasons on which it is baed and must be notified to the 
Management Board and the requesting Member State. In theory, after the entry into force of 
the Lisbon Treaty, a requesting Member State should be able to challenge the denial of a 
request before the Court of Justice under Article 263 TFEU.  
 If positive, the Agency draws up an operational plan together with the requesting 
Member State, detailing the conditions for the deployment of the teams as laid down in 
Article 8e of the Frontex Regulation. Amendments to the operational plan require the 
agreement of both the Executive Director and the requesting Member State. The Agency shall 
inform the national contact points of the number and profiles of border guards needed. There 
is no time set within which an operational plan hasto be agreed upon, but within five days of 
its approval the teams must be deployed.  
 Member States are required to make border guards available for deployment in RABIT 
teams “unless they are faced with an exceptional situation substantially affecting the 
                                                
158 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe called upon Contracting Parties to “close unsuitable 
reception and detention centres, and construct new centres which are adequate and appropriate for the length of 
time irregular migrants and asylum seekers are to be detained”: Resolution 1637 (2008), point 9.7. 
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discharge of national tasks.”159 This compulsory element was added by Parliament and 
referred to as “mandatory” or “compulsory solidarity.”160 However, in the light of Article 
64(1) EC, which states that Title IV EC does not “affect the exercise of the responsibilities 
incumbent upon Member States with regard to the maintenance of law and order and the 
safeguarding of internal security”, the question whether such an exceptional situation exists is 
left to be assessed by the individual Member States.161 
 The members of the RABIT are drawn from a so-called “Rapid Pool”, which is the 
total number of Member State border guards available who fulfil a certain profile, in terms of 
working experience, skills – such as language skills - and competences. This profile, as well 
as the overall number of the pool has been established by a decision of the Management 
Board, requiring a two-thirds majority.162  
 During deployment of the teams, instructions to the teams shall be issued by the host 
Member State in accordance with the operational plan.163 The Executive Director appoints 
one or more members of the Frontex staff as Coordinating Officer who shall act as an 
interface between the Agency, the host Member State and the other participating Member 
States. Through the Coordinating Officer Frontex may express its views on the instructions of 
the host Member State, which is obliged to take these views into consideration.164  
 Unlike with joint operations, the Agency covers in full the costs of the deployment of 
a RABIT ranging from border guards’ health care to a daily subsistence allowance, also 
including accommodation. The Management Board has adopted a decision on the rules 
concerning the payment of the daily subsistence allow nce of members of the teams.165 A 
special statement added to the RABIT regulation provides that if the Agency does not have 
the financial means in its budget, “all possibilities to ensure funding should be explored.”166 
The Commission should see whether funds could be red ployed under Article 23 of the 
                                                
159 Article 8b(2) and Article 8d(8), Frontex Regulation. 
160 ‘Rapid response teams to tackle illegal immigration’ (EP Press Release, 26 April 2007). 
161 Both Finland and Poland raised questions during the legislative process as regards the compatibility of this 
article with Article 64(1) EC (Council Document 8456/07). 
162 Article 4(2), RABIT Regulation. See the Management Board Decision No 10/2007 of 31 August 2007 on the 
profiles and the overall number of border guards to be made available for the Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
(Rapid Pool). 
163 Article 5(1), RABIT Regulation. 
164 Article 5(2), RABIT Regulation. 
165 Management Board Decision No 9/2007 of 27 August 2007 detailing the rules concerning the payment of the 
daily subsistence allowance to members of the Rapid Bor er Intervention Teams during deployment and border 
guards of the Rapid Pool who are participating in training and exercises. Although Article 3(1) of this Decision 
provides that daily subsistence allowances are to be paid at the level of the home Member State, the Management 
Board has pronounced itself in favour of harmonising daily subsistence allowances in the future.   
166 Statement by the European Parliament, the Council a d the Commission, annexed to the RABIT Regulation. 
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Financial Regulation, or in case a decision of the budgetary authority would be required, 
initiate a procedure under Article 24.167 
  
Apart from training exercises in accordance with Article 8c of the Frontex Regulation, there 
have to date been no deployments of RABITs. The RABIT Regulation was clearly adopted 
with the situation of irregular migration by sea in mind. This is clear for instance from the 
reference made to the proposal in the Council’s Conclusions on the implementation of the 
Programme of measures on illegal immigration across the maritime borders and the further 
reinforcement of the Southern Borders.168 Recital 18 of the Regulation states that it shall be 
applied with full respect for obligations arising under the international law of the sea, in 
particular as regards search and rescue.  
 The nature of operations at sea however makes the deployment of these teams highly 
implausible. Firstly, the RABIT mechanism deals with speedily making available human 
resources, not technical means and/or equipment, for which purpose there is the CRATE. In 
the case of operations at sea such technical means, in particular vessels, are indispensible and 
unless the supporting Member State is located nearby, they are difficult to quickly relocate. 
Secondly, vessels, as wells as aircrafts, always remain under the tactical command and control 
of the Member State of the flag. Especially if the operational area of the joint operation is 
located outside Member State territory, i.e. on the high seas or in third country territorial 
waters, there is no point in making the rules of the host-Member State applicable to the 
deployment of the RABIT, as on board the rules of the flag state will apply. Member States 
have been reluctant to actually deliver the means they have pledged, or have put restrictive 
conditions on their use, partly also resulting from the uncertainty as to the responsibility for 
irregular migrants and/or asylum seekers they would take on board.169 
 
Even if the practical importance of the RABIT regulation may have been limited, the wider 
importance for the development of the EU’s management of the external borders cannot be 
underestimated. Although RABIT members remain natiol border guards of the home 
Member State, as specifically stated, the Regulation has created an “on call” force of 629 
border guards which may well be considered as the for runners of a more permanent 
                                                
167 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, supra note 111. 
168 Draft Council Conclusions evaluating the progress on the implementation of the Programme of measures to 
combat illegal immigration across the maritime borders (Council Document 15087/04), 5 and Draft Council 
Conclusions on reinforcing the southern external maritime border (Council Document 13559/06), 3. 
169 The Netherlands for instance has limited the deployment of the navy vessel it has pledged to the territorial 
waters of the Member States: ‘Nederland levert fregat voor Frontex’s (Volkskrant, 26 January 2008). 
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European Corps of Border Guards.170 The blue EU/Frontex bracelet that visiting officers will 
be required to wear can be seen as the symbolic expression of this.171  
 In addition, in parallel to the RABIT pool, the Agency has developed the concept of 
Frontex Joint Support Teams (FJST). These teams are drawn from a pool of the same 
composition as the RABIT pool. They may be deployed in situations such as those described 
in Article 8(1) in which Member States require increased assistance, but there has not yet 
been any case of emergency.172 They are trained specifically to participate in Frontex 
operations and Member States are asked to give priority t  these border guards when selecting 
personnel for participation in joint operations.173   
  
4.7  Tasks and Powers of Guest Officers and Members of the RABITs 
 
Perhaps of even greater significance than the creation of the RABIT pool, is that the RABIT 
Regulation has regulated the tasks and powers of visiting border guards or “guest officers”, 
that is the border guards from one Member State that participate as members of a RABIT, but 
also those that participate in a joint operation. This regulation of tasks and powers has 
received very little attention so far.174 The Frontex Regulation initially did not address the 
question of the tasks and responsibilities of border guards from one Member State being 
deployed in another. The Commission Communication of 2002 on the integrated management 
of the external borders had already made it clear that:
 
 “The main difficulty to be overcome in establishing a European Corps of Border 
 Guards is connected with conferring the prerogatives of public authority on staff of the 
 European Corps who do not have the nationality of the Member State where they are 
 deployed. This is a fundamental question on constitutional grounds.”175 
 
Articles 7 and 47 CISA only provided for the exchange of liaison officers, which - it stated 
specifically - “shall not be empowered to take independent police action.” Under the Frontex 
                                                
170 Article 7(1), RABIT Regulation.  
171 Article 10(4), Frontex Regulation; Article 6(4), RABIT Regulation. 
172 Beuving, L., ‘FRONTEX: its role and organisation’ (Strasbourg, SECURINT Working Paper No. 8), 13. 
173 See Executive Director Decision No 2008/24 dated 23 May 2008 on the organizational structure of Frontex 
Joint Support Teams. COWI Report, supra note 121, 53. 
174 It is telling that only in some of the latest drafts the “regulation of tasks and powers” was included in the title 
of the proposal. 
175 COM(2002) 233, supra note 153, 22 
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Regulation, it was assumed that the border guards were acting under the laws of the host 
Member State.176  
 The proposal for the RABIT Regulation was relatively modest in comparison to the 
Regulation that was finally adopted. The Commission had proposed to allow guest officers to 
exercise a limited number of task, enumerated in Articles 7 and 8 of the proposal. It followed 
an external study it had commissioned, which concluded that:  
 
 “Police officers in charge of border management have, in general, much broader prerogatives 
 related to the exercise of public authority as police officers are responsible for preserving 
 public order, promoting public safety and preventing and detecting crime. This makes it more 
 difficult to accomplish a complete integration of “guest officers” with “similar” powers…”177 
 
The study showed that border guards throughout the EU felt not only the need for a clear legal 
framework, but were also well aware of the growing expectations for joint action.178 It was 
rightly pointed out that trust and good personal relations cannot act as a substitute for legal 
certainty. It suggested that specific minimum powers be given to visiting border guards, for 
the limited period of time of joint operations, whic  would allow them to actively support 
host officers without exercising discretionary powers.179 
 The tasks envisaged by the Commission proposal included: to check travel documents, 
carry out interviews, search means of transport, participate in border patrols and “prevent 
people from crossing illegally the external border of the host-Member State.” The latter task 
especially was very broadly formulated and potentially encompassed far-reaching 
discretionary powers.180  
 In the SCIFA however, much to the satisfaction of Frontex, an even further reaching 
approach was taken. The proposal was amended so as essentially to equate guest officers with 
national border guards. Under the most far reaching draft version of the Regulation, dating 
from 21 February 2007, guest officers would have had the capacity to perform all tasks and 
exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance in accordance with the Schengen 
Borders Code (SBC), “as well as those that are necessary for the realisation of the objectiv s 
of that Regulation.”181 By March, this potentially very broad scope had been somewhat 
                                                
176 This was also pointed out by the House of Lords Select Committee on the EU, supra note 127, 19-20. 
177 ‘Study on conferring executive powers on border officers operating at the external borders of the EU’ 
(Unisys, Brussels, April 2006), 8. 
178 Ibid, 13. 
179 Ibid, 14. 
180 This was also noted by Lord Grenfell, Chairman of the Select Committee on the EU in his letter requesting 
additional information regarding the RABIT Proposal to the UK government dated 18 October 2006.  
181 Council Document 6613/07.  
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limited in what would be the final version, by stating that guest officers would have the 
capacity to perform all tasks and exercise all powers for border checks or border surveillance 
in accordance with the SBC, “and that are necessary for the realisation of the objectives of 
that Regulation,” formulating a cumulative rather than alternative requirement.182  
 The explicit reference to the SBC, has not only made the potential tasks of visiting 
border guards very broad, it has also rendered the participation of the UK and Ireland in the 
Agency’s activities much more difficult. The new rules on tasks introduced by the RABIT 
Regulation do not automatically apply in relation to the UK and Ireland. Moreover, the 
Regulation makes explicit reference to the SBC, in which the UK and Ireland do not, and 
have no desire to, participate. The same problem exists in relation to the rules on criminal and 
civil liability. As a result there will be a continuing uncertainty as to the position of UK and 
Irish officers in joint operations. Although the RABIT Regulation had not yet been adopted 
when the ECJ ruled on the exclusion of the UK and Ireland from full participation in Frontex, 
in relation to the Frontex Regulation, the Court was probably right in arguing that 
participation of the UK in a Schengen developing measures presupposed the prior acceptance 
of those parts of the Schengen acquis which were being developed.183 Since the adoption of 
the RABIT Regulation it would be difficult to consider the Frontex Regulation a “self-
standing” measure.184    
 In the exercise of their powers, the guest officers must comply with Community law 
and the national law of the host Member State. They ma  only perform their tasks under 
instructions from and, as a general rule, in the presence of border guards of the host-Member 
State. Although the exercise of powers in the absence of a border guard from the host-
Member State would have to be considered an exception and therefore interpreted narrowly, it 
is unclear what room is left for guest officers to act independently from the instructions of the 
host Member State.  
 Most far-reaching are the provisions on the carrying of weapons and the use of force. 
Oddly enough, none of the Member States in the Council seems to have raised national 
concerns of a constitutional nature here. Guest officers may carry their service weapons, 
ammunition and equipment in accordance with the natio l law of the home Member States. 
The host Member State may however prohibit the carrying of those weapons, ammunition and 
                                                
182 Council Document 6966/07. 
183 Case C-77/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-1145, para. 68 and Case C-137/05, UK v Council [2007] ECR I-
11593, para. 50. 
184 See the discussion in Chapters IV and VII.  
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equipment that it does not allow for its own border guards.185 Guest officers are authorised to 
use force, including service weapons, ammunition and equipment on the following 
conditions: 1) consent of both home and host-Member State, 2) presence of border guards of 
the host Member State 3) in accordance with the law of the host-Member State. What is not 
clear is whether this consent needs to be given in every particular instance. Finally, the host 
Member State may authorise guest officers to consult its national and European databases 
which are necessary for border checks and surveillance. The guest officers shall consult only 
those data which are required for performing their tasks and exercising their powers.186 
 The Frontex Regulation states that Member States should, in advance of an operation, 
state which weapons, ammunitions and equipment they allow visiting border guards to carry, 
as well as to which of its databases they will grant ccess. Under Article 8e(d) this 
information shall also be included in the operational plan. Since it would be against the 
principle of non-discrimination if a Member State were to grant different access rights to 
different Member States, this information could and is indeed already being collected by the 
Agency. Moreover, the Agency has been collecting information on the Member States’ laws 
and regulations on the use of force and legitimate self-defence. It is however clear that these 
rules require translation, explanation and interpretation and can therefore not easily be 
summarised. One can therefore validly question to what extent it is feasible to give visiting 
border guards a sufficient understanding of the host Member State’s rules during the briefing 
for a joint operation or  the deployment of a RABIT. 
 
4.8 Accountability of visiting Border Guards 
 
In the previous chapter it was already pointed out tha the non-binding nature of operational 
activities vis-à-vis third parties does not mean that in the course of such activities rights and 
obligations cannot arise from the conduct of national law enforcement personnel. Since the 
RABIT Regulation has given visiting border guards the possibility to use coercion, it has also 
                                                
185 Practical problems have arisen in relation to the transportation of weapons, since the RABIT Regulation does 
not contain a specific provision as that of Article 9 of the EU Status of Forces Agreement under the Second 
Pillar, authorising the transit and temporary deployment of military staff and their equipment within the territory 
of a Member State subject to the agreement of the competent authorities of the concerned Member States, OJ 
2003, C321/6. 
186 Note that this is a case of mutual recognition comparable to for instance lawyers under Directive 98/5/EC to 
facilitate practice of the profession of lawyer on a permanent basis in a Member State other than that in which 
the qualification was obtained, OJ 1998, L 77/36. The difference is however the application of this principle to 
the exercise of public authority.  
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addressed the question of their civil and criminal liability. It regulates liability regarding acts 
committed both by them and against them. The articles on civil liability provide that the host 
Member State shall be liable in accordance with its national law for damages caused by 
visiting border guards during their operations. Although it is not surprising that the law of the 
host Member State applies to these situations, in accordance with the adage “lex locus delicti 
commissi”, it is significant that the host Member State takes responsibility for the acts of 
border guards who are not its own, thereby equating them with its own border guards. Where 
this damage is the result of gross negligence or wilful misconduct, the host Member State can 
approach the home Member State for reimbursement of these damages. At the same time 
Member States waive all claims against each other for damages incurred during the 
operations. In case of a dispute the ECJ will have competence. The Agency is liable for the 
damages caused by its equipment, except in cases of gross negligence or wilful misconduct.187   
 As regards criminal liability, the visiting border guards are to be treated in the same 
way as the border guards from the host-Member State. Here again the visiting border guards 
are equated with border guards from the host-Member State. Presumably this means that any 
aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to their status as public officials would also 
apply, which is yet another example of the impossibility of insulating national criminal law 
from the Community’s law making powers.  
 The article on criminal liability is different from its counterpart in the EU standard 
Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) under the Second Pillar, which deals with criminal 
offences committed by military staff. Under the EU SOFA, the sending Member State has 
primary jurisdiction over offences against its own personnel and arising out of any act or 
omission done in the performance of official duty. The receiving Member State has primary 
jurisdiction over all other offences.188  
 Recital 17 of the RABIT Regulation states that it respects fundamental rights and shall 
be applied in accordance with the Member States’ obligations as regards international 
protection and non-refoulement. Recital 22 of the Frontex Regulation makes a similar 
reference to fundamental rights and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union. Article 2 of the RABIT Regulation, provides that it shall apply without prejudice to 
the rights of refugees and persons requesting international protection, in particular as regards 
non-refoulement. Article 5(2) contains the obligation for RABIT mebers to fully respect 
human dignity in the exercise of their duties and to comply with principles of proportionality 
                                                
187 See also Article 19, Frontex Regulation, for the Agency’s contractual and non-contractual liability. 
188 Article 17, EU SOFA, supra note 185. 
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and non-discrimination. As was discussed in the previous chapter it is unclear to what extent 
these articles fall within the jurisdiction of the ECJ. Their very inclusion however would 
support the argument that the jurisdiction of the Court should extend to the activities of 
national border guard authorities in the context of joint operational activity, since otherwise 
these articles would be devoid of content.  
 The obligation to wear a bracelet is not merely symbolic, it also functions as an 
important means of identification. So does the accreditation document that is issued on the 
basis of Article 8 of the RABIT Regulation and Article 10a of the Frontex Regulation and 
which visiting border guards must carry with them at all times. The document contains the 
name, rank and photo of the border guard, as well as the rights s/he has in accordance with the 
Frontex/RABIT Regulation. The document is issued in the official language of the host 
Member State and another official language of the EU Institutions. Accountability towards 
third country nationals would be increased if the (main) languages of the neighbouring third 
countries were also to be included.  
 
5. Frontex’s Accountability 
 
The rules on civil and criminal liability of national border guards are of great importance for 
the accountability of joint operational activities coordinated by Frontex. They relate however 
to the responsibility of national border guards participating in joint operations, rather than to 
the accountability of the Agency itself. Frontex, being a Community agency, is subject to a 
number of accountability mechanisms, most of which are laid down in its founding regulation 
and which govern its overall functioning, including the coordination of operational activities.    
 As Everson has noted, the compatibility of independent agencies with the EC Treaty, 
ultimately rests upon their accountability.189 Through accountability mechanisms the respect 
for the institutional balance of power, understood as a system of checks and balances rather 
than as a system of separation of powers, can be ensured.190 Accountability here will be used 
in a broad sense, encompassing not merely ex post, but also ex ante means of control. 
 The Community legislator has put in place oversight mechanisms to ensure that 
Frontex will act in compliance with its founding regulation. In terms of principal-agent 
theory, these controls aim at reducing “agency slack”: shirking (or bureaucratic drift) and 
                                                
189 Everson, M., ‘Independent Agencies: Hierarchy Beaters?’ 1 ELJ 2 1995, 198.   
190 Case 9/56, Meroni, supra note 20, at 147-149 and Case 10/56, Meroni, supra note 20, at 169-171. See: 
Yataganas, X.A., supra note 26, 38. 
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slippage.191 These agency losses are generally minimized when principal and agent share 
common interests and where the principal is informed of the agent’s activities and results.192 
Oversight mechanisms either monitor the agency’s activities directly and in a centralised 
manner (“police patrol” monitoring), or allow third parties to signal administrative 
malpractice (“fire alarm” monitoring).193  
 Accountability is closely related to responsibility, transparency, answerability and 
responsiveness, and these terms are often used interchangeably. The Commission in its White 
Paper on European Governance mentioned transparency alongside accountability as one of 
the five principles underlying good governance.194 Frontex draws its formal legitimacy from 
its adoption by the Community legislator on the legal bases provided in the EC Treaty. 
Accountability mechanisms however serve to enhance its social legitimacy, that is “the extent 
to which the allocation and exercise of authority commands general acceptance.”195  
 
5.1 Accountability through the Founding Regulation 
 
Many of the advantages of agencies flow from their (semi-) independence. The Community 
legislator therefore must find a balance between the agency’s independence from undue 
influence and making it answerable to the EU institutions, the Member States and the public, 
so that “no one controls the agency, but that at the same time the agency is under control”.196 
The constituent regulation of an agency should lay down not only monitoring mechanisms, 
but also provisions that guarantee its independence.197  
 The Frontex Regulation in Article 1 and 2 stipulates the Agency’s objectives and 
tasks. The fact that new pieces of legislation have m nded and added to the powers of the 
                                                
191 McCubbins, M. and Page, T., ‘A Theory of Congressional Delegation’, in: McCubbins, M. and Sullivan, T. 
(Eds), Congress: Structure and Policy (New York, CUP, 1987), 410-411. In the case of shirking, the agency 
pursues policy goals differently from that of the principal. In the case of slippage, incentives or constraints 
flowing from the structure of the delegation cause the agent to act differently from the principal’s intent: Pollack, 
M., supra note 5, 26. 
192 Lupia, A., supra note 7, 3376. 
193 McCubbins, M. and Schwartz, T., ‘Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police Patrols versus Fire Alarms’ 
28 AJPS 1 (1984), 166 and McCubbins, M. and Lupia, A., ‘Learning from Oversight: Fire Alarms and Police 
Patrols Reconstructed 10 JLEO 1 (1994), 96-125. 
194 COM(2001) 428 final, Commission White Paper on European Governance, 10.   
195 The distinction between formal and social legitimacy is made by Arnull, A., ‘Introduction: The European 
Union’s Accountability and Legitimacy Deficit’, in: Arnull, A. and Wincott, D. (Eds), Accountability and 
Legitimacy in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002), 3-4.    
196 Everson, M., supra note 189, 190. 
197 Ibid., 199. 
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Agency, means that the agency’s powers are now to be found over different legislative 
instruments which makes it more difficult to establish its responsibilities.  
 Article 15 gives the Agency legal personality and grants it formal independence in 
technical matters, which it however does not define a d which, as we saw earlier, may be 
problematic considering the highly politicized nature of its tasks. The terms of office of the 
Members of the Management Board, its Chairman and the (Deputy) Executive Director are 
fixed, and renewable once. A proposal to add that renewal would only take place after an 
evaluation, taking into account the results from the past few years and the tasks for the 
coming year, was proposed for all agencies but has never been adopted.198  
 Article 26 of the Frontex Regulation prescribes the procedure of appointment of the 
(Deputy) Executive Director. Vacancy of the post of Executive Director shall be made public 
amongst others, in the Official Journal. The (Deputy) Executive Director is appointed “on the 
grounds of merit and documented administrative and management skills, as well as his/her 
relevant experience in the field of management of the external borders.” The Executive 
Director shall neither seek nor take instructions from any government or other body.199 
Although not explicitly stated, the same must be assumed for the Deputy Executive Director. 
The Regulation itself does not require staff to make  declaration of interests, but the Agency 
does have a practice of requiring such declaration. This should be considered particularly 
important in relation to interests in the security technology industry.200  
    
5.2 Accountability to the Member States and the Community Institutions 
 
Through their representatives in the Management Board, the Commission and the Member 
States exercise control over the Agency’s policy and the implementation thereof. The 
Management Board may exercise disciplinary control over the (Deputy) Executive Director. 
The Commission representatives in the Management Board are likely to have considerable 
influence over their Member State counterparts, due to their more intensive contacts with the 
                                                
198 COM(2005) 190 final. This proposal aimed to set a harmonised term of office for the Executive Directors f 
all Community agencies to five years - which was already the case for Frontex - and add the requirement of an 
evaluation prior to renewal. 
199 Article 25(1), Frontex Regulation. 
200 Recall Frontex’s task of following up on the development of research relevant for the control and surveillance 
of external borders, Article 2(1)(d), Frontex Regulation. 
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Agency and the resulting informational imbalance.201 It may moreover be questioned to what 
extent the Members of the Management Board actually nswer to their respective 
governments, rather than act as a community of like-minded professionals.202 Majone has 
argued that the inclusion of an agency in a network will force it to uphold its professional 
standards and policy commitments, in ensuring its reliability vis-à-vis the other actors.203 
However, here again the danger exists that once a lvel of mutual trust and a common 
approach have been established, the network starts functioning as a single actor, being 
answerable only to itself.204   
 The European Parliament monitors the activities of the Commission by asking it oral 
and written questions. The Frontex Regulation state in Article 25(2) that both the Parliament 
and the Council may invite the Executive Director of the Agency to report on the carrying out 
of his/her tasks.205 The refusal by Frontex to attend a public hearing organised by the LIBE 
Committee, “Tragedies of Migrants at Sea” on 3 July 2007, caused considerable discontent 
amongst some Members of the European Parliament.206 It shows that the Agency did not 
consider this provision as constituting an obligation. A more binding formulation would be 
preferable, strengthening the possibility for the Parliament and Council to scrutinize Frontex’s 
work.  
 Considering its limited responsibility for and powers of direct control over the 
Agency, the Parliament’s powers to censure the Commission do not constitute an effective 
means of control over the Agency.207 In case of serious structural problems, the Parliament 
could consider the setting up of a Commission of inqu ry, also as a means of pressuring the 
Management Board to exercise its powers of control.208 Probably the most important means of 
control over the Agency is through the “power of the purse.” Frontex’s revenue consists of a 
subsidy from the Community entered in the Commission ection of the EU’s general budget, 
                                                
201 See Busuioc, E., “Autonomy, accountability and contr l: the case of European agencies (Paper presented at 
the 4th ECPR General Conference, Pisa, 5-8 September 2007), 17-18. 
202 The same has been observed in relation to the members of the Comitology Committees: Joerges, C. and 
Neyer, J., ‘From Intergovernmental Bargaining to Deliberative Political Processes: The Constitutionalisation of   
Comitology’, 3 ELJ 3 (1997), 291. 
203 Majone, G., ‘The Agency Model: The Growth of Regulation and Regulatory Institutions in the European 
Union’, Eipascope 2 (1997), 4. See also Majone, G., ‘The new European Agencies: regulation by information’, 4 
JEPP 2 (1997), 271-272. 
204 Harlow, C., Accountability in the European Union (Oxford, OUP, 2002), 184.  It should be noted however 
that whereas in the first few years of its existence the Programme of Work and General Report were adopte  
without much ado by the Management Board, it recently seems to be taking a more critical approach.  
205 This is a provision that can also be found in the constituent regulations of a number of other regulatory 
agencies, such as the European Network and Information Safety Agency (ENISA), the European Railway 
Agency (ERA) and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA). 
206 See also House of Lords, supra note 140, 30. 
207 Article 201 EC. 
208 Article 193 EC. 
 291 
a contribution from the SAC, fees for services provided, as well as any voluntary contribution 
from the Member States, including the contribution from the UK and Ireland for their 
participation in the Agency’s activities.209 The main source of income is however the 
Community subsidy.210  
 Article 29 of the Frontex Regulation lays down theprocedure for the adoption of the 
Agency’s budget. The Management Board adopts a draft budget (“estimate”) for the 
following year and forwards it to the Commission by31 March. The Commission then 
forwards this draft to the budgetary authority (i.e. the Parliament and the Council), together 
with the EU’s general preliminary budget. The preliminary budget includes under a separate 
heading the estimates the Commission deems necessary for the Agency’s establishment plan 
(number of posts by grade and by category), as well as the amount of the subsidy. In drawing 
up these estimates the Commission can exercise an indirect influence over the Agency.211 
Since the subsidy constitutes non-compulsory expenditure, the Parliament can exercise an 
important ex-ante control over the agency’s functioning.212 Parliament may propose 
amendments in relation to non-compulsory spending and t kes the final decision on these 
amendments at last reading. 213 
 Parliament has used its powers in October 2008 to increase Frontex’s budget by 30 
million euro, but at the same time putting 30% of the administrative budget in reserve in order 
to increase its “accountability and effectiveness.”214 One may question how effective it is to 
freeze part of the administrative budget, whilst increasing its operational budget. First of all, 
the Agency already has to cope with problems with the recruitment of staff.215 Second, much 
of the effectiveness of the Agency’s operations depends on Member States’ willingness to 
participate and contribute to joint operations.216 
  The Agency’s budget is adopted by the Management Board and becomes final after 
the adoption of the general Community budget. Where necessary the Agency’s budget is 
adjusted in accordance with the general budget. The Management Board is bound to inform 
the budgetary authority when it plans to implement projects with significant financial 
                                                
209 Article 29(1) and Article 20(5), Frontex Regulation.  
210 For instance, under the Agency’s 2008 budget, the Community subsidy accounted for 96 percent of the total. 
211 Busuioc, E., supra note 201, 17-18. 
212 Non-compulsory expenditure is expenditure which does not necessarily result from the Treaties or from acts 
adopted in accordance with them.   
213 Article 272(4) read in conjunction with 272 (6) EC.   
214 House of Lords, supra note 140, 28. See EP Resolution of 13 December 2007 on the draft general budget of 
the European Union for the financial year 2008 as modified by the Council (P6_TA(2007)0616). 
215  COWI Report, supra note 121, 72. See also: ‘Staff woes hit EU border agency’ (BBC News, 26 January 
2007). 
216 See also the COWI Report, ibid, 36 and COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 4. 
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implications for the funding of its budget, in particular any projects relating to property. 
Either branch of the budgetary authority has the right to forward an opinion to the 
Management Board within six weeks of the notification.217 
 
5.3 Judicial Accountability 
 
Judicial accountability refers to the possibility of holding the Agency accountable through 
resort to the courts. The difficulty of judicial control being exercised over operational activity 
has been pointed out both in this and the previous chapter. In relation to Frontex’s activities 
there are different reasons why an “act” of the Agency may not be amenable to judicial 
review.  
 First, the act may in reality be a preparatory action for a Commission decision and as 
such have no legal effect.218 This would be the case where the Agency determines th  
weighing factors for the allocation of money under the EBF.219  
 Second, the act may be attributed to a national border guards rather than to the 
Agency, which would be the case during joint operational activity. Here the RABIT 
Regulation has brought about important improvements by regulating the civil and criminal 
liability of visiting border guards, granting the national courts of the host Member State 
jurisdiction. Under Article 19 of the Frontex Regulation the ECJ has jurisdiction in relation to 
disputes about the contractual and non-contractual liabi ity of the Agency, but in the case of 
the latter the damage would actually have to be imputable to the Agency. 
 Lastly, where a decision of the Agency does have legal effects, for instance where it 
refuses to co-finance a joint operation or it denies a request for the deployment of a RABIT, 
Article 230 EC would not allow for judicial review since agencies are not included amongst 
the institutions and bodies whose acts may be challenged before the ECJ.220  
 A recent judgment of the Court of First Instance (CFI), if not confined to the specific 
field of public procurement, may open up the way for judicial review by the Court. In that 
case, the CFI recalled that the cancellation of a tender procedure by the European Agency for 
                                                
217 Article 29(11), Frontex Regulation. 
218 Cf. with the preparatory work done by the EMEA, a Community body in the field of pharmaceuticals 
regulation: Case T-326/99, Fern Olivieri v. Commission and EMEA [2003] ECR, II-6053, para. 53. 
219 Article 15, EBF. 
220 See the order in Case T-148/97 Keeling v. OHIM [1998] ECR II-2217, para. 32 and Case C-160/03, Spain v. 
Eurojust [2005] ECR I-2077, paras 36-37. A similar problem would apply to the application of Article 232 EC 
on a failure to act. 
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Reconstruction adversely affected the applicant, bringing about a distinct change in his legal 
position.”221 Referring to the ECJ’s case law in Les Verts the CFI recalls that the Community 
is based on the rule of law and that the general scheme of the Treaty is to make a direct action 
available against all measures adopted by the institutions which are intended to have legal 
effects.222 Excluding review of the Court on the basis of the fact that Agencies are not listed in 
Article 230 EC would deprive the applicant of an effective legal remedy. The Court 
emphasises that the EAR takes decisions that would therwise have been taken by the 
Commission, and “cannot cease to be acts open to challenge solely because the Commission 
has delegated powers to the EAR.”223 This reasoning could be less easily transposed to the 
case of Frontex, where such a direct link cannot readily be established. Nevertheless, the entry 
into force of the Lisbon Treaty would seem to confirm this extension of jurisdiction to acts of 
agencies of the Union intended to produce legal effects vis-à-vis third parties in Article 263 
TFEU.  
 
5.4 Financial Accountability 
 
The general Financial Regulation which lays down the rules for the establishment and 
implementation of the general Community budget refers expressly to agencies.224 Where the 
Commission chooses to implement the budget through a encies (“indirect centralised 
management”), it must ensure itself that mechanisms are in place that ensure the accuracy and 
transparency of financial transactions, such as procedures for procurement and grant-award, 
internal control, independent external audit.225 On the basis of Article 185(1) of the Financial 
Regulation the Commission has adopted a Framework Financial Regulation for bodies set up 
by the Communities, having legal personality and receiving grants charged to the Community 
budget.226 Article 185(1) states that the financial rules applicable to the these bodies may not 
depart from the Commission’s Financial Implementing Regulation, unless specifically 
required for the Agency’s operation and with the Commission’s prior consent.227 The 
Management Boards shall, as far as necessary, adopt detailed rules for implementing the 
                                                
221 Case T-411/06, Sogelma v. AER [2008] ECR II-0000, nyr, para. 38. 
222 Ibid., para. 36. 
223 Ibid., paras 39-40.  
224 Article 54, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, supra note 111. 
225 Article 56(1), ibid.  
226 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002, supra note 75. 
227 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2342/2002, supra note 111. 
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financial regulation of the Community body on the proposal of its Director.228 This provision 
is taken over in Article 32 of the Frontex Regulation.229
 
 
 Article 30 of the Frontex Regulation governs the implementation of the budget. By 1 
March following each financial year, the Agency’s accounting officer communicates the 
provisional accounts to the Commission’s accounting officer together with a report on the 
budgetary and financial management for that financial year. The Commission’s accounting 
officer consolidates the provisional accounts of the institutions and decentralised bodies.230   
 The implementation of the budget of all agencies is subject to control from the 
European Court of Auditors.231 By 31 March, the Commission’s accounting officer fo wards 
the Agency’s provisional accounts of the previous financial year to the Court of Auditors, 
together with a report on the budgetary and financial management. This report is also 
forwarded to the Parliament and the Council. Upon receipt of the observations of the Court of 
Auditors, the Executive Director draws up the final accounts and forwards them to the 
Management Board for an opinion.  
 By 1 July the Executive Director sends the final accounts to the Commission, the 
Court of Auditors and the Parliament. These are public. By 30 September s/he shall also send 
a reply to the observations of the Court of Auditors, both to the Court of Auditors and the 
Management Board. In line with the Financial Regulation, the Parliament shall, upon 
recommendation from the Council, before 30 April of the discharge year + 2, give a discharge 
to the Executive Director in respect of the implementation of the budget for that year.  
 The general Financial Regulation provides for inter al auditors for each institution.232 
It submits agencies to the control of the Commission’  internal auditor.233 In accordance with 
Article 71 of Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002, Frontex has also appointed an internal 
auditor itself. The Management Board can further allow the Commission’s financial 
irregularities panel, set up in accordance with Article 66(4) of the general Financial 
Regulation, to exercise the same powers in respect of the Agency, as it has in respect of 
Commission departments.234  
 Lastly, the European Anti Fraud Office (OLAF) can use its powers to investigate 
fraud, corruption and any other illegal activity adversely affecting the Community’s financial 
                                                
228 Article 99, Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002, supra note 75. 
229 Amongst the first decisions adopted by the Management Board in 2005 were the Frontex Financial 
Regulation, supra note 111 and Frontex Financial Implementing Regulation, supra note 111.   
230 Article 128, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, supra note 111. 
231 Article 248 EC, Article  91, Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002, supra note 75. 
232 Article 85, Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, supra note 111. 
233 Article 185(3), Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002, supra note 111. 
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interests also in relation to the agencies.235 As required by Article 31(2) of the Frontex 
Regulation, Frontex has acceded to the Inter-Institutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 
concerning internal investigations by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).236 The 
decisions concerning funding, as well as the implementing agreements and instruments that 
result from such decisions, explicitly stipulate that the Court of Auditors and OLAF may 
carry out, if necessary, on-the-spot checks among the recipients of Frontex funding and the 
agents responsible for allocating it.237  
 Although the Community financial rules and regulations constitute an important 
instrument for the transparent and sound financial m nagement of the Agency’s budget, the 
Commission Communication on the future of Regulatory Agencies notes that the small size of 
agencies compared to institutions would seem to justify “appropriate adaptations.”238 Frontex 
has found itself to some extent constrained by the ne d to conclude financial partnership 
agreements and grant agreements, the negotiation ofe  takes considerable time.239 There have 
been considerable delays in the reimbursement of Member States’ expenses, which are partly 
of an organisational nature at both the Agency and Member State level, but also because of 
the difficulty national authorities have with the strict deadlines imposed and complexity of the 
rules.240  
 
5.5 Accountability to the Public 
 
Transparency may be considered both part of accountability and a prerequisite to it.241 Article 
28 of the Frontex Regulation contains a specific provision on ‘Transparency and 
Communication,’ which stipulates that the Agency shall provide the public and any interested 
party rapidly with “objective, reliable and easily understandable information” on its activities, 
in addition to the publication of the general report. Frontex however tends to underline the 
                                                
235 Article 2, Commission Decision 1999/352 (EC, ECSC, Euratom) establishing the European Anti Fraud Office 
(OLAF), OJ 1999, L/136/20 and Article 1(3), Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999, concerning investigations 
conducted by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OCAF), OJ 1999, L136/1. See also Article 33, Commission 
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136/15. See further the Frontex Management Board Decision of 16 December 2005 on the terms and conditions 
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237 Article 31(3), Frontex Regulation. 
238 COM(2008) 135, supra note 25, 6. 
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240 COWI Report, supra note 121, 81. 
241 Dyrberg, P., ‘Accountability and Legitimacy: What it the Contribution of Transparency?’, in: Arnull,A. and 
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confidential nature of its activities. Management Board Meetings are confidential.242 The 
information that is disseminated is often general and superficial. NGO’s and IGO’s have 
complained that it does not allow for a true understanding of the nature of Frontex’s 
activities.243  
 
Access to Documents 
 
An important element of transparency is the right of access to documents held by the 
institutions and bodies of the EU. The CFI has held that access to documents is essential to 
allow the public “to carry out genuine and efficient monitoring of the exercise of the powers 
vested in the Community institutions (…).”244 However, Article 255 EC on access to the 
documents of the Commission, Council and Parliament does not mention access to documents 
of European agencies.245 Nevertheless, the founding regulations of all regulatory agencies, 
including that of Frontex in Article 28, make Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 governing the 
public access to documents of the European Parliament, Council and Commission equally 
applicable.246 Article 28 of the Frontex Regulation makes Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 
governing the public access to documents of the European Parliament, Council and 
Commission documents applicable to the Agency.247  
 As Aden has observed in relation to police cooperation in general, there is a 
“considerable gap between the theoretical level of accountability and reality.”248 This may in  
part be explained by the nature of the policy area requiring a higher level of confidentiality, in 
part a consequence of a secretive culture within natio l enforcement authorities and an 
unfamiliarity with the application of the EC’s rules on access to documents.249  
                                                
242 Article 10, Management Board Decision of 25 May 2005, supra note 89. 
243 See for instance the ECRE Report, supra note 62, 10.  
244 Case T-92/98, Interporc Im- und Export GmbH v Commission [1999] ECR II-3521, para. 39. 
245 Article 15(3) of the TEU grants a right of access to documents of all Union institutions, bodies, offices and 
agencies. 
246 See also Recital 8, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 regarding public access to European Parliament, Council 
and Commission documents, OJ 2000, L 145/43. The Management Board has adopted a Decision laying down 
practical arrangement regarding public access to the documents of Frontex on 21 September 2006. 
247 The Management Board adopted a Decision laying down practical arrangement regarding public access to the 
document of Frontex on 21 September 2006. 
248 Aden, H., Administrative governance in the fields of EU police and judicial co-operation, in: Hofmann, H. 
and Türk, A. (Eds), EU Administrative Governance (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 2006), 354.  
249 The rules on access to public documents do however apply equally to both the Second and Third Pillar: 
Recital 7,  Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, supra note 246.  
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 Article 4(1) of Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001 does allow for exceptions on the basis 
of public security, defence and military matters, amongst others. Article 9 of the Regulation 
contains rules on information which is classified as top secret, secret or confidential. 
However, in the words of the Court “any exception t the right of access to the institutions’ 
documents under Regulation No 1049/2001 must be intrpreted and applied strictly.”250 
Nevertheless, one can imagine that detailed operational information relating to joint 
operations would qualify as non-accessible under thse exceptions.  
 It is important to note that the Court has held that Article 4(5) of the Regulation, which 
states that a Member State “may request the institution not to disclose a document originating 
from that Member State without its prior agreement,” cannot be interpreted so as to give the 
Member State a right simply to veto disclosure without any further motivation.251 Instead, it 
has to put forward reasons cast in terms of the excptions provided for by the Regulation.252 
 The Management Board Decision on practical arrangements for access to documents 
states in its recital that the “sensitive nature of tasks of FRONTEX” should be taken into full 
account and that access to documents should not jeopardise the “successful and effective 
fulfilling of Frontex objectives.”253 On various occasions the Agency has had to remind 
Member States of the confidentiality of information relating to joint operations when through 
national channels, operational details made their way to the media.254 At the same time 
UNHCR has voiced concern over a lack of information regarding operational activities, 
preventing them deploying their resources effectively in a given operational area.255 
 Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that Frontex has been unwilling to readily grant 
access to documents where possible, denying the existence of documents or refusing to 
consider the possibility of granting partial access under Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC) No 
1049/2001. Although important improvements have been made recently, Frontex’s website 
continues to lack a comprehensive and updated register of documents.256 The Agency’s 
                                                
250 Joined Cases C-39/05 P and C-52/05 P, Sweden and Maurizio Turco v. Council [2008] ECR I-0000, nyr, para. 
71. 
251 Case C-64/05 P, Internationaler Tierschutz [2007] ECR I-11389, para. 75. 
252 Ibid., para. 76. 
253 Recital 6, Management Board Decision of 21 September 2006, supra note 247 
254 As was for instance the case with the joint operation HERA I: ‘Stemming the Immigration Wave’ (BBC 
News, 10 September 2006). 
255 Informal discussion with UNHCR staff in Malta, October 2005. 
256 Article 11, Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, supra note 246. See in this respect the Decision of the European 
Ombudsman closing his inquiry into complaint 3208/206/GG against the European Commission on the 
inadequacy of the Commission’s register, 18 December 2008. 
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general report still does not contain an overview of the application of the rules on access to 
documents.257 
 
Language Regime 
 
Closely linked to the question of transparency and ccess to documents is the question of the 
Agency’s language regime. Article 27(1) of the Frontex Regulation makes the provisions of 
Regulation No 1 of 15 April 1958 determining the languages to be used in the EC applicable 
to the Agency. This Regulation contains the same right as laid down in Article 21 EC, namely 
that all citizens can address the institutions or bodies mentioned in that article or in Article 7 
EC in one of the official languages of the Union and are entitled to an answer in that 
language. This is once more made explicit in Artice 28(4) of the Frontex Regulation. Article 
27(2) provides that the general report and the programme of work shall be translated in all 
official languages of the Community.  
 Some agencies have for reasons of efficiency reduced the number of languages used. 
The question of languages is however a very sensitive one, in particular in relation to agencies 
that take decisions binding on individuals.258 In practice, Frontex’s working language is 
English, although this is nowhere decided. A heated d bate in one of the early Management 
Board meetings resulted in the Executive Director making a promise that during future 
meetings, depending on the availability of translators, a full language regime would be 
provided for. It has already been noted that the accreditation document of visiting border 
guards is produced in both the home country language nd another official Community 
language.  
 
Data protection 
 
Although Frontex does not (yet) process personal information on a structural basis, it is 
covered by Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the 
processing of personal data by the Community institutions and bodies and on the free 
                                                
257 As required by Article 17(1), Regulation (EC) No 1049/2001, supra note 246 and Article 15, Management 
Board Decision of 21 September 2006, supra note 247. 
258 See in this respect: Case C-361/01 P, Kik v. OHIM [2003] ECR I-8283, paras. 92-94, confirming the CFI’s 
ruling in Case T-120/99, Kik v. OHIM [2001] ECR II-2235, paras. 62-63.   
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movement of such data, as pointed out by recital 19 to the Frontex Regulation.259 As such, the 
Agency is subject to control by the European Data Protection Officer and has appointed an 
internal data protection officer.260 The Commission’s view is that the Agency does not have 
the competence to process personal data. The Agency however argues that the processing of 
personal data is necessary for the fulfilment of its tasks, in particular assistance in return 
operations and would as such fulfil the requirement of Article 5(1) of Regulation (EC) No 
45/2001 which provides that the processing of personal data is lawful if it is necessary for the 
performance of a task carried out in the public interest on the basis of a legal instrument 
adopted on the basis of the Treaties. 
 
5.6 Reporting and Evaluation Duties 
 
A number of planning, reporting and evaluation duties has been laid down in both the Frontex 
Regulation, as well as the RABIT Regulation. These nable the Management Board, the 
Community institutions, but also the public, including interest groups, to better monitor the 
Agency’s activities.  
 First is the adoption of a the annual Programme of W rk.261 The Management Board, 
before 30 September each year, and after receiving the opinion of the Commission, adopts 
Frontex’s “agenda” for the coming year. The programme of work is forwarded to the 
European Parliament, Council and Commission. It shall be adopted “according to the annual 
Community budgetary procedure and the Community legislative programme in relevant areas 
of the management of external borders.” This rather obscure formulation seems to underline 
that the programme of work has to be in line with the Community’s financial perspectives and 
relevant Community legislation.  
 Second, is the adoption by the Management Board, before 31 March each year, of the 
general report for the previous year.262 The report is forward by 15 June at the latest to the 
Parliament, the Council, the Commission, the European Economic and Social Committee and 
the Court of Auditors and is made public. It includes a “comprehensive comparative analysis” 
of the evaluation reports of joint operations which are made on the basis of Article 3(3) of the 
                                                
259 Regulation (EC) No 45/2001 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data 
by the Community institutions and bodies and on the fre  movement of such data, OJ 2001, L8/1. 
260 Articles 1(2) and Article 24, Regulation (EC) No 45/2001, ibid. 
261 Article 20(2)(c), Frontex Regulation. 
262 Article 20(2)(b), Frontex Regulation. 
 300 
Frontex Regulation. The RABIT regulation does not include a similar evaluation duty as 
regards the deployment of RABITs, which is to be regretted.  
 The analysis of the joint evaluation reports serves to enhance “the quality, coherence 
and efficiency of future operations and projects.” The individual evaluation reports are 
generally available only upon request, and then only those parts that do not contain 
operational details. In terms of quality, an independent evaluation of Frontex in 2008 
concluded that the reports usually only gave the “direct output of the activity and not the 
impact.” In its general report of 2008, Frontex noted the need to better compare individual 
evaluations. However, more important would be to take into account that its activities 
although limited by its mandate to border management, have wider impacts. In particular, 
there should be more information on the number of asylum requests filed, the results of these 
procedures, the diversion effects caused by joint operations, as well as the fate of people that 
are being directly returned. 
  On the basis of Article 33 of the Frontex Regulation, every five years the 
Management Board commissions the evaluation of the implementation of the Frontex 
Regulation. The results of the first evaluation, which was to be carried out three years after 
the Agency commenced its work, were presented to the Management Board at its meeting in 
February 2009.263 The evaluation examines the Agency’s effectiveness, impact and working 
practices. On the basis of the evaluation the Management Board shall forward 
recommendations to the Commission, which together with its own opinion and where 
appropriate proposals, to the Council. 264 Both the findings of the evaluation, so in theory not
the whole evaluation report, and the recommendations are to be made public. The RABIT 
Regulation in Article 13 provides for an evaluation by the Commission one year after its entry 
into force. This evaluation was included in the Commission evaluation of the Agency itself, as 
part of its 2008 “Border Package.” However, the Commission’s main finding, as well as that 
of the Article 33 evaluation, was that it was too early to draw conclusions, especially because 
no deployment of RABITs had yet taken place.265  
 
                                                
263 COWI Report, supra note 121.This evaluation should not be mistaken with the evaluation carried out by the 
Commission in 2008, COM(2008) 67, supra note 65. 
264 Considering the extension of the co-decision procedur  to Article 66 EC, Council should be read as Council 
and Parliament. 
265 SEC(2008) 148, supra note 71, 18 and COWI Report, supra note 121, 55. 
 301 
6. The Future Development of Frontex 
 
Let us now consider how the Commission envisages th role of Frontex to evolve in the 
future. The Commission in its Report on the Evaluation and Future Development of the 
Frontex Agency, as part of its “Border Package” presented in February 2008, aims to 
reinforce both Frontex’s role as a more classical regulatory agency, as well as its role in the 
coordination of operational activities. The Communication rather carefully states that 
Frontex’s “role should be expanded as necessary in esponse to concrete needs, based on a 
step-by-step approach and a gradual reinforcement of its administrative capacity, and on a 
continuous evaluation of how it fulfils its tasks.”266 Nevertheless the Commission’s vision for 
the long term development of Frontex would considerably expand the remit of its activities.  
 The Commission wants to strengthen Frontex’s role as the centre of a system of 
information exchange between national authorities th mselves, as well as between the Agency 
and these authorities. It suggests that the Agency be put in charge of managing ICO-net and 
take over the activities of the Centre for Information, Discussion and Exchange on the 
Crossing of Frontiers and Immigration (CIREFI).267 It would considerably strengthen the role 
of Frontex as an institutional actor, but also in terms of having readily accessible information 
from a range of national authorities dealing with migration management (not limited to border 
guard authorities) for the purposes of its own risk-analyses. Arguably putting Frontex in 
charge of the ICO-net would require an amendment of the ICO-net decision and preferably of 
the Frontex Regulation itself. If Frontex were to take over the work of CIREFI, this could 
entail the risk of limiting the CIREFI’s current tasks too much to immigration and border 
control only. In the long run, the Commission refers to Frontex’s role in the creation of a 
network integrating all maritime surveillance systems as mapped out in the Communication 
on the establishment of EUROSUR. The Commission suggests that Frontex be given access 
to surveillance information on a more structural and systematic way, which could form the 
basis for a “Frontex intelligence led information system.”268 
 Above, we briefly referred to the possible extensio  of Frontex’s tasks flowing from a 
greater horizontal integration between border and customs authorities. The Hague Programme 
already stated that an evaluation of Frontex should examine whether “the Agency should 
                                                
266 COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 8. 
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concern itself with other aspects of border management, including an enhanced co-operation 
with customs services and other competent authorities for goods-related security matters.”269 
The Commission does however appear rather reluctant, recommending a study on inter-
agency cooperation and suggesting the launch of Frontex/Commission-led joint operations in 
coordination with national customs authorities.270 It seems unlikely that the Commission will 
be willing to encroach upon the powers of its own DG Taxations and Customs. It should 
moreover be realised that the Customs Union has been functioning satisfactorily without the 
involvement of a specific central European regulatory authority.  
 
A potentially important new task for Frontex would be its involvement in the work of the 
Schengen Evaluation Committee.271 Although the Schengen evaluations cover the whole 
acquis, going beyond border management, Frontex could according to the Commission 
“provide added value to these evaluations through its independent status, its expertise on 
external border control and surveillance and its activities on training and risk analysis.”272 
Again, in the Hague Programme the Council had already c lled for “a proposal to supplement 
the existing Schengen evaluation mechanism with a supervisory mechanism, ensuring full 
involvement of Member States experts, including unannounced inspections.”273 The Council’s 
conclusions on the Commission Communication carefully state that “FRONTEX should play 
a supportive role in the Sch-eval mechanism, with rega d to relevant risk analysis for the 
purpose of evaluation missions and possibly also by providing necessary training to optimise 
implementation of those missions.”274 Frontex has in the meantime organised the first course 
for the national participants in Schengen evaluations.275 
 The current Schengen evaluation mechanism does not provide for unannounced 
visits.276 The evaluation reports for individual Member States are issued “every two or three 
years (at best), the conclusions are neither totally autonomous nor immediately operational, 
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and the membership of the evaluation team constantly changes.”277 We would argue that 
Frontex’s position as a regulatory agency allows for a much stronger role in the Schengen 
evaluation process than the one proposed by the Commission or the Council. As was noted in 
the previous chapter the current role of the Council i  evaluating the implementation of the 
Schengen borders acquis can be seen as a remnant of the intergovernmental origins of 
cooperation in this area. Carrying over these powers to an independent agency rather than the 
Commission, could constitute an acceptable compromise, as well as a logical next step in the 
communitarisation of the management of the external borders. It would encourage the 
Commission to act more aggressively in enforcement, ensuring a more uniform application of 
the Schengen border acquis.278 A potential danger of reinforcing this regulatory role of the 
Agency may however be that it could prejudice its good relations with national border guard 
authorities and as a result its ability to act as coordinator of operational cooperation.  
   
In any case, the Commission does not seem to have abandoned the idea for a European Corps 
of Border Guards. It was argued earlier that the adoption of the RABIT Regulation constitutes 
a new step towards the gradual establishment of such body. Even if a specific reference to the 
creation of such corps is missing, the Commission sees a need to determine “to what extent 
coordination of Member States’ resources should be replaced with the assignment of border 
guards and equipment on a permanent basis.”279 Not only would this render the Agency much 
more independent from Member States’ participation and resources, it would also imply a 
more structural presence of the Agency on the territory of Member States situated at the 
external borders.  
 The Communication recognises that the conferral of executive powers on the 
Agency’s staff would call for a review of Frontex legal framework. The question however, is 
whether the Community even has the competence to end w “Frontex border guards” with 
public authority powers. We would argue that under th  current treaty framework a legal basis 
to do so is lacking, even under a very wide interprtation of Article 62(2)(a) EC or Article 66 
EC, the legal bases for the Frontex and RABIT Regulation. The entry into force of the Lisbon 
Treaty could mean an important change in this respect, considering the much broader 
formulation of Article 77(2)(d) TFEU, which provides that the Union has competence to 
adopt “any measure necessary for the gradual establishment of an integrated management 
                                                
277 Ibid. 
278 Cf. Kelemen, R., supra note 43, 112.  
279 COM(2008) 67 final, supra note 65, 10. 
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system for external borders.”280 Arguably this wide formulation would also allow the 
Community legislator to extend Frontex’s competences to the field of police cooperation on 
the basis of this article.281 However, the question is whether this would be politica ly feasible. 
It would certainly change not only the nature of cooperation in the AFSJ, but arguably that of 
European integration, were EU officials to be endowed ith the power to use force.  
 A final point that the Commission Communication raises is the importance of 
cooperation with Third Countries, contemplating a possible extension of Frontex’s 
competences to European border control missions conducted in third countries. The question 
of the external dimension of European border management will be discussed in the final 
chapter. 
 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The image that has been drawn of Frontex as a regulatory agency shows that in fact it is an 
agency with two faces. One is the more classical regulatory agency with informational and 
technical assistance tasks, the other is that of the only police agency under the First Pillar, 
although of course not endowed with any operational powers itself.  
 Although Frontex is formally independent, this independence is considerably 
constrained both de jure as well as de facto. Member States, as well as the Institutions 
continue to have an important say over the Agency’s activities, which on the one hand reflects 
the political nature of Frontex’s activities, but on the other ignores the rationale of Frontex as 
an independent and technical body. The European Parliament can exercise considerable 
control by having the last say over the Community’s subsidy to the Agency’s budget.  
 Once more one may observe difficulties in terms of accountability and legal certainty, 
which seem inherent in the way in which operational cooperation is taking shape in the AFSJ. 
Most importantly, judicial review of joint operational activity coordinated by Frontex remains 
with the Member States. The responsibilities of Frontex for the potential violations of 
fundamental rights in the course of joint operations is unclear. The status of the operational 
plan, and importantly the responsibility for asylum seekers remains problematic.  On a more 
positive note however, the visibility of Frontex and the strict rules in terms of access to 
                                                
280 Council Conclusions on Integrated Border Management (Council Document 15801/06, 27). 
281 Although one could argue that this belongs in the c apter on police cooperation: Title V, Chapter 5, TFEU.  
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documents to which it is subject, may contribute positively to the accountability not only of 
the Agency, but also of the activities of Member States’ national border guards.  
 It would nevertheless be a good idea for the European legislator to consider the future 
role of Frontex in a more structured manner. The RABIT Regulation shows how the EU’s 
policy for the management of the external borders is essentially control based and how a 
sense of crisis and the urge to show decisive action results in legislation that is on the one 
hand far-reaching and on the other hand of limited practical relevance. The Community 
should however move beyond this “panic-politics” and think beyond a mere extension of 
Frontex’s tasks. In the absence of a true constitutional framework for operational cooperation, 
which can ensure sufficiently high levels of accountability of such operations, perhaps 
priority should be given to the development of the Agency’s regulatory role.  
 If indeed, the management of the Schengen external borders is to remain with the 
Member States, better results could be expected from inancial burden sharing under the EBF 
and an improved cooperation and exchange of information, without the actual deployment of 
Member State’s border guards on territory that is not of their own Member State. While the 
case could be made for the deployment of  law enforcement staff outside national territory in 
cases of specific crimes with a cross-border element, this is not the case for the management 
of the external borders.  
 Where national law enforcement staff is to be deployed outside the Member State of 
origin, one may question whether the example of Frontex deserves following. In the field of 
police cooperation there does not exist a set of harmonised rules that could be applied, as is 
the case for the management of the external borders in the form of the SBC. More important 
is the realisation that a system which allows law enforcement officers from one Member State 
to exercise coercive powers under the rules of another, means that such officers work within a 
legal framework in which they are not trained and which they cannot reasonably be expected 
to fully understand. 
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X. The External Dimension of EU Border Management 
  
1. Introduction 
 
 “Se non risolviamo questo problema e non lo facciamo in cooperazione con i paesi di 
provenienza, finisce che le operazioni di Frontex in alto mare diventano un modo per portare 
in Europa clandestini”1  
  
 If we do not resolve this problem, and if we do not d  so in cooperation with countries of 
origin, the Frontex operations on the high seas will become a way of bringing irregular 
immigrants to Europe 
 
With the merging of internal and external security after the fall of the Berlin wall, the 
cooperation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) soon developed a so-called 
“external dimension.”2 Independent of any such external dimension, borders themselves are 
par excellence the site where internal and external security concer s meet. By its very nature 
the management of the EU’s external borders takes place at the crossroads of Community, 
national and public international law. Not only the Community, but also the Member States 
and Frontex maintain relations with third countries on matters relating to the management of 
the EU external borders.3 This raises important questions as to the legal basis for such action 
and the division of competence between the various actors. 
 The Council’s Strategy for the External Dimension f the JHA of December 2005 
emphasised that the policy should pursue both internal and external policy objectives and 
should be “coordinated across the pillars”, including the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and European Security and Defence Policy.4 This implies that the external dimension 
                                                
1 Statement by former Italian Minister of the Interior, Guiliano Amato (Press Release Italian Ministry of the 
Interior, ‘Immigrazione: il Ministro dell´Interno a Lussemburgo al Consiglio giustizia e affari interni della 
Commissione Europea,’ 20 April 2007). 
2 Lavenex, S., ‘EU External Governance in “Wider Europe”’, 11 JEPP 4 (2004), 689. See also Chapter VII. A 
variety of concepts has been applied to describe the different ways in which EU policies exercise effect outside 
the EC/EU territory, such as external governance, externalisation and extra-territorialisation. See for instance: 
Rijpma, J. and Cremona, M., ‘The Extra-territorialis t on of EU Migration Policies and the Rule of Law’ 
(Florence, EUI Law Working Paper 1/2007, 2007), 11-12 and Balzacq, T, ‘The External Dimension of EU 
Justice and Home Affairs: Tools, Processes, Outcomes’, (Brussels, CEPS Working Document No. 303, 
September 2008), 2. 
3 This chapter will not discuss the relationship between the Community and the Schengen Associated Countries 
(SAC) as this has already been the subject of scrutiny in earlier chapters. 
4 Council, ‘A Strategy for the External Dimension of JHA : Global Freedom, Security and Justice’ (Council 
Document 15446/05), 5. 
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of the management of the EU external borders serves not only the control and surveillance of 
said borders, but also the exportation of Schengen sta dards and best practices to third 
countries, including institution and capacity building in the area of border management 
structures in those countries.5  
 In the discussion on the external dimension of the Community’s migration and asylum 
policies the focus is often on the way in which the EU attempts to control unwanted migration 
flows from a distance, aiming to avoid their actual arrival at the external borders.6 We already 
referred to the term “remote policing” in Chapter II in order to describe the way in which this 
is done, for instance through the imposition of visa requirements.7 The 2006 Council 
Conclusions which define the concept of integrated border management specifically include 
measures in third countries and cooperation with neighbouring countries. They furthermore 
refer to inter-agency cooperation for border management and international cooperation.8 Here 
it should be noted that in the case of the EU’s southern maritime borders, it is the control of 
the external borders itself that is increasingly shifted beyond the Schengen territory.  
 The quotation cited at the head of this chapter by former Italian minister of the Interior 
Guiliano Amato refers to the situation in which Italian vessels participating in Frontex joint 
operations in the Mediterranean save irregular migrants on the high seas, subsequently 
disembarking them on Italian soil. It is exemplary of the importance that Member States 
attach to cooperation with third countries for the purpose of the management of the EU’s 
external borders, but also highlights one of the many legal questions that this extra-territorial 
border surveillance raises.  
 
2. The External Dimension of Migration and Border Management 
 
The Tampere Agenda emphasised the importance of using “all competences and instruments 
at the disposal of the Union, and in particular, in external relations” to build the AFSJ, 
integrating JHA concerns in the definition and implementation of other Union policies and 
activities.9 The Hague Programme reiterated that “[a]ll powers available to the Union, 
                                                
5 COM(2004) 491 final, Commission Communication on a Strategy on the External Dimension of the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, 5. 
6 See e.g. Guiraudon, V., ‘Before the EU border: Remot  Control of the “Huddled Masses”’, in: Groenendijk, K. 
et al. (Eds), In Search of Europe’s Borders (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 2003), 191-214.  
7 Bigo, D. and Guild, E., ‘Policing at Distance: Schengen Visa Policies’, in: Bigo, D. and Guild, E., Controlling 
Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe (Aldershot, Ashgate, 2005), 234.  
8 Council Document 15801/06, 27, 28. 
9 European Council Conclusions, Tampere, 15-16 October 1999, point 59. 
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including external relations, should be used in an integrated and consistent way to establish 
the area of freedom, security and justice.”10 
 Balzacq argues that the external dimension of JHA “is best thought of as a distinctive 
policy, with its own raison d’être and mechanisms.”11 However, this is not the position of the 
Community institutions. The Commission has argued that “the external dimension of the area 
of justice, freedom and security cannot be seen as an independent policy area but must be part 
of the EU’s external policy activities.”12 It may be better to distinguish the external dimensio  
of the JHA as an internally driven external policy, or as Cremona puts it “an example of the 
interdependence of the internal and external dimension of a policy.”13  
 The Commission, in its Communication on a Strategy for the External Dimension of 
JHA, emphasised that the external dimension of the AFSJ does not only work for the benefit 
of the establishment of the internal area of freedom, security and justice. The Council in its 
Strategy affirmed that “the development of the area of freedom, security and justice can only 
be successful if it is underpinned by a partnership with third countries on these issues which 
includes strengthening the rule of law, and promoting the respect for human rights and 
international obligations.”14 Although the external dimension of the AFSJ may indeed benefit 
third countries, there should be no doubt that ultima ely the EU’s policy is essentially driven 
by self-interest. In the words of the German presidncy, the EU can only accomplish its goal 
of establishing an AFSJ by “confronting security threats and of strengthening freedom and 
justice to the benefit of European citizens” in cooperation with third countries.15  
 Not surprisingly, the external dimension of migration and border management has 
been high on the agenda. The Seville European Council concluded that combating illegal 
immigration should involve “the use of all appropriate instruments in the context of the 
European Union’s external relations.”16 It furthermore called for a “systematic assessment of 
relations with third countries which do not cooperat  in combating illegal immigration.”17
 The Commission in its Communication on a Strategy for the external dimension of 
JHA stated that “[e]fficient border management is vital to fight threats such as terrorism and 
                                                
10 The Hague Programme, Annex to the European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 4-5 November 2004, point 4. 
11 Balzacq, T., supra note 2, 1. 
12 COM(2004) 491 final, supra note 5, 11. 
13 Cremona, M., ‘EU External Action in the JHA Domain: A Legal Perspective (Florence, EUI Law Working 
Paper 2008/24, 2008), 4. 
14 COM(2004) 491 final, supra note 5. Council Strategy, supra note 4, 2. 
15 JHA External Relations Multi-Presidency Work Programme (Council Document 5003/07), 1. Emphasis added. 
16 European Council Conclusions, Seville, 21-22 June 2002, point 33. 
17 Seville European Council Conclusions, ibid., point 35. Although the Council did adopt a ‘Monitor ng and 
evaluation mechanism of the third countries in the field of the fight against illegal immigration’ (Council 
Document 15292/03), this does not seem to have had much practical value.   
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organised crime, while also contributing to good relations between neighbouring states”.18 
Although not referring to irregular migration here, throughout the Communication border 
management is mentioned in connection with migration and asylum. It follows also from the 
Council’s Strategy that border controls are seen as an important means of tackling irregular 
migration:  
 
 “The EU must pursue in close co-operation with third countries both short- and long-term 
action to tackle irregular flows and their underlying causes. This should include efforts to 
strengthen border controls, improve travel document s curity and combat people smuggling 
and trafficking. These must be accompanied by readmission agreements that assure returns of 
illegal immigrants, with priority being accorded toconcluding planned agreements and 
implementing existing ones. (…)”19  
 
By enhancing the capacity of third countries’ systems of migration and border management, 
the EU is essentially aiming to shift border controls upstream.  
 A similar rationale underpinned the AENEAS Programme, which provided financial 
and technical assistance to third countries in the area of migration and asylum.20 It was 
adopted under Articles 179 and 181a EC, on development aid and assistance to non-
developing third countries respectively, which may explain why improved management of 
migration flows was presented as being important for the development of some countries.21 
One of the specific actions the programme could support was the “evaluation, and possible 
improvement, of the institutional and administrative framework and of the capacity to 
implement border controls as well as improvement in he management of border controls, 
including by means of operational cooperation.”22 
 It is telling that the programme aimed specifically, although not exclusively, at 
countries that had concluded a re-admission agreement with the EU.23 As was noted in earlier 
chapters, the conclusion of readmission agreements, as well as increased cooperation on 
illegal immigration and border management, may all be prerequisites for visa facilitation.24 
                                                
18 COM(2005) 491 final, supra note 5, 5. 
19 Council Strategy, supra note 4, 3-4. 
20 Regulation (EC) No 491/2004 establishing a programme for financial and technical assistance to third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), OJ 2004, L80/1. 
21 Recital 4, ibid. 
22 Article 2(2)(f), ibid. 
23 Article 1(2), ibid. 
24 COM(2006) 735 final, Commission Communication, ‘The Global Approach to Migration one year on: 
Towards a comprehensive European migration policy’, 7. 
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There is the assumption that readmission makes Member States and third states responsible 
for controlling their borders efficiently.25  
 An informal meeting of the European Council at Hampton Court in October 2005, 
triggered by events in Ceuta and Melilla earlier that month, asked the Commission to come 
forward with a list of priority actions, with a special focus on the African region.26 The 
European Council subsequently adopted an Action Plan c lled a “Global Approach to 
Migration: priority actions focusing on Africa and the Mediterranean”.27 Since then three 
more Commission Communications dealing with “the Global Approach” have seen the light, 
expanding it with an East and South-Eastern Neighbourhood Dimension.28 The firm language 
from the Seville European Council Conclusions has largely been replaced by an emphasis on 
partnership, dialogue and cooperation.  
 The Commission and Council both stress the importance of a “balanced, global and 
coherent approach towards migration”, including attention to the root causes of migration and 
legal migration opportunities.29 One could read, in the way the Global Approach is presented 
as a break with the past, the implicit recognition that so far there has been too strong an 
emphasis on the reinforcement of migration and border controls. However, it is yet to be seen 
how far the Global Approach will indeed make a difference, bearing in mind that even the 
Seville Council Conclusions called for a comprehensive and balanced approach.30 The 2008 
Council Conclusions on enhancing the Global Approach to Migration once more call for 
priority action on:  
 
 improved border management, identification of forged or falsified documents, negotiation and 
implementation of readmission agreements, (…) capacity building and technical assistance 
related to migration outflows and inflows; and the prevention of and fight against illegal 
                                                
25 EU Schengen Catalogue, External borders control, removal and readmission: recommendations and best 
practices, Council, February 2002, 55: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/catalogue20EN.pdf. 
26 In October 2005 there were repeated attempts by predominantly sub-Saharan Africans to enter Ceuta and 
Melilla, storming the fences surrounding the Spanish enclaves. A number of migrants died and many were 
injured as Moroccan and Spanish authorities attemptd to prevent their entry, others were injured by the barbed 
wire. They often seriously and on occasion fatally injuring themselves: see inter alia: ‘“Oí tiros, muchos tiros, y 
sólo pensé en correr sin mirar atrás”’ (El País, 30 September 2005) and ‘Seis inmigrantes mueren en el lado 
marroquí al intentar pasar a Melilla’ (El Mundo, 6 October 2005). See also COM(2005) 621 final, Commission 
Communication, ‘Priority actions for responding to the challenges of migration - First follow-up to Hampton 
Court’. 
27 European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 15-16 December 2005, Point IV and Annex I. 
28 Most importantly: COM(2006) 735 final, supra note 24; COM(2007) 247 final, Commission Communication, 
‘Applying the Global Approach to Migration to the Eastern and South-Eastern Regions Neighbouring the 
European Union’, COM(2008) 611 final, Commission Communication, ‘Strengthening the Global Approach to 
Migration: increasing Coordination, Coherence and Synergies’.  
29 European Council Conclusions, supra note 27, point 8; COM(2005) 621 final, supra note 26, 2. 
30 Seville European Council Conclusions, supra note 16, point 33. 
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migration and trafficking in human beings, with the involvement of FRONTEX where 
appropriate and strengthening asylum and refugee prot ction (…).31 
 
It is true that the Conclusions continue by saying that priority actions should also focus on 
fostering the links between migration and development, but in reality there has been little 
concrete action taken in this area. The last Commission Communication that specifically 
addresses this link dates back to 2005, although the 2007 Commission Communication on 
circular migration and mobility partnerships is considered to build on this Communication.32 
Nevertheless, the European Council Conclusions of 18-19 June 2009 once more places 
cooperation with third countries squarely in the context of the fight against irregular 
migration.33 
 
3. Shaping the External Dimension of EU Border Management 
 
The external dimension of the EU’s border management policy is shaped in a number of 
different ways. The conclusion of an international agreement is only one of the ways in which 
EU policies may gain an external dimension.34 The EU/EC can adopt legislation independent 
of third countries, which nevertheless has an important impact on third countries and their 
nationals. Examples are the Community’s visa policy or the Schengen borders regime. It may 
also adopt legislation autonomously which will require the consent or active participation of 
third countries at which it is directed in order to be effective. Here the Returns Directive or 
the posting of Immigration Liaison Officers can serve as an example.35 A third way, the 
importance of which should not be underestimated, is the promotion of the EU acquis in third 
countries and the adoption of (parts of that) acquis in their domestic legal orders. This may 
take place through the conclusion of an internationl agreement, such as an association 
agreement, but may also be achieved through soft-law mechanisms, such as benchmarking, 
peer review and exchange of good practices. Often, the EU’s external policies consist of a 
                                                
31 Council Conclusions on enhancing the Global Approach to Migration (Council Document 9604/08), 5. 
32 COM(2005) 390 final, Commission Communication on Migration and Development: Some concrete 
orientations; COM(2007) 248 final, Commission Communication on circular migration and mobility 
partnerships between the European Union and third countries, see on the mobility partnership below, 2. 
33 European Council Conclusions, Brussels, 18-19 June2009, point 36. 
34 Lavenex, S. and Uçarer, E., ‘The External Dimensio of Europeanization’, 39 Cooperation and Conflict 4 
(2004), 418. See also Rijpma, J. and Cremona, M., supra note 2.  
35 Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning illegally staying 
third-country, OJ 2008, L 348/98 (“Returns Directive”). 
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combination of the above instruments. Importantly, financial support programmes fund 
technical and operational cooperation for the achievement of mutually agreed objectives. 
 
3.1 External Competence for the Management of the EU’s xternal Borders 
 
Let us first examine the legal basis for external competence in the field of external border 
management, i.e. the competence to conclude international agreements in this policy area. 
Title IV EC does not contain any express external powers.36 In fact such express conferral in 
the EC Treaty is rare. Instead the ECJ has developed an elaborate doctrine of implied external 
competences.37 A recent restatement of this jurisprudence can be found in Opinion 1/2003.  
 
 “The competence of the Community to conclude international agreements may arise not only 
from an express conferment by the Treaty but may equally flow implicitly from other 
provisions of the Treaty and from measures adopted, within the framework of those 
provisions, by the Community institutions (see ERTA, paragraph 16). The Court has also held 
that whenever Community law created for those institutions powers within its internal system 
for the purpose of attaining a specific objective, the Community had authority to undertake 
international commitments necessary for the attainment of that objective even in the absence 
of an express provision to that effect (Opinion 1/76, paragraph 3, and Opinion 2/91, paragraph 
7).”38 
 
Under Title IV EC the conclusion of visa facilitation agreements on the basis of Articles 
62(2)(b)(i) and (ii) EC forms an example of an implied external competence which exists as a 
result of internal legislation. The power to conclude readmission agreements under Article 
63(3)(b) EC is an example of an implied external competence which is necessary for the 
achievement of internal EU objectives. An implied external competence for the management 
of the EU’s external borders would have to be found in Articles 62(2)(a) and 66 EC.  
 Implied external competence can either be exclusive or shared. The Court has held 
that an implied external competence is exclusive where an internal competence can be 
                                                
36 This would not change with the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, with the exception of an express 
competence for the negotiation of readmission agreements (Article 73(4) TFEU) and partnership and association 
agreements on asylum (Article 78(2)(g) TFEU).  
37 The possibility of having implied treaty making powers is confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty in Article 216(1) 
TFEU. 
38 Opinion 2003/1, Lugano Convention [2006] ECR I-1145, para. 114, with reference to Case 22/70, Commission 
v. Council (ERTA) [1971] ECR 263, Opinion 1/76, Inland waterway vessels [1977] ECR 741; Opinion 2/91, 
ILO Convention No 170 [1993] ECR I-1061. 
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effectively exercised only at the same time as external competence.39 Second, the Court has 
held that implied external competence can become exclusive through pre-emption, meaning 
that where common rules have been adopted, the Member States no longer have the right, 
acting individually or even collectively, to undertake obligations with non-member countries 
which affect those rules.40 Under Title IV however a very pragmatic approach seems to have 
been adopted in response to Member States’ fear of losing external competence in this policy 
area under which shared competence remains the norm.41  
 A good example is the acceptance of a shared competence for the conclusion of 
readmission agreements between the EU and third countries.42 It is worth noting that a 
number of Community readmission agreements concluded with neighbouring countries, 
provide for such an accelerated procedure if a person has been apprehended in the border 
region after irregularly crossing the border coming directly from the territory of the requested 
state.43 The details for such accelerated procedure are to be negotiated by the individual 
Member States in the framework of implementing protoc ls which are to be concluded 
between individual Member States and the third country i  question.44 
 The persistence of shared rather than exclusive competence may also be explained by 
the fact that while agreements in this policy area may benefit the EU as a whole, there may be 
instances in which the Member States are in a better position to negotiate such agreements, 
either because of special relations with the third country in question or because they are able 
to give something in return, such as a legal migration quota or national development aid. 
Individual Member States thus remain important actors, in particular where questions of 
migration and border management are tied into broader discussions on development and legal 
migration. Moreover, as we showed in Chapter VII, migration issues are often linked to 
questions of criminal law and security which remain within Member States’ competence.
 Member States have been represented alongside the Commission at the Euro-African 
                                                
39 Opinion 2003/1, ibid, para. 115. 
40 Ibid., para. 116. 
41 Cremona, M., supra note 13, 23.  
42 Cremona, M., ibid., 20-21. See also for a detailed analysis of the competence question: Coleman, N., 
European readmission policy : third country interests and refugee rights (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
2009), 73 ff. On the continuing relevance of bilater l agreement and the increasingly informal nature hereof, 
see: Cassarino, J.-P., ‘Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood’, 42 International 
Spectator 2 (2007), 179-196. 
43 This is the case for the agreements with Macedonia, Moldova, Russia, Serbia, Ukraine: Trauner, F. and Kruse, 
I., ‘EC Visa Facilitation and Readmission Agreements: Implementing a New EU Security Approach in the 
Neighbourhood’ (Brussels, CEPS Working Document No. 290, April 2008), 25. 
44 See for instance Articles 6(3) and 19(1)(b), Agreem nt between the Community and FYR Macedonia on the 
readmission of persons residing without authorisation, OJ 2007, L334/7 and Articles 6(3) and 20(1)(b), 
Agreement between the Community and Russia on readmission, OJ 2007, L129/40. 
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ministerial conferences on migration and development, based on the initiative of the 
Moroccan government.45 It was only after the opposition of other Member States that French 
President Sarkozy’s plan for a Mediterranean Union was incorporated into the Euro-
Mediterranean Partnership, the re-launched and renam d Barcelona Process.46 What is more, 
individual Member States have continued to negotiate bilateral agreements with third 
countries of origin on questions of migration and border management.47  
 In the specific field of external border management, a legal argument in support of this 
practice of non-exclusivity, may be found in Protocol 31 (on external borders) attached to the 
EC Treaty, if one interprets this provision as a limitation of the Court’s doctrine on pre-
emption and implied powers:  
 
 “The provisions on the measures on the crossing of external borders included in Article 
62(2)(a) of Title IV of the Treaty shall be without prejudice to the competence of Member 
States to negotiate or conclude agreements with third countries as long as they respect 
Community law and other relevant international agreem nts.” 
 
One could however also read the protocol as a confirmat on that Member States retain 
competence to sign agreements on external borders, but only as long as the Community has 
not acted in these fields.48 The Court in Opinion 1/94 clearly held that “only in so far as 
common rules have been established at internal levedo s the external competence of the 
Community become exclusive.”49 It could be argued that in as far as the Schengen Borders 
Code (SBC) exhaustively regulates the crossing of the external borders by individuals, 
Member States cannot conclude agreements with thirdcountries which would affect these 
common rules in any way. At the same time, in relation o the broader management of the 
external borders, there is no valid reason why Member States should no longer be competent 
to conclude agreements on for instance operational cooperation at their stretch of the 
                                                
45 See the Rabat Declaration and Action Plan adopted at the first conference held in Rabat, 10-11 July 2006. 
46 ‘Merkel criticises Sarkozy’s Mediterranean Union plans’ (EU Observer, 6 December 2007); Speech Nicolas 
Sarkozy (Toulon, 7 February 2007); Final Declaration f the Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial 
Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995 and its work programme.  
47 In particular the Southern Member States, Portugal, Spain, France and Italy, have been very active in 
negotiating such agreements. Spain has concluded agr ements with both African and Latin-American countries. 
See for instance the Acuerdo Marco de Cooperación en material de inmigración entre el Reino de España y la 
República de Mali, BOE No 135, 4 June 2008, 25633. Similar agreements have been concluded with Guinea 
Conakry, Guinea Bissau, Cape Verde, Mali, Niger andMauritania. Negotiations with Senegal, Cameroun and
Ghana are in course.  
48 This is the position advocated by Peers, S., EU Justice and Home Affairs (Oxford, OUP, 2006), 177. 
49 Opinion 1/94, WTO Agreement [1994] ECR I-05267, para. XIV. 
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Schengen external borders, especially since the responsibility for the management thereof 
remains with the individual Member State. 
 Two examples show that practice is inconclusiveness as regards the question of the 
nature of the external competences of the EC in relation to the external borders. The Local 
Border Traffic (LBT) Regulation forms a derogation from the SBC.50 It does not itself 
establish a regime for local border traffic at the external borders of the Member States, but 
rather requires implementation by means of bilateral agreements between individual Member 
States and their respective neighbouring third countries.51 The Regulation makes no reference 
to the Protocol on external borders attached to the EC Treaty. On the one hand it leaves the 
power to conclude bilateral agreements with the Memb r States, which could be read as a 
broad interpretation of the Protocol. On the other and, the Regulation effectively curtails the 
Member States’ external competence by the limits wihin which they may act, requiring also 
reciprocity (“comparability of treatment”).52 As such it could be argued that the Member 
States have merely been empowered by the EC to conclude agreements in order to implement 
an exclusive competence, comparable under Article 2(1) FEU. 
 Even where Member States retain competence to conclude agreements, they are 
legally constrained by the Community law principle of loyal cooperation, which affects the 
way in which those competences can be exercised in practice, and in particular imposes 
obligations of information and consultation.53 The Protocol itself states that Member States 
have to “respect Community law and other relevant international agreements”. Article 13(1) 
of the LBT Regulation provides that Member States must eliminate incompatibilities in 
existing bilateral agreements with neighbouring third countries on local border traffic.54 It 
furthermore contains explicit obligations of information and consultation. Under Article 13(2) 
Member States are obliged to consult with the Commission before concluding or amending a 
bilateral agreement and to eliminate any incompatibly found by the Commission. This does 
not seem to preclude the possibility that a conflict over the correct interpretation of the 
Regulation would be brought before the ECJ. Article 19 obliges Member States to notify 
bilateral agreements concluded under the LBT Regulation to the Commission.   
                                                
50 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 laying down rules on l cal border traffic at the external land borders of the 
Member States, OJ 2006, L405/1 (hereinafter: ‘LBT Regulation’). 
51 Article 13, LBT Regulation. Cf. to the provisions of some of the Community Readmission Agreements which 
leave it to the individual Member States to negotiate bilateral implementing protocols regarding procedur s for 
readmission, supra note 44. 
52 Articles 14 and 15, LBT Regulation. 
53 Article 10 EC. C.f. Case C-266/03 Commission v. Luxembourg (“Inland Waterway”) [2005] ECR I-4805, para. 
60. 
54 Cf. Article 307 EC, second paragraph and Case C-62/98, Commission v. Portugal [2000] ECR I-5171. 
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 The question remains of how far Member States are allowed to refuse to conclude 
such agreements, for instance in view of national foreign policy interests.55 The permissive 
wording that Member States are allowed to conclude bilateral agreements, seems to imply that 
they are not under an obligation to do so. If the Protocol on the external borders is to be 
interpreted so as to respect the competence of Member States to conclude agreements on their 
external borders this would also mean that they remain free not to use this competence. 
Likewise, considerations related to the EU’s Common F reign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
could in principle not stop a Member State from exercising its competence to conclude such 
an agreement. Although one could argue that Member States’ powers are subject to Article 10 
EC and Article 11(2) EU on the obligation of solidarity in the Union’s external relations, the 
Member States remain legally competent to act in cotravention of their CFSP obligations. 
Moreover, these obligations cannot be enforced by the ECJ, which lacks jurisdiction over the 
CFSP.   
 A second example, the conclusion by the Community of the so-called Palermo 
Protocols, would seem to justify a more restrictive reading of the Protocol on the External 
Borders.56 As we have seen in Chapter VIII, both the Community and the Member States 
have become parties to the Protocol against Migrant Smuggling and the Protocol against 
Human Trafficking attached to the UN Convention against Organised Crime. The 
Commission opposed the Council’s attempt to enumerate precisely in the competence 
declaration the provisions of the two Protocols that would fall under Community competence. 
It argued that in view of the amount of legislation adopted in this field and the “rapid 
evolution” of this area, any competence declaration w uld be incomplete or soon outdated.57  
 Moreover, the Commission clashed with the Council on the fact that some Member 
States had proceeded to ratify both Protocols, arguing that they did not have the power to 
ratify the protocols in their entirety and were as such encroaching upon an area of exclusive 
community competence.58 Again there was no mention made of the Protocol on the External 
Borders. The Commission eventually succeeded in negotiating a very generally formulated 
                                                
55 Of course national foreign policy interests in themajority of cases would push in favour of the conclusion of 
such agreement, but this does not necessarily have to b  the case. 
56 Council Decision 2006/616/EC on the conclusion of the Smuggling Protocol, in so far as its provisions fall 
within the scope of Articles 179 and 181a EC, OJ 2006, L262/24; Council Decision 2006/617/EC on the
conclusion of the Smuggling Protocol, in so far as its provisions fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV EC, OJ 
2006, L262/34; Council Decision 2006/618/EC on the conclusion of the Trafficking Protocol, in so far as its 
provisions fall within the scope of Articles 179 and 181a EC, OJ 2006, L262/44; Council Decision 2006/619/EC 
on the conclusion of the Trafficking Protocol, in so far as its provisions fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV 
EC, OJ 2006, L262/51. 
57 Council Document 7603/05, 2. See also Council Document 5948/04, 4. 
58 Council Document 7603/05, 6. 
 318 
declaration of competence, which moreover contains  clear reference to exclusivity: “In these 
fields [the crossing of the external borders and irregular migration] the Community has 
adopted rules and regulations and, where it has done s , it is hence solely for the Community 
to enter into external undertakings with third States or competent international 
organisations.”59  
 The conclusion of the Palermo Protocols raises an additional question in relation to the 
Schengen Associated Countries (SAC). All SAC are parties to the Palermo Protocols and are 
thus bound by them under public international law. One may wonder to what extent a SAC is 
bound also as a result of its association with the Schengen acquis. In the same vein, one could 
ask what would be the consequences if a SAC does not wish to accede to an international 
agreement concluded by the EC in an area covered by the Schengen acquis in which the EC’s 
external competences have become exclusive. The SAC’s association with the Schengen 
acquis did not intend to limit in any way their external competences, but arguably the articles 
in the Association Agreements which state that in case a SAC does not accept a legislative 
measure adopted by the EC/EU legislator, the agreement is deemed to be terminated unless 
otherwise decided by the Mixed Committee, would have to be applied analogously.60 
  
3.2 The Exportation of the EU Borders Acquis and Best Practices 
  
The nature of implied powers, means that such external powers for the management of the EU 
external borders can only be considered to exist where external action relates back to the 
management of the EU’s external borders. If one speaks of the promotion of the EU acquis or 
border management standards beyond the external borders in furtherance of external policy 
objectives, the competence for such external action must be found in one of the other legal 
bases provided for by the treaties. In practice, cooperation for the purposes of managing the 
EU’s external borders is often linked to cooperation on a third country’s more general system 
of border and migration management, confirming the idea that the EU is mobilising third 
countries as gatekeepers to the EU.61 
                                                
59 Annex II of the Decisions enumerated supra note 56. 
60 Articles 8(4) and 11(3), Agreement concluded by the Council and Iceland and Norway concerning the latt rs’ 
association with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, L176/36 
and Articles 7(4) and 10(3), Agreement between the EU, the EC and Switzerland on the association of 
Switzerland with the implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2008, L53/52. 
See Chapter IV. 
61 See for instance the technical missions of the Commission and Frontex to Libya, during which not only 
cooperation for the management of the EU southern mariti e sea borders was under discussion, but also the 
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 In many third countries cooperation on external border management forms part of 
wider security sector reform.62 It includes not only the modernisation of border management 
systems, including institution and capacity building, but often also the shift from a military 
border force to a civilian command structure.63 The Council’s 2004 Action Plan for Civilian 
Aspects of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) for the first time also included 
border control.64  
 External action on border management may be covered by policy areas as diverse as 
enlargement, development cooperation, association relationships, the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP) or the fight against international terrorism and crime. That this may 
give raise to questions of (cross-pillar) competence is evidenced by the Philippines Border 
Management Case.65 In this case, the ECJ specifically held that “border management is, as a 
rule, likely to increase the internal stability and security of the country concerned by leading 
to an improvement in the controls so far as concerns, in particular, the trafficking in arms, 
drugs and human beings, activities which undeniably constitute serious obstacles to economic 
and social development.”66 This was however not enough to bring a Commission pr ject on 
border management in the Philippines within the scope f Regulation (EC) No 443/92 on 
economic development cooperation.67 The Court held that “a project of institutional 
strengthening must, to be eligible as economic cooperation, be conspicuous for the existence 
of a direct connection with its aim of strengthening investment and development,” the 
objective of the Commission project was however the fight against terrorism and international 
                                                                                                                                              
upgrading of Libya’s southern land borders: Council Document 7753/05 and the Report of the Frontex-led EU 
Illegal Immigration Technical Mission to Libya, 28 May-5 June 2007, 17-18. 
62 COM(2006) 253 final, Commission Communication, ‘A Concept for European Community Support for 
Security Sector Reform,’ 5. See also Hills, A., ‘Border Control Services and Security Sector Reform’ (Geneva, 
DCAF Working Paper 37, July 2002).  
63 See for a discussion of the Turkish case: Kiricşci, K., ‘Border Management and EU Turkish Relations: 
Convergence or Deadlock?’ (Firenze, EUI RCSAS, CARIM Research Report 3/2007) and the Ukrainian case: 
Gatev, I., ‘Border Security in the Eastern Neighbourh od: Where Bio-politics and Geopolitics Meet’, 13 
EFARev 1 (2008), 97-116. Hills questions whether the Schengen border acquis is actually suitable for 
exportation in the context of the Western Balkans: Hills, A., ‘The Rationalities of European Border Security’, 15 
European Security 1 (2006), 85. While Hills has referred to differencs in “political imperatives, functional 
necessities and social realities”, Frontex has acknowledged the distinct geographic characteristics of the southern 
Libyan desert border: Frontex Report, supra note 61, 18. 
64 Council Document 10307/04, 3. 
65 Case C-403/05, European Parliament v. Commission (“Philippines Border Management”) [2007] ECR I-9045. 
66 Ibid., para. 64. 
67 Regulation (EC) No 443/92, on financial and technial assistance to, and economic cooperation with, the 
developing countries in Asia and Latin America, OJ 1992, L52/1. This Regulation has now been repealed nd 
replaced by Regulation 1905/2006/EC establishing a fin ncing instrument for development cooperation, OJ 
2006, L378/41. 
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crime, which were not covered by that Regulation.68 It should be noted that, as Cremona has 
pointed out, the Court here was interpreting the Regulation rather than ruling that the 
Community’s competence in development aid cannot cover questions of border management 
in relation to the fight against terrorism. This aim had however been consciously excluded 
from the scope of the Regulation, “implementing power being no substitute for legislative 
revision.”69  
 In relation to its direct neighbourhood, three different groups of countries can be 
distinguished. First of all there are the candidate countries: Croatia, FYR of Macedonia and 
Turkey. Negotiations are under way with these countries and the process leading up to 
accession entails the transposition and implementatio  of the acquis communautaire, 
including the rules on migration and border management, in their legal order. Accession 
partnerships establish the priorities for reform and pre-accessions support. Council Decisions 
lay down the principles, priorities and conditions for the individual countries. It may come as 
no surprise that in each of these decisions referenc  is made to border management.70 Annual 
progress reports contain sections on the progress made in this area, including the reform of 
border guards services and the development of border infrastructure.71 
 A second group consists of the remaining Western-Balkan countries, covered by the 
Stability and Association Process (SAP): Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo 
and Albania.72 All have a prospect of accession, but negotiations have not yet started.73 So-
called European Partnerships establish priority areas for reform, fostering their integration 
with the EU and eventually allowing them to become candidate countries.74 Again, Council 
Decisions lay down the principles, priorities and conditions for each country and here the 
need for improvement in the area of border management also features prominently.75 
                                                
68 Case C-403/05, supra note 65, paras 66-68. The current framework for financial assistance related to border 
management is considered below.    
69 Cremona, M., ‘Annotation of  Case C-403/05,’ 45 CMLRev (2008), 1738. 
70 See for instance Council Decision 2008/157/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 2006/35/EC, OJ 2008, L51/4, Annex, 
Point 3.1, ‘Short term priorities’. 
71The Progress Reports for the candidate and potential candidate countries can be found online: 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/press_corner/key-documents/reports_nov_2008_en.htm. 
72 The Stabilisation and Association Process is the EU’s policy towards the Western Balkans, launched at the 
1999 Zagreb summit and aiming at greater integration of the region with the EU. It combines contractual 
relationships (Stabilisation and Association Agreemnts), including trade preferences, with financial assistance.  
73 European Council Conclusions, Santa Maria de Feira, 19-20 June 2000, point 67, reaffirmed by the European 
Council Conclusions, Thessaloniki, 19-20 June 2003, point 40. 
74 See Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 on the establi hment of European partnerships in the framework of 
the stabilisation and association process, OJ 2004, L86/1.   
75 See for instance Council Decision 2008/211/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and repealing Decision 2006/55/EC, OJ 2008, L80/18, Point 
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 A third group consist of the countries covered by the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP). These are the countries in the near neighbour o d of the EU, both to the east and 
south, not all of which have a prospect to of membership. As was noted in Chapter IV the 
ENP was designed in order to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines on the European 
continent after the 2004 enlargement. It focuses on developing bilateral relations between the 
EU and individual third countries, within the framework of ENP Action Plans. 
 The ENP Action Plans are policy documents, setting out priorities and objectives, 
which are negotiated after the preparation of a Country Report by the Commission.76 They 
are adopted as recommendations of the Association or Co peration Councils set up under the 
Association Agreements or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) already in force 
between the EU and the third countries concerned.77 Under the ENP Action Plans these 
bodies are given the additional task of monitoring the implementation of the action plans. 
One of the advantages for the EU of the ENP Action Plans is that their “soft” status removes 
the need for a “hard” Treaty legal base, and thus does not raise competence questions.78 
However, where specific concrete action such as financial assistance, operational activity or 
the conclusion of an agreement with the partner country is envisaged, a legal base will need 
to be found.  
 It should be recalled that the Russian Federation is not covered by the ENP. Border 
management issues in relation to Russia are dealt with under the Common Space of Freedom, 
Security and Justice. In 2005 Russia and the EU agreed on a Road Map for the Common 
Space of Freedom, Security and Justice.”79 
 All ENP Action Plans contain a heading on migration, which is subdivided into legal 
and illegal migration, readmission, visas and asylum and border management. Border 
management relates not merely to the external borders of the EU which adjoin the 
                                                                                                                                              
3.1. ‘Short term priorities’. Note that the Commission has published Guidelines for Integrated Border 
Management in the Western Balkans (version January 2007): 
http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/pdf/financial_assistance/cards/publications/ibm_guidelines_en.pdf. 
76 The ENP Country Reports are published as SEC documents and are available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm 
77 PCAs should not be mistaken for Association Agreemnts. They are non-preferential agreements, covering a 
wide range of political, economic and trade related issues: Van Der Klugt, A., ‘Association, Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements with East European Countries,’ Eipascope 3 (1993), 4; Hillion, C., ‘Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements between the EU and the New Independent States of the Ex-Soviet Union,’ 3 EFARev 3 
1998, 399. 
78 For example, as to the extent to which specific Action Plan measures fall within the First, Second or Third 
Pillar. See Cremona, M. and Hillion, C., ‘L’Union fait la force? The Potential and Limitations of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy’ (Florence, EUI Law Working Paper 22, 2006). 
79 Road Map for the Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (Council Document 8799/05), see point 
1.2 on cooperation on border issues. See also the Action Oriented Paper on Implementing with Russia the 
Common Space of Freedom, Security and Justice (Council Document 15534/1/06 REV 1). 
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neighbourhood country, but to the country’s more general system of border management. In 
the ENP APs negotiated since 2006, there is however an important element linking back to 
the EU’s external borders, namely the reference to nhanced cooperation between Frontex 
and the border guard authorities of the ENP country.80  
 A horizontal instrument that has been developed within the framework of the Global 
Approach to migration is the so-called Mobility Partnership.81 Not unlike the ENP Action 
Plans, the Mobility Partnership brings together a set of disparate objectives (albeit all related 
to migration) in the form of a legally non-binding document. The Mobility Partnership is a 
joint declaration of a third country, the EC and interested Member States, which should act as 
an “open-ended, long-term framework based on a political dialogue.”82 This again does away 
with the immediate need for the identification of a specific legal basis. The instrument is also 
a recognition of the shared nature of competences in the area of migration and border 
management and an example of how these shared competence are managed.83 
 The choice for Cape Verde and Moldova as the firsttwo countries with which to 
conclude such partnerships can be explained by their position along major immigration 
routes, as well as from the fact that they reflect both the southern and eastern dimensions of 
the Global Approach. As Parkes has noted in relation o the mobility partnership with 
Moldova they are first and foremost a product of the EU’s migration policy with, 
notwithstanding appearances, little connection to the ENP.84 Despite the attention to questions 
of legal migration and development, the term “mobility partnership” is rather deceptive. 
Border and migration control form at least an important element of the partnership.85 
Increased mobility seems to be the carrot for the active support of third countries in the EU’s 
effort to fight irregular migration. In this context there is much emphasis on establishing 
cooperation with Frontex.86 Commitments to achieve greater mobility are few and limited for 
                                                
80 Guild, E. et al., ‘State of the Art: the Nexus between European Neighbourhood Policy and Justice and Home 
Affairs’ (Warsaw, CASE Reports No. 73/2007, April 2007). See for instance the ENP Action Plans for Lebanon 
and Egypt. All ENP Action Plans are available at: ht p://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/documents_en.htm#2. 
81 See the Council Conclusions of 10 December 2007 on m bility partnerships and circular migration in the 
framework of the global approach to migration (Council Document 16326/07, 25) and the Joint Declarations n 
Mobility Partnerships between the EU and Moldova and the EU and Cape Verde (Council Document 9460/08). 
See also the reference to “Mobility Packages” in COM(2006) 735 final, supra note 24, 7 and COM(2007) 248 
final, supra note 32. 
82 Council Document 9460/08, point 14. 
83 Cremona, M., supra note 13, 22. 
84 Parkes, R., ‘Mobility Partnerships: valuable addition to the ENP repertoire?’ (Berlin, SWP Working Paper 
FG1, 2009/3, January 2009), 2.  
85 Indeed the Commission in COM(2008) 823 final on the Eastern Partnership speaks of “Mobility and Security 
Pacts”, 5. 
86 Frontex concluded a working arrangement with the Moldovan Border Guard Service on 12 August 2008. 
Negotiations with the Cape Verdean Border Guard authorities are in course.   
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instance to the provision of information on legal channels of migration and the development 
of “a dialogue on short-stay visa issues to facilitate the mobility of certain categories of 
persons.” The Annex to the partnerships concluded so far does contain a list of projects by 
participating Member States, including modest labour migration schemes. However, the 
overall effect of these schemes is unlikely to have  great impact, especially when - in the 
case of Moldova - off-set against increased border and migration control that results from the 
imposition of the Schengen acquis along the Moldovan-Romanian borders.87  
 
3.3 Funding Instruments 
 
The EU’s external policies are financially backed by a number of financing instruments. In 
2006 there was a drastic overhaul of the legislative framework for the funding of external 
assistance, which had thus far grown in an ad hoc manner.88 There are now six instruments 
for external aid, most importantly:  
 
1) the European Neighbourhood Partnership Instrument (ENPI), covering the ENP 
 countries, as well as the Russian Federation and replacing the formerly existing 
 regional funding programmes MEDA (for Mediterranea countries) and TACIS 
 (former USSR, including Moldova);89  
2)  Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA), replacing pre-accession aid 
 programmes such as Phare (Central and Eastern European Countries) and CARDS 
 (Western Balkans);90 
3) Instrument for Development Cooperation (IDC);91 
                                                
87 Parkes, R., supra note 84, 3. 
88 VanderMosten, R., ‘Managing migration action at EU-level: a multi-pillar and multi-heading challenge’ 
(Paper presented in the EUI Migration Working Group, 1 March 2006), 4; COM(2004) 626 final, Commission 
Communication on the Instruments for External Assistance under the Future Financial Perspective 2007-213. 
89 Regulation (EC) No 1638/2006 laying down general povisions establishing a European Neighbourhood and 
Partnership Instrument, OJ 2006, L310/1; MEDA Programme, Council Regulation (EC) No 1488/96 on financial 
and technical measures to accompany the reform of ec nomic and social structures in the framework of the
Euro-Mediterranean partnership, OJ 1996, L189/1; TACIS Programme, Council Regulation (EC, EURATOM) 
No 99/2000 concerning the provision of assistance to the partner States in Eastern Europe and Central Asi , OJ 
2000, L12/1. 
90 Council Regulation (EC) No 1085/2006 establishing an Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance, OJ 2006, 
L210/82; Phare Programme, Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 on economic aid to certain countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe, OJ 1989, L375/11; Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and 
Stabilisation (CARDS), Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, OJ 
2000, L306/1. 
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4) Instrument for Stability, replacing most importantly the Rapid Reaction 
 Mechanism;92  
 
The IPA provides the financial assistance for the alignment of the candidate countries’ border 
regime with the Schengen acquis and the improvement of border infrastructure and 
institutions.93 The ENPI and the IDC cover financial support for projects and activities related 
to the improvement of third countries’ systems of brder management in more general terms. 
Article 2(2)(q) of the ENPI specifically refers to “ensuring efficient and secure border 
management,” the IDC does so for Central Asia in Article 8(c).   
 The AENEAS Programme, which was phased out in 2007, has been replaced by a so-
called thematic programme based on Article 1(2) of the IDC and elaborated in a Commission 
Strategy Paper.94 Like its predecessor it aims to give “assistance to third countries to support 
them in their efforts to ensure better management of migratory flows in all their 
dimensions.”95 The Strategy Paper frankly states that the programme does not directly attempt 
to deal with the root causes of migration, which should be addressed by the broader 
geographical programmes such as the ENPI and the IDC itself.96 Although the Programme 
covers third countries falling under the ENPI, the IDC and the European Development Fund 
(this latter covers the African, Caribbean and Pacific ountries and the Overseas Countries 
and Territories), the Strategy Paper leaves little doubt that the focus is on migration towards 
the EU, showing once more the use of a “development” ins rument in support of the EU’s 
goal of controlling immigration flows.97  
 
The Stability Instrument was adopted, unlike the Rapid Reaction Mechanism, on the basis of 
Article 179 (development aid) and 181a EC (assistance to third countries) rather than Article 
308 EC. Its purpose is twofold. First, it allows the EU to respond swiftly to (emerging) crisis 
                                                                                                                                              
91 Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006 establishing a financing instrument for development cooperation, OJ 2006, L 
378/41. 
92 Regulation (EC) No 1717/2006 establishing an Instrument for Stability, OJ 2006, 327/1 (hereinafter: “Stability 
Instrument”); Council Regulation (EC) No 381/2001 creating a rapid-reaction mechanism, OJ 2001, L 57/5 
(hereinafter: “Rapid Reaction Mechanism”). Two other instruments for Humanitarian Aid and Macro-Financi l 
Assistance remained in force. 
93 Note also the continuing support under the so-called Schengen facility in Article 35 of the 2004 Act of 
Accession, OJ 2003, L236/33 provided for continuing support in this area and Article 32 of the 2007 Act of 
Accession, OJ 2005, L157/203.  
94 COM(2006) 26 final, Commission Communication on the Thematic programme for the cooperation with third 
countries in the areas of migration and asylum and the Annual Action Programme 2009 and 2010. 
95 COM(2006) 26 final, ibid., 7 
96 Annual Action Plan 2009 and 2010 supra note 94, 5. 
97 Ibid. 
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situations in third countries, of both human or natur l nature.98 Secondly, in more stable 
conditions, it aims to address threats with a potentially destabilising effect and raise 
preparedness for potential crises.99 The type of actions that can be financed under the S ability 
Instrument are very broad, and include a wide range of activities in areas that touch upon 
competences covered by the Second and Third Pillar.100 Its preamble explicitly states that 
measures taken under the Stability Instrument, may be complementary to and should be 
consistent with CFSP objectives and measures adopte under Title VI EU.101 
 The entry into force of the Stability Instrument has considerably expanded the scope 
of the Community’s funding activities in areas such as security sector reform and the fight 
against small arms and light weapons. The financing of the Philippines Border Management 
Project would not have been problematic under the Stability Instrument, considering that the 
Regulation specifically refers to the strengthening of institutions in the fight against terrorism 
and organised crime.102 It was already clear from the ECJ’s ruling in E vironmental Penalties 
that Community legislation could cover subject matters falling under the Third Pillar. This 
was subsequently confirmed in Ship Source Pollution and, in relation to the Second Pillar, in 
Small Arms and Light Weapons103 In the latter case the Court reiterated that where, upon 
examination of a measure’s content and aim, it is possible to adopt a measure under the First 
Pillar, Article 47 EU prevents such a measure from being adopted under the EU Treaty.104 
Similarly, where a measures pursues simultaneously, equally important objectives partly 
covered by the EC Treaty and partly by the EU Treaty, Article 47 EU requires its adoption 
under the EC Treaty.105  
 
Like its predecessors both the ENPI and the IPA include important regional and cross-border 
components. In as far as these relate to cross-border cooperation across the Schengen external 
borders, the EC’s policy is to:  
                                                
98 Article 1(2)(a), Stability Instrument. Under Article 6(2) of the Stability Instrument this support can now be 
provided up to 18 months, whereas under Article 8(2) of the Rapid Reaction Mechanism this was six months.   
99 Article 1(2)(b), Stability Instrument. 
100 See in more detail on the relation with development-CFSP in relation to the Stability Instrument: Hoffmeister, 
F., ‘Das Verhältnis zwischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Gemeinsamer Auβen- und Sicherheitspolitiek 
am Beispiel des EG-Stabilitätsinstruments’, EuR (Beiheft 2, 2008), 55-76.  
101 Recital 3, Stability Instrument. 
102 Article 4(1)(a), Stability Instrument. 
103 Case C-176/03, Commission v. Council (“Environmental Penalties”) [2005] ECR I-7879, para. 48 and Case 
C-440/05, Commission v. Council (“Ship Source Pollution”) [2007] ECR I-9097, see also Chapter VIII. Case C-
91/05, Commission v. Council  (“Small Arms and Light Weapons”) [2008] ECR I-3651.  
104 Case 91/05, ibid, para. 60. 
105 Ibid., para. 77. In the case at hand, the Court concluded that Joint Action 2002/589/CFSP on the EU’s 
contribution to combating the destabilising accumulation and spread of small arms and light weapons (OJ 2002, 
L 191/1) should have been adopted under the EC developm nt cooperation policy (paras. 108-109). 
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 “(…) support sustainable development along both sides of the EU’s external borders, to help 
decrease differences in living standards across these borders, and to address the challenges and 
opportunities following on EU enlargement or otherwise arising from the proximity between 
regions across our land and sea borders.”106 
 
On the one hand, one could consider this Cross Border Cooperation (CBC) element as a 
genuine concern for the need for regional development. On the other hand, implied also in the 
above quotation, the CBC is alleviating the negative consequences resulting from the 
imposition of the Schengen regime at the new external borders. The idea that “good fences 
make good neighbours” remains very much present. Cross-border cooperation is seen as a 
way to “prevent and combat common security threats in border areas.”107 One of the main 
objectives of the CBC is to ensure “efficient and secure borders,” meaning that they facilitate 
bona fide cross-border movement, but perhaps most importantly prevent illegal border-
crossings.108  
 
Once more the role of individual Member States needs to be emphasised here. Bilateral 
agreements on questions of migration and border management often also include funding 
from Member States for activities in third countries. One of the clearest examples can be 
found in the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation between Italy and Libya.109 In 
Article 19(2) the Italian government pledges to bear half of the costs for the development of a 
border control system at Libya’s southern borders, and it is agreed that both parties will ask 
the EU for the other half.110 Considering that many immigrants attempting to reach Europe by 
boat set sail from Libyan coasts, both Italy and the EU have an obvious interest in the 
development of such a system, again shifting control away from actual external Schengen 
borders. 
  
                                                
106 ENPI, Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy Paper 2007-2013, Indicative Programme 2007-2010, 5. 
107 COM(2006) 253 final, supra note 62, 9. 
108 ENPI, Cross-Border Cooperation Strategy Paper 2007-2013, supra note 106, 11. 
109 The text of the ‘Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione’ is annexed to the law authorizing its 
ratification and implementation (Law No 7,6 February 2009, GU No 40, 18 February 2009). 
110 This would probably have to be done under the ENPI, even if Libya is not a partner to the ENP. There ar  no 
bilateral legal ties between the Community and Libya. A piecemeal approach focussing on the “Benghazi 
HIV/AIDS crisis” and irregular immigration has proven largely unsuccessful. Negotiations to establish a more 
comprehensive EU-Libya framework agreement are currently taking place. See the concept note for the first
Libya Country Strategy Paper and National Indicative Programme 2011-2013. 
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4. The Operational Character of the External Dimension of EU Border Management 
 
In its Communication on the Reinforcing of the Southern Maritime Borders the Commission 
considered “building on existing relations and practical cooperation already established with 
the third countries, pursuing and strengthening our dialogue and cooperation with third 
countries on these operational measures (…)” as an important part of the overall approach.111 
The external action of the EU in the area of border management has a strong operational 
character. This external dimension is twofold. On the one hand, the EC’s support to third 
countries’ border management systems takes place throug  its financial instruments for 
funding external action, putting much emphasis on institution and capacity building, as well 
as the promotion of best practices. In some instances, border management projects go beyond 
providing mere financial and technical assistance, sending missions of border experts to third 
countries. On the other hand, the external dimension for the management of the external 
borders of the Schengen area itself is largely shaped at executive level. First of all through 
operational cooperation between Member States’ border guards authorities and their 
counterparts in third countries, but increasingly aso through the “external relations” of 
Frontex.  
 
4.1 Border Management Missions in Third Countries 
 
In this section we will briefly examine two examples of border management projects that have 
been set up by the EC in its neighbourhood: the EU Border Mission in Moldova and Ukraine 
(EUBAM) and the EU Border Management Programme for Central Asia (BOMCA).  
 In 2002, the BOMCA was launched by the EC Commission at the initiative of the 
Central Asia Border Security Initiative (CABSI), a consortium of EU Member States led by 
Austria. It was previously funded under TACIS and currently under the IDC.112 In the words 
of the Programme’s website:   
 
                                                
111 COM(2006) 733 final, Commission Communication, ‘Reinforcing the management of the European Union's 
Southern Maritime Borders,’ 4.  
112 Article 8(c), Regulation (EC) No 1905/2006, supra note 91. 
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 “Training and exposure to European Best Practices in Integrated Border Management (IBM) 
form the main component of the programme. IBM means intra-service, inter-agency and 
cross-border cooperation between Central Asian border management agencies.”113 
 
The BOMCA is one of the EC’s largest assistance programmes and there are no other donors 
in the region with assistance programmes specifically iming at the reform of border 
management.114 The Programme focuses on institutional reform, the training of border guards 
and the improvement of infrastructure capacities in selected parts of the region. Local 
governments are encouraged to adapt their border rules and regulations, including 
demilitarisation.115 BOMCA is closely related to another security programme in the region, 
the Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) and complementary to EU programmes 
in the area of customs, energy and transport.116 Especially at the Tajik-Afghan border drugs as 
well as arms and human trafficking are of important concern to the EU.117 Intensified securing 
of this border may however mean more barriers to the free movement of persons and goods, 
disrupting local trade and constituting an additional means of extraction for corrupted border 
guards officials.118 It may also make it even more difficult for people in need of international 
protection to have access to asylum. 
 The EU generally works together with other international organisations, both inter-
governmental and non-governmental.119 For instance, BOMCA is implemented and co-
financed by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Another example can be 
found in the Western Balkans, where the Ohrid Process on Border Security and Management 
is a joint effort of five countries as well as the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the former Stability 
Pact (Regional Cooperation Council).120 The EU further contributes financially to the so-
                                                
113 http://bomca.eu-bomca.kg/en/about. 
114 The seventh phase of BOMCA has an estimated budget of 6 million Euro, see the ENPI Regional Action 
Programme 2006, Project Fiche Border Management in the NIC Countries, 11. 
115 See the ENPI Regional Action Programme 2005, Project Fiche 8 Border Management programme for Central 
Asia (BOMCA 6), 4. 
116 http://cadap.eu-bomca.kg/; See also: ‘The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership’ (Council 
Document 10113/07), endorsed by the European Council, Brussels, 21-22 June 2007. 
117 Matveeva, A., ‘Central Asia: A Strategic Framework for Peace building’ (London, International Alert, 
February 2006), 25. These also concern the US, which however has less leeway in relation to Russia and China 
and unlike the EU less long term interests: Kassenova, N, ‘The New EU Strategy towards Central Asia: A View 
from the Region’ (Brussels, CEPS Policy Brief no. 148, January 2008), 3. 
118 Matveeva, A., ibid, 59 and Matveeva, A., ‘Tajikistan: Evolution of the Security Sector and the War on 
Terror,’: in Ebnöther, A. et al. (Eds), Facing the Terrorist Challenge: Central Asia’s Role in Regional and 
International Co-operation (Vienna, Bureau for Security Policy at the Austrian Ministry of Defence, April 2005), 
138.  
119 See e.g. the ENPI Regional Action Programme 2006, supra note 114. To name but a few: OSCE, ICMPD, 
UNDP, UNHCR, IBRD (World Bank), IOM, ECRE. 
120 See the two founding documents of the Ohrid Regional Conference, 22-23 May 2003: the Way Forward 
Document and the Common Platform on Border Security and Management. 
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called Söderköping process, an initiative to promote dialogue on asylum and irregular 
migration issues among the countries situated along the EU eastern border, involving also the 
IOM, the Swedish Migration Board and the UNHCR.121 
 
It follows from its name that the EU Border Mission to Moldova and the Ukraine (EUBAM) 
must be distinguished from the BOMCA: it is an on-the ground operation within third country 
territory, rather than a mere programme for financil and technical assistance. As Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner, Commissioner for External Relation and the ENP, summed up:  
 
“We will deploy a number of mobile teams, consisting of approximately 50 border guards 
and customs officials from EU Member States, to the most relevant locations along the entire 
border, including the Transnistrian segment. These experts will make unannounced visits to 
any location on the Moldovan-Ukrainian frontier.”122  
 
On 2 June 2005, Presidents Voronin of Moldova and Yuschenko of Ukraine addressed a joint 
letter to Commission President José Barroso and the EU High Representative for the 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Javier Solana, requesting EU assistance on the 
Ukrainian-Moldovan border.123 On 7 October 2005, Commissioner Benita Ferrero-Waldner 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding between the Commission and the governments of 
Moldova and Ukraine establishing a EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM).124  
The overall objectives of the Mission, as stated in the Annex to the Memorandum, are 
to contribute to the EU policy towards Ukraine and Moldova, in particular as regards border 
management issues, to build up an appropriate operational and institutional capacity for 
effective border monitoring, to contribute to the settlement of the Transnistria conflict and to 
improve transnational cooperation in border management. 
The EUBAM shows how internal and foreign policy goals come together in the 
ENP.125 There is undoubtedly a strong link with the EU’s CFSP in the region, if not to say 
                                                
121 http://soderkoping.org.ua/page2864.html. 
122 Speech by Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, ‘Strengthening the partnership 
between the EU and its neighbours: Signature of EU-Moldova-Ukraine Memorandum of Understanding’ 
(Palanca border crossing point, 7 October 2005). 
123 Already the ENP Action Plan for Ukraine stated that the country would develop co-operation with Moldova 
on border questions and would engage actively in the trilateral expert talks involving Ukraine, Moldova and the 
Commission, Chapter 2(1), point 14. 
124 Memorandum of Understanding of 7 October 2005 betwe n the Commission, the Government of Moldova 
and the Government of Ukraine on the European Commission Border Assistance Mission to Moldova and 
Ukraine. 
125 Lavenex, S., ‘EU External Governance in “Wider Europe”’, 11 JEPP 4 (2004), 681. 
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that the EUBAM has clear CFSP objectives.126 Kurowska and Tallis have described in detail 
how this led to disagreement between the Commission and Council on the control over the 
initiative.127 The Commission argued that it should be in charge of the Mission because of its 
civilian character, while the Council considered this to be an infringement of its powers under 
the CFSP.128 Reportedly, a lack of funds in the CFSP budget andRussian sensibilities as 
regards interference in its near neighbourhood, allowed the Commission to move ahead under 
the First Pillar.  
 The EUBAM’s rather unclear legal framework reflects the dualistic character of the 
Mission. The EUBAM was initially funded under the Rapid Reaction Mechanism and 
subsequently the TACIS and ENPI. These funding instruments thus seem to constitute the 
Mission’s legal basis. In addition the CFSP Joint Ac ion appointing a special representative 
for Moldova was amended so as to include in its policy objectives the increased efficiency of 
customs and border management at the Ukraine-Moldova border and the Special 
Representative’s mandate was extended to include the monitoring and promotion of cross-
border cooperation in the region.129 Still, the EUBAM is supervised by DG Relex and theEC 
delegation in Kiev, and the Mission reports directly to Brussels rather than through the EU’s 
Special Representative.130  
 The Memorandum of Understanding is a legally non-binding agreement, also bearing 
in mind that “international law does not know the class of administrative agreements as a 
category distinct from that of international agreemnts.”131 Nonetheless, it regulates important 
questions regarding immunity, privileges and responibilities.132 The staff of the mission are 
accorded diplomatic immunity and equated with the Commission staff at the Commission’s 
                                                
126 See also the remarks of Javier Solana, EU High Repres ntative for the CFSP at the launch of the EU Border 
Mission for Moldova - Ukraine, Odessa, 30 November 2005 (Press Release, No S398/05, 2 December 2005). 
127 Kurowska, X. and Tallis, B., ‘EU Border Assistance Mission: Beyond Border Monitoring?’, 14 EFARev 1 
(2009), 49 ff. 
128 Note that the European Union Border Assistance Mission for the Rafah Crossing Point (EUBAM Rafah) in 
Palestine was set up on the basis of a Joint Action under the ESDP (Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP, OJ 2005, 
L327/28) after the Palestinian Authority and the Israeli Government had addressed letters of invitation for the 
establishment of a border mission. The tasks of the EUBAM Rafah can in many aspects be compared to that of 
the EUBAM. It shall “contribute, through mentoring, to building up the Palestinian capacity in all aspects of 
border management”. Also the EUBAM Rafah does not have executive tasks, although it does have the authority 
to ensure compliance with the terms of the ‘Agreement on Movement and Access’ between Israel and the 
Palestinian Authority of 15 November 2005 and may in that role order the re-examination and reassessment of 
any passenger, luggage, vehicle or goods. 
129 Article 1, Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP amending the mandate of the European Union Special Representative 
for Moldova, OJ 2005, L292/13. 
130 Kurowska, X and Tallis, B., supra note 127, 52. 
131 Opinion AG Tesauro in Case C-327/91, France v. Commission, delivered on 16 December 1993, para. 22. 
132 Article III and IV, Memorandum, supra note 124. Article IV(4) states that disputes on interpretation or 
implementation need to be resolved through negotiati ns. 
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representation in Ukraine and Moldova. The Governments of Moldova and Ukraine take full 
legal responsibility for the activities of the mission and its staff carried out under the 
Memorandum.  
 It is repeatedly stressed that the EUBAM is an “advisory, technical body” with no 
executive powers.133 The Memorandum expressly states that the Mission and its staff: “have 
no authority to enforce laws and (…) [will] refrain from any action or activity incompatible 
with the advisory or audit nature of their duties.”134 EU Experts may however make 
unannounced visits to border locations and may request the Head of a Border Post to order the 
re-examination and re-assessment of goods subject to ustoms duties.135 The Mission will 
furthermore “provide assistance” in preventing the smuggling of people and goods.136 
Kurowska and Tallis state in very critically terms that: “[i]t is unethical to disguise 
disciplinary practices as mentoring and to frame thbuttressing of Fortress Europe as a 
success story of neighbourhood cooperation.”137 Without wanting to assess the EUBAM in 
those terms, they are right to observe that the Mission is presented as a mere technical 
exercise, while it is much more an expression of the EU’s external policy interest in the 
region. Moreover, for Moldova and Ukraine the real interest in EU assistance may lie with the 
supply of border surveillance equipment rather than in the application of EU rules and 
standards at their borders. As the deputy chief of Ukraine’s southern border command 
admitted, Ukraine is most interested in modern equipment for customs inspections and 
passport controls, as well as access to European information databases.138 A 9 million Euro 
project, initially funded under TACIS and implementd by the EUBAM, allows inter alia for 
the purchase of equipment and communication systems.139  
 An interesting question is whether there could be a role envisaged for Frontex in the 
framework of the EUBAM. There is an obvious overlap in the respective organisations’ 
activities, not only in terms of operational activities, but also training, albeit that Frontex’s 
mandate is limited to the Schengen external borders. The Commission states that Frontex “has 
established a solid working relationship” with the EUBAM, but one may question how far 
                                                
133 http://www.eubam.org/staticdownloads/eubam_brochure_en.pdf. 
134 Article II(2), Memorandum, supra note 124. 
135 Articles II(3) and II(5), Memorandum, ibid.  
136 Article II(6), Memorandum, ibid. 
137 Kurowska, X and Tallis, B., supra note 127, 60. 
138 ‘Moldova: EU Launches First “Neighbourhood Policy” Border Mission In Post-Soviet Space’ (Radio Free 
Europe/Radio Liberty, 9 October 2005). 
139 BOMMOLUK (Improving Management on the Moldovan-Ukrainian State Border), see: 
http://www.eubam.org/index.php?action=show&sid=<&id=192 
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there is in fact structural cooperation between the two organisations.140 In terms of coherence 
and efficiency it would be only logical for Frontex to be given a much stronger say over the 
EUBAM, although admittedly its current legal framework does not allow for that. This is 
recognised in the EU’s communication on the future rol  of the agency, which states that 
“[t]he mandate of Frontex as concerns cooperation with third countries is limited in the sense 
that projects aiming, for example, at technical assistance cannot be carried out by Frontex in 
third countries.141 It continues by proposing in more general terms that “[a]t a later stage, and 
against the background of the Lisbon Treaty, a reflection could be initiated on what role the 
Agency can have regarding the participation in European border control missions conducted 
in third countries.”142 If this were to be the case, then more careful thoug t should be given to 
the question of immunities and responsibilities, especially if such missions were to involve 
the exercise of executive powers. As we shall see below some of these questions already arise 
in the context of joint operations in third country erritorial waters.  
 
4.2 Operational Activities at the External Borders  
 
The suggestion that Frontex take on a role in border management missions conducted in third 
countries brings us to the second operational dimension of EU external action in the area of 
border management: the operational activities in cooperation with third countries for the 
management of the external borders of the EU itself. Article 14 of Regulation (EC) 
No 2007/2004 endows Frontex with the task of facilitat ng cooperation between Member 
States and third countries 1) in matters covered by its activities, 2) to the extent necessary 
required for the fulfilment of its tasks and 3) in the framework of the EU’s external relations 
policy.143  
 The Agency may further conclude working arrangements with international 
organisations and the authorities of third countries competent in matters covered by the 
                                                
140 SEC(2008) 150, Statistical Data, document accompanying COM(2008) 67 final, Commission Report on the 
evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX Agency, 44. 
141 COM(2008) 67 final, Commission Report on the evaluation and future development of the FRONTEX 
Agency, 8. It must be assumed that this refers to third countries not bordering the EU, since third countries such 
as Ukraine are already eligible for funding for the participation in joint operations. Moreover, Frontex joint 
operations have been conducted in third country teritorial waters, see below. 
142 COM(2008) 67 final, ibid. 
143 Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2004, L349/1 (hereinafter: 
“Frontex Regulation”). 
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Frontex Regulation.144 This must be done “in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty.” This later condition is rather unclear and should probably be interpreted so as to 
mean that the Agency cannot conclude international agreements binding the Community, 
since for this procedures have been laid down in the Treaty (Article 300 EC).145 As Ott rightly 
points out, the domestic legal personality of EU agencies has to be clearly distinguished from 
their lack of international legal personality.146 Indeed, all Frontex working arrangements 
contain a stipulation that they do not constitute agreements under international law.  
 The Management Board has adopted a rather elaborate procedure for the conclusion of 
such working agreements.147 The Executive Director presents a draft mandate with 
negotiation guidelines to the Management Board, after consulting with relevant Member 
States and the Commission. Once the Management Board has given a mandate, negotiations 
are carried out by the Executive Director, in practice he Agency’s External Relations Officer. 
The Chair of the Management Board may support the Executive Director. Once negotiations 
have been concluded the Executive Director consults with the Commission prior to putting 
the arrangement before the Management Board. The Management Board adopts the final 
version of the working arrangement by absolute majority after which the Executive Director 
can proceed with signature. The prominent role of the Member States and the Commission 
can be easily explained, although it does not follow from the wording of Article 14 of the 
Frontex Regulation. The duty of loyal cooperation evid ntly entails obligations of information 
and consultation, but arguably Frontex’s independent position should allow it greater freedom 
of action. At the same time the highly politicised nvironment in which Frontex acts would 
justify close scrutiny by the Commission and Member States.148 
 The Agency has concluded working arrangements withthe relevant authorities of the 
Russian Federation, Ukraine, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova, Albania, Serbia, FYR Macedonia, 
Switzerland (now redundant in view of Switzerland’s association with the Schengen acquis), 
Montenegro and the USA. The negotiation process is well advanced with the authorities of 
Turkey, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Senegal and Cape Verde. It has received a further mandate 
from the Management Board to negotiate working arrangements with the authorities from the 
                                                
144 Articles 13 and 14, Frontex Regulation. 
145 See Case C-327/91, France v. Commission [1994] ECR I-3641, paras 27-28. 
146 Ott, A., ‘EU Regulatory Agencies in EU External Relations: Trapped in a Legal Minefield Between European 
and International Law’, 13 EFARev 4 (2008), 519.  
147 Article 2, Frontex Management Board Decision of 1 September 2006 laying down the procedures for 
negotiating and concluding working arrangements with third countries and international organisations. 
148 Note that this is essentially the same dilemma that was observed in the previous chapter in relation to political 
influence over the Agency’s decisions in relation t joint operations and/or the deployment of Rapid Border 
Intervention Teams.  
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Commonwealth of Independent States, Libya, Egypt, Morocco, Mauritania and Brazil. 
Although priority is given to potential EU-candidate countries, many of the countries Frontex 
is engaging with do not actually border the Schengen area. This could be justified by 
Frontex’s competences in relation to air-borders, yet cooperation with these countries extends 
also to the exchange of information, training, capacity building and collaboration on relevant 
technologies.  
 Working Arrangements normally start out with a list of objectives, on which - along 
with the development of good relations and mutual trust - the fight against irregular migration 
and improved security at the borders feature prominently. This is followed by a general 
summing up of activities which may be developed in the framework of the Working 
Arrangement, ranging from information exchange to agreed points of contact, risk analysis 
and training to the coordination of joint operational measures and pilot projects.149 Detailed 
terms and the conditions for joint operational activity can be found in the Financial 
Partnership Agreements which are concluded together with the working arrangement for the 
same duration. They are similar to the financial partnership agreements concluded between 
the Commission and third country beneficiaries on the basis of Title IV of the general 
Financial Regulation.150 It is however striking to note that the Commission Regulation on the 
framework Financial Regulation for the bodies referred to in Article 185 of the general 
Financial Regulation is silent as to the “external action” of agencies.151 Also the Frontex 
Regulation itself is silent on the point of giving financial assistance to third countries. The 
Agency has nevertheless co-financed the participation of third countries in joint operations.152 
 Frontex’s “external relations” will of course have to be in conformity with the EU’s 
external relations policy. The Commission Communication on the participation of ENP 
countries in EC Agencies and Programmes in this respect states that “[b]oth the priorities of 
external relations policies of the European Union and the priorities based on operational needs 
are taken into consideration when choosing partner countries.”153 Nevertheless there is a risk 
that “technical agreements” turn into a less transprent alternative for contacts at Commission 
                                                
149 The Working Arrangements have not been published, but have been made available to the author by Frontex 
upon a request for access. 
150 Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) 1605/2002 on the Financial Regulation applicable to the General Budget 
of the European Communities, OJ 2002, L248/1. See also Title III of Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 
2342/2002 laying down detailed rules for the implementation of the general Financial Regulation. 
151 Commission Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2343/2002 on the framework Financial Regulation for the bodies 
referred to in Article 185 of the general Financial Regulation, OJ 2002, L357/72. 
152 See for instance the participation of Ukraine in the series of joint operations Ursus I-IV, carried out in July-
December 2007.   
153 COM(2006) 724 final, Commission Communication on the general approach to enable ENP partner countries 
to participate in Community agencies and Community programmes, 7. 
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level, allowing for progress to be made in the specific area of external border management, 
whilst ignoring the broader and potentially more sensitive political context of the relations 
with specific third countries. Moreover, rather contr versial assistance, for instance the supply 
of border management equipment to third countries with a less than perfect human rights 
record, could be channeled through the Agency, without implicating the Commission. 
   
Although the Frontex Working Arrangements certainly have the potential of becoming 
important instruments of cooperation between the EU and third countries in the area of 
external border management, the continuing importance of practical cooperation agreements 
between Member States and third countries cannot be und restimated.154 Article 2(2) of the 
Frontex Regulation and Article 16(3) SBC explicitly stipulate that: “without prejudice to the 
competencies of the Agency, Member States may continue cooperation at an operational level 
with other Member States and/or third countries at external borders, where such cooperation 
complements the action of the Agency.” As always, they are under a duty of loyal 
cooperation. Member States must refrain from activity that could jeopardise the Agency’s 
functioning or the attainment of its objectives and they must report to the Agency on these 
operational matters. 
 Member States may be in a better negotiating position vis-à-vis third countries, tying 
operational cooperation into a package deal with additional benefits for third countries. In fact 
many of the bilateral agreements between individual Member States and third countries on 
questions of migration, refer to cooperation in border management.155 The Commission in this 
respect also supports the Agency by underlining the importance of cooperation with Frontex 
in its broader relations with third countries, such as for instance in the ENP Action Plans or 
Mobility Partnerships. In practice however, the operational cooperation between Member 
States and third countries most often takes place on the basis of rather informal cooperation 
arrangements, such as memorandums of understanding as opposed to fully fledged 
international agreements. It must be questioned to what extent Frontex is indeed informed on 
a structural basis by the Member States on their bilateral initiatives. Importantly, the Agency 
does not dispose of an overview of all existing (informal) arrangements between the Member 
                                                
154 There are many examples. For just a few, see: Spanish Ministry of the Interior, ‘Alonso se reúne con el Rey 
Mohamed VI y con su homólogo Mustapha Sahel para reforzar la cooperación bilateral’ (Press Release, 17 
February 2005); ‘Latest International Cooperation the Border Guard Service of Latvia’ (5 March 2007): 
http://soderkoping.org.ua/page12824.html; ‘Cooperation between border guard services of Poland and Ukraine’ 
(6 March 2007): http://soderkoping.org.ua/page12984.html;. 
155 See for instance Article 19(1) of the Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione, supra note 109 or 
Article 8 of the ‘Acuerdo marco de cooperación en material de inmigración entre el Reino de España y l 
República de Cabo Verde’, BOE No 39, 14 February 2008, 8028. 
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States and third countries, even where these have formed the basis for Frontex coordinated 
activities in the territorial waters of third countries. 
 
5. Taking to the High Seas and Beyond: Extra-territorialising Border Control 
 
Much of the attention of the public, and as a consequence of Member States’ politicians and 
EU policy makers, has been on the situation at the southern maritime borders of the EU. Some 
of the most costly joint operations that have been co-financed by Frontex are maritime 
operations aiming to kerb migration flows departing from the African continent, as well as the 
Turkish coasts.  
 We have already observed that the EU aims to improve the border management 
systems of countries of origin or transit of irregular migration to the EU as a means of 
tackling irregular migration at as early a stage possible. The imposition of visa obligations 
and carrier sanctions has a similar aim of preventing irregular migration “at the source.” By 
making it increasingly difficult for people to actually reach EU territory, the Member States 
try to avoid the responsibility for asylum claims or the - in practice often impossible - removal 
of irregularly present third country nationals. In this respect, the Frontex-coordinated joint 
operations at sea form a variation on a familiar theme. The patrols on the High Seas and in the 
territorial waters of third countries from which irregular migrant boats depart mean that the 
physical surveillance of the external borders has also moved upstream. 
 The rather elaborate discussion that follows below will to some extent exceed the 
scope of this chapter. It serves not only to illustrate the external dimension of the EU’s 
external borders policy, the operational dimension thereof and the interaction between  third 
countries, Member States and the Community. It is also intended to support a more general 
argument, which holds that although the control-based focus on the external borders may be 
explained from a lack of substantive harmonisation in the area of immigration and asylum 
rules, in the absence thereof, as well as in the absence of a common interpretation of 
internationally binding rules, any common external border policy is necessarily flawed. 
 
5.1 Territorial Scope of the Schengen Borders Code and Frontex Regulation  
 
Joint patrols taking place outside the territorial w ters of the Member States raise the question 
of the territorial scope of both the Schengen Borders Code (SBC) and the Frontex Regulation. 
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Article 3(1) of the Frontex Regulation is titled “Joint operations and pilot projects at external 
borders.” It is questionable how far one can consider the High Seas or third country territorial 
waters to fall under this article. The definition of external borders in Article 1(a)(1) of the 
Frontex Regulation differs slightly from that in Article 2(2) of the SBC, in referring to the 
borders to which “the provisions of Community law on the crossing of external borders” 
applies.   
 Interestingly, the Decision establishing the External Borders Fund (EBF) in Article 
14(6)(b) defines the “external maritime borders” as “the outer limit of the territorial sea of the 
Member States as defined according to Articles 4 to16 of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). However, in cases where long range operations on a regular 
basis are required in order to prevent irregular migrat on/illegal entry, this shall be the outer 
limit of high threat areas. It does add that this definition of external maritime borders is used 
exclusively for the purposes of the EBF.  
 It is clear that both the SBC and the Frontex Regulation apply in the territorial waters 
of the Member States. According to Article 3 of UNCLOS these waters may extend up to 12 
miles. Countries may claim on the basis of Article 33 UNCLOS an additional 12 mile 
contiguous zone to “prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigration or sanitary laws 
and regulations.”156 One could argue that this provision allows for the application of both the 
SBC and the Frontex Regulation also in this area of the High Seas.  
 More questionable is the extension beyond the contiguous zone. From one point of 
view the territorial scope of the application of the SBC flows from its material scope of 
application, meaning that it applies wherever border control or surveillance takes place.157 
This interpretation would have the positive effect of making all the procedural safeguards that 
are contained in the SBC relating to a refusal of entry applicable to border control activities 
outside the EU territory. However, one may question his interpretation on the basis of the 
territorial scope of the EC Treaty. Such interpretation would also leave unanswered the more 
fundamental question regarding the jurisdiction of Member States’ border guards authorities 
under public international law at sea and Frontex’s coordinating powers.  
 
                                                
156 Note that not all Member States have declared sucha ontiguous zone, e.g. Italy. See however Article 6, 
Decree of the Italian Minister of the Interior of 14 July 2003, ‘Disposizioni in materia di contrasto 
all'immigrazione clandestine’, GU No 220, 22 September 2003, referring to immigration control in the 
contiguous zone. 
157 ECRE, ‘Defending Refugees’ Access to Protection in Europe’ (London, December 2007), 24. 
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5.2 Joint Operations on the High Seas. 
 
Unlike for instance in the case of piracy, UNCLOS does not expressly allow for the shipping 
authorities of a State other than the flag State to take action against a ship on the High Seas 
and inspect it on illegal immigration grounds. Irregular migration is often carried out in 
unseaworthy boats, without nationality. Article 110 UNCLOS allows for the boarding and 
inspection of a ship that does not fly a flag, although there is no consensus as to what 
consequences can be attached if it is established that a ship is indeed without nationality. 
According to one view only vessels in possession of a nationality enjoy the freedom of 
navigation and a flagless ship enjoys no protection.158 Others point out that different 
connecting factors for the exercise of jurisdiction ver the ship need to be taken into 
consideration such as the nationality of the owner or the passengers on board.159 Article 110 
UNCLOS has nonetheless served as the legal basis upon which Member States’ ships during 
joint operations have intercepted boats suspected of carrying irregular migrants.160  
 Article 8(1) of the Palermo Protocol on Migrant Smuggling states that “[a] State Party 
that has reasonable grounds to suspect that a vessel that is flying its flag or claiming its 
registry, that is without nationality or that, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show a 
flag, is in reality of the nationality of the State Party concerned is engaged in the smuggling of 
migrants by sea may request the assistance of other S ates Parties in suppressing the use of the 
vessel for that purpose.”161 It continues in Article 8(7) that “[a] State Party that has reasonable 
grounds to suspect that a vessel is engaged in the smuggling of migrants by sea and is without 
nationality or may be assimilated to a vessel withou  nationality may board and search the 
vessel”. If evidence confirming the suspicion is found, that State Party shall take appropriate 
                                                
158 Lauterpacht, H. (Ed.), Oppenheim’s International Law (London, Longmans, 1948), 546. See the Ruling of the 
Privy Council in Naim-Molvan v Attorney General for Palestine [1948] AC 351.  
159 Shearer, I. (Ed.), O’Connell’s The International Law of the Sea (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), 755-757 
and Churchill, R. and Lowe, A., The Law of the Sea (Manchester, Manchester University Press, 1999), 214.  
160 Council Programme of measures to combat illegal immigration across the maritime borders of the European 
Union (Council Document 13791/03), 6. Interception is understood as any action taken against a vessels 
suspected of carrying irregular migrants. Note thatere is no definition of interception in international law. The 
UNCHR Executive Committee has given the following, very broad description: interception is one of the 
measures employed by States to:  
i. prevent embarkation of persons on an international journey; 
ii.  prevent further onward international travel by persons who have commenced their journey; or 
iii.  assert control of vessels where there are reasonable grounds to believe the vessel is transporting persons 
 contrary to international or national maritime law;  
where, in relation to the above, the person or persons do not have the required documentation or valid permission 
to enter; and that such measures also serve to protect the lives and security of the travelling public as well as 
persons being smuggled or transported in an irregular manner”: Conclusion on Protection Safeguards in 
Interception Measures. (No 97 (LIV) - 2003). 
161 Palermo Protocol on Smuggling, supra note 56. Emphasis added. 
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measures in accordance with relevant domestic and internatio l law. The extent of the rights 
that this article confers on the intervening state r  however not entirely clear. The 
phraseology “suppressing the use of the vessel” or “take appropriate measures” seem to imply 
the possible use force. This must however be a means of last resort and will be subject to the 
requirement of necessity and proportionality.162 It must in any case be doubted whether this 
article can provide a solid legal basis for the exercis  of jurisdiction over the people on board 
the vessel.  
 Article 3(a) of the Protocol defines smuggling as “the procurement, in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into 
a State Party of which the person is not a national r  permanent resident.” Consequently, the 
act of smuggling does not require the actual illegal entry of the person being smuggled. This 
could lead to questions of evidence before the natio l courts.163 Some Member States, such 
as Italy, do not interfere with vessels suspected of carrying irregular migrants until they have 
entered the territorial waters.164 Others such as France have made provision in their national 
laws granting them jurisdiction over ships on the High Seas which are bound for their 
territory, or that of other Schengen Member States, with the purpose of disembarking its 
passengers irregularly.165 Spain in its Criminal Code has included irregular migration in the 
list of offences covered by universal jurisdiction.166 Member States may however be reluctant 
to exercise this jurisdiction, since although they may be eager to prosecute the smugglers, 
they are much less willing to take responsibility for the people on board the vessel.167  
                                                
162 Here the leading cases are The I’m Alone (RIAA Vol. III (1935), 1609) and Red Crusader (35 ILR (1962), 
485). 
163 See however the ruling of the Spanish Tribunal Supremo (Penal Section), No. 618/2007, 26 June 2007, 4-5, 
which without much motivation stated that an intercepted cayuco, a traditional boat commonly used by irregular 
migrants destined for the Canary Islands, was “undobtedly” heading for Spanish territory and that its purpose to 
enter illegally was “evident.” 
164 Until entry into the territorial waters a vessel suspected of carrying irregular migrants will be followed 
unnoticed: Article 5(3), Decree of 14 July 2003, supra note 156. 
165 Article 12, Loi No. 2005-371 modifiant certaines dispositions législatives relatives aux modalités de 
l’exercice par l’Etat de ses pouvoirs de police de mer, JORF No 95, 23 April 2005, amending Title III of Loi No 
94-589 relative aux modalités de l’exercice par l’Etat de ses pouvoirs de contrôle en mer, JORF No. 163, 16 July 
1994, 10244, see Article 22. This can be compared to the approach adopted in USA law in relation to the
trafficking of drugs destined for the USA: Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act 1986, 46 USCA §1903. 
166 Article 2, Ley Orgánica No. 13/2007 para la persecución extraterritorial del tráfico ilegal o la inmigración 
clandestina de personas, BOE No 278, 20 November 2007, 47334 amending the Ley Orgánica 6/1985 del Poder 
Judicial, BOE No 157, 2 July 1985, 20632, see Article 4(g). 
167 A similar situation has arisen in the context of the fight against piracy off the coast of Somalia. States have 
been hesitant to exercise jurisdiction over pirates for fear of having to deal with asylum claims by suspected 
pirates or of not being able to return the pirates to Somalia after they have served their penalty. ‘Pirates can claim 
UK asylum’ (The Times, 13 April 2008). There have been calls to set up an International Tribunal for Piracy: 
‘High time for piracy tribunal, experts say’ (NRC Handelsblad/International, 20 April 2009).  
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 Member States’ responsibility would entail the processing of any asylum claim put 
forward and the return of others. Having committed no other offence than irregularly crossing 
a Member State’s border, migrants can be detained for a limited period of time only, after 
which they have to be either returned or released. In Spain this has been 40 days and many of 
the irregular migrants that have arrived in the Canary Island have been issued with a 
deportation order and transferred to mainland Spain, where they have disappeared in the 
shadow economy.168 In Malta detention can be up to 18 months, however once finally 
released the possibilities for irregular migrants to be absorbed into the small island’s informal 
economy are very limited.169 The “Returns Directive” sets the limit for detention for the 
purpose of removal at six months, however Member States may choose not to apply the 
directive to people who have been refused entry at the border or who are apprehended or 
intercepted in connection with the irregular crossing of the external borders.170 
 It is not entirely clear to what extent the Member States engage in diversions of 
vessels on the High Seas.171 Frontex’s standpoint has always been that during joint operations 
no diversions take place, although some of the Agency’s staff in more informal discussions 
have advocated such an approach. Reports by human rights organisations indicate that the 
border guard authorities of a number of Member States do actively divert ships carrying 
migrants and asylum seekers.172 This practice entails not only a real risk to the lif  and safety 
of the passengers on board these often unseaworthy ships, but as regards possible asylum 
seekers on board, it also risks violating the right to claim asylum and the prohibition of 
refoulement. 
 
                                                
168 ‘Illegal migrants “dumped on city streets” in Spain’ (The Telegraph, 28 August 2006). A planned reform of 
Spain’s immigration law proposes to extend this period to 60 days, with a possible extension of 10 days in 
exceptional circumstances, which would include the not very exceptional situation in which there are delays in 
the return procedure (Article 56, Anteproyecto del L y de Reforma de la Ley Orgánica 4/2000 de Derechos y 
Libertades de los Extranjeros en España y su Integración Social). 
169 See also ‘UN experts express concern at length of custody for illegal migrants in Malta’ (UN News Centre, 29 
January 2009). In fact Malta is hardly ever the preferr d destination of irregular migrants due to its strict rules on 
irregular migration, long detention periods, small absorption capacity and limited possibilities to act s a gateway 
to the EU. 
170 Article 2(2), Directive 2008/115/EC on common stand rds and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country, OJ 2008, L 348/98 (“Returns Directive”). 
171 Diversion is used here in the meaning of  diverting the course of a ship back to its point of departure or 
another third country, through the use of force or threat thereof. 
172 Proasyl, ‘“The truth may be bitter, but it must be told”: The Situation of Refugees in the Aegean and the 
Practices of the Greek Coast Guard’ (Frankfurt am Main, October 2007). French law seems to explicitly al ow 
for diversions in Article 21(II) of Loi No. 94-589, supra note 165.  
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5.3 Joint Operations  in the Territorial Waters of Third Countries 
 
Because of the legal difficulties of intervention o the High Seas, Member States are 
increasingly focussing on cooperation with third countries, concluding agreements that allow 
them to patrol the territorial waters of third countries from whose coasts immigrant boats 
depart.173  
 Frontex joint operations in third country territoral waters underline once more the 
continuing importance of Member States’ bilateral relations with third countries. Frontex as 
such does not have any working arrangements in place which allow for joint operations in 
third country territorial waters. Rather, where joint operations of this kind have taken place, 
the legal basis for these operations have been bilatera  agreements between a Member State 
and the third country in question. The Commission Communication on the reinforcement of 
the Southern Maritime Borders suggests that regional agreements be concluded to “define the 
right of surveillance”, avoiding the need for agreements for each individual operation.”174  
 Often, the Member States’ bilateral agreements are not really international agreements. 
Rather they are non-binding Memoranda of Understanding between the ministries of the 
interior. This means that they escape parliamentary sc utiny in the Member States. Frontex, 
after initially denying that it was in possession of the agreements of Spain with Mauritania 
and Senegal which formed the legal basis for the so-called Hera Operations coordinated by 
Frontex in the coastal waters of these countries, ha  denied access to the text of these 
agreements after consultation with the Spanish authorities.175 Only with Cape Verde does 
Spain has a fully fledged bilateral agreement in place that allows for joint patrols in the 
territorial waters of this island state.176 Article 6(2) of this Agreement specifically refers to the 
possibility of patrols being integrated in the context of Frontex joint operations. It is important 
to note that the patrols are carried out in cooperation with Cape Verde. Article 3(1)(b) clearly 
states that where patrols are carried out with Spanish assets the effective presence of a Cape 
Verdean official is compulsory. This latter option resembles the so-called “ship rider 
                                                
173 See the introductory comment above by former Italian Minister of the Interior Guiliano Amato, supra note 1. 
174 COM(2006) 733 final, supra note 111, 10. 
175 From press sources it follows that a number of different “Memoranda of Cooperation” between the Spanish 
and Senegalese Ministries of the Interior have been th  basis of the Hera operations. A first one dates back to 
August 2006, a second was agreed in September 2006 followed by a Joint Declaration in December 2006 and the 
Prolongation of this previous agreement in May 2008. A first Memorandum of Cooperation between the Spanish 
and Mauritanian Ministries of the Interior also dates back to August 2006. 
176 Acuerdo entre España y Cabo Verde sobre vigilancia conjunta de los espacios marítimos bajo soberanía y 
jurisdicción de Cabo Verde, BOE No 136, 5 June 2009, 47545. 
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agreements”, which are a common feature in the USA’s fight against drugs trafficking in the 
Caribbean.177 Officers from Senegal and Mauritania have also been pr sent on the Member 
States’ vessels during the Hera operations.178  
 Italy has also been very active in negotiating operational cooperation arrangements 
with third countries. Throughout the 1990s the country experienced considerable inflows 
across the Adriatic of irregular migrants departing from the Albanian coasts. In 1997 it 
concluded a number of agreements with Albania which allowed the Italian coast guard to 
effectively impose a naval blockade in Albanian terri o ial waters and to act in international 
waters against any vessel “flying the Albanian flag or of ships anyhow ‘connected’ with the 
Albanian State.”179 Not unlike the Spanish government, the Italian government has 
systematically refused to publish most of the treaties and technical agreements that form the 
basis for operational cooperation.180  
 In accordance with Article 19(1) of the 2008 Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation Italy and Libya are to reinforce their cooperation on irregular migration, referring 
back to an earlier Agreement of 13 December 2000, and in particular the implementing 
Protocol on Cooperation in the Fight against Irregular Migration between Italy and Libya, 
concluded on 29  December 2007.181 Article 2 of the Protocol foresees in joint Italian nd 
Libyan patrols in Libyan territorial waters, as well as international waters, whilst Article 3 
expresses Italy’s intention to provide Libya with is own patrol vessels.  
 From the point of view of public international law an international agreement is not a 
prerequisite for the patrol of one State in the territorial waters of another; the consent of the 
coastal state, being sovereign over its territorial w ters, suffices. The question of legality of 
patrols in the territorial waters of third countries is therefore one for the Member States’ 
domestic legal order and - in relation to the coordinating activities of Frontex – for the 
Community legal order. Although it is clear that the SBC cannot find application in third 
country territory, Article 14 of the Frontex Regulation could provide the legal basis for the 
Agency’s coordinating activities, although only if the category “matters covered by its 
                                                
177 Byers, M., ‘Policing the High Seas: the Proliferation Security Initiative, 98 AJIL 3 (2004), 538-539. 
178 ‘HERA 2008 and NAUTILUS 2008 Statistics’ (Frontex News Release, 17 February 2009). 
179 Pastore, F., ‘Conflicts and Migrations: A Case Study on Albania (Rome, CeSPI Occasional Paper, January 
1998), 9.   
180 The legalitly of this practice is questioned by Favilli, C., ‘Quali modalità di conclusione degli accordi 
internazionali in materia di immigrazione?’, 88 RDI 1 (2005), 160-161. 
181 Trattato di amicizia, partenariato e cooperazione, supra note 109; Accordo tra il Governo Italiano e Libia, per 
la collaborazione nella lotta al terrorismo, alla criminalitá organizzata, al traffico illegale di stupefacenti e di 
sostanze psicotrope ed all'immigrazione clandestina (GU No. 111, 15 May 2003). The Protocol has not been 
published. 
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activities” is interpreted broadly, so as to include extra-territorial border surveillance and they 
are considered necessary for the fulfilment of the Ag ncy’s tasks. 
  
5.4 Rescue of Life at Sea 
 
Two factors complicate the legal framework sketched above. The first factor stems from the 
fact that many of the boats that are used for irregular migration are unseaworthy and/or 
overloaded and as a result are at risk of perishing at sea. This brings into play the international 
rules on search and rescue at sea, which apply irrespective of the jurisdictional maritime zone 
in which the boat finds itself. The obligation to render assistance to save life at sea is laid 
down in Article 98 UNCLOS and further worked out in the 1974 Convention on Safety of 
Life at Sea (SOLAS Convention) and the 1979 Search and Rescue Convention (SAR 
Convention). This obligation applies to all ships at sea, so also to Member States’ assets 
participating in Frontex joint operations. However, SAR operations as such are not only 
outside the scope of Frontex’s competences, they ar outside the scope of competence of the 
EC/EU. If in the course of a Frontex joint operation a search and rescue (SAR) situation 
arises, the coordination is taken over by the Rescue Coordination Centre of the country 
responsible for the Search and Rescue Region (SRR) in which the persons in distress are 
located.    
 One problem with the SAR regime is that there is no u iform interpretation of the 
rules contained in the Conventions. First, there is no clear definition of “distress”, the 
assessment of which is left to the ship master. Some Member States, such as Malta, do not 
consider a ship to be in distress unless there is a call for help and there is immediate danger to 
life and safety of persons on board. Other Member States, like Italy, will “forcibly” rescue 
passengers aboard unseaworthy ships, taking into acc unt the likelihood that such a vessel 
will eventually be in need of salvation. These differing interpretations have hindered the 
drawing up of operational plans for Frontex joint operations taking place in the SRR of Malta, 
in which Italy has participated. As a result, Italy nd Malta have applied the SAR regime each 
in accordance with its own different definition of distress.  
 Another complication relates to the responsibility for disembarkation. On more than 
one occasion have coastal states refused the disembarkation of people rescued at sea, 
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unwilling to take the responsibility for asylum requests or return procedures.182 To tackle this 
problem amendments to the SAR and SOLAS Convention were adopted. They entered into 
force on 1 July 2006, with two EU Member States, Finland and Malta, objecting.183 Article 
4.1-1 SOLAS, as amended, provides that: 
 
 “The Contracting Government responsible for the search and rescue region in which such 
assistance is rendered shall exercise primary responsibility for ensuring such co-ordination 
and co-operation occurs, so that survivors assisted ar  isembarked from the assisting ship and 
delivered to a place of safety, taking into account the particular circumstances of the case and 
guidelines developed by the [IMO].”  
 
Article 3.1.9 SAR, as amended, is drafted in identical terms.184 The purpose of the 
amendments is to ensure that in each situation a place of safety is provided within a 
reasonable time.185 The responsibility to ensure that a place of safety is provided, falls on the 
Contracting Party responsible for the SRR in which the persons were rescued, which however 
does not mean that it is under an obligation to disembark survivors in its territory. Malta has 
argued that the nearest port of safety should be taken as a central concept.186 As Malta has 
argued, the current rules are unclear as to the responsibilities of Contracting Parties who are 
not responsible for the SRR in which the rescue has taken place, but who are geographically 
close by.187 Considering the enormous breath of the Maltese SRRone can easily understand 
Malta’s stance. An additional problem is caused by the fact that many rescue operations occur 
in the SRR of Libya, which although a party to the SAR Convention, has not effectively 
implemented it.188  
 Whilst Libya has so far refused to assume its obligations under the SAR convention, 
Mauritania and Senegal have agreed to accept people rescued in the Senegalese SRR. This 
                                                
182 Most (in)famous is the Tampa case in which Australia refused a ship carrying rescued Afghan asylum seekers 
to dock: ‘Australia defiant in refugee standoff’ (BBC News, 31 August 2001).  
183 MSC Resolutions 153(78) and 155(78), MSC 78/26/Add. 1, Annex 3 and 5 respectively. 
184 The ‘Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at sea’ were adopted together with the Amendments: 
Resolution MSC Resolution 167(78), MSC 78/26/Add.2, Annex 34. 
185 Defined in Point 6.12 of the Guidelines, ibid., as “a location where rescue operations are considered to 
terminate. It is also a place where the survivors. safety of life is no longer threatened and where their basic 
human needs (such as food, shelter and medical needs) can be met. Further, it is a place from which 
transportation arrangements can be made for the survivors. next or final destination. 
186 See the comments submitted by Malta to the IMO Sub-Committee on the Flag State, 27 February 2009. 
187 This resulted for instance in a four-day diplomatic stand-off between Malta and Italy over the responibility 
for the irregular migrants rescued by a Turkish vessel, the Pinar, close to Lampedusa, yet in the Maltese SRR: 
‘Italy takes in stranded migrants’ (BBC News, 19 April 2009). 
188 This led Malta to refuse a Spanish trawler who hadrescued a group of Eritrean migrants in the Libyan SRR, 
to dock. Eventually different Member States, including Malta and Spain, took in migrants: ‘Malta migrants 
allowed on shore’ (BBC News, Friday 21 July 2006). 
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has in great part contributed to the success of Frontex operations in the Atlantic.189 Quite 
cynically one could argue that in the Atlantic the SAR regime has functioned as a means of 
concealed diversion. However, the state of the vessels used for the crossing to the Canary 
Islands seems to justify their interception, as should be the case in the Mediterranean. In the 
previous chapter we have already noted how the responsibility for people taken on board in 
the course of joint operations is a point of concer and contention amongst the Member States 
participating in a joint operation; the availability of a third country place of safety should not 
however be allowed to determine whether or not to engage in a SAR operation. 
  The disagreement on the interpretation of “distress” and on the rules for 
disembarkation has had as a consequence that Member Stat s participating in joint operations 
have assumed responsibility for persons rescued in the SRR of other Member States or even 
third countries. One could wonder to what extent Malta (and Finland for that matter) are 
under a Community obligation to accept the amendments to the SAR and SOLAS 
Conventions agreed by the other Member States. The ECJ in its early Kramer judgment held 
that Member States are not only obliged not to enter i o any commitment which could hinder 
the Community in carrying out its tasks, but imposed also a positive obligation to proceed by 
common action in international forums covering issues of Community competence.190 In the 
IMO Case the Court held that a Member State cannot take initiatives within an international 
organisation which are likely to affect Community rules adopted for the attainment of Treaty 
objectives.191 In both cases however, the Member States involved w re acting in an area of 
exclusive Community competence. Not only is it unclear to what extent the external 
competence for the management of the external borders has become exclusive; the SAR 
amendments relate to life and safety at sea, an area outside EC competence, which only 
indirectly hinders the implementation of the Community policy for the management of the 
external borders. 
 In fact the successful operation of the SAR regime s under considerable pressure. 
According to Frontex officials, migrants repeatedly create SAR situations themselves in order 
to secure a “safe passage”.192 More importantly, recurring disagreement over the 
disembarkation of rescued migrants may disincline ship masters to come to the rescue. The 
                                                
189 Mauritania does not have its own SRR, but accepts people rescued in its territorial waters and contiguous 
zone. 
190 Joined Cases 3, 4 and 6/76, Kramer [1976] ECR 1279, paras 44-45. 
191 Case C-45/07, Commission v. Greece (IMO) [2009], ECR I-0000, nyr, paras 29-30.  
192 Informal discussions with members of the Frontex staff. 
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prosecution for human smuggling of shipmasters who claim to have engaged in a SAR 
operation is another discouraging factor.193    
 
5.5 Rules on Asylum  
 
The second factor complicating the legal framework results from the “mixed” character of 
migration flows across the EU’s southern maritime border, meaning that amongst irregular 
migrants there are people who have well-founded claims for asylum or are entitled to some 
other form of international protection.194 This brings into play a second set of obligations, 
namely the rules on asylum and international protections and in particular the obligation of 
non-refoulement.195 These rules may apply simultaneously to the rules on SAR.196  
 Within the territorial sea of a Member State, one could argue that the rules of the 
Dublin II Regulation apply, meaning that this Member State has primary responsibility for 
asylum seekers intercepted in that maritime zone.197 This reasoning seems to underpin The 
Netherlands’ decision to limit the possible participat on of one of its navy ships under 
CRATE to the territorial waters of the Member States in order to avoid having to take 
responsibility for people intercepted.198 In theory, complications could nevertheless arise f om 
the fact that onboard a ship, the flag state has juri diction even when in territorial waters.   
                                                
193 See the case of the Cape Anamur: ‘Italy holds migrants ship captain’ (BBC News, 12 July 2004) and the case 
of seven Tunisian fishermen: Vassalo Paleologo, F., ‘Ancora sotto accusa chi salva la vita in mare’ (Melting Pot 
Europe, 18 August 2007): http://www.meltingpot.org/stampa10973.html 
194 According to the UNHCR “about 75 percent of those who arrived in Italy by sea applied for asylum, and 
around 50 per cent of them were granted refugee status or protection on other humanitarian grounds. Nearly all 
people who arrived irregularly by sea in Malta applied for asylum and some 60 percent were recognized as being 
in need of international protection.”: ‘Mediterranean Sea arrivals: UNHCR calls for access to protection’ 
(Geneva, UNHCR Press Release, 9 January 2009). 
195 There is a growing body of literature on the question of the obligations under human rights and refuge law in 
the framework of border controls at sea, see: Fischer-Lescano, A. et al., ‘Border Controls at Sea: Requirements 
under International Human Rights and Refugee Law,’ 21 IJRL 2 (2009), 256-296; Trevisanut, C., ‘L'Europa e 
l'immigrazione clandestina via mare: FRONTEX e diritto internazionale’, Il diritto dell'Unione Europea, 2 
(2008), 367-388 and Trevisanut, C., ‘The Principle of Non-Refoulement at Sea and the Effectiveness of Asylum 
Protection’ 12 Max Planck YUNL (2008), 205-246; Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., ‘The Refugee, the Sovereign and 
the Sea: EU Interdiction Policies in the Mediterrane ’, in: Adler-Nissen, R. and Gammeltoft-Hansen, T. (Eds), 
Sovereignty Games: Instrumentalising Sovereignty in Europe and Beyond (Houndmills, Palgrave Macmillan, 
2008), 171-196; Weinzierl, R., ‘The Demands of Human and EU Fundamental Rights for the Protection of the 
European Union’s External Borders’, (Berlin, GIHR, July 2007).   
196 The UNCHR and IMO have together published a leaflet for shipmasters summarizing the legal framework:  
‘Rescue at Sea: A guide to principles and practice as applied to migrants and refugees’, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/450037d34.html.  
197 Council Regulation (EC) No 343/2003 establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member 
State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country 
national, OJ 2003, L50/1. 
198 ‘Nederland in gesprek over fregat voor Frontex’ (NRC Handelsblad, 17 June 2009). 
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 Most authors agree that the prohibition of n n-refoulement also applies to the High 
Seas, thus prohibiting the diversion of ships back to unsafe third countries. As we noted in 
Chapter II, whenever a person is outside his/her country of origin the non-refoulement 
principle is deemed applicable.199 In a Frontex joint operation the Member State of the flag 
would have to be considered responsible for an asylum claim lodged on board its ship, save 
agreement to the contrary with the other Member States.200 The question remains to what 
extent a Member State is responsible for an asylum claim that is made from a boat alongside 
its vessel. Border guards have pointed out that in practice this does not occur, because of the 
chaotic situation at open sea. During Frontex joint perations boats intercepted on the High 
Seas have been escorted to EU territory after which people on board have been given the 
opportunity to lodge an asylum claim.201  
 Whilst it was argued that diversions on the High Seas could violate the principle of 
non-refoulement, diversions have become the rules rather than the exception within the 
contiguous zones and territorial waters of third countries. Even if most of these diversions 
take the form of SAR operations, the IMO Guidelines on the treatment of persons rescued at 
sea state that “[d]isembarkation of asylum-seekers and refugees recovered at sea, in territories 
where their lives and freedom would be threatened should be avoided.”202 A national of the 
coastal state will not be able to invoke the Geneva Convention in the territorial waters of this 
state, since the Convention requires the person to have left his/her country. However, many 
people aboard the ships intercepted by the joint patrols do not posses the nationality of the 
coastal State.203  
                                                
199 Fischer-Lescano, A. et al., supra note 195, 267. See also Case 10.675, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights 
et al. v. United States, Report No 51/96, Inter-AmCHR, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. (1997), para. 157, 
discussed in Chapter II. 
200 Goodwin-Gill, G. and McAdam, J., The Refugee in International Law (Oxford, OUP), 246; Hathaway, J., The 
Rights of Refugees under International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2005), 335 ff; Lauterpacht, E. and Bethlehem, 
D., ‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement’, in: Feller, E., Türk, V. and Nicholson, F. 
(Eds), Refugee Protection in International Law (Cambridge, CUP, 2003), 110-111. See also the UNHCR 
Advisory Opinion on the Extraterritorial Application of Non-Refoulement Obligations under the 1951 
Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol, 26 January 2007.  
201 The UNHCR’s standpoint is that the identification a d subsequent processing of asylum-seekers is most 
appropriately carried out on dry land: UNHCR Background Note on the Protection of Asylum-Seekers and 
Refugees Rescued at Sea (Geneva, 1 March 2002). This is also excluded by Article 35(5), Council Directive 
2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ 2005, 
L326/13 
202 IMO Guidelines, supra note 184, para. 6.17. Note that these guidelines apply irrespective of the jurisdictional 
maritime zone. 
203 See for instance the overview of nationalities in the public excerpts of the Frontex Evaluation Reports f joint 
operations Hera III, Nautilus and Poseidon in 2007, which list amongst others Ivory Coast, Afghanistan, Eritrea, 
Somalia and Iraq as important countries of origin (made available to the author).   
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 The EU has time and again reaffirmed its commitment to the Geneva Convention, yet 
by operating in third country territorial waters it de facto emasculates the right to seek 
asylum.204 It must be questioned whether all third countries with which the EU cooperates in 
these operations can effectively guarantee the rights provided for in the Geneva Convention. 
Therefore, whenever an asylum claim is made on board a Member State’s vessel operating in 
the territorial waters of a third country, there should be a subsidiary responsibility for the flag-
state in question. There is little or no information available about the fate of the people on 
board once they have been returned. The fact that this concern is not taken into account in the 
preparations of joint operations at sea may be partly blamed on the one-sided focus on border 
management in Frontex’s mandate.  
   
5.6 Questions of Liability for Wrongful Acts 
 
In considering the responsibility for wrongful acts, such as a violation of the principle of non-
refoulement, the illegal use of force or failure to come to the rescue, we should first of all 
recall the difficulty in holding Frontex responsible for its coordinating activities.205 While the 
RABIT Regulation has regulated the civil and criminal liability of guest officers in joint 
operations and RABIT deployments, it should be realis d that in general there will be no 
guest officers present on the vessels of other Member States. What will be discussed here 
therefore is the responsibility of the Member States acting in Frontex coordinated operations 
under provisions of international law.  
 Whereas the personal scope of the Geneva Convention and thus the obligation of non-
refoulement is limited to people who have left their country of origin, other human rights 
instruments are not. Importantly, these may find application outside the territory of the 
Contracting Parties. Treaties such as the Internatio l Covenant of Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), the Convention against torture and other cruel inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (CAT) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) all contain provisions that are relevant in cases of 
                                                
204 See for instance the reference in recital 20, SBC, Recital 17 and Article 2, Regulation (EC) No 863/2007, 
establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams and amending Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and powers of guest officers, 
OJ 2007, L199/30 (hereinafter: “RABIT Regulation”). See in the relation to the right to leave one’s country: 
Harvey, C. and Barnidge, R., ‘Human Rights, Free Movement, and the Right to Leave in International Law’, 19 
IJRL 1 (2007), 12 ff, who assess it also in light of the Palermo Protocols, upra note 56. 
205 See Chapter IX. 
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refoulement.206 Outside the context of refugee law these human rights instruments may also 
serve to protect other rights which could be violated in the course of a joint operation at sea. 
In the Marine I case, Spanish human rights organisations brought several complaints against 
Spain before the Committee against Torture regarding the reception and treatment of a 
number of irregular migrants who had been rescued in the Atlantic and had subsequently been 
returned to Mauritania. Although the case was declar d inadmissible because the 
complainants could not be considered to have been duly authorised to represent the alleged 
victims under Article 22(1) CAT, the Committee did note that Spain exercised control over 
the irregular migrants from the time of their rescue and throughout their detention in 
Mauritania, triggering Spain’s responsibility under the CAT for their treatment.207  
 Here, we shall focus on the case law of the ECHR in view of its special position in the 
Community legal order.208 In Banković the ECtHR reaffirmed that the notion of jurisdiction in 
Article 1 of the ECHR, which determines the scope of application of the Convention, was to 
be understood “to reflect the ordinary and essentially territorial notion of jurisdiction, other 
bases of jurisdiction being exceptional and requiring special justification in the particular 
circumstances of each case.”209 Nevertheless, as early as 1975 the European Commission of 
Human Rights in Cyprus v. Turkey established that a State’s jurisdiction encompasses “all the 
persons under their actual authority and responsibility, whether that authority is exercised on 
its own territory or abroad.”210 In Loizidou the ECtHR added that the concept is not limited to 
the national territory of the Contracting States, holding that “a state may also be held 
accountable for violation of (…) rights and freedoms of persons who are in the territory of 
                                                
206 In particular Article 2 (right to life) and Article 3 (prohibition of torture) ECHR may be of relevance, 
although it has been argued that other provisions may also come into play: Den Heijer, M., ‘Whose Rights and 
Which Rights? The Continuing Story of Non-Refoulement under the European Convention on Human Rights’, 
EJML 10 (2008), 277-314. See for a comprehensive overview: Gammeltoft-Hansen, T., Access to Asylum: 
International Refugee Law and the Offshoring and Outso rcing of Migration Control (PhD thesis, Aarhus 
University, 2009), 116 ff. 
207 J.H.A. v Spain (“Marine I Case”), Committee against Torture, 21 November 2008, Communication No. 
323/2007 (annotation by Wouters, K. and Den Heijer, M. forthcoming).  
208 The ECJ has held that respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of 
Community law, the observance of which is to be ensured by the Court: Case 11/70, Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, para. 4. The Court has identified the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, as well as international human rights treaties which involved the Member States, as a source 
of these fundamental rights: Case 4/73, Nold [1974] ECR 491, para. 13. The Court has attributed specific 
significance to the ECHR: Case 36/75, Rutili [1975] ECR 1219, para. 32, and subsequent cases, such a  Case C-
36/02, Omega [2004] ECR I-9609, para. 33. 
209 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others (Appl. No. 52207/99; adm. dec.), 12 December 2001, para. 61, 
see also Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (Appl. No. 71412/01 
and 78166/01; adm. dec.), ECtHR, 2 May 2007, para. 69. 
210 Cyprus v. Turkey (Appl. Nos. 6780/74 and 6950/75), ECommHR 26 May 1975, 2 DR (1975), 136. Cf. Lopez 
Burgos v Uruguay, UN Human Rights Committee, 6 June 1979 (UN Doc. A/36/40, 176), para 12.3 and 
Armando Alejandre Jr. and Others v. Cuba (‘Brothers to the Rescue’) (Case 11.589), Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. 29 September 1999, para. 24. 
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another State but who are found to be under the former State’s authority and control through 
its agents operating - whether lawfully or unlawfully - in the latter State”.211 In Issa it 
furthermore made clear that Article 1 could not “beinterpreted so as to allow a State party to 
perpetrate violations of the Convention on the territory of another State, which it could not 
perpetrate on its own territory.”212  
 In fact Banković did expressly acknowledge the possibility of extra-territorial 
jurisdiction, where a contracting state would exercise “the effective control of the relevant 
territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of military occupation or through the 
consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that territory, exercises all or some 
of the public powers normally to be exercised by that Government.”213 It referred specifically 
to the activities of diplomatic and consular agents acting abroad and on board craft and 
vessels registered in, or flying the flag of, that State”.214 Where violations are the result of 
actions of the third country official on board, Member States should not be allowed to escape 
their responsibility. First of all, the official would be under the jurisdiction of the Member 
State of the flag. Secondly, where people are taken on board, these find themselves under the 
jurisdiction of the Member State of the flag, which would put a positive obligation on the 
Member State of the flag to protect the rights of these persons under the ECHR.215  
 In case of the sinking of a boat carrying migrants because of negligence or by 
accident, it is questionable whether the Member State could be considered to have been 
exercising jurisdiction.216 If the sinking were to occur as the direct result of deliberate force 
directed at the boat or in the course of boarding the boat, one would have to assume it did. In 
Xhavara and others, the ECtHR was asked to consider the case of an Albanian boat that 
perished in the Canal of Otranto, after colliding with an Italian warship which had attempted 
to make it change its course. Although the ECtHR held that the case was inadmissible for the 
non exhaustion of local remedies, it clearly stated that the contracting parties were bound to 
                                                
211 Loizidou v. Turkey (Appl. No. 15318/89), ECtHR, 18 December 1996, para. 52. The criterion was also 
applied in Öcalan, which was declared admissible, because “the applicant was physically forced to return to 
Turkey by Turkish officials and was subject to their authority and control following his arrest [by Kenyan 
officials] and return to Turkey: Öcalan v. Turkey (Appl. No. 46221/99), ECtHR, 12 March 2003, para. 93. 
212 Issa and Others v. Turkey (Appl. No. 31821/96), ECtHR, 16 November 2004, para. 71. 
213 Banković  supra note 209, para. 71. 
214 Ibid, para. 73. 
215 For instance, in Osman, the ECtHR held as regards Article 2 (right to life), that a Contracting States is under 
the obligation “not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate 
steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction: Osman v. United Kingdom (Appl. No. 23452/94), 
ECtHR, 28 October 1998, para. 115. 
216 Lawson, R., ‘Life after Bankovic’, in: Coomans, F. and Kamminga, M. (Eds), Extraterritorial Application of 
Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004), 123. 
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protect the lives of those falling within their jurisdiction.217 This implies that the victims were 
indeed considered as falling under Italian jurisdiction, notwithstanding the fact that the 
shipwreck took place in international waters.218 One element to which the Court referred later 
in Banković was that “common jurisdiction was established by written agreement,” which is 
comparable to the situation in which joint operations take place on the basis of bilateral 
agreements between Member States and third countries.219 
 The question of jurisdiction under Article 1 ECHR, should be distinguished from the 
question whether there may be state liability under public international law, invoked by one 
state against another on behalf of its nationals.220 Article 2 of the of the Draft Articles on State 
Responsibility defines an internationally wrongful act as an action or omission which is a) 
attributable to a State under international law, b) constitutes a breach of an international 
obligation of the State. Article 4 provides that the conduct of any State organ shall be 
considered an act of that State. Consequently, Member States could be held responsible for 
the actions of their border guards during Frontex operations. Under Article 6: “[t]he conduct 
of an organ placed at the disposal of a State by another State shall be considered an act of the 
former State under international law if the organ is acting in the exercise of elements of the 
governmental authority of the State at whose disposal it is placed.”221 One could therefore 
also argue that a third country coastal state, using the Member States as its agents to patrol its 
territorial waters, could be held responsible for the violation of the rights of nationals other 
than its own.222 Alternatively, one could argue that the Member States act as agents for the 
Community, triggering the responsibility of the EC under the equivalent provisions in the 
Draft Articles on the responsibility of international organizations.223 One may doubt however, 
in how far the principle of state responsibility would provide the individual with an effective 
remedy for a violation of his/her rights.224 
                                                
217 Xhavara and Others v. Italy and Albania (Appl. No. 39473/98; adm. dec.), ECtHR, 11 January 2001.  
218 Tribunale di Brindisi, Penal Section, Ruling No. 338, 19 March 2005, 29. 
219 Banković, supra note 209, 81. 
220 O’Boyle, M., ‘Comment on “Life after Bankovic”’, in: Coomans, F. and Kamminga, M. (Eds), 
Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties (Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004), 130. See also: Spijkerboer, 
T., ‘The Human Cost of Border Control’, 9 EJML 1(2007), 137. 
221 See also the Comment of the Dutch Permanente commissie van deskundigen in internationaal vreemdelingen-
, vluchtelingen- en strafrecht on the Proposal for the RABIT Regulation to the Members of LIBE Committee of 
the European Parliament (Utrecht, 24 October 2006), which however does not seem to distinguish between th  
responsibility of guest officers during joint operations and State Liability. 
222 ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, ICL Report of 53rd Session, 
A/56/10, 2001, Chap. IV. 
223 ILC Draft Articles on international responsibility of international organisations, ILC Report of 56th Session, 
A/59/10, 2004, Chap. V. 
224 Bradley, M., ‘The Conditions of Just Return: State R sponsibility and Restitution for Refugees’ (Oxford, 
RCS Working Paper No 21, March 2005), 10. 
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5.7 The Search for a Common Interpretation of Rules 
 
As follows from the above, the legal framework for extra-territorial patrols by Member States 
in the context of Frontex operations is characterized by the lack of a uniform interpretation of 
provisions of international law. As early as 2004, the JHA Council invited the Commission to 
“make an in-depth analysis of the existing international law instruments regarding illegal 
migration by sea which could identify the need for p ssible amendments to these international 
instruments to fill legal loopholes.”225 Specific attention was to be given to questions of SAR 
and international protection.  
 In May 2007, the Commission published a Study on the international law instruments 
in relation to illegal immigration by sea.226 A number of fatal incidents in the summer of 2007 
put considerable pressure on Frontex and the Commission to provide more clarity as regards 
the legal framework in which Frontex was to operate. Consequently, under considerable 
media attention, an “Expert Drafting Group on Practical Guidelines for Frontex Operations at 
Sea” convened in Brussels on 8 June 2007, involving not merely Member States 
representatives, but also representatives from the Commission, Frontex and international 
organisations such as IMO, UNHCR and IOM.  
 The group has met several times since, without however reaching agreement and 
eventually disintegrating into a Brussels talking shop. This may not come as too much of a 
surprise. The expert group’s failure to come up with a set of mutually agreed guidelines, 
shows the limits of practical cooperation. First of all, Member States’ representation was very 
diverse, ranging from envoys of the Permanent Repres ntations to lawyers and officials of the 
ministries of the Interior, to practitioners from the various national border guard authorities. 
Secondly, the underlying questions at stake were anything but technical, but highly political. 
Rather than simply reaffirming its commitment to inter ational obligations, the Community 
would actually have to decide how to interpret these obligations, something which was clearly 
beyond the scope of the expert group’s powers. Finally, it was repeatedly pointed out by 
delegations that many of the questions on the table did not belong to the Community’s powers 
                                                
225 Council conclusions evaluating the progress made with regard to the implementation of the Programme of 
measures to combat illegal immigration across the mariti e borders of the Member States of the European 
Union (Council Document 15087/04), 7. 
226 SEC(2007) 691 final, Commission Staff Working Document, Study on the international law instruments in 
relation to illegal immigration by sea. 
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and ought to be dealt with in the appropriate international forums, such as in the framework of 
the IMO. 
 The draft guidelines under discussion by the Expert G oup have informed a 
Commission proposal for a draft implementing decision, currently under negotiation within 
the comitology committee.227 Article 12(5) SBC provides for the adoption of additional rules 
governing border surveillance under comitology. This would mean that rather than non-
binding guidelines, there would be binding rules. The text of the proposed decision is not 
publicly available. Border surveillance is however defined in Article 1(11) SBC as “the 
surveillance of borders between border crossing points and the surveillance of border crossing 
points outside the fixed opening hours, in order to prevent persons from circumventing border 
checks.” Not only does this make it highly doubtful whether Article 12 SBC actually covers 
extra-territorial border surveillance, something onwhich there seems to be a lack of 
agreement also within the Committee, but also the relative openness of the expert group, 
including the involvement of international organisations with expertise in the field, has been 
lost. The adoption of the Decision, seems nevertheless unlikely leaving many of the questions 
and concern raised in this chapter unanswered. 
 In the meantime, Member States continue to play by their own interpretation of the 
rules. Joint patrols of Libya and the Italy under the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and 
Cooperation started on 15 May 2009. Earlier that month Italy declared that it had for the first 
time managed to directly return people to Libya, something it presented as a major success in 
its fight against irregular migration by sea and as an example for a European policy.228  
 From the little information available in the press it appears that two boats were sighted 
adrift about 50 miles off the coast of the Italian island of Lampedusa.229 Italy refused to 
intervene, claiming that it was Malta’s responsibility, since the boats found themselves in 
international waters in the Maltese SRR. Italy was however undoubtedly the nearest place of 
safety and the Member State most suited to come to the rescue. Only after Libya had agreed 
to take the people back onto its territory, were thy taken on board an Italian patrol boat and 
subsequently returned. 
                                                
227 Draft Commission decision establishing rules on the surveillance of the sea borders pursuant to Regulation 
(EC) No 562/2006 of the European Parliament and of the Council, not publicly available (Comitology Register, 
Dossier CMTD(2009)0143). 
228 Italian Ministry of the Interior, ‘Maroni: “Il respingimento dei barconi rappresenta una svolta nel contrasto 
all'immigrazione clandestina”’ (Press Release, 7 May 2009). 
229 ‘Migrants “might be taken back to Libya” – Maroni’ (Times of Malta, 6 May 2009); ‘Libya accepts boat 
people back from Italy’ (AFP, 7 May 2009); ‘Italy Returns 227 Migrants to Libya’ (New York Times, 8 May 
2009). 
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  Although in theory this operation could be cast in terms of a SAR operation, the 
Italian government did not even attempt to do so.230 It showed very little concern for the 
question of non-refoulement or the fate of the people returned in general.231 Both Frontex and 
the Commission have declined to comment on the situation. Italy in the meantime continues 
its practice of diversions despite fierce criticism by the UNHCR and other human rights 
organisations.232 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
This chapter has shown that the external dimension of the management of the external borders 
has continuously gained importance as part of the EU’s overall policy in this field. Action in 
the external domain is mostly motivated by internal security concerns, and in this respect the 
external dimension of this policy field, and in fact the broader AFSJ, mirrors the internal 
development of thereof. There is first of all a strong emphasis on security in the form of 
control measures and only limited attention to question  of freedom and justice. Secondly, the 
external dimension is characterised by the focus on “on the ground” operational cooperation.  
 The external dimension of the Community policy forthe management of its external 
borders takes shape in a number of different ways. A distinction can be made between the 
power to conclude international agreements for the purpose of the management of the external 
borders themselves and the promotion of the EU’s border acquis in third countries. Even if 
the purpose of the latter is often the externalisation of the Community’s border controls to 
third countries, the substantive legal bases for external border management in the Treaty 
cannot as such serve as implied external powers and these must therefore be found in other 
areas of Community competence.  
                                                
230 Note that Italy has a history of returning large groups of irregular immigrants to Libya. It has done so on the 
basis of article 10 of the Italian immigration law (“respingimenti”, i.e. rejection at the border), rather than under 
Article 13 (administrative expulsion), Decreto Legislativo 286/1998, GU No 191, 18 August 1998. See Human 
Rights Watch, ‘Libya: Stemming the Flow. Abuses Against Migrants, Asylum Seekers and Refugees’, 18 
Human Rights Watch Report 5 (2006), 106 ff and Pastore, F., ‘Libya’s entry into the migration great game: 
recent developments and critical issues’, October 2007, forthcoming in: Guiraudon, V., The International 
Politics of Immigration in Europe (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar).  
231 Libya is not a party to the Geneva Convention. Provisi ns on the Geneva Convention do exist in the Libyan 
Constitution and Convention of the Organisation of African Unity, which has been ratified by Libya. See on the 
inhumane treatment of irregular migrants and asylum seekers in Libya: Human Rights Watch, ibid., 30 ff. See 
also the reply of Italian Minister of the Interior Roberto Maroni to questions asked in the Italian House of 
Representatives on 14 May 2009 on the fate of the diverted migrants: 
http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/16/0448_Pezzotta_3-00521.pdf.  
232 UNHCR Press Release of 7 May 2009: ‘UNHCR deeply concerned over returns from Italy to Libya’; ‘Lite 
Onu-Maroni sui respingimenti. Sono illegali. Noi andiamo avanti’ (La Repubblica, 16 May 2009).  
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  The existence of a special protocol on the external borders and the inconclusiveness 
of practice seems somehow to set this area apart from the EU’s general external relations law. 
Although in terms of substantive law-making the Community is increasingly occupying this 
field of Community competence, circumscribing the leeway of the Member States, it is 
unlikely that the Member States will be fully deprived of their powers in the external sphere 
of border management, in particular in relation to bilateral operational cooperation. On many 
occasions the Member States will continue to be in a better position to negotiate agreements 
with third countries, rather than the Community itself. 
 The exportation of the Community’s border acquis may take place under a number of 
different external Community policies, in particular the Community’s enlargement policy, the 
ENP and development policy. It is financially made possible through the Community’s 
instruments for external funding. Since the restructuring of these instrument, the limitations 
that result from the distinction between the pillars of the European Union as came to the fore 
in the Philippines Border Management case, have largely been overcome. They have, 
amongst others, been used for the financing of EU border management missions in third 
countries, such as the BOMCA and the EUBAM. Both of these touch not only upon questions 
of migration, but also of crime control and the Community’s CFSP. 
 Border missions in third countries are the first example of the operational character of 
the external dimension of the EU’s border management, even if admittedly the members of 
these missions do not have actual operational powers themselves. The second example is 
formed by operational activities at the external borders involving the border guard authorities 
of neighbouring third countries. Here Member States’ authorities, but also Frontex, have 
increasingly been involved in the conclusion of non-bi ding operational agreements, which 
allow for intensified operational cooperation with third countries’ border guards authorities.  
 The prominence of the operational dimension is also present in the extra-territorial 
border surveillance on the High Seas and in third country territorial waters. It is clear 
however, that many of the advantages the Member States wish to gain from this extra-
territorial control are offset against the uncertainty of the legal framework under which they 
operate. The failed attempts to provide for more clarity in relation to the legal framework for 
Frontex operations at sea evidence the limits to operational cooperation and the need for 
substantive harmonisation and a common approach in this area. It may well be argued that a 
solution can only be found in the establishment of a truly European burden-sharing system, 
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under which the responsibility for asylum claim and return is divided between the Member 
States.233  
 It should be clear that Member States cannot escap their responsibility to process 
asylum claims and will be fully responsible for possible wrongdoings vis-à-vis irregular 
migrants. Unfortunately, the lack of transparency and the “executive” character of cooperation 
with third countries means that it is increasingly difficult to assess what is actually happening 
at the external borders of the EU. Even if legally there may be certain safeguards available, in 
practice it is very difficult to assess whether these are actually being respected.   
 This brings us to a set of final consideration which are no longer of an exclusively 
legal nature. The Community should in the development of the external dimension of external 
borders management be more aware of the practical implications of its policies. Increased 
cooperation with some third countries has already le  to the diversion of migratory routes, the 
“waterbed effect”, often resulting in longer and more perilous journeys. Moreover, by 
effectively preventing people from leaving certain third countries, the EU is emasculating the 
right to look for asylum, either because asylum seekers cannot leave their country or because 
they are forced to stay in a third country that cannot adequately process their request or may 
refoule them. If the EU is really committed to respect for fundamental human rights and its 
international obligations, it should reconsider on these very practical grounds its cooperation 
with third countries with a questionable human rights record. It should moreover give thought 
to how it can ensure respect for the safeguards contained in the SBC in the context of extra-
territorial controls, ensuring that the rule of law is also respected in the external dimension of 
EU border management.  
                                                
233 A very careful first step in that direction can be discerned in the European Council Conclusions of 18-19 June 
2009 which call for “the coordination of voluntary measures for internal reallocation of beneficiaries of 
international protection present in the Member States exposed to specific and disproportionate pressur and 
highly vulnerable persons,” point 37. 
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XI. Conclusion 
 
This concluding chapter will, rather than summarise the conclusions that can be found at the 
end of each individual chapter, highlight some of the problems that were identified in this 
thesis as regards the EU’s regulatory framework on the management of the external borders.  
 Since the incorporation of the Schengen acquis into the European legal order by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, a true regulatory framework for the management of the external 
borders has been put in place. To a large extent this policy area can now be regarded as any 
other area of Community competence. Not only have competences been fully 
communitarised, the implementation of legislation now also follows the standard Community 
practice of implementation by the Commission under th  supervision of comitology. The area 
in which the Community rules on the free movement of persons apply is increasingly 
congruent with the Schengen area, since all acceding Member States are under an obligation 
to accept the Schengen acquis in full and the EEA countries and Switzerland have ssociated 
themselves with the Schengen cooperation. The intergov rnmental origins of the Schengen 
cooperation remain clearly visible only in as far as the Schengen evaluation on the 
implementation of the Schengen borders acquis continues to fall under the responsibility of 
the Council rather than the Commission.  
 
The EU’s policy on the external borders does however have a number of structural flaws 
which jeopardise not only its efficiency, but also its legitimacy. First, a true borderless area in 
which there is the free movement of people, comparable to a Member States national territory, 
or even the internal market for goods, does not exist. The Schengen Borders Code (SBC) does 
not contain a right of entry into the Schengen territory once a third country national (TCN) 
fulfils all entry conditions.1 Only those persons with a right of free movement uder 
Community law can claim a right of entry into another Member State, unless of course one of 
the narrowly defined exceptions applies. The case lw that preceded the Metock judgement 
demonstrates the reluctance of Member States to accept limitations on their sovereign power 
to decide who to allow to enter their respective territories.2 Metock not only confirmed that 
EU citizens may invoke the right to cross any Member State’s border when coming from 
outside the EU, but also held that TCN family members of the EU citizen do not already have 
                                                
1 Regulation (EC) No 562/2006 establishing a Community Code on the rules governing the movement of persons 
across borders (Schengen Borders Code), OJ 2006, L105/1.  
2 Case C-127/08, Metock [2008] ECR I-0000, nyr. 
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to be legally present on the territory of the EU Member State. The only remaining question is 
whether this right may be invoked at any of the Community borders or only at the border of 
the Member State in which the EU citizen exercises his/her right of free movement.  
 The fundamental distinction between EU citizens and TCNs not only shapes the 
Community’s rules on free movement, but also the way in which people are treated at the 
external borders of the Schengen area. Here an additional distinction needs to be made 
between TCNs that are exempted from a visa obligation and those that are not. Although the 
Commission’s proposal to introduce a registered traveller status independent of citizenship 
would somewhat mitigate the consequences of the distinction between TCNs and EU citizens, 
it would neither change, nor do away with, any visa requirements. The right of TCNs to move 
freely within the Schengen area is limited to three months. The Lisbon Treaty confirms 
explicitly that it is the Member States alone who deci e on the number of persons they allow 
to enter their territory for periods exceeding three months. It is also within the exclusive 
competence of the Member States to decide on requests for asylum. One could argue that 
despite the abolition of border controls, the Member States still very much think in terms of 
nationally defined territories. An example can be found in the Italian “expulsion decree” and 
the existence of the Schengen visa with limited territorial validity.3 Also the nature of the 
(limited) free movement rights granted to certain categories of TCNs under Title IV EC must 
be noticed. The recently adopted “Blue Card Directive” provides for a right of (re)entry and 
stay only in the issuing Member States, with a right of passage through other Member States.4  
 
The second problem relates to the principle that the individual Member States remain 
ultimately responsible for their internal security and therefore also for the management of 
their respective part of the external borders. The SBC only contains general rules in terms of 
the requirements for border guards, the intensity and modus operandi of border controls, as 
well as the organisation of border guard authorities.  
 A harmonisation of these issues is not indispensable for a correct and uniform 
application of the SBC. In fact this could largely be achieved through the exchange of best 
practices, joint training and exercise, areas in which Frontex has competence, but on which it 
should perhaps increase its focus. The Commission at the same time should take a much 
firmer stand, insisting not only on the correct application of the rules contained in the SBC, 
                                                
3 Decreto-Legge, No 181, 1 November 2007, Disposizion  urgenti in materia di allontanamento dal territoio 
nazionale per esigenze di pubblica sicurezza, GU No 255, 1 November 2007. 
4 Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country nationals for the
purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ 2009, L155/17. 
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but in particular on the respect for fundamental human rights and international refugee law in 
doing so. Although the Court is not explicitly precluded from judging on the validity or 
proportionality of the activity of border guards, an rgument against this could be found in 
Articles 68(2) EC and 35(5) EU. It was nevertheless argued that the ECJ should assume 
jurisdiction by analogy of its case law on Member States’ national rules that come within the 
scope of Community law and check the conformity of Member States’ operational activity 
with fundamental rights.   
 So far Frontex has remained a rather weak actor, which has on various occasions 
become the victim of blame-shifting by the Member States and the Community for their own 
failings in migration and asylum policy. The agency has no executive powers and its role is 
limited to the coordination of joint operational activity. During joint operations all assets 
remain under national command, and Frontex is dependent on the Member States’ respect for 
the operational plan drawn up in advance of the operation, the legal status of which however 
remains unclear. Although most of Frontex’s human and financial resources have been 
directed at the coordination of joint operational cooperation the success of these operations is 
difficult to measure.  
 Evidently much can be said for rationalising and coordinating patrols in adjourning 
border areas. Yet, under current practice, Frontex’s joint operations seem to have had little 
added value other than a symbolic one, in addition perhaps to the financial benefit for 
participating Member States in the form of co-funding. If the aim of joint operational activity 
is to achieve a level of solidarity between the Memb r States in managing the external 
borders, this could be better achieved through a fin ncial redistribution mechanism such as 
the External Borders Fund (EBF), support in building up reception facilities, as well as a 
resettlement programme for asylum seekers.5 It has been argued that the tasks given to 
Frontex under the EBF fits its role much better as a regulatory agency.   
 
A third issue concerns the operational character of the management of the external borders 
and the exercise of public authority. The operational character of this policy field sets it apart 
from other areas of Community competence, while it forms, at the same time, the feature that 
it has in common with other competences under the Third Pillar.  
 Because of its operational character, the management of the external borders is 
consistently portrayed as a non-political and technical exercise. The experience with Frontex, 
                                                
5 Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 as part of the 
General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migrat on Flows’, OJ 2007, L144/22. 
 360 
however, shows that it is anything but. Although established in part as an independent agency 
exactly so that it can be insulated from conflicting ational interests, the Agency has found 
itself under strong political pressure from the Community institutions, as well as from the 
Member States. Although it could insist more heavily on its independence, the dilemma is that 
under the Court’s Meroni doctrine it would not be allowed to engage in political decision-
making.6 Yet in its assessment of whether, where, when and how to deploy its limited 
resources, it inevitably has to make policy choices.  
 Furthering European integration and achieving a level of harmonisation through 
practical cooperation is also problematic. If harmonisation is desirable at all, it requires 
important political choices to be made and hence democratic legitimacy which would require 
the adoption of legislation. The current cooperation between border guard authorities within 
the framework of Frontex originated from practical intergovernmental working arrangements 
which were only at a later stage given a legal basis in secondary legislation. Likewise, the 
development of EUROSUR is already under way, before any legislative proposal has been 
made. Even where legislation has been adopted, the very nature of border management is 
operational and does not of itself involve decision making aimed at creating rights and 
obligations on third parties, which makes the judicial review of operational activity difficult.   
 
A fourth issue that arises concerns the quality of law and policy making, which seems 
subordinated to the (political) wish to show decisive action in the fight against irregular 
migration. While Member States are generally very cautious to adopt legislation in areas 
touching upon the core understanding of sovereignty, i  the fight against irregular migration 
they have adopted legislation that is both far-reaching and of limited practical value at the 
same time.  
 The prime example here is the RABIT Regulation, which may be considered a small, 
but important step in the direction of a Common Corps of Border Guards.7 It establishes a 
system which essentially equates visiting border guards with those of the home Member 
States on the basis of Community law. The fact that this also entails the right to carry weapons 
and the potential use of force has, however, largely b en ignored as a result of the more 
controversial amendment introduced by this Regulation, which established a mechanism for 
the deployment of Rapid Border Intervention Teams (RABITs). Although the creation of the 
                                                
6 Case 9/56, Meroni [1957] ECR 11 at 147-149 and Case 10/56, Meroni [1958] ECR 53 at 169-171. 
7 Regulation (EC) No 863/2007 establishing a mechanism for the creation of Rapid Border Intervention Teams 
and amending Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 as regards that mechanism and regulating the tasks and 
powers of guest officers, OJ 2007, L199/30. 
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RABIT mechanism was predominantly motivated by the irr gular migration in the Atlantic 
and the Mediterranean, it has proven impracticable for joint operations at sea, and is yet to be 
put in practice on land.  
 A second example is the insistence on the development of databases and systems for 
information exchange such as the SIS II, the VIS, but also the proposed entry-exit system. Not 
only has the development of such systems been plagued by technical problems, they have also 
been adopted without a thorough assessment of their feasibility, of the benefits that are likely 
to be achieved and of their impact on the citizens’ right to privacy.  
 
A final concern relates to the extra-territorialisat on of border controls. The wish to take 
action against the flow of irregular migration across the Mediterranean and Atlantic has 
resulted in joint operations coordinated by Frontex taking place on the High Seas or in the 
territorial waters of third countries. Not only have these operations been very costly, they 
have taken place on shaky legal ground, removed from the public eye and, most worrying, 
with a lack of attention for questions of international protection.  
 The failure of practitioners to come up with guidelin s for these operations shows 
once more that the management of the external borders does not take place in a legal vacuum. 
In the case of extra-territorial border controls at sea, a common interpretation of the Law of 
the Sea, the Search and Rescue Regime and the Geneva Convention is necessary, which 
requires action from the Union’s political actors. In the meantime, the failure of the European 
Union to do so has resulted in Member States playing the game by their own rules. Italy has, 
for example, started to divert boats carrying irregular migrants to their port of departure under 
a bilateral agreement with Libya. This blatant violation of international obligations shows not 
merely the legal, but also moral weakness of the EU’s immigration and asylum policy.  
 
Despite the existence of uniform rules governing the crossing of individuals of the Schengen 
external borders, most importantly in the form of the SBC and the Local Border Traffic 
Regulation, the broader management of the external borders takes place in a much more 
complex legal framework.8 Border management should be a part of or rather a complement to 
a Common European Asylum and Migration policy, but c rrently constitutes at most an 
incomplete substitute. While the expectations of the EU are high, as are its aspirations, the 
                                                
8 Regulation (EC) No 1931/2006 laying down rules on l cal border traffic at the external land borders of the 
Member States, OJ 2006, L405/1. 
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reality shows that the success of operational cooperation essentially depends on the Member 
States’ commitment to it.  
 The Commission has not abandoned its vision of a European Corps of Border Guards, 
although it is careful to say so aloud. It is now up to the Community legislator to make the 
choice either to continue following the inevitably long and winding road towards future 
integration and the eventual establishment of such Corps or to leave border management 
exclusively to the individual Member States, possibly under a stricter supervision of the 
Commission and with additional solidarity mechanisms put in place other than those based on 
operational cooperation. The Lisbon Treaty seems to provide for the necessary legal basis for 
the first option. Member States should, however, realis  that the conferral of executive powers 
on the European Union has important consequences for the nature of European integration 
and for their position as sovereign states within tat Union. It remains to be seen whether the 
desire to kerb irregular migration could placate Memb r States’ sovereignty concerns.  
 
The main text of this thesis was finished in June 2009, the same month in which the 
Commission presented its Communication in preparation of a new multiannual programme in 
the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ), the follow-up to the Hague Programme.9 
This agenda, already referred to as the Stockholm Programme, is to be adopted in the Autumn 
of 2009 under the Swedish Presidency. As was shown in this thesis, border management 
cannot be seen in isolation from the other policies in EU Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) 
cooperation. Therefore a brief look at the way in which the Commission envisages the future 
development of the AFSJ is in order. 
 In respect of the management of the external borders, the Commission’s 
Communication of June 2009 in preparation of the Stockholm Programme largely recalls the 
proposal set out in its 2008 Border Package.10 It states that an entry-exit system and a 
registered traveller programme must be established. Only in relation to the system of prior 
travel authorisation it argues that its usefulness would still have to examined. EUROSUR 
should be up and running by 2013.11  
                                                
9 COM (2009) 262 final, Commission Communication, ‘An area of freedom, security and justice serving the 
citizen’. 
10 COM(2008) 67 final, Commission Communication, ‘Report on the evaluation and future development of the 
FRONTEX Agency’; COM(2008) 68 final, Commission Communication examining the creation of a European 
Border Surveillance System (EUROSUR); COM(2008) 69 final, Commission Communication, ‘Preparing the 
next steps in border management in the European Union.’ 
11 COM (2009) 262 final, supra note 9, 31. 
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 The Commission recognises the need for improvement in the operational cooperation 
between Member States and argues that Frontex’s operational capacities should be expanded. 
Its priorities are the “powers of command over joint operations on a voluntary basis, use of its 
own resources, and ability to mobilise more easily the manpower needed to carry out 
operations.”12 It is especially the suggestion that Frontex should be put in command of joint 
operations, even if on a voluntary basis, that seems to go further than anything suggested so 
far and would fuel concerns voiced as regards the accountability and responsibility of the 
Community during joint operational activities. 
 A further diversification in the way in which checks are carried out at the external 
borders is implied in the Commission’s notion of separating private and commercial traffic. 
“One-stop-shop” checks at the external borders should further the objective of a system of 
integrated border management.13 The security function attributed to the border comes to the 
fore in the assertion that a strategy for the internal security of the Union should centre around 
three interconnected fields of action: “stronger police cooperation, a suitably adapted criminal 
justice system and more effective management of access to EU territory.”14 An integrated 
border management should allow for “smooth entry into the Union, while guaranteeing the 
security of its territory and the fight against illegal immigration.”15 It is interesting that any 
reference to a role for Frontex in relation to cross-border crime is absent from the 
Communication. 
 The Communication in its explicit reference to “serving the citizen” confirms that the 
Area of Freedom, Security and Justice essentially serve  the interest of the Union and it 
citizens. Migration issues are to remain an integral part of the external policy, with the 
habitual reference to the need to control illegal migration and promote cooperation on 
surveillance and border controls. At the same time, th  aspirations of the “Global Approach to 
migration” are visible in the reference to the promotion of mobility and legal migration.  
 In this thesis, the focus of EU law and policy making in the AFSJ on the external 
borders was in part explained by the lack of substantial progress in areas of asylum, migration 
and criminal law. It must therefore be regarded as po itive that in all three areas the 
Commission intends to take action.  
 In the field of asylum law its goal is to create a common area offering protection and 
solidarity through a single asylum procedure and a uniform international protection status. 
                                                
12 Ibid., 18. 
13 Ibid., 31. 
14 Ibid., 16. 
15 Ibid., 31. 
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The question is to whom this solidarity refers. In terms of a genuine burden-sharing of 
responsibility, the Communication only repeats the very cautious call for a “mechanism for 
internal resettlement” that is voluntary and coordinated and it remains therefore doubtful 
whether this mechanism will be very effective if agreement is ever reached on it.16  
 In the area of migration law the Commission proposes the adoption of a an 
“Immigration Code”, granting legal migrants a uniform level of rights comparable to those of 
the EU citizen. Although, as was noted above, individual Member States will retain the power 
to determine the numbers of TCNs they admit for stays exceeding three months, a uniform set 
of rights should establish a genuine area of free move ent for legal immigrants, which should  
include the right to cross the external borders of the European Union under conditions similar 
to those of EU citizens. 
 In relation to criminal law, the Commission notes that progress has been slow. It 
rightly acknowledges the need for an alignment of national rules in relation to specific 
serious, cross-border crimes. The lesson to be learnt from cooperation under the coordination 
of Frontex is, however, that a substantive body of legislation may not be enough to ensure 
effective cooperation between Member States enforcement authorities. Attention should 
therefore also be paid to the institutional aspects of his cooperation, as well as to the exercise 
of executive powers in the course of joint operational activity. Unlike Frontex, however, 
agencies like Europol and Eurojust will find a specific legal basis in the EU Treaty if the 
Lisbon Treaty enters into force. However, as we have seen the Lisbon Treaty does fail to 
provide an overall constitutional framework for the exercise of executive powers. It will be 
necessary to monitor the development of the Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI) 
closely, in order to see how the exercise of these powers in the AFSJ will develop after the 
eventual entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. 
 The management of the borders, the enforcement of asylum and migration law and the 
cooperation in criminal matters all touch upon the fundamental rights of individuals. The 
Commission seems to balance the unchecked growth of databases containing personal data, 
with the establishment of a comprehensive personal dat protection scheme covering all areas. 
Although legislation protecting the individual is indispensable, a broader discussion on the 
necessity for and proportionality of the collection f personal data is much needed.  
 In the management of the external borders, migration and asylum, the rights of TCNs 
are at stake, rather than those of the EU citizen. The TCNs that are affected by these policies 
                                                
16 Ibid., 27. 
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generally find themselves in a particularly vulnerable position. Despite the almost obligatory 
assertion in EC legislation that any legislation fully respects fundamental rights, the 
Communication lacks specification on how these rights are to be protected. Current Member 
State practice at the external borders shows that in the absence of a common interpretation 
and a genuine commitment to ensuring these rights, affirmations that “[m]aintaining a high 
level of internal security must go hand in hand with the absolute respect for human rights and 
international protection” remain mere lip-service to the EU’s fundamental values. 
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‘Immigrati, deciso lo stato di emergenza, Fini: il governo riferisca a Montecitorio’ (Corriere 
Della Sera, 25 July 2008) 
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‘Europe is kwetsbaar voor Terrorisme’ (De Standaard, 11 September 2008) 
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(Kathimerini, 6 November 2008) 
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‘Test nieuw systeem grenscontrole mislukt volkomen’ (Volkskrant, 15 January 2009) 
‘Albayrak pakt België-route aan’ (Trouw, 27 January 2009) 
‘UN experts express concern at length of custody for illegal migrants in Malta’ (UN News 
Centre, 29 January 2009) 
‘Swiss-EU relations challenged by eastern workers rferendum’ (EUObserver, 6 February 
2009) 
‘Ljubljana “ready” to accept mediation in Croatia dispute’ (Europolitics, 17 February 2009). 
‘Croatia accepts EU help to solve dispute with Slovenia’ (EurActiv, 10 March 2009).  
‘EU proposes panel to resolve Slovenia-Croatia row’ (EUbusiness, 15 April 2009) 
‘Quadro Group report stresses solidarity and burden sharing’ (Times of Malta, 6 March 2009) 
‘Italy takes in stranded migrants’ (BBC News, 19 April 2009). 
‘High time for piracy tribunal, experts say’ (NRC Handelsblad/International, 20 April 2009) 
‘Migrants “might be taken back to Libya” – Maroni’ (Times of Malta, 6 May 2009) 
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‘Italy Returns 227 Migrants to Libya’ (New York Times, 8 May 2009) 
‘Lite Onu-Maroni sui respingimenti. Sono illegali. Noi andiamo avanti’ (La Repubblica, 16 
May 2009) 
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_2005_5159_F_EN_ROYAUME_UNI.pdf 
Commission Decision 1999/352 (EC, ECSC, Euratom) establi hing the European Anti Fraud 
Office (OLAF), OJ 1999, L/136/20   
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purpose of determining, in conformity with the relevant provisions of the Treaty 
establishing the European Community and the Treaty on European Union, the legal 
basis for each of the provisions or decisions which constitute the acquis, OJ 1999, 
L176/1 
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concluded by the Council of the European Union and the Republic of Iceland and the 
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Council Decision 1999/439/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement with the Republic of 
Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway concerning the latters’ association with the 
implementation, application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 1999, 
L176/35 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedur s for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission, OJ 1999, L184/23 
Council Decision 2000/29/EC on the conclusion of the Agreement with the Republic of 
Iceland and the Kindom of Norway on the establishment of rights and obligations 
between Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Briain and Northern Ireland, on the 
one hand, and the Republic of Iceland and the Kingdom of Norway, on the other, in 
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Council Decision 2000/365/EC concerning the request of he United Kingdom of Great 
Britain and Northern  Ireland to take part in some of the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis, OJ 2000, L 131/43  
Council Decision 2000/751/EC on declassifying certain parts of the Common Manual adopted 
by the Executive Committee established by the Convention implementing the 
Schengen Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 2000, L303/29 
Council Decision 2000/777/EC on the application of the Schengen acquis in Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden and in Iceland and Norway, OJ 2000, L309/24 
Council Decision 2002/192/EC concerning Ireland’s request to take part in some of the 
provisions of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2002, L 64/20 
Council Decision 2002/353/EC on declassifying Part II of the Common Manual adopted by 
the Executive  Committee established by the Convention implementing the Schengen 
Agreement of 14 June 1985, OJ 2002, L123/49 
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Council Decision 2002/463/EC adopting an action programme for administrative cooperation 
in the fields of external borders, visas, asylum and immigration (ARGO programme), 
OJ 2002, 161/11 
Council Decision 2004/512/EC establishing the Visa Information System (VIS), OJ 2004, 
L213/5 
Council Decision 2004/573/EC on the organisation of joint flights for removals from the 
territory of two or more Member States, of third-country nationals who are subjects of 
individual removal orders, OJ 2004, L261/5 
Council Decision 2004/849/EC on the signing, on behalf of the European Union, and o  the 
provisional application of certain provisions of the Agreement between the European 
Union, the European  Community and the Swiss Confederation concerning the Swiss 
Confederation's association with the implementation, application and development of 
the Schengen acquis, OJ 2004, L368/26 
Council Decision 2004/860/EC on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, and on 
the provisional application of certain provisions of the Agreement between the 
European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation, concerning 
the Swiss Confederation’s association with the imple entation, application and 
development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2004, L370/78 
Council Decision 2004/861/EC on the signing, on behalf of the European Community, and on 
the provisional application of certain provisions of the Agreement between the 
European Union, the European Community and the Swiss Confederation, concerning 
the Swiss Confederation’s association with the imple entation, application and 
development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2004, L370/78 
Council Decision 2004/867/EC, amending Decision 2002/463/EC adopting an action 
programme for administrative cooperation in the fields of external borders, visas, 
asylum and immigration (ARGO programme), OJ 2004, L/371/48 
Council Decision 2004/927/EC providing for certain reas covered by Title IV of Part Three 
of the Treaty establishing the European Community to be governed by the procedure 
laid down in Article 251 of that Treaty, OJ 2004, L396/45 
Council Decision 2005/211/JHA concerning the introduction of some new functions for the 
Schengen Information System, including in the fight against terrorism, OJ 2005, 
L68/44 
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Council Decision 2005/267/EC, establishing a secure w b-based Information and 
Coordination Network for Member States’ Migration Management Services, OJ 2005, 
L83/48 
Council Decision 2005/385/EC designating the seat of the European Agency for the 
Management of Operational  Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member 
States of the European Union, OJ 2005, L114/13 
Council Decision 2006/616/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the EC of the Protocol Against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organised Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in 
so far as the provisions of this Protocol fall within the scope of Articles 179 and 181a 
EC, OJ 2006, L262/24 
Council Decision 2006/617/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the EC of the Protocol Against 
the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organised Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in 
so far as the provisions of the Protocol fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV EC, 
OJ 2006, L262/34 
Council Decision 2006/618/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the EC, of the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women And 
Children, supplementing the UN Convention Against Transnational Organised Crime 
concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in so far as the provisions of this Protocol 
fall within the scope of Articles 179 and 181a EC, OJ 2006, L262/44;  
Council Decision 2006/619/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the EC, of the Protocol to 
Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women And 
Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational 
Organised Crime concerning the provisions of the Protocol, in so far as the provisions 
of the Protocol fall within the scope of Part III, Title IV EC, OJ 2006, L262/51. 
Council Decision 2007/471/EC on the application of the provisions of the Schengen acquis 
relating to the  Schengen Information System in the Cz ch Republic, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, 
the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the R public of Slovenia and the 
Slovak Republic, OJ 2007, L179/46 
Council Decision 2007/49/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Montenegro, OJ 2007/16 
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Council Decision 2007/511/EC on the conclusion, on behalf of the Community, of an 
Arrangement between the European Community and the Republic of Iceland and the 
Kingdom of Norway on the modalities of the participation by those States in the 
European Agency for the Management of Operational Cooperation at the External 
Borders of the Member States of the European Union, OJ 2007, L188/15 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen  Information System (SIS II), OJ 2007, L205/63 
Council Decision 2007/533/JHA on the establishment, operation and use of the second 
generation Schengen  Information System (SIS II), OJ 2007, L205/63 
Council Decision 2007/801/EC on the full application f the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis in the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Latvia, the 
Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, theR public of Malta, the Republic 
of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic, OJ 2007, L323/34 
Council Decision 2008/119/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with Croatia and repealing Decision 2006/145/EC, OJ 2008, 
L42/51 
Council Decision 2008/157/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with the Republic of Turkey and repealing Decision 
2006/35/EC, OJ 2008, L51/4 
Council Decision 2008/210/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Albania and repealing Decision 2006/54/EC, OJ 2008, 
L80/1 
Council Decision 2008/211/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Bosnia and Herzegovina and repealing Decision 
2006/55/EC, OJ 2008, L80/18 
Council Decision 2008/212/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
Accession Partnership with the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and repealing 
Decision 2006/57/EC, OJ 2008, L80/32 
Council Decision 2008/213/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia including Kosovo as defined by United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1244 of 10 June 1999 and repealing Decision 
2006/56/EC, OJ 2008, L80/46 
Council Decision 2008/213/EC on the principles, priorities and conditions contained in the 
European Partnership with Serbia including Kosovo as defined by United Nations 
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2006/56/EC, OJ 2008, L80/46 
Council Decision 2008/261/EC on the signature, on behalf of the European Community, and 
on the provisional application of certain provisions of the Protocol between the 
European Union, the European Community, the Swiss Confederation and the 
Principality of Liechtenstein on the accession of the Principality of Liechtenstein to 
the Agreement between the European Union, the European Community and the Swiss 
Confederation on the Swiss Confederation's associati n with the implementation, 
application and development of the Schengen acquis, OJ 2008, L83/3 
Council Decision 2008/615/JHA, on the stepping up of cr ss-border cooperation, particularly 
in combating  terrorism and cross-border crime, OJ 2008, L210/1 
Council Decision 2008/903/EC on the full application f the provisions of the Schengen 
acquis in the Swiss Confederation, OJ L327/15 
Council Decision 2009/371/JHA establishing the European Police Office (Europol), OJ 2009, 
L121/37 
Decision 2001/886/JHA on the development of the second generation Schengen Information 
System (SIS II), OJ 2001, L328/4 
Decision No 574/2007/EC establishing the External Borders Fund for the period 2007 to 2013 
as part of the  General programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, 
OJ 2007, L144/22  
Decision No 575/2007/EC establishing the European Return Fund for the period 2008 to 2013 
as part of the General Programme ‘Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows’, 
OJ 2007, L144/45 
Decision No 895/2006/EC introducing a simplified regime for the control of persons at the 
external borders based on the unilateral recognition by the Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia of certain 
documents as equivalent to their national visas for the purposes of transit through their 
territories, OJ 2006, L67/1  
Decision No. 896/2006/EC establishing a simplified r gime for the control of persons at the 
external borders based on the unilateral recognition by the Member States of certain 
residence permits issued by Switzerland and Liechtenstein for the purpose of transit 
through their territory, OJ 2006, L167/8 
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Directives 
 
Council Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the 
movement and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public 
policy, public security or public health, OJ  Spec. Ed 1964, 850/64, 117 
Council Directive 68/360/EEC on the abolition of restrictions on movement and residence 
within the Community for workers of Member States and their families, OJ 1968, 
L257/13 
Council Directive 90/364/EEC on the right of residenc , OJ L180/26 (“Playboy Directive”)  
Council Directive 93/96/EEC on the right of residenc  for students, OJ L317/59 
Council Directive 2002/90/EC defining the facilitaton of unauthorised entry, transit and 
residence, OJ 2002, L328/17  
Council Directive 2003/109/EC concerning the status of third-country nationals who are long-
term residents, OJ 2003, L16/44 
Council Directive 2003/110/EC on assistance in cases of transit for the purposes of removal 
by air, OJ 2003, L321/26 
Council Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunification, OJ 2003, L 251/12 
Council Directive 2004/114/EC on the conditions of admission of third-country nationals for 
the purposes of studies, pupil exchange, unremunerated training or voluntary service, 
OJ 2004, L 375/12 
Council Directive 2005/71/EC, on a specific procedur  for admitting third-country nationals 
for the purposes of scientific research, OJ 2005, L289/15  
Council Directive 2005/85/EC on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for 
granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ 2005, L326/13 (“Procedures Directive”) 
Council Directive 2009/50/EC on the conditions of entry and residence of third-country 
nationals for the purposes of highly qualified employment, OJ 2009, L155/17 (“Blue 
Card Directive”) 
 
Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data and on the free movement of such data, OJ 1995, L281/31 
Directive 96/71/EC concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision of 
services, OJ 1997, L18/1 
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77/36 
Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to move 
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Directive 2008/115/EC on common standards and procedures in Member States for returning 
illegally staying third-country, OJ 2008, L348/98 (“Returns Directive”) 
Directive 2009/52/EC providing for minimum standards on sanctions and measures against 
employers of illegally staying third-country nationals, OJ 2009, L168/24 
 
Framework Decisions 
 
Framework Decision 2002/584/JHA, on the European arrest warrant and the surrender 
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Framework Decision 2002/629 on Combating Trafficking  Human Beings for the Purposes 
of Labour Exploitation or Sexual Exploitation, OJ 2002, L203/1 
Framework Decision 2002/946/JHA on the strengthening of the penal framework to prevent 
the facilitation of unauthorised entry, transit and residence, OJ 2002, L328/1 
Framework Decision 2006/960/JHA on simplifying the exchange of information and 
intelligence between law enforcement authorities of the Member States of the 
European Union, OJ 2006, L386/89 
Framework Decision 2008/616 on the implementation of Decision 2008/615/JHA, OJ 2008, 
L210/12 
Interinstitutional Agreement of 25 May 1999 concerning internal investigations by the OLAF, 
OJ 1999, L 136/15 
Framework Decision 2008/977/JHA of 27 November 2008 on the protection of personal data 
processed in the framework of police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters, OJ 
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Joint Action 96/197/JHA on airport transit arrangements, OJ 1996, L63/8 
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Joint Action 2005/776/CFSP amending the mandate of the European Union Special 
Representative for Moldova,  OJ 2005, L292/13 
Joint Action 2005/889/CFSP, on establishing a European Union Border Assistance Mission 
for the Rafah  Crossing Point (EU BAM Rafah), OJ 2005, L327/28 
 
Regulations 
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Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 on mutual assistance between the administrative 
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Council Regulation (EC) No 2666/2000 on assistance for Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
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Council Regulation (EC) No 533/2004 on the establishment of European partnerships in the 
framework of the stabilisation and association process, OJ 2004, L86/1 
Council Regulation (EC) No 866/2004 on a regime under Article 2 of Protocol No 10 of the 
Act of Accession (“Green Line Regulation”), OJ 2004, L161/128 
Council Regulation (EC) No 871/2004 concerning the introduction of some new functions for 
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to third countries in the areas of migration and asylum (AENEAS), OJ 2004, L80/1 
Regulation (EC) No 648/2005, amending Council Regulation (EEC) No 2913/92 establishing 
the Community Customs Code, OJ 2005,  L 117/13 
 424 
Regulation 1160/2005 amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement of 
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standards for security features and biometrics in pass orts and travel documents issued 
by Member States, OJ 2009, L142/1 
 
Other 
 
Common Manual, OJ 2002, C313/133 
 425 
Memorandum of Understanding between the European Commission and FRONTEX 
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12. Proposals for EC/EU Legislation 
 
COM(84) 749 final, Proposal for a Council Directive on the easing of controls and formalities 
applicable to nationals of the Member States when crossing intra-Community borders 
(amended by COM(85) 224 final) 
COM(93) 684 final, Proposal for  (I) a decision, based on Article K3 of the TEU establishing 
the Convention on the crossing of the external frontiers of the Member States, (II) a 
Regulation, based on Article 100C of the TEC determining the third countries whose 
nationals must be in possession of a visa when crossing the external borders of the 
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COM(95) 346 final, Proposal for a Council Directive on the right of third- country nationals 
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Ministerial Meeting Between EFTA Countries and the EC and its Member States', EFTA Bull. 
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MSC Resolution 153(78) on Amendments to Chapter V of the 1974 SOLAS Convention, 
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ch 
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